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Abstract 
 
This study commences with a critical, philosophical exploration of the ethical theories that 
constitute the normative basis of the dominant business ethics paradigm. It is argued that the 
universal and communitarian notions of the good upon which this paradigm is based, are inadequate 
in helping us deal with the complexities that define the modern day business environment. It is 
suggested that a sophisticated and affirmative account of postmodernism is a better suited 
alternative, as this paradigm is geared towards assisting us in finding workable solutions to our 
problems in the absence of universal truths or homogenous operating environments.    
 
Although postmodernism serves as a useful starting point for challenging the normative basis of 
business ethics, this study moves beyond this broad paradigm in providing an analysis of both 
complexity theory (specifically critical complexity theory), and Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
philosophy. The paradigm of critical complexity presents us with a useful framework for 
understanding, and thinking through the implications that complex phenomena hold for us, for our 
practices, and for our understanding of our responsibilities. Deconstruction (which serves as a 
philosophical example of a complex position) contributes to, and supplements this paradigm. 
Specifically, deconstruction draws attention to the processual nature of ethical decision-making and 
action, as well as to the ethical and political implications that arise from our limited knowledge of 
complex phenomena.  
 
Once critical complexity theory and deconstruction are adequately defined, a close reading of a 
critical text on the relevance of Derrida for understanding business ethics is presented. In 
undertaking the close reading, a number of criticisms against deconstruction are addressed, and an 
argument is made for why a more complex understanding of ethics is preferable to universal or 
communitarian notions of the good – and, therefore, preferable as a normative basis for business 
ethics.  
 
After making the case for a complex ethics, a general circumscription of a complex ethics is 
provided. This circumscription is premised on an understanding of ethics as a critical, provisional, 
transgressive, and imaginative enterprise. The specific implications that such a notion of ethics hold 
for teaching business ethics, and for understanding prominent business ethics themes (such as 
corporate social responsibility, responsible leadership, and sustainable development) are also 
elaborated upon.  
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In conclusion, it is argued that taking cognisance of the insights and implications that arise from this 
study will help to support the future viability of business ethics. This is because a complex 
understanding of ethics can promote the development of robust and flexible strategies, which are 
needed for dealing with the realities of the modern business environment. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie begin met ‘n kritiese, filosofiese ondersoek na die etiese teorieë wat die normatiewe 
basis van die dominante sake-etiek paradigma vorm. Daar word aangevoer dat die universele en 
kommunitaristiese idees van die goeie, waarop hierdie paradigma berus, onvoldoende is om ons in 
staat te stel om die kompleksiteite wat die hedendaagse sakeomgewing definieer sinvol te hanteer. 
Die voorstel word gemaak dat ’n gesofistikeerde en positiewe beskrywing van postmodernisme ’n 
meer gepaste alternatief is, omdat hierdie paradigma gerig is op werkbare oplossings vir ons 
probleme in die afwesigheid van universele waarhede of homogene werksomgewings. 
 
Alhoewel postmodernisme as ’n nuttige vertrekpunt dien om die  normatiewe basis van sake-etiek 
te bevraagteken, beweeg hierdie studie verby die breë paradigma deur ’n analise van beide 
kompleksiteitsteorie (meer spesifiek kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie), en Jacques Derrida se 
dekonstruktiewe filosofie aan te bied. Die paradigma van kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie verskaf aan 
ons ‘n nuttige raamwerk om komplekse verskynsels te verstaan, en ook om deur die gevolge wat 
kompleksiteit vir ons praktyke en ons begrip van ons verantwoordelikhede te bedink. Dekonstruksie 
(wat dien as ’n filosofiese voorbeeld van ’n komplekse posisie) dra by tot, en vul hierdie paradigma 
aan. Meer spesifiek fokus dekonstruksie ons aandag op die prosessuele aard van etiese 
besluitneming en optrede, sowel as die etiese en politieke implikasies wat uit ons beperkte kennis 
van komplekse verskynsels voortspruit.  
 
Nadat kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie en dekonstruksie deeglik omskryf is, word ‘n kritiese teks oor 
die moontlike bydrae wat Derrida tot ons begrip van sake-etiek kan lewer noukeurig ontleed. Deur 
die loop van die ontleding word ’n aantal punte van kritiek teen dekonstruksie aangespreek, en ’n 
saak word uitgemaak dat ’n meer komplekse begrip van etiek verkieslik is bo universele en 
kommunitaristiese idees van die goeie – en dus meer geskik is as ’n normatiewe basis vir sake-
etiek. 
 
’n Algemene omskrywing van ’n komplekse etiek word ook verskaf om verdere steun te bied vir die 
verkieslikheid van so ’n opvatting van die etiek. Hierdie omskrywing is op die begrip van die etiek 
as ’n kritiese, provisionele, oorskryende, en verbeeldingsryke onderneming gebaseer. Die bepaalde 
implikasies wat hierdie idee vir onderrig in sake-etiek en ’n kennis van prominente sake-etiek temas 
(soos korporatiewe sosiale verantwoordelikheid, verantwoordelike leierskap, en volhoubare 
ontwikkeling) inhou, word aangespreek. 
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In die gevolgtrekkig word daar geargumenteer dat kennisname van die insigte en implikasies wat uit 
hierdie studie voortspruit die toekomstige lewensvatbaarheid van sake-etiek kan bevorder. Dit is 
omdat ‘n komplekse begrip van die etiek die ontwikkeling van robuuste en buigsame strategieë, wat 
nodig is vir die hantering van  die realiteite van die moderne sakeomgewing,  kan aanspoor. 
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The real challenge to philosophy lies in how to access the complexity of the experiences involved – 
which is in no way restricted to supplying natural knowledge – and how to access their 
significance… 
David Wood 
 
 
A deconstruction of business ethics would encounter the difficulties of the aporias involved, and 
would uncover many more. Such an engagement is neither to accept nor reject business ethics, but 
rather to take it to its limits. 
Campbell Jones (paraphrased) 
 
 
The intelligence of complexity, isn’t it to explore the field of possibilities, without restricting it with 
what is formally probable? Doesn’t it invite us to reform, even to revolutionize?   
Edgar Morin 
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Introduction 
 
1. Business ethics and the business landscape 
 
The Enron case signifies a historical marker: whereas business ethics received little attention in the 
period prior to the Enron debacle, this debacle (along with other similar cases, including 
WorldCom) ushered in a new era of business ethics. Today there are very few MBA programmes 
that do not incorporate ethical and governance issues as part of their curriculum. Many professional 
bodies (such as the South African Institute for Chartered Accounting) have also mandated courses 
in ethics. Similarly, the institutionalisation of corporate governance has, in some instances, been the 
direct result of major corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron. The enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States of America in 2002 serves as an example of the latter 
point. At face value, the focus on business ethics seems to be a positive development in the business 
world – one that can potentially restore public trust in business dealings.  
 
However, seven-and-a-half years after Enron filed for bankruptcy, the world experienced the largest 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. The reasons for the crisis are complex, but one pertinent 
argument attributes the cause of the crisis to the unethical transferral of risk (in terms of loans, 
bonds and credit default swops) to parties who could not handle it (Boatright, 2009a). As in the 
Enron case, the belief was that everything would work out in the long run, but once systems began 
to fail, the house of cards imploded.  
 
The world is still reeling from the aftermath of the crisis and the recession that followed, and much 
work must still be done in order to determine how we managed to find ourselves in such a situation. 
One thing, however, is certain: the recent focus on business ethics did very little to prevent the 
crisis. Leslie Maasdorp (2010), vice chairman of ABSA Capital and Barclays Capital, reports that 
several sessions were devoted both to rethinking business ethics, and to re-examining the structure 
of modern capitalism at the World Economic Forum, held in Davos in early 2010. She, however, 
did not experience these sessions as very fruitful, writing that: ‘I don't think anyone of us had high 
hopes of hearing new earth-shattering wisdom on this age old question of how to make the 
economic system of capitalism more fair and equal.’ From the evidence, it would appear that, thus 
far, business ethics has delivered a relatively minor contribution to addressing the issues with which 
the business world is currently grappling.  
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For those who take a more sober stance, this conclusion is perhaps not so surprising. The 
institutionalisation of business ethics was, in many instances, a knee-jerk reaction to the business 
and accounting scandals that rocked the business world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. No doubt 
it was implicitly assumed by some that institutionalising ethics would temper unethical behaviour in 
the business world. It is, however, highly debatable whether a university course in business ethics 
(for example) can have the same force as other socialisation and enculturalisation practices (such as 
religion). In other words, it is debatable whether institutionalising business ethics can significantly 
modify the moral behaviour of students. Instead of viewing business ethics in terms of its 
moralising influence, it is much more profitable and realistic to view the goal of business ethics as 
providing sense-making tools and tools of analysis1 that can aid in ethical decision-making in the 
workplace.  
 
Of the most powerful tools at the disposal of business ethicists are normative ethical theories. 
Writing within the economic context, John Maynard Keynes (1953: 306) states that: ‘The ideas of 
economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more 
powerful than is commonly understood… It is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good and evil.’ The same argument applies to the business ethics context: the ideas of 
organisational theorists and moral philosophers are also more powerful than is commonly 
understood, since they constitute the conceptual paradigms and models according to which we 
understand ethics, and the work that ethics does in the world. As such, these ideas warrant attention. 
In the words of Stephen Linstead (2004a: 176): one needs to cultivate ‘a passion for the ideas 
themselves’, since without this passion ‘we are not likely to have either the patience, the discipline, 
the respect or the simple love to discover the potential that they hold for us.’ This study is, 
therefore, dedicated to critically exploring the ideas behind various theories, in order to discover the 
potential that they hold for the field of business ethics.  
 
Before turning to a more detailed description of the goals of this study, it is useful to briefly 
illustrate Keynes’s argument regarding the power of ideas. Specifically, we turn to an example of 
where theory has had a decisively negative impact on ethical behaviour in the business world, in 
order to reinforce the point that ideas can be used as instruments for encouraging not only good, but 
also bad, behaviour.  
 
                                                    
1
 In the context of this study, the term ‘tool’ refers not only to analytical strategies used to promote rational 
thought, but also creative strategies that promote critical self-reflection, moral imagination, and an ability to 
engage in complex thought. For a fuller analysis on the nature of tools, see the conclusion, section 3.   
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2. Bad theories are destroying good practices 
 
In his article entitled, ‘Bad management theories are destroying good management practices’; the 
late Sumantra Ghoshal (2005: 75) argues that ‘we – as business school faculty – need to own up to 
our own role in creating Enrons. Our theories and ideas have done much to strengthen the 
management practices that we are all now so loudly condemning.’ It is important to qualify that 
Ghoshal’s argument pertains to management theories specifically – not normative ethical theories, 
which form the focus of this study. However, he, nevertheless, makes a compelling argument for 
why we should not blindly trust theory, in showing how business schools have – over the last thirty 
years – freed their students from any sense of moral responsibility by actively propagating 
ideologically-inspired amoral theories (76).  
 
His reason for characterising management theories as amoral is because such theories constitute a 
‘pretence of knowledge’ (von Hayek in Ghoshal, 2005: 76) based on the ‘partialization of analysis, 
the exclusion of any role for human intentionality and choice, and the use of sharp assumptions and 
deductive reasoning’ (Bailey & Ford in Ghoshal, 2005: 76-77). Ghoshal (2005: 79) attributes the 
amoral nature of management theories to the fact that such theories are ‘overwhelmingly causal or 
functional in their models of explanation’.  He (77) argues that morality or ethics is inseparable 
from some form of human intentionality.  A precondition for transforming business studies into a 
science has, therefore, been the denial of ethical and moral considerations in business theories, and 
prescriptions for management practices. In this regard, he (79) references Milton Friedman’s (1962) 
denial of any form of corporate social responsibility beyond profit-making as a prime example of 
the reductive tendencies in management theories. Ghoshal (2005: 79) argues that reductionism leads 
to the pretence of science in management practices, and offers the following example to illustrate 
the effects of this pretence: 
 
when managers, including CEOs, justify their actions by pleading powerlessness in the face 
of external forces, it is to the dehumanization of practice that they resort. When they claim 
that competition or capital markets are relentless in their demands, and that individual 
companies and managers gave no scope for choices, it is on the strength of the false premise 
of determinism that they free themselves from any sense of moral or ethical responsibility 
for their actions (79).    
 
Amoral management theories are also often framed within a ‘gloomy vision’ (Hirschman, 1970 in 
Ghoshal, 2005: 77) of human nature. Ghoshal (2005: 76) argues that this gloomy vision is premised 
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on an ideology that ‘is essentially grounded in a set of pessimistic assumptions about both 
individuals and institutions.’ According to this gloomy vision, the main goal of social science is to 
restrict ‘the social costs resulting from human imperfections’ (76). Unlike physical phenomena, 
humans respond to theories, which claim to describe their nature. Ghoshal (77) provides the 
following example from Osterloh and Frey (2004), in order to illustrate this latter point: ‘A theory 
that draws prescriptions on corporate governance on the assumption that managers cannot be trusted 
can make managers less trustworthy.’ It is noteworthy that this criticism has also been raised against 
the draconian legislation upon which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is based. In layman’s terms this 
phenomenon is called a self-fulfilling prophecy. In academic terms, it is referred to as the double 
hermeneutic loop.  Ghoshal (87) concludes this discussion, stating that: 
 
Excessive truth-claims based on extreme assumptions and partial analysis of complex 
phenomena can be bad even when they are not altogether wrong. In essence, social scientists 
carry an even greater social and moral responsibility than those who work with physical 
sciences because, if they hide ideology in the pretence of science, they can cause much more 
harm. 
  
Ghoshal (87-88) admits that he alone does not have a substantive alternative to the ideological 
absolutism that characterises management theories. However, in order to formulate such an 
alternative, he (88) suggests that we – as academics and practitioners – should encourage 
intellectual pluralism. According to him (88), ‘the social sciences, in general, and business schools, 
in particular, have lost their taste for pluralism’.  The only way in which we can, however, ‘temper 
the pretence of knowledge’ is to: 
 
reengage with the scholarships of integration, application, and pedagogy to build 
management theories that are broader and richer than the reductionist and partial theories we 
have been developing over the last 30 years.   
 
3. Is business ethics based on bad theory? 
 
Kurt Lewin (1945: 129) argues that ‘nothing is as practical as a good theory’. From Ghoshal’s 
(2005: 86) analysis of management theories, we see that the converse also holds true: nothing is as 
dangerous as a bad theory.  As such, it is important to critically examine the normative ethical 
theories commonly taught in business ethics, in order to ascertain whether these theories do, indeed, 
promote ethical business practices.   
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The goal of normative ethical theories is to provide guidance in answering the question ‘how ought 
one to act, morally-speaking?’ Different normative ethical theories can provide significantly 
different answers to this question, depending on the substantive and procedural assumptions upon 
which the theories are based. Two important questions are, therefore, what type of normative ethical 
theories informs our teaching and professional practices; and, are these theories conducive to 
helping practitioners make ethical decisions in the workplace?  
 
A central premise of this study is that the ethical theories that constitute the normative tale 
commonly espoused in business ethics (namely, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics), 
are marred by both substantive and procedural problems. This negatively affects the practical 
applicability of the normative tale. As such, the main goal of business ethics, i.e. providing tools of 
analysis to assist practical decision-making in the workplace, is severely undermined by the 
normative ideas commonly propagated in business ethics.  
 
The problem of reductionism, to which Ghoshal (2005) alludes in his critical discussion on the 
ideologically-inspired theories that inform management practices, is also prevalent in the 
interpretation and application of the standard normative tale. All-too-often, it is assumed that 
definitions of what constitute the good can be easily determined by referring to pre-established 
categories (such as the promotion of happiness or the promotion of rationality); or, it is assumed 
that by following certain procedural guidelines, we will come to the ‘right’ answer. Such 
assumptions can only be supported on the grounds of certain reductive tendencies, whereby, for 
example, it is postulated that one’s experiences have no effects on one’s views of right or wrong2, 
and that the past necessarily resembles the future (see Allen, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, many theorists and practitioners also hold a ‘gloomy vision’ of human behaviour 
(Ghoshal, 2005), in that they believe that, when left to our own devices, we necessarily act in our 
own self-interest. On this interpretation, the goal of normative ethical theories is to move people 
from acting egoistically to acting altruistically (see Hattingh & Woermann, 2008). Both the 
reductive tendency, and the tendency to view human behaviour in terms of either other-motivated or 
self-motivated actions, is commonly advanced in business ethics. In this study it will be argued that 
such assumptions cannot account for the complex nature of human life, both in terms of who we 
are, and in terms of how we act. Furthermore, this study supports Ghoshal’s (2005: 87) conclusion 
that ‘excessive truth-claims based on extreme assumptions and partial analysis of complex 
phenomena can be bad even when they are not altogether wrong.’  
                                                    
2
 This example does not apply to virtue ethics.  
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4. Engaging with other ideas 
 
In order to address this problem, it is, indeed, necessary to foster a taste for pluralism (as advocated 
by Ghoshal).  To this end, it is hypothesised that it may be useful to search for other ideas 
concerning the nature of ethics – both in the field of philosophy, as well as further afield. This study 
is, therefore, transdisciplinary in nature, in that an attempt is made ‘to think together’ a number of 
different paradigms in order to both ‘expose, challenge and problematise the underlying 
assumptions that inform conventional theories and practices’ (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 276) and ‘to 
ask new and different questions about what forms of intervention we should pursue’ (Midgley, 
2003: 93).   
 
This transdisciplinary agenda is supported by studies that acknowledge that social systems and 
organisations are complex (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 276). An important set of ideas that can help to 
achieve the aims of this study, therefore, come from the complexity literature (and the literature that 
influenced the development of complexity theory).  Indeed, Peter Allen (2000: 29) notes that, 
within the management and policy context, the science of complexity provides ‘an integrated, 
multidimensional approach’, which leads to advice that can ‘be related successfully to the real-
world situation.’ However, Allen (29) also warns that ‘this may indeed spell the limits to knowledge 
and turn us from the attractive but misleading mirage of prediction.’ This is because – as will be 
elaborated upon in this study – complexity theory emphasises the dynamic, non-linear, spatial, and 
temporal relations between nodes in a system. Applied to social systems, this means that our 
behaviour cannot be analysed in terms of predicable causal outcomes, or in terms of fixed, binary 
categories such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In exploring complexity, one is soon led to the conclusion that 
our traditional moral categories are in need of serious revision, if they are to be successfully related 
to real-world situations. To this end, complexity theory provides us with an important set of ideas 
for rethinking the definition and role of ethics in today’s business world.  
 
A central challenge in this study is to show how a complex ethics is conducive to helping 
practitioners make ethical decisions in the workplace. One of the main ‘benefits’ of the  standard 
normative tale (as it is often interpreted in business ethics textbooks) is that it offers a rule or 
compliance-based model to ethics, in which categorically-binding principles, codified knowledge, a 
communitarian understanding of ethics, or strict procedures are put forward as some of the main 
tenets of these theories. These tenets provide one with the ‘mirage of predictability’, which for 
many, remains preferable to a complex view of ethics that resists institutionalisation. In order to 
address this challenge, this study also draws heavily on the deconstructive philosophy of Jacques 
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Derrida. Derrida is deeply concerned with problems related to the naturalisation of conceptual 
paradigms, and the negative consequences that arise when we view our reductive models as 
corresponding with reality.  
 
Through a close reading (undertaken in chapter five), it is shown not only that a deconstructive 
ethics is an example of a complex ethics, but that Derrida’s philosophy provides a radical challenge 
to business ethics, and thereby allows us to ask new questions that, with time, can lead to a broader, 
richer, and more productive interpretation of business ethics. The complexity theorist, Edgar Morin 
(2008: 56) argues that we must abandon the programmes and solutions that have worked in the past, 
and instead invent new strategies for the future.  Derrida’s philosophy suggests such a strategy, and 
although it cannot lead us back to the comfort of moral predictability, it does help us to ‘unclose 
closed matters’, as so beautifully described by Alain Badiou (2009: 138); and, thereby to start the 
patient, disciplined, respectful, and loving investigation (Linstead, 2004a) of what ethics might 
mean for a conception of business that tries to account for the many complex ways in which we 
relate with one another and with the world. 
 
Badiou (2009: 132) writes that for Derrida, the word ‘deconstruction’ ‘was an indication of a 
speculative desire, a desire for thought. A basic desire for thought.’ In this study, it is argued that, in 
order for business ethics to be a viable field that can positively influence the business world, 
business ethicists must forego their complacency, and engage in thought. Business ethics, as a 
subject and as a practice, cannot be restricted to merely repeating and applying the moral precedents 
established in the history of philosophical ethics. The world is experiencing an increase in the 
number of political, social, and environmental crises, for which our currents tools of analysis 
(including our standard normative ethical theories) are inappropriate.  
 
Indeed, the recent recession revealed the cracks in the capitalistic landscape, characterised by vested 
interests and political power. Many would agree that now is the time to sow the seeds of new ideas, 
in the hope that these may grow, take shape, and blossom in the cracks. In this regard, this study 
could be considered as one such a seed.      
 
5. The way forward 
 
In focusing on the potential that certain ideas hold for the field of business ethics, this study 
constitutes a philosophical work. The business ethics context is referred to in order to illustrate the 
consequences that our theories and ideas hold for thinking about the ethics of our business practices. 
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These consequences are explored in terms of implications for conceptualising the field of business 
ethics, as well as for teaching business ethics.  
 
The study commences in three parts. In the first part of the study – chapters one and two – the 
problem statement (i.e. that the traditional interpretation of the standard normative tale is bad for 
business ethics) is elaborated upon, and an alternative tale (based on the insights of postmodern 
philosophy) is introduced and evaluated. Both these chapters focus strongly on the way in which the 
standard normative tale and postmodernism3 is interpreted in the field of business ethics (and 
organisational studies) specifically. Chapter two concludes with a discussion of the three tenets of 
an affirmative postmodernism that emerged from the analysis, and the implications that these tenets 
hold for thinking about the ethical task. These three tenets, namely that limited knowledge is not 
‘any’ knowledge, that ethics implies choice and performative reflexivity, and that ethics is a 
contextually-defined practice, can also be argued for from the perspective of complexity theory or 
deconstruction. As such, chapter two should be read as a general introduction to the more specific, 
and detailed, discussions to follow. In drawing on critical complexity theory and deconstruction, 
this study moves beyond postmodernism (and the implication that postmodernism holds for 
business ethics).  
 
The second part of the study – chapters three, four, and five – constitutes an exercise in theory-
building, with the aim of rethinking the normative basis of business ethics. Here, it is shown why a 
complex, deconstructive ethics is preferable to the standard normative tale. In chapter three, the 
paradigm of complexity, specifically critical complexity4, is elaborated upon. In order to 
contextualise this paradigm, some of the main influences on the development of critical complexity 
theory are also investigated. At the end of the chapter, the three ‘postmodern tenets’ are revisited 
and explored in terms of the further implications that emerged from the discussion on complexity 
theory. What is clear from this analysis is that mechanisms are needed, which can help us to 
continually challenge and transform our conceptual paradigms (Allen, 2000: 10).  
 
In chapter four, the theory of deconstruction (supported by the Derridean terms of supplement, play, 
différance, and trace) is explained in detail. Here, it is demonstrated that a deconstructive ethics is 
                                                    
3
 There are many different interpretations of postmodernism. In this study, a broad distinction is drawn 
between sceptical postmodernists (who support relativism and positions that verge on nihilism) and 
affirmative postmodernists (who show a healthy temperance in trying to find working solutions in the absence 
of universal truths) (Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 455). This study builds on an affirmative view of postmodernism. 
For a more detailed discussion on the difference between these positions, see chapter two, sections 1 and 
5.2.  
4
 Complexity theory is subject to various interpretations. In this study, the view of critical complexity is 
subscribed to. See the introduction to chapter three, for a brief overview of what this view entails.   
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based on ‘a recursive modality’ or ‘an always renewable openness’ (Wood, 1999: 117). As such, 
deconstruction provides us with an important ‘mechanism’ for continually evaluating and 
transforming our systems of meaning. The recursive nature of the deconstructive enterprise also 
implies that the ethics of deconstruction cannot be captured in categorical principles or rules. It is, 
therefore, not possible to explain the ethics of deconstruction in terms of a number of substantive 
points, since the theory is process-orientated, rather than content-orientated.  A hallmark of 
complexity theory is that it is also processual in nature, in that emphasis is placed on the dynamic, 
non-linear relations between components of a system, rather than the system itself. As such, one can 
interpret the deconstructive enterprise as an example of a complex position. Therefore, in exploring 
the ethics of deconstruction, a number of important insights emerge as to what a complex ethics 
might entail.  
 
Since a deconstructive ethics cannot be neatly summarised in a number of fixed premises, a more 
fruitful way of further discovering what it might entail is by bringing deconstruction into 
conversation with a position that is compatible with the conception of ethics espoused in the 
standard normative tale.  This is achieved in chapter five, in which a close reading is presented of a 
text by the business ethicist, Richard De George (2008), in which he criticises Campbell Jones’s 
(2007) deconstructive reading of the notion of corporate social responsibility. De George’s text, 
however, also launches a larger attack on Derrida’s philosophy, in that he argues that the categories 
made available in Derrida work confound, rather than add to the field of business ethics. Through 
means of the close reading, one is, therefore, able to demonstrate what the ethics of deconstruction 
(which also serves as an example of a complex ethics) entails. Such an ethics provides a radical 
challenge to the standard approach to business ethics issues, such as corporate social responsibility. 
In this analysis the differences between a critical and complex ethics (of which deconstruction 
serves as an example) and an ethics based on assumptions regarding a common human morality 
become clear.  
 
Together, part one and part two serve to show both why the standard interpretation of the normative 
tale does not provide a sound basis for business ethics, as well as why deconstruction and 
complexity theory can greatly benefit the field by providing accounts of ethics that are more 
conducive to dealing with real-world business problems. In part three – chapters six and seven – the 
theoretical and practical implications that a complex, critical view of ethics hold for our 
understanding of ethical categories, will be elaborated upon. In chapter six, the idea of a complex 
ethics is unpacked in terms of appropriate ethical models, the embeddedness of our ethical 
practices, and the critical task (which is characterised as a transgressive, ironic, and imaginative 
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activity). Through this analysis, certain implications arise for our understanding of moral 
responsibility and awareness, tolerance and openness, and ethical strategy development. In chapter 
seven, the challenge that a complex ethics poses for our understanding of traditional ethical values 
is illustrated at the hand of 1) the implications that a complex ethics holds for conceptualising 
prominent business ethics themes, such as corporate citizenship; sustainable development; and 
responsible and effective leadership; and, 2) the challenges and implications that a complex view of 
ethics holds for the traditional understanding of business ethics, and for the possibility of teaching 
business ethics. 
 
With regard to the value that affirmative postmodern ideas hold for business ethics, Linstead 
(2004a) writes: ‘We have scratched the surface, and we have found something – but there is so 
much more to discover.’ By building on, and moving beyond these postmodern ideas, the 
complexity and deconstructive insights developed in this study will hopefully present the reader 
with some small discoveries regarding what business ethics could become! 
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Part I: 
Introducing the Argument 
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Chapter 1 
The Normative Tale of Business Ethics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As stated in the introduction, one of the goals of this study is to critically evaluate the normative 
tale commonly presented in the business ethics literature. This normative tale consists of three 
dominant strands or perspectives, namely utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. These 
theories will be presented and critiqued in this chapter. The critique will focus on the substantive 
and procedural claims made in these theories, as well as on the implications that these theories hold 
for the teaching and practice of business ethics. The goal of the chapter is to draw attention to the 
urgent need to re-evaluate the type of normative tale presented to business ethics students and 
practitioners. In subsequent chapters, it will be specifically argued that, in order for business ethics 
to be a viable field that can have a positive and sustainable impact on the corporate environment, 
business ethicists should take cognisance of the developments in postmodern philosophy 
(specifically deconstruction), and complexity theory (specifically critical complexity). The 
normative implications of deconstruction and critical complexity lead to a more robust, flexible, 
modest, and complex understanding of ethics, which – as will be argued – is more suited to dealing 
with the contemporary challenges facing business today. However, as stated, the focus of this 
chapter is specifically on the standard normative tale, and the practical implications that this tale 
holds for ethical decision-making in business.  
 
The analysis will begin by placing the standard normative tale in context. To this end, the normative 
or prescriptive field of business ethics will be briefly compared with the empirical or descriptive 
field of business ethics. Next, the normative ethical theories will be introduced, followed by a 
critical analysis of the substantive content of these theories. After introducing and evaluating the 
ethical theories, the standard depictions of these theories in the business ethics literature will be 
evaluated. The evaluation is undertaken in order to determine the perceptions regarding ethical 
decision-making that such depictions create in the minds of business students. In the last part of the 
analysis, the challenges that exist in applying these theories in practice are identified and discussed. 
The chapter concludes with some general comments regarding the status of the standard normative 
tale, and the way forward.   
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2. A tale of two cities 
   
At a seminar I recently attended, the speaker stressed the indefinite article used to characterise the 
tale he wished to tell about pragmatism. ‘A tale’ as opposed to ‘the tale’ lays emphasis on the 
myriad interpretations that can be ascribed to any field of study, and business ethics is no exception. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy5, the field of business ethics is roughly four 
decades old. Ten Bos (1997: 1006; 1007), however, contends that the field only emerged as an 
organised discipline in the early 1980s6 with the establishment of the first journal on business and 
organisational ethics (Journal of Business Ethics), founded in 1981. Over the last three decades, 
interest in the field has grown in response to the apparent decline in ethical standards in business, 
and in recognition of the fact that economic relations are premised on normative grounds that need 
protecting (Keleman & Peltonen, 2001: 152). However, these responses have been far from 
unanimous, since, as the field has grown in popularity, so too have the diversity of responses (by 
philosophers, social scientists and management practitioners) to these issues.  The fragmentation in 
the field is so pronounced that some theorists (see Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver (1994)) have 
questioned whether it would not be better to divide ‘business ethics’ into two separate fields.  
 
Roughly speaking, the argument put forth by Trevino and Weaver (113-115) is that academic 
business ethics is divided into a normative/prescriptive interpretation usually offered by 
philosophers or theologians; and an empirical/descriptive/predictive interpretation usually put forth 
by social scientists, management consultants, or business school academics. Whereas the former 
interpretation stresses ethics above business, the latter places emphasis on business above ethics. 
Although one should be weary of an over-simplification of these interpretations, one could state that 
– in broad terms – the fissure between these interpretative categories is marked by a difference in 
meta-theoretical assumptions that guide the theories and norms originating from these disciplines. 
Briefly stated, the normative field is concerned with judging and justifying behaviour as ethically 
right or wrong, whereas discussion within the descriptive field is limited to questions concerning 
epistemology and methodology, and critical faculties are focused on determining ethical yardsticks 
(Willmott, 1998: 79).  
                                                    
5
 See ‘Business Ethics’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-business/ Published April 16, 2008.  
6
 Although business ethics exists as a field in its own right, there has also been a focus on business ethics 
issues in the fields of organisation studies, management sciences, and leadership studies. The reasons for 
the import of ethics in these fields are: 1) An increased recognition of the importance of ethical issues (such 
as equal opportunity policies, disability and ethnicity issues, social cost accounting, environmental 
responsibility, corporate governance, whistle-blowing, ethical marketing, etc.); 2) A cultural or humanist turn 
that replaces blind rule-following; and, 3) A renewed focus on worthwhile ends (as opposed to the mere 
development of social technologies) as the raison d’etre of these studies (Parker, 1998a: 3-4).  
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Despite conflict between these two interpretative categories, Trevino and Weaver (1994: 114) 
contend that, rather than witnessing a collapse in the field, the two streams are becoming more 
institutionalised and entrenched. Indeed, this observation has been confirmed over the last sixteen 
years, since the publication of their article. The house divided is, therefore, turning into a tale of two 
cities! Along these lines, Parker argues that the field is best charaterised by Lyotard’s (1988) term, 
agon, which ‘refers to the wrestling match between incommensurable language games’ (Parker, 
1998b: 284). In the case of business ethics, the clash between the normative and descriptive 
interpretations can be crudely set-up as idealism versus realism, or (in metaphorical terms) the ivory 
tower meets the law of the jungle7 (283).  Below follows a brief (and more academic!) description 
of the characteristics that define the normative and descriptive fields of business ethics:   
 
2.1. The normative field of business ethics  
 
The normative approach – which focuses on what ought to be the case – is interdisciplinary in 
nature, drawing from ‘philosophy, theology, political and social theory, and other self-consciously 
critical inquiries’ (Trevino & Weaver, 1994: 114). Although Trevino and Weaver (114) concede 
that the normative task is not only prescriptive in nature, but also involves analysis and description; 
they, nevertheless, identify the formulation of prescriptive moral judgements as the dominant 
feature of the normative approach. The normative approach is, therefore, ‘unashamedly value-
driven’ (116). 
 
Although the task of formulating these moral prescriptions is not specified by any research 
methodologies (as is the case in the social sciences), there is, nevertheless, methodological self-
consciousness, which individuates to the task at hand, and which can be described ‘by a small 
number of heuristic guidelines’ (116). Whilst the philosophical methodology lacks specificity, the 
philosophical lexicon is well-developed, having been refined over centuries of philosophical and 
ethical study (118). For example, the term ‘ethical behaviour’ refers to behaviour which is right, just 
                                                    
7
 Trevino and Weaver (1994: 113) provide the following two, slightly overstated, vignettes to illustrate the 
attitude that normative and descriptive business ethicists have towards each other. The context for these 
vignettes is a conference in business ethics, where people affiliated with the field of business ethics meet to 
share their work with one another:  
Business school faculty member: ‘These philosophers don’t seem to know much about business. 
Their papers are full of mumbo jumbo that no one else can understand, least of all business 
managers. What does this tell us about management in the real world, anyway? I’d like to be a fly on 
the wall when they attempt to deliver these incomprehensible abstractions to the local Chamber of 
Commerce.’ 
Philosopher: ‘Oh no, a panel discussion by business school faculty on employee theft. Someone will 
probably talk about the relationship between authorized paper clip acquisitions and variations in 
office lighting, holding moonlight constant, of course. Big deal! That won’t improve anyone’s 
character, nor give the genuinely puzzled a guide for moral living, It’s no surprise, though; they really 
haven’t studied ethics.’   
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or fair – each of which, in turn, has its own history. In order to determine whether these terms are 
understood and used correctly, a significant amount of conceptual clarification precedes the actual 
formulation of moral prescriptions or judgements (120). According to Trevino and Weaver (120), 
this meta-ethical task is exemplified in the debate over the ontological status of organisations (i.e. 
are organisations moral agents to which we can attribute moral responsibility and blame?).  
 
Apart from this meta-ethical task, the purpose of normative business ethics is to evaluate the 
propriety of the corporate world, and to prescribe morally better alternatives (120). These morally 
better alternative are encapsulated in moral standards or principles, which are derived from 
normative ethical theories. Standards and principles present abstract, ideal cases, against which real 
actions can be critiqued and evaluated (120). In other words, normative business ethicists, in 
specifying what ought to be the case, are more concerned with the instantiation of a moral principle, 
than with the causal antecedents of an action (120).  
 
Opinions differ as to how moral principles should be applied to business problems, but it is 
generally accepted that normative ethical theories provide us with the tools necessary to undertake 
an analysis and informed discussion of ethical issues that arise in the business context (121). 
Furthermore, opinions also differ regarding which principles should be applied to resolve business 
ethics problems. Generally, however, MacIntyre’s (1984) circumscription of applied ethics as 
containing two elements is accepted. These two elements are ‘context-neutral (i.e. putatively 
universal) ethical theory, and context-sensitive discussions of particular ethical issues’ (Trevino & 
Weaver, 1994: 121). Deciding upon which normative theory to apply to a given business ethics 
issue depends on whether a given theory is more ‘correct’, useful, or well-founded than contesting 
theories (124).  
 
According to Trevino and Weaver (121), the scope of normative ethical theory ‘concerns morality 
as such i.e., a standard of moral reasoning which holds for persons qua persons.’ It is assumed that 
moral persons or agents – who have to make choices in practical contexts – freely and responsibly 
decide whether to act in accordance with the moral standards espoused in these normative theories 
(118; 122). Therefore, because moral agents are rational and autonomous, ‘moral action is self-
explanatory or self-interpreting in character, needing no additional explanation in causal or 
nomological terms’ (119). The explanation for ethical behaviour lies between the dictates of 
morality and an agent’s actions (119).  
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Thus, in a nutshell, one can state that the ‘method’ of ethical theory (as defined by Rawls (1971)) 
involves achieving a ‘reflective equilibrium between theoretical constructions and our considered 
moral judgments’ (Trevino & Weaver, 1994: 122).  
 
2.2. The descriptive field of business ethics 
 
In contrast to the normative approach, social scientists who employ the descriptive approach – 
which Trevino and Weaver (1994: 114) identify most strongly with the functionalist paradigm – 
attempt to elucidate what is the case. Such a goal is premised on an objective view of the world, as 
well as a managerial orientation geared towards stability, as opposed to change (114-115). In order 
to define, explain, and predict phenomena in an organisational context, social scientists make use of 
design criteria and quantitative statistical methods to test the validity of hypotheses. Historical 
analysis, observation, interviews, surveys and experiments are also used as methodological tools in 
the descriptive approach (117).  
 
Compared to the normative approach, the ethical vocabulary employed by the social scientist is 
quite young. As a result, key ethical terms are used loosely, to refer to different things in different 
contexts (119). For example, in the language of the social scientist, ‘ethical behaviour’ does not 
necessarily refer to behaviour that is a priori characterised as good, right, or deserving of respect, 
but can represent any behaviour exhibited by individuals facing ethical decisions (118). In this 
example, the term ‘ethical behaviour’ can be used descriptively, and also accounts for the external 
determinants that impact upon individual behaviour (118).  
 
Most social scientists ascribe to Bandura’s (1986) viewpoint of reciprocal causation, where ethical 
or unethical behaviour is the outcome of both individual and environmental factors, which mutually 
influence each other (Trevino & Weaver, 1994: 119). Social scientists, in emphasising multiple 
determinants of human behaviour, find it difficult to reconcile ethical behaviour with moral free 
will. Moreover, although conceptions of individual responsibility and autonomy are not negated in 
this paradigm, external determinants (such as reward systems, the visibility of business ethics tools 
etc.) are viewed as more interesting subjects of study, as these are factors that can be controlled and 
manipulated (119 -120).  
 
Complex organisational behaviour is described with reference to social scientific theory, which 
‘provides a conceptual basis for examining regularities and relationships that can lead to 
generalizations about organizational behavior – to describe, explain and or predict specific 
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outcomes of interest to the researcher’ (121). Social scientific theory, therefore, forms the 
theoretical basis for managing the ethical behaviour of individuals and organisations. Hypothesised 
causal factors are informed by ‘the social scientific roots of the investigator’ (122) and empirical 
research is undertaken to determine the strength and influence of causal factors (119).  
 
The descriptive approach is empirically-based, and theory is built incrementally and deductively by 
testing hypotheses against organisational phenomena and behaviour, in order to determine the 
explanatory or predictive success of a given theory (123). The extent to which these theories help 
managers to deal with, and predict, ethical problems is used as the criterion for evaluating the 
success of a given theory.  
 
2.3. Evaluating the two fields of business ethics 
 
It is important to again reiterate that the above categorisation offers a very simplistic overview of 
the normative and descriptive approaches to business ethics. Indeed, Trevino and Weaver (1994: 
114) warn that both ‘approaches are admittedly more complex and less unified’ than their 
discussion suggests. Added to this caveat, is the fact that, although the above distinctions are useful 
in plotting the field(s) of business ethics, the fissure that divides these two approaches is also not as 
absolute as one is led to believe by the above analysis, and by Martin Parker’s comment concerning 
the agon. Indeed, whilst it is true that philosophers generally focus on moral agency or abstract 
moral principles as the main determinate of responsible action, contextual factors (as propagated in 
the empirical approach) are also taken into consideration in some of the context-based normative 
theories. Conversely, although the main focus of social scientists is on external determinants that 
influence ethical behaviour, internal determinants (such as locus of control, cognitive development, 
and moral psychology) are also often considered when describing, explaining, or predicting moral 
behaviour.    
 
Additionally, despite the fact that social scientists work with concrete social phenomena, their 
approach is (as stated), nevertheless, informed by the scientific roots of the investigator – be it 
psychology, sociology, management theory, scientific management etc. Although the social 
scientist applies her body of theoretical knowledge to specific field experiments, the initial 
hypotheses are (like with the normative approach) often based on abstract, theoretical postulates 
regarding human behaviour. In other words, because there is no common understanding of what a 
human being is, descriptions cannot be innocent of theoretical prejudice (Parker, 1998a: 2). 
Philosophers do not do field experiments to test their hypotheses, but their reliance on illuminating 
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cases and examples to elucidate desirable/undesirable moral behaviour and principles, also suggests 
that the normative approach is not always as abstract as one is led to believe. Nevertheless, despite 
these warnings, the categorisation still offers a useful distinction for plotting the field(s) of business 
ethics.  
 
In chapter two (sec. 3), it will be shown that the distinction between the normative and the 
descriptive approaches rests on a problematic assumption regarding our ability to justify our 
conceptual models on either epistemological or ontological grounds. However, the focus of the 
remaining part of this chapter will be on the normative approach. One of the reasons for choosing to 
focus on the normative approach is because most business ethics textbooks and courses have a 
strong normative component. Indeed, the business ethics course mandated for undergraduate 
accounting students by the South African Institute for Chartered Accountants (SAICA) not only 
includes a section on normative ethical theories, but also on value systems (SAICA, 2005). 
However, a more prominent reason for focusing on the normative approach concerns the goal of 
this study, namely: to critically explore the ideas behind various normative theories, in order to 
discover the potential that they hold for business ethics specifically (see intro., sec. 1).  
 
3. The standard normative tale: introducing the ethical theories 
 
As stated above, Trevino and Weaver (1994: 118) argue that social scientists often understand 
ethics descriptively. However, most definitions of business ethics are derived from definitions of 
ethics, and, therefore, have a normative orientation. In philosophy, ethics is commonly defined as 
the study of what constitutes right and wrong, good and bad, and what deserves respect and what 
does not. In other words, ‘ethics is the attempt to build a systematic set of normative prescriptions 
about human behaviour, codes to govern everyday morals and morality’ (Parker, 1998a: 1). From 
this definition it follows that the question ‘Is it ethical?’ represents an attempt ‘to render a matter 
accountable by emphasizing or privileging the relevance of moral criteria rather than some other 
measure, such as feasibility or effectiveness’ (Willmott, 1998: 76).  Business ethicists extend and 
apply this definition to human conduct in the business context (Shaw, 2008: 5). De George (2006: 
23) provides an even broader definition of business ethics, stating that the field as such ‘is defined 
by the interaction of ethics and business. Business ethics is as national, international, or global as 
business itself, and no arbitrary geographical boundaries limit it.’ If one concedes that every 
business decision has a normative dimension, then it stands to reason that the topics covered in 
business ethics are as broad as business itself.  
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Despite the fact that the broad normative dimension of business decisions will receive a lot of 
attention in the following chapters, what is of interest at present is the specific normative ethical 
theories that are commonly employed in business ethics, in order to differentiate between ethically 
right and wrong actions. The three most common theories presented in standard business ethics 
textbooks and readers are utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and virtue ethics. Together, these three 
theories form what is referred to as ‘the standard normative tale’ in the context of this study8.  
 
Before investigating how the standard normative tale is applied in business ethics, it is necessary to 
unpack the substantive claims of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics (sec. 3.1.), as well 
as to provide a critical evaluation of these three normative ethical theories (sec. 3.2.). In terms of the 
substantive claims, it must be noted that section 3.1. only presents a very brief circumscription of 
the three ethical theories. This overview is based on the presentation of these theories in standard 
business ethics textbooks9 (for examples see Shaw, 2008; De George, 2006; Boatright, 2009b; 
Velazquez, 2006; Rossouw et al., 2009; Fisher and Lovell, 2009), and should not be read as a 
sophisticated philosophical exposition of these three positions.  
 
3.1. Overview of the normative ethical theories 
 
3.1.1. Utilitarianism  
 
Utilitarianism is an example of consequentialism, which, in contrast to Kantian ethics and virtue 
ethics, means that the morality of one’s actions is a function of the consequences that result from 
these actions. The different types of consequentialist positions can be defined by asking the 
question: ‘consequences for whom?’ Three broad consequentialist strands can be identified, 
namely: egoism (consequences for myself); altruism (consequences for others); and, utilitarianism 
(consequences for everyone affected by an action). Out of the three strands, utilitarianism is 
presented as the most common guiding normative theory in the applied ethics literature.  
 
                                                    
8
 The scope of the normative tale presented in this study does not exhaust the discussion of normative 
ethical theories within business ethics. Many textbooks also provide social contract or pragmatic approaches 
to business ethics. Within specific business ethics topics, such as distributive justice, additional normative 
theories such as the deontological approach of John Rawls (1971), or the libertarian approach of Robert 
Nozick (1974) are also often discussed. The standard normative tale depicted within the context of this study 
should, therefore, be read as the minimal requirements for understanding a normative approach to business 
ethics.   
9
 Although some textbooks such as De George (2006) describe the normative ethical theories in more detail 
than presented in the following section; others such as Rossouw, du Plessis, Prinsloo, and Prozesky (2009) 
provide more or less the same depth of coverage.  Most of the textbooks also discuss some of the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with the normative ethical theories, as well as make reference to 
how these theories can be applied in the business context.   
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Utilitarianism has its roots in Jeremy Bentham’s hedonistic calculus. Bentham (2001: 87) 
maintained that pain and pleasure alone can ‘point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine 
what we shall do.’ Pain and pleasure thus become the sole determinant of morality, and the moral 
rule amounts to maximising pleasure and minimising pain for the greatest number of people 
affected by one’s actions (this idea is expressed in the ‘Greatest Happiness’ principle). John Stuart 
Mill’s (1863) utilitarian position sought to refine Bentham’s crude calculus, by ranking pleasure and 
pain according to their importance in allowing for human actualisation and maximum societal 
utility. However, despite this refinement, utilitarianism remains a highly rationalistic project, 
whereby moral beings behave ‘as if they were machines valuing logic over everything else’ (Jones, 
Parker & ten Bos, 2005: 39).  
 
A further distinction that is often drawn is between rule and act utilitarianism: whereas act 
utilitarians judge the morality of the action by the specific consequences that an act holds for those 
affected by the action, rule utilitarians try to identify certain rules, which, if followed by everyone, 
would lead to the greatest amount of societal welfare. The difference between these two types of 
utilitarianism, therefore, concerns the object of calculation (50-51): namely, the specific or the 
general case.  
 
Regardless of the object of calculation, certain factors need to be considered when undertaking a 
calculation (Shaw, 2008: 69-71): i) One must not only focus on pleasure, happiness or utility; but 
also on pain, unhappiness and disutility. In other words, in situations where one will experience 
equal happiness or utility, one must choose that situation, which can be realised with the least 
amount of unhappiness or disutility. ii) The focus of a utilitarian calculation is on the units of 
happiness/unhappiness or utility/disutility – not on the amount of people. People may be affected to 
different degrees by a certain action and this should be considered. Utilitarian calculation is not 
democratic in the sense of one person, one unit. What is of importance is the degree of 
happiness/utility or unhappiness/disutility experienced by the various parties affected by a decision. 
iii) Almost anything can, in principle, be morally right in a particular context. iv) When attempting 
to maximise happiness or utility, long term effects should also be considered. v) One must always 
aim to maximise happiness. vi) One’s own happiness/utility and unhappiness/disutility must also be 
factored into the calculation. By taking the above features into account, one can successfully 
perform a utilitarian calculation, and, thereby, ascertain the morally-correct course of action in any 
given situation.   
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3.1.2. Kantian ethics 
 
In contrast to utilitarianism, Kantian ethics is an example of a deontological ethics, where the 
morality of one’s actions is not determined by the consequences, but by whether the actions are a 
priori defined as morally required, forbidden, or permitted. According to the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy10, ‘[t]he word deontology derives from the Greek words for duty 
(deon) and science (or study) of (logos).’ This study of moral obligation lies at the heart of Kantian 
ethics.  Immanuel Kant’s interest in duty may very well be ascribed to the influence of 18th century 
German Protestantism, which placed duty at the centre of ethics (Norman, 1998: 70).  
 
For Kant (1993: 7), nothing is good in itself except goodwill. As such, moral evaluations must be 
focused on our intentions rather than the consequences of our actions, and these intentions must be 
grounded in a sense of duty (as an expression of goodwill), as opposed to feelings or inclinations. 
Our duty is, furthermore, founded in reason which is completely free from contingencies. Duty, for 
Kant, is abstract and formal and, therefore, contains no empirical content (10-12). From this 
circumscription of goodwill and duty, Kant formulates the moral law, which is legislated and 
sanctioned by pure reason. Such a law constitutes a universal a priori principle, and the universality 
of the principle is derived from rationality. This is because a universal principle, based on pure 
reason, requires that one must follow any law as if all rational beings should follow it. According to 
Kant, only one such a law exists, namely the categorical imperative. In other words, if we concede 
that a law is universally valid for all rational beings at all times, such a law would be categorically 
binding, and not allow for exceptions. Such a law would also take on the nature of a command 
(imperative), since if no exceptions are allowed, we will sometimes have to will against our 
inclinations.  
 
Kant provides several formulations of the categorical imperative, the most common and complete of 
which is the formulation: ‘So act as if [you] were through [your] maxim always a legislating 
member in the universal kingdom of ends’ (43). This formulation brings together the idea of 
‘universal laws’ and ‘rational beings’, and implies that our actions will only have moral worth if we 
can universalise our actions (the universal imperative11), and if our actions show respect for people 
as ends in themselves, and not as means towards our ends (the practical imperative12).  
                                                    
10
 See ‘Deontological Ethics’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ Published November 21, 2007. 
11
 ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law’ (Kant, 1993: 30).  
12
 ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end’ (Kant, 1993: 36).  
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3.1.3. Virtue ethics 
 
As with Kantian ethics, virtue ethics is also a non-consequentialist position, but unlike Kantian 
ethics, virtue ethics is a normative position that stresses the moral character of a person, as opposed 
to impersonal duties or rules. Aristotle is commonly identified as the founding father of virtue 
ethics13. He subscribed to the viewpoint that everything has an ultimate goal or telos. Furthermore, 
he believed that it is good to achieve the goal for which you are destined. Such an achievement 
would be a good for its own sake (and not a means to a further end). The highest good for humans is 
eudaimonia, understood as a state of well-being and flourishing (see Ethics14, Book I). Aristotle was 
of the opinion that we could achieve eudaimonia if we were to act according to the unique human 
function, i.e. the function which distinguishes man from all other things, namely rationality.  
 
Aristotle’s notion of rationality does not, however, denote a formal rationality, but rather a type of 
rationality that guides feeling: feeling and rationality are, therefore, closely related. If we act in 
accordance with reason, we act in accordance with virtue, in that we would know what the 
appropriate behaviour would imply within a specific context. For Aristotle, acting with virtue 
implies following the mean between excess and deficiency. This idea is encapsulated in Aristotle’s 
celebrated ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ (see Ethics, Book II), which stands central in Aristotle’s ethics, 
and which is commonly understood as the mean between two vices. For example, the happy mean 
of bravery lies between foolhardiness and cowardice (for more examples, see De George, 2006: 
107; Rossouw et al., 2009: 61). When we act in accordance with the mean, we are acting virtuously.  
 
We are, however, not born virtuous; rather, virtue is something that we develop in relation to others. 
Society, in a sense, therefore, constitutes the virtuous person by showing us which virtues are held 
in esteem; and, by presenting us with examples of virtuous people who are admired and who act as 
moral leaders (De George, 2006: 108). Therefore, as the Greeks used to say, ‘to live a good life, one 
must live in a great city’ (Solomon, 2008: 70). The fact that we are not born virtuous further implies 
that virtues are also something that we develop through our actions. A person who consistently or 
habitually acts morally is a person of good character (De George, 108). Such a person is said to 
possess phronesis, which can be loosely translated as practical wisdom, and implies that one has the 
ability to make decisions in circumstances where there are no black or white answers (see Ethics, 
Book VI). 
                                                    
13
 Virtue ethics recently experienced a revival with the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981) book, 
entitled After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory, in which he provides both a strong critique of modernity, and a 
sophisticated revision of Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
14
 Ethics is an oft-used abbreviation for The Nicomachean Ethics.  
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The above description of the three strands of the normative tale depicts the standard picture of these 
theories in the business ethics literature. On the one hand, communal theorists, like Aristotle, 
believe that the good life can only be attained by coming together to create ethically sustainable 
states and communities. On the other hand, liberal theorists ‘trust the capacity of autonomous 
individuals in making their own rational or optimal choices’ (Keleman & Peltonen, 2001: 155). 
Despite these differences, De George (2008: 78) argues that all three ethical theories ‘are in accord 
on the wrongness of killing others, stealing, lying, and so on.’ Regarding the interrelationship 
between these theories, he writes that:  
 
Kant’s theory, which places its emphasis on human reason, justifies and explains the same 
basic actions as does Mill’s utilitarianism, which places its emphasis on consequences. Both 
of them consider virtue, but place it in a secondary position, whereas Aristotle’s position 
gives virtues more prominence (78).  
 
As such, De George is of the opinion that one must be careful of overemphasising the differences 
between these theories, lest one forgets that these theories all constitute an attempt to define our 
moral inclinations and intuitions.  
 
Despite the fact that these normative theories can offer valuable guidance when one tries to answer 
the question, ‘what ought I to do, morally-speaking?’, these theories are, nevertheless, also plagued 
by various substantive and procedural difficulties. In the section that follows, the specific 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the three theories will be investigated.  
 
3.2. Critical evaluation of  the normative ethical theories 
 
3.2.1. Utilitarianism 
 
Utilitarianism can be praised for trying to give practical guidelines based on empirical arguments as 
opposed to transcendental appeals, such as is the case with Kantian ethics. Furthermore, the 
utilitarian standard was developed in order to evaluate and criticise the social and political 
institutions during both Bentham’s and Mill’s lifetimes, and did lead to the alleviation of suffering 
and social improvements. However, a highly disputable utilitarian claim is that the entire moral 
world can be expressed in units of pleasure/ happiness/utility and pain/unhappiness/disutility. 
Bentham’s (2001: 87) original premise – that we are governed by ‘two sovereign masters, pain and 
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pleasure’ – is hardly an adequate description of morality. However, even if we accept this premise, 
further problems emerge with the application of this principle.  
 
Firstly, the fact that the definition of the good is subjectively defined by a decision-maker, whose 
preferences can apparently be easily articulated and freely chosen between, is dubious (Jones et al., 
2005: 33). Indeed, Freudian theory has long dispelled the idea that something like a self-transparent 
consciousness exists (34). Secondly, not only is it assumed that one’s own preferences are 
transparent, but that the preferences of others can also be measured, and that accurate judgements 
are possible in complex social situations.  Given this instrumental moral orientation, utilitarians run 
the risk of both objectifying other humans, and of ignoring the substantive value considerations that 
define every act of calculation and compromise (Painter-Morland, 2008: 553; 4). Thirdly, it is likely 
that the ‘relation between individual and collective goods is not as straightforward as utilitarians 
might have us believe’ (Jones et al., 2005: 37). Indeed, commonsense dictates that there are many 
instances in which sacrificing the individual for the collective good is not morally acceptable (see 
footnote 21). 
 
Compounding this information problem of individual and collective preferences, as well as the 
relation between them, is the fact that actions have future consequences that also need to be taken 
into consideration. Decisions are made in complex environments, and affect many stakeholders over 
long periods. Practically-speaking, business practitioners, for example, rely on past knowledge in 
order to predict future outcomes. However, as noted by Rolland Munro (1998: 209) ‘the idea that 
the future will resemble the past is always fraught with induction’. As a consequence, business 
practitioners are unable to predict the future consequences of their actions, and end up managing 
only for today. Or, in the words of Munro (209): ‘Tomorrow is not something today’s incumbent 
feels responsible for.’ Given our inadequate and partial assumptions regarding the effects of these 
judgements, we simply cannot make accurate moral judgements (Jones et al., 2005: 38). This is 
further evidenced by the fact that business practitioners often find it difficult to see how their 
actions could have caused human misery.  
 
3.2.2. Kantian ethics  
 
The categorical imperative is a formal rule, and, therefore, holds the advantage over utilitarianism 
that it does not prescribe the substantive content of ethical behaviour. The freedom of the individual 
ethical agent to make her own moral decision is, therefore, valued. Furthermore, the theory attempts 
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to remove prejudice by placing emphasis on respect for all rational beings. The value and the 
dignity of the individual, therefore, receive top priority.  
 
However, as we will see in section 4.2., several problems can be identified with regard to the 
application of a formal rule or principle-based ethics, and these problems should not be forgotten in 
the context of Kantian ethics. The most serious of these problems is the fact that no categorically-
binding theory has ever been identified. An implication of this is that a universal ethics that does not 
allow for any exceptions (such as Kantian ethics), cannot deal with the problem of conflicting 
categorical duties. In other words, Kant ‘cannot assist us in deciding between two equally ‘rational’ 
moral directives’ (Painter-Morland, 2008: 58).  
 
In order to illustrate this point, Mollie Painter-Morland (58) offers the example of a business 
practitioner who has made several promises to different stakeholders in good faith. If a situation 
occurs where the practitioner is no longer able to fulfil all these promises, she will inevitably be 
forced to choose where to direct her resources and energies. According to Clegg, Kornberger and 
Rhodes (2007: 112), ethics is at stake in situations (such as presented in the above example) where 
‘no third meta-rule can be applied to resolve the dilemma’. This problem is further compounded by 
the complex and competitive nature of the business environment. In such a context, it is unlikely 
‘that the mature moral agent has the ability to rationally retreat from his/her immersion in particular 
role-responsibilities and employ the universalisation test, in order to judge the categorical validity 
of various possible courses of action’ (Painter-Morland, 2008: 59).  
 
Even if it were possible for the moral agent to objectively apply the universalisation test, and even if 
no competing moral obligations exist, the outcome of applying the test may also not necessarily be 
desirable. To apply principles categorically, often leads to morally dubious actions as seen in 
Munro’s (1998: 218) reference to Rae Langton’s (1992) paper on letters between Kant and Maria 
von Herbert:  
 
Briefly, von Herbert has, belatedly, followed Kant’s advice in his books over telling the 
truth to the terrible detriment of her life, and she is now writing to him to request that he 
rethink his proscription over suicide. In his unthinking refusal and belittling comments, it is 
difficult to see Kant as other than insular, shabby and chauvinist in this affair.  
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1993: 39; 40) builds on this type of criticism by arguing that Kant’s universal 
man must disavow moral reasoning as a temporal and territory-bound practice in favour of abstract 
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universal principles. As a result, autonomous moral responsibility is relegated to living out one’s 
duty according to ‘universal, extemporal and extraterritorial principles’ (39).  As such, the most 
serious problems haunting the Kantian project ‘primarily have to do with Kant’s postulation of a 
rational independent moral agent, capable of distancing him/herself from personal prejudice and 
contextual biases for the sake of objective moral deliberations’ (Painter-Morland, 2008: 63).  
 
Bauman (1993: 38) further argues that a universal ethics can only be justified if images of good and 
evil do not differ from one place to another. In a heterogeneous world, one can only defend the 
universality of one’s moral rules if other rules are not only shown to be ‘just different, but mistaken 
or evil: that their acceptance is an outcome of ignorance and immaturity, if not of ill will’ (38). This 
criticism is more applicable to utilitarianism than to Kantian ethics, as the categorical imperative is 
a formal, and therefore, substantively empty principle. However, it does raise problems for applying 
the categorical imperative. The universalisation test, as a test for moral permissibility, seems to vary 
in outcome, depending on the beliefs and values of the moral agent. Although one can try to 
circumvent this problem by placing oneself in other people’s shoes, the fact remains that there is no 
one objective standard against which one can measure the rightness of one’s actions.  
 
The problem with Kantian ethics is succinctly described by Munro (1998: 200) as an individuation 
problem in that it ‘encourages us to split knowledge between the primary task of conducting a 
surveillance of the ‘core’ self [we ‘account for the self, to the self’ (Roberts in Munro, 1998: 197)] 
and the secondary matter of knowing others in terms of their ‘needs’.’ According to Munro’s (1998: 
204) interpretation of Bauman (1991), it is impossible to reduce the other to knowledge of her 
‘needs’ without the condition of ethical distance. In such circumstances, ‘rationality’ is opposed to 
‘ethicality’, as people are posited and understood as means, rather than ends in themselves. 
Ironically then, ethical distance safeguards the Kantian project, because without this distance, ‘[t]he 
ethical self would flounder under the sheer weight of knowledge which it would be necessary to 
gather, and assess, prior to making each decision’ (Munro, 1998: 205).  
 
Therefore, there can be no overarching rules, as people have different conceptions of what counts as 
the good, and also apply the rules differently. Without this acknowledgement, we see how the 
‘hideous purity’ (Law in Parker 1998b: 290) of modernity becomes a justification for various forms 
of cruelty15.  
 
                                                    
15
 In Modernity and the Holocaust (1989), Bauman makes the argument that the Holocaust ‘should not be 
seen as an aberration of modern civilization, but rather as a product of it’ (ten Bos, 1997: 997).    
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3.2.3. Virtue ethics 
 
The recently revival and widespread uptake of virtue ethics in the applied field is evidence of the 
many practical benefits associated with virtue ethics. Given the ever-increasing complexity of 
today’s world, virtue ethics stands to benefit moral decision-making in that it is a practical, ‘lived’ 
ethics. Ethical decision-making emerges and develops through life experience, and is not based on 
abstract rules. In this regard, virtue ethics allows for sound ethical decision-making in ambiguous 
situations. Furthermore, virtue ethics fosters sensitivity towards social and political conditions. This 
is because the good life is an interdependent life. As such, our actions cannot be construed as 
ethically neutral since they affect other people. Ethical action is considered and contextually-based 
action, rather that action that coincides with a priori rules.  Another benefit of virtue ethics is that it 
considers the whole spectrum of human actions: virtues enable us to successfully fulfil our social 
roles. Ethics cannot be divorced from these social roles, and from this perspective, statements such 
as ‘business ethics is an oxymoron’ simply prove to be moronic! A last advantage of virtue ethics 
worth mentioning is the fact that virtue ethics demands that we argue for the ethics that we assume. 
Since no feelings are in themselves good or bad, we must be led by reason when assuming an 
ethical stance. Furthermore, the type and degree of feeling that we exhibit needs to be justified 
within a particular context – business or otherwise.  
 
These advantages of virtue ethics go a long way towards addressing the problems associated with 
universal positions that rely on abstract, contextless rules or fixed conceptions of the good. 
However, when uncritically applied, virtue ethics runs the risk of sliding into a ‘born-again’ 
communitarian position (Bauman, 1993: 44) which fares no better than the universal position. 
Mautner (2005: 112) defines communitarianism as:  
 
a social and political theory which rejects the individualism considered to be inherent in 
liberal political theory, and which puts an emphasis on values and goals of a collective 
nature… The ethical theory of writers who advocate communitarianism is in many cases 
virtue-orientated, in opposition to ethics of individual autonomy [such as Kantian ethics], 
and it is argued that the virtues needed for human flourishing can only be exercised in a 
society which has a distinctive communal way of life.  
 
Communitarianism is heavily indebted to Aristotelian virtue ethics. Despite the emphasis that virtue 
ethics places on moral character, we see that the character of the individual moral agent develops 
through education and the good example of others. In other words, the development of moral 
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character is contingent upon societal conceptions of the good. It is, therefore appropriate to read 
some of Bauman’s critique against this position, as a critique of an overly-optimistic uptake of 
virtue ethics in fields such as business ethics.   
 
What is clear from the above description is that normative priorities are communally defined within 
the communitarian perspective. Bauman, however, warns that the idea of the moral agent rooted in 
a community, is by no means a natural given. Indeed, Bauman (1993: 46) argues that the situated 
self is controversially constructed by ‘self-appointed spokesmen…  [who] deny or at least curtail 
the individual moral discretion.’ Membership to a community is, therefore, defined in terms that do 
not really allow for the possibility of individual dissent (Painter-Morland, 2008: 77). 
Communitarianism also shows little sensitivity for the ‘subtle but significant differences in 
perspective that often exist among those who participate in a social system of relations’ (80-81). 
This obviously undermines the ability of the individual moral agent to argue for a specific ethical 
position, which is incongruent with the ethical positions generally held by a particular society. 
 
According to Bauman (1993: 47), only rules that can withstand ‘this ‘depersonalization’ are seen as 
meeting the conditions set for ethical norms.’ Bauman (48-50) (following Levinas), argues that 
moral relations can only be entered into by the individual (not the collective), and moral 
prescriptions can only apply to individual moral agents. In other words, moral communities are only 
possible due to the moral competence of their individual members. We are, therefore, firstly moral 
and then social (Keleman & Peltonen, 2001: 159). For Bauman (1993: 50), the difference between 
ethical prescriptives directed at the individual as opposed to at the abstract collective lies in the 
word responsibility: ‘When addressed to me, responsibility is moral’. Bauman further argues that it 
is exactly due to the uniqueness (rather than generalisability) of responsibility that I can be placed in 
a moral relationship (51). He elaborates on this point, stating that: 
 
converting the object of responsibility to my standard, taking him or her into my possession, 
putting under my command, making identical with myself in this or any other respect, and 
thus stripping him or her of their responsibility, which constitutes their alterity, their 
uniqueness – is most certainly not the outcome my responsibility may pursue or contemplate 
without denying itself, without ceasing, to be a moral stance. Our ‘moral party’ is not one of 
fusion, of identity, of joint submission to a ‘third term’... (53). 
 
From the above citation, we see that Bauman’s argument is directed against both universal and 
communal standards and understandings of responsibility, since both these positions necessarily 
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appeal to generalised duties over individual responsibilities. As such, these positions strive to 
‘substitute heteronomous ethical duty for autonomous moral responsibility’16, that is, the subjection 
of a community of individuals to the rule of an external law (46). In this sense, both universal man 
and communitarian man suffer from the same affliction: namely, ‘the exappropriation of the 
individual’s right to moral judgment’ (47). Bauman contends that morality can never have the 
character of a rule – instead, the moral is that ‘which resists codification, formalization, 
socialization, universalization’ (47). 
 
3.2.4. Summary 
 
Therefore, in summary, one can say that utilitarianism holds the benefit of being empirically-
grounded, but because it is based on the assumption that the ultimate grounds of morality (as an 
expression of pleasure, utility or happiness) can be determined, it leaves no room for contesting 
interpretations of what morality may entail. Furthermore, utilitarians express our moral 
responsibilities in terms of numbers. According to Bauman (1993: 47), ‘[h]umanity is not captured 
in common denominators – it sinks and vanishes there’. As such, not only is respect for the dignity 
of the individual undermined in a utilitarian analysis, but true moral responsibility is also 
impossible. This is due to the fact that moral responsibility can only be assumed by individuals. 
When viewed as pertaining to a collective, responsibility becomes a rule or duty (54). Kantians – 
although not guilty of reducing the unique individual to the collective – are, nonetheless, guilty of 
turning responsibility into duty, dictated by a formal, universal rule; which, when applied, has the 
effect of turning people into subjectively defined sets of needs. Although virtue ethicists resist the 
type of formalisations characteristic of rule or principle-based ethical theories, a naïve and 
depoliticized notion of virtue ethics can easily lead to the subversion of the individual to the 
community.  
 
Painter-Morland (2008: 81) succinctly sums up the two main problems with the standard normative 
tale as follows: Firstly, procedure is emphasised at the expense of substance i.e. ‘little attention is 
paid to the meaning of the good that these procedures embody’ (this criticism holds for Kantian 
ethics and utilitarianism). Secondly, problems arise regarding the relationship between the 
individuals and society, as well as the way in which moral beliefs are thought to be constituted in 
                                                    
16
 It is important to note that Bauman’s understanding of morality is similar to the understanding of ethics 
employed in this study, and vice-versa. In the context of this study, morality is equated with moral codes, 
formal principles, and institutionalised normative expressions, whereas ethics is concerned with the 
individual’s normative propriety and pronouncements. The opposite applies to Bauman’s (1993: 31-32) 
categorisation of ethics and morality. In this regard, consider the following citation: ‘Human reality is messy 
and ambiguous – and so moral decisions, unlike abstract ethical principles, are ambivalent’ (32).      
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institutions such as organisations. This second problem has two important consequences with regard 
to the normative ethical theories: these theories tend to either universalise (and, thereby) generalise 
ethical norms (as seen from the above critique), or the theories individualise and particularise to the 
point of fragmentation17. As such, many of the ethical theories cannot simultaneously accommodate 
the individual moral agent and the institutions or communities to which she belongs, and in which 
she participates. In other words, ‘[t]he locus of control in morality is almost invariably exclusively 
associated with either the one or the other’ (85).  
 
4. The standard normative tale: depicting and applying the normative ethical theories 
 
Having briefly provided both an overview of the standard normative tale, and a critical discussion 
of the three normative ethical theories that comprise this tale, it is now necessary to turn our focus 
to how this tale is applied in business ethics. In section 4.1., a critical investigation of how the 
standard normative tale is taught in business ethics is presented. The emphasis is on the manner in 
which the tale is commonly conveyed to business students, and the implications that this 
presentation holds for students’ perceptions of ethical decision-making. In section 4.2., the actual 
application of the standard normative tale to ethical issues that arise in a business context is 
investigated, and the success of the normative ethical theories for helping practitioners to deal with 
ethical problems is gauged.    
 
4.1. Problems with the standard depictions of the normative ethical theories  
 
The first problem with the standard normative tale concerns the scope of the tale. Jones et al.  
(2005: 3) note that: 
 
Despite the fact that ethics has been hotly debated in philosophy throughout the twentieth 
century and has been one of the major sources of philosophical reflection up to the close of 
the millennium, the discipline of business ethics has insulated itself from these 
developments, either ignoring them altogether or misrepresenting them so that it looks as if 
twentieth century philosophy has nothing interesting to say about ethics.  
 
Thus, the objection here is that the standard normative tale only presents half the story when it 
comes to presenting the ideas available in moral philosophy, without any motivated reason for 
                                                    
17
 This latter point constitutes the problem of subjectivism or relativism, briefly addressed in section 4.2.1., as 
well as in chapter two, section 6.1.  
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doing so. Moreover, the standard normative tale is slanted towards the Anglo-American or analytic, 
as opposed to the European or continental philosophical tradition. This may go some way towards 
explaining why twentieth century ethics has largely been ignored in this tale: the most influential 
ethical positions of the twentieth century were developed by continental philosophers, such as 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Emmanuel Levinas. However, the above citation (by Jones 
et al.) strongly implies that disciplinary developments do not fully account for this omission.  
 
Perhaps a more prominent reason for this omission concerns the type of normative theories that 
have become popular in the business ethics field. In contrast to much of twentieth century 
philosophy, Kantian and utilitarian positions present us with what is popularly referred to as rule or 
principle-based ethics18. In other words, both the categorical imperative and the greatest happiness 
principle represent attempts to codify ethical behaviour. A great advantage of such normative 
positions is that they are compatible with a compliance-based model of ethics: codes of conduct or 
disciplinary structures and procedures, for example, can easily ground their moral authority in a 
principle or rule-based ethics.  Rules and principles also aid in reducing the undecidability that often 
characterises moral decision-making, and are, therefore, easy to apply. However, as will be seen in 
section 4.2., such simplifications of the ethical task do not necessarily hold good consequences for 
practice. Before looking at the application problems, it is necessary to first provide some critical 
comments regarding the depiction of these theories in standard business ethics textbooks.  
 
4.1.1. Standard depictions of utilitarianism  
 
Out of the three normative ethical theories, utilitarianism is the most accurately expressed in the 
business ethics literature. Furthermore, its uptake in the business world has arguably been the 
greatest of all three normative streams, and the current mode of privileging mathematised and 
codified knowledge (or the calculating view of anything happening in the organisation) can be seen 
                                                    
18
 All normative positions are in fact guided by principles and rules. Even the most decentralised positions 
can be rewritten in the language of rules. The reason for this is that since there are no ‘natural realities’ 
(Derrida 1988a: 134) – a point that will be expounded upon later in this dissertation – a rule must be invoked 
in order to select, sanction or evaluate a certain position (normative or otherwise). However, in the context of 
this study, rule or principle-based positions refer to ethical theories that do not account for their own 
provisionality (i.e. the fact that they are models or tools for guiding ethical behaviour, rather than blueprints – 
that if followed – guarantee ethical behaviour); or, that disregard the context in which their rules are invoked 
(thereby uplifting morality to a transcendental level). In contrast to this, non-rule-based positions refer to 
positions that account for their own limitations, and that espouse an ethics that is sensitive to these 
limitations. Non-rule-based positions are, therefore, constantly under revision, in order to mitigate the impact 
of these limitations.   
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as being derived from this normative position19 (Jones et al., 2005: 36). Indeed, Parker (1998b: 288; 
287) argues that utilitarian formulations are the most symptomatic outcomes of the Weberian view 
of the bureaucratic organisation, which involves modern forms of ‘ordering’ i.e. placing people and 
things in systematic, calculable, and repeatable relationships. In this sense, the modern 
bureaucracy20, like Bentham’s description of the Panopticon, is ‘a new mode of obtaining power of 
mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example’ (Bentham, 1791: i-ii).  
 
Bureaucratic administrators have, no doubt, benefited significantly from the easy application of 
utilitarian principles to moral problems. In fact, free market capitalism itself functions on the 
premise that such a system leads to the greatest good for the greatest number of people (see Adam 
Smith’s (1985: 16) argument for the invisible hand of the market). However, although this 
calculating view has long been privileged, this simplistic rendition of human nature is itself marred 
by ‘confusion, illusion, and delusion’ (Warburton, 2000: 7). As stated in section 3.2., it is a 
dangerous simplicity to presume that we can reduce the other to a knowledge about their needs, 
since such a presupposition causes ethical distance (or the denigration of the moral impulse), 
effacement of the other’s face, and the reduction of individuals to bundles of traits (Bauman, 1989; 
1991; 1993).  This, in turn, allows us to calculate benefits for stakeholders, without having to 
adjudicate between them as individuals, or as ‘a class of beings who may potentially confront the 
actor as “faces”’ (Bauman, 1993: 127; my italics). On the utilitarian analysis, ‘[t]he scales of justice 
swing this way and that, without regard to their content because justice, like the bureaucrat, is 
intentionally blind’ (Parker, 1998b: 288). The privileged position of utilitarianism, therefore, 
‘cannot be maintained by simplicity alone’ (Jones et al., 2005: 36) as the consequences of such a 
calculating view can be devastating21.  
                                                    
19
 Consider the example of company lay-offs: statements such as ‘I’m sorry, but we've got to let you go as 
there is not enough revenue to support your job’ allow managers to transfer their ethical responsibilities to 
the numbers (Munro, 1998: 205).   
20
 René ten Bos (1997: 999) argues that not all contemporary organisations are bureaucracies of the type 
that Weber or Bauman had in mind. However, despite this, we see that most organisations (even those 
operating ‘entirely under an anti-bureaucratic cloak’) prize ‘moral technology’ above ‘moral quality’.  Parker 
(1998b: 288) asserts that a primary reason for why the ‘bureaucratization of the ethical’ is difficult to avoid is 
because ‘speaking of ethics within business effectively rules out many of the ways of formulating decision-
making and responsibility that are not amendable to managerial rationalizations’.   
21
 One of the most famous examples against utilitarianism involves an episode at New York’s Willowbrook 
State Hospital, which at the time (1956), was New York’s largest institution for retarded children. Two doctors 
– who were researching the progression of hepatitis – approached the authorities at Willowbrook with the 
request to study the retarded children, as a large percentage of them had hepatitis. The controversial part of 
the research involved infecting healthy children with the disease, as it was argued that they would most likely 
contract the disease in any case. As a result of their studies, the doctors successfully developed a vaccine 
against hepatitis, but the question remains whether it is ethically justified to sacrifice the health of a few 
children, in order to promote the health of many (see Jonsen, 2003: 153-154).  
A similar case in the context of biomedical ethics is the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (Jones, 1981). This 
case involved a clinical study in which impoverished African-American men were left untreated for syphilis 
and were prevented from seeking treatment elsewhere. Once again, the purpose of the study was for 
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In a sense, the critique offered against utilitarianism feeds into the much larger critique against 
treating business ethics as a technology. This critique is also relevant to depictions of Kantian ethics 
and virtue ethics. Although both of these philosophies present us with carefully motivated, and 
subtly-complex ethical positions, ‘the instrumentalisation’ of their positions is evident in the 
manner in which these theories are often presented in business ethics textbooks. Frequently, Kant’s 
and Aristotle’s main insights are distilled into a couple of premises that are presented as concise 
summaries of their thoughts. Alternatively, their insights are reduced to procedural forms of 
reasoning (Verstraeten, 2000: 3).  The danger with such simplifications is that the content of ethical 
theories gets distorted and depicted as a set of easy-to-follow rules, principles, or virtues; which, on 
a theoretical level, are free from tension and difficulty. Consequently, business ethics students view 
the ethical theories as unambiguous moral codes or prescriptions that can be directly applied to 
business problems. To illustrate this point, a brief evaluation of the standard application of virtue 
ethics and Kantian ethics is presented. 
 
4.1.2. Standard depictions of Kantian ethics 
 
Jones et al. (2005: 55) argue that ‘business ethicists have tended to make Kant far more palatable 
and less challenging than he is if we read him carefully.’ The depiction of Kantian ethics in standard 
business ethics textbooks focuses on the categorical imperative, understood as the ethical 
prescription against which we can test our actions in order to deduce whether they are morally 
permissible or not. Bowie (2008: 57) – who is largely credited with bringing Kantian ethics to the 
business world – argues that we freely choose to act in accordance with the categorical imperative, 
as we recognise this law to be the rational and moral foundation of our actions. The ethical person is 
a person who acts from the right intention, and, therefore, from a sense of duty.  
 
However, Jones et al. (2005: 46) question Bowie’s optimistic uptake of Kantian ethics, arguing that 
Kant himself was a lot less sure about the possibilities of rational autonomous behaviour. The idea 
that the categorical imperative is indeed an imperative shows that it can misfire: either you obey the 
imperative or you don’t.  Kant argues that if our actions were completely rational, morality would 
                                                                                                                                                                            
researchers to study the disease. The clinical study spanned a 40-year time period, and was conducted 
between 1932 and 1972. 
In the context of business ethics, the Ford Pinto case (see Shaw, 2008: 78-82) presents the most famous 
example against a consequentialist analysis. In this case, the Ford Company decided not to remove the Ford 
Pinto from the market, even though it was established that the Pinto presents a serious fire hazard when 
struck from the rear. Their decision was based on an analysis of the costs that would be incurred from taking 
the necessary safety precautions compared to the societal costs arising from the loss of life. Based on this 
analysis, Ford continued with the production of the Pinto. The Ford Pinto case presents an example of 
egoism, but goes some way towards illustrating the effects of a calculating, depersonalised utilitarian 
methodology.    
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be reduced to a technocratic application of universal imperatives. In his own words: ‘conduct would 
thus be changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet-show, everything would gesticulate 
well, but there would be no life in the figures’ (Kant, 2008: 127)22.  For true morality to exist – for 
humans to act out of duty, and not merely in accordance with duty – a certain struggle must take 
place. This struggle is rooted in human imperfection and lack of knowledge, which paradoxically, 
allows for choice and, therefore, for moral freedom.    
 
Jones et al. (2005:53-54) argue that the ‘very effort to create moral transparency through a 
fetishistic form of bureaucratic rule following would be condemned by Kant as profoundly 
immoral.’ Indeed, Bowie’s uptake of Kantian ethics, as a means of controlling collective behaviour 
through stressing ethical duties and rules, is very much at odds with Kant’s own orientation (52). 
When Kant’s categorical imperative is interpreted as a rationale for institutionalising immutable 
universal laws in bureaucracies (which, as Painter-Morland (2008: 62) argues, it often is), ‘self-
respect, integrity, empathy, autonomy, conscience, or individual responsibility’ changes into ‘self-
sacrifice, obedience… docility, duty and discipline’ (Bauman, 1989: 21; 160). This is because, in 
such circumstances, the horison of one’s actions is not determined by how one thinks about these 
actions, but by whether these actions accord with ‘the rules laid down by those who occupy a higher 
rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy’ (ten Bos, 1997: 999).  
 
Kant always focuses on the individual ethical being and her freedom and struggles. When morality 
is denigrated to mere rule-following or proceduralism, the ethical struggle, which characterises 
human finitude, and which allows for human dignity and moral autonomy, is denied. As such, the 
question of ‘doing good’ is replaced with pure discipline (1009).  
 
4.1.3. Standard depictions of virtue ethics 
 
As with the standard uptake of Kantian ethics in the business ethics literature, one can also identify 
problems with the manner in which Aristotle’s virtue ethics is commonly conveyed to business 
ethics students. The first problem with this standard depiction relates to Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
mean, whereas the second has to do with the conceptualisation and application of Aristotle’s 
conception of the community.   
 
                                                    
22
 Although, at first glance, this clarification seems to overcome Bauman’s critique that Kant’s universal man 
is doomed to live out a generalised duty rather than to practice true moral autonomy, the point remains that 
moral responsibility is dictated by abstract universal rules. As such, the scope of one’s responsibilities is 
limited to accepting one’s formal duties. This is because responsibility does not extend beyond the 
categorical imperative.  
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In The Moral Philosophers: an Introduction to Ethics, Richard Norman (1998: 35) argues that the 
doctrine of the mean is often superficially understood. Generally, the doctrine of the mean is 
construed as a mean in relation to a thing or a concept. In this case the doctrine of the mean would 
constitute the midpoint between two extremes. The example used earlier was that of bravery, which 
marks the midpoint between foolhardiness and cowardice. The problem with this uptake is that the 
doctrine of the mean would always promote a stance of sober caution. Norman claims that Aristotle 
is emphatic that this popular reading is not the stance that he is advocating (36). For Aristotle, the 
mean should be construed in relation to us. In this sense the mean should be understood as follows: 
 
It is possible, for example, to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain 
generally, too much or too little; and both of these are wrong. But to have these feelings at 
the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motives and in the 
right way is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and this is the mark of 
virtue (Ethics, 1106b, 18-23).   
 
To observe the mean, therefore, does not necessarily imply choosing the midpoint between two 
extremes. It all depends on the circumstances. Although this conception of the mean does not 
amount to the attractive and substantial doctrine provided by the popular interpretation, it does help 
in illuminating the relation between reason and feeling. The doctrine of the mean implies that 
actions cannot be intrinsically right or wrong, but should coincide with feelings that accord with the 
mean. As such, feeling is not subordinated to reason. Reason, instead, guides feeling to correspond 
with the mean. This allows for a more fruitful interpretation of action: on this account, ‘an action 
which accords with the mean will be an action which is an expression of feelings which accord with 
the mean’ (Norman, 1998: 37). Despite presenting us with a more fruitful interpretation, the above 
understanding of the doctrine of the mean also presents us with a more difficult interpretation. No 
longer is it sufficient to employ an easy-to-follow formula in order to ascertain what type of action 
accords with the mean. Rather, determining the correct action in a particular circumstance demands 
moral sensitivity and ethical work.   
 
In order to illuminate the second problem – namely the conceptualisation and application of 
Aristotle’s idea of the community – we turn to the work of Robert Solomon. Solomon (2008) is a 
leading business ethics scholar, focusing on the application of virtue ethics in the business arena. 
Following Aristotle and the Greeks, he argues that ‘[o]ur individuality is socially constituted and 
socially situated’ and, as cited before, ‘to live a good life one must live in a great city’ (70). In this 
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sense, virtuosity can be defined as ‘a community orientated form of practical action.’ (Jones et al., 
2005: 65). Solomon (2008: 70) applies this argument to business, stating that:  
 
The Aristotelian approach and, I would argue, the leading question for business… begins 
with the idea that business is first of all a community. We are all individuals, to be sure, but 
we find our identity and meaning only within communities, and for most of us that means – 
at work in a company or an institution.   
 
In the above citation, we see how Aristotle’s conceptualisation of ancient Athens’ political 
community is directly extended to current business communities, without any real consideration of 
how these communities may differ. Jones et al. (2005: 66) argue that ‘there is no particular reason 
why we should not try to live well and virtuously at work’; however, one must take note of the fact 
that work practices constitute only ‘a pale shadow of the really complex and difficult virtue that is 
needed amongst our friends and community.’ Such a virtue cannot simply be switched on and off at 
the beginning and the end of the work day, but characterises a way of being together in a social 
community. Little consideration is also given in the applied literature to the political tensions, 
confusions, and contradictions that characterise Aristotle’s conception of the political community 
(60; 66). This liberal application of virtue ethics allows for a sentimental understanding of business 
‘as a potentially warm place inhabited by fully human beings’ (58; see Solomon, 1992; 1999).  
 
A related problem that Jones et al. (2005:67) identify in the direct application of virtue ethics to a 
business setting, is the disregard that such an application shows for the specificity of what virtues 
might entail in different contexts, during different historical periods. Indeed, the question of ‘How 
should I live a good life?’ cannot be answered by referring to a universal code of virtues. Athenians 
or Spartans might have had very different answers to this question than do contemporary business 
managers (66). Similarly, different business settings may require different virtues, and merely 
coming up with a neat list of forty five virtues applicable to business today – as does Solomon 
(1999) in his book A Better Way to Think about Business – seems to go against the very grain of an 
ethics which focuses upon the social context in which morality and virtues develop.  
 
4.1.4. Evaluation 
 
The above criticism of the general depiction of the standard normative tale in the business ethics 
literature is by no means exhaustive. Rather, the point is merely to illustrate what is at stake when 
we reduce canonical texts to simple prescriptions such as: ‘Always choose the midpoint between 
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two extremes’; ‘Strive towards living a virtuous life within a supportive business community, 
typified by associations of equal citizens’; or, ‘Always act in such a way that your behaviour 
coincides with the categorical imperative’. Such prescriptions, when translated into moral codes, 
tend to encourage employees to suspend or defer their personal moral beliefs, and to ignore the 
tensions, contradictions, paradoxes, limitations, fallibility, and opacity that characterise ethical 
actions. It is exactly due to these reasons that utilitarianism is so popular. However, applying 
utilitarianism without exercising discernment, or merely accepting the standard Kantian or 
Aristotelian maxims, is a negation of the very heart of ethics. 
 
Following this line of argument, Jones et al. (2005: 2) argue that business ethics – in its uncritical 
and/or narrow appropriation of these normative positions – has failed to deliver on what it has 
promised, namely talk of ethics and justice. This failure presents us with not only a technical 
failure, but also a moral failure, because as Willmott (1998: 84) suggests: 
 
Textbooks in which work organizations are presented as technical and value-neutral invite 
students to read their contents as ‘descriptive’ rather than ‘normative’ accounts of their 
subject matter and, in doing so, to suspend any moral misgivings as well as intellectual 
belief.     
 
Willmott further argues that codes of conduct and texts of this nature ‘legitimize a particular kind of 
closure in respect of the reality of management and organizations: a closure, that is, which conflates 
‘descriptive’ with ‘normative’ ethics’ (84). Perversely then, the increased interest in business ethics 
and instruments designed to nurture ethics in organisations (such as codes of conduct), may limit 
and undermine the capacity and inclination ‘to appreciate and wrestle with ethical issues and 
dilemmas’ (97).  
 
This problem is amplified when these simple prescriptions (or moral maxims) are incorporated into 
a form of procedural reasoning, whereby moral dilemmas are apparently resolved by following 
formulae such as: ‘When there is a clash between two or more virtues, choose the most important 
virtue’; ‘When there is a clash between two or more obligations, choose the most important 
obligation’ (see Barry, 1986); or, to introduce an example of a slightly more sophisticated model, 
‘identify the problem; generate alternative solutions; evaluate the alternatives, using cost-benefit 
approaches; select the solution; implement the chosen solution’ (Kitson & Campbell, 1996: 23). 
Such procedures reduce ethics to a purely instrumental reasoning that pays no heed to the normative 
judgements that are needed to discern and order virtues and obligations in terms of importance. As 
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such, Johan Verstraeten (2000: 4) argues that business ethics textbooks often end where moral 
formation or judgement begins.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the complex nature of ethical action is often appealed to in organisational 
practices as a justification for procedural or instrumental reasoning, or for ethical wrongdoing. In 
such circumstances, ‘[m]orality is sacrificed on the altar of complexity’ (ten Bos, 1997: 1001). The 
uncertainty that results from complexity cannot simply be discounted, or reduced to proceduralism. 
The reasons for this are threefold: firstly, as we have seen, moral agency is denied when a person’s 
actions are determined by external criteria or predetermined rules. Secondly, in practice, people are 
confronted with a plurality of prescriptions, procedures, and morals. Merely following one model 
may not be a reason for dismissing an alternative model. And, thirdly, models cannot fully account 
for contingencies: some interpretation is always needed (Clegg et al. 2007: 111). As such, the 
‘objectivity’ of procedural fairness can never be legitimated on the grounds of truth, or the realism 
of any metaphysical propositions (see Porter, 1992).   
 
When business ethicists teaching or practices are premised on blind rule-following, they act ‘as a 
technology… for the reduction of undecidability’, and, through this, become: 
 
much the same as described by the German philosopher Theodor Adorno, as a form of 
mathematised and codified knowledge in which thought is removed and ‘which robots can 
learn and copy’ (1973:30) – textbook knowledge for puppets, not knowledge that you gain 
by thinking for yourself (Jones et al., 2005:8). 
 
4.2. Problems with the application of the standard normative ethical theories 
 
Whether the normative theories are inherently characterised by an instrumental thinking or whether 
the theories are reduced to a few instrumental prescriptions, the effect is the same: it is assumed that 
the ethical theory unproblematically provides all the answers and that the challenge lies in 
motivating individuals to act and adhere to these ethical prescriptions. The standard approach to 
applying ethical theory, therefore, follows a top-down trajectory. At one extreme the moral agent 
bears little individual accountability for her actions, besides complying with, and applying 
predetermined rules. A possible consequence is that when prescriptive principles are translated into 
universal moral codes designed to stimulate ethical thought, they may – in practice – achieve the 
opposite effect and instead serve to diminish moral awareness and sensitivity (as argued above). In 
such instances, parochiality is presented as universalism (Willmott, 1998: 93).  
52 
 
At the other extreme, however, we have the common criticism that business practitioners find the 
qualitative, philosophical approach foreign, and often have a negative attitude towards this 
approach. Sorell (1998: 17) argues ‘that relations between academic ethicists and practitioners is 
much more uneasy in the case of business than in such areas as medicine, legal advocacy, police 
work or public administration’ (see Stark, 1993). He contends that whereas there is wide agreement 
concerning the purpose of doctors, lawyers, police, or political office-holding; mainstream business 
goals look dubious to the ethicist, whereas lofty academic ideals come across as self-righteous or 
utopian to the practitioner. In short, ethicists are distanced from practitioners (a phenomenon Sorell 
dubs the alienation problem23).   
 
A consequence of the alienation problem is that we are often left with ‘a wholly ineffectual business 
ethics’ (Sorrel, 1998: 17). Sorrel (17) argues that such a position need not be self-contradictory as 
there is still a case to be made for providing normative justifications for certain business practices; 
however, he claims that ‘the ethical point of doing so when no business people are listening is 
perhaps a little obscure.’ The consequences resulting from the alienation problem are compounded 
when rule or principle-based ethical approaches are further simplified or instrumentalised through 
their depictions and applications.  Below follows a more in depth description of why this might be 
the case. 
 
4.2.1. There are no categorically-binding rules or principles 
 
Joseph DesJardins (2004: 97) identifies the fact that we have not found any rules that are 
categorically-binding on all people, in all contexts, at all times, as one of the most serious problems 
to haunt rule or principle-based normative theories. Even an empty, formal rule such as the 
categorical imperative seldom provides unambiguous answers to practical problems. With careful 
formulations, one can universalise many things. This problem is further compounded when one 
introduces competing ethical theories, such as utilitarianism – which, in practice, often yields 
radically different ethical ‘answers’ to the Kantian approach, for example.   
 
The above argument can be restated in the following way: moral theories do not a) provide a 
‘complete answer to the question, “What ought I to do?”’ and, b) do not ‘solve all of one’s practical 
moral dilemmas’ (Hoffman, 1984: 263-264). In his article, ‘The course in business ethics: Why 
                                                    
23
 Sorell is by no means the first to acknowledge the alienation problem. Many authors (Francis & Armstrong, 
2003; Jones, 1995; Joyner & Paine, 2002; Raiborn & Payne, 1996) have all debated whether ethics and 
business goals (such as competitive advantage and profitability) can be aligned. Clegg et al. (2007: 109) 
trace the origins of this problem back to Adam Smith’s view on the invisible hand of the market, and Karl 
Marx’s rebuttal of this view.  
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don’t philosophers give business students what they need?’, George Pamental (1991: 388; 389) 
argues that students of philosophy have extensive training in logical analysis and ethical 
argumentation, which allows them to discriminate between different normative positions and 
identify plausible solutions. However, business students and practitioners have no training in 
philosophical analysis and struggle to mediate between these different positions. As a result, they 
adopt either a relativist approach – where theories are viewed as mutually interchangeable; or, a 
subjectivist approach – where priority is accorded to one theory, which automatically becomes the 
default position in all situations. Ethics is also often regarded as a ‘soft’ science, which lacks 
theoretical foundation (Donaldson, 2003: 363). Such a view stems from the perception that ethics is 
‘an incursion from a moral realm outside ordinary practice and orderly theory (Feldman, 2004), an 
incursion from a transcendent and barely grasped tradition’ (Clegg et al., 2007: 107).  
 
4.2.2. The character of the moral agent is not taken into consideration 
 
This perception of ethics as transcendent and other-worldly, ties in with the second major problem 
associated with applying many ethical theories, namely that abstract rules also do not take the 
character of the moral agent into consideration. The focus of such abstract rules is more on the type 
of actions an ethical agent should undertake, rather than on the type of person the ethical agent 
should be. A further related problem is that principle and rule-based ethical theories are external to 
the moral agent. Before being applied, the external rules should first be accepted, internalised, and 
adopted by the moral agent. The motivation to act on a principle is also inversely proportional to the 
abstract character of the principle i.e. the degree to which it is rationally binding on all people at all 
times (DesJardins, 2004: 97). This means that, whereas most people might accept the categorical 
imperative (for example) as a legitimate ethical prescription, few people will be motivated to make 
ethical decisions on the basis of this prescription. Past experiences and contextual considerations are 
likely to play a much larger role in informing individuals’ decisions.  
 
Once again, Pamental (1991: 390) concurs with these points, arguing that philosophical questions 
often hold ‘little or no interest to the individuals facing the day-to-day difficulties of decision-
making in an organization vying in a competitive market’. Pamental (390) goes on to illustrate this 
problem with the following example: 
 
During fourteen years in business I never participated in a serious discussion of the merits of 
capitalism versus those of Marxism. In all my discussions with people in business, I have 
never encountered one who was particularly concerned with the legitimacy of the 
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corporation, nor have I ever met a business person who felt compelled to know whether the 
corporation can or cannot have a conscience.  
 
Although the above examples do not directly concern the normative theories that are being 
evaluated, the same point may very well be extended to Kantian or utilitarian ethics. As argued 
above, it is unlikely that the average business person spends much time worrying about whether a 
particular decision is based on Kantian or utilitarian grounds. The criticism is that ‘[f]ar too many 
business ethicists have occupied a rarefied high ground, removed from the real concerns of and real-
world problems of the vast majority of managers. They have been too preoccupied with… abstract 
theorizing, and with prescriptions that apply only remotely to managerial practices’ (Stark, 1993: 
38). Or, as one respondent stated during a focus group session in a recent study24 designed to 
improve the teaching of business ethics to accounting students: ‘We are not philosophy students and 
don’t forget that. We have a whole different mindset to philosophy people, and if you are going to 
treat us like philosophy people, we are going to switch off’ (Woermann & Hattingh, 2008: 9).   
 
It must also be noted that Pamental’s example mirrors the type of criticism that a descriptive 
business ethicist might direct at a normative business ethicist (see footnote 7). Nevertheless, the 
criticism should be addressed, as it does raise an important issue, namely: how far can one veer into 
the direction of abstract rules and principles before losing connection to the real world of business? 
Although philosophers can undoubtedly contribute good arguments from the seminar room, such 
arguments will be useless if they do not translate into the language of the boardroom (Parker 1998b: 
283). As such, business ethicists must move away from ‘armchair applied ethics’ and do some leg-
work (Sorell, 1998: 19) in order to familiarise themselves with the practitioner’s concerns.  
 
4.2.3. The context of moral decision-making is not taken into consideration 
 
A third and last issue identified by Pamental (1991) concerns the application of normative theories 
in the business context: successfully applying moral theory assumes both the ability to engage in 
abstract thought, and to remain completely rational in all situations (Furman, 1990). Most ethics 
training programmes are, therefore, premised on the idea that business practitioners are autonomous 
individuals who freely choose their value orientations, whilst simultaneously remaining committed 
                                                    
24
 This study (which was conducted by the Department of Philosophy, Stellenbosch University) compares the 
experiences of students from three South African universities with regard to their business ethics education. 
Students completed a survey and attended focus groups, and in depth interviews were conducted with 
lecturers, members of the South African Institute of Chartered Accounting (SAICA), and a member of 
EthicSA. The goal of the research was to identify current strengths and challenges in business ethics 
education, in order to propose guidelines for teaching business ethics.  
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to the organisational goals (Willmott, 1998: 85). Three factors counter this objective attitude within 
an applied context: firstly, business students and practitioners are often taught to be ‘practical’ and 
‘make the right decision’. This presumes the direct opposite of abstract, contextless thought 
processes. Secondly, the socialisation process often introduces cultural pressures in the workplace, 
which undermine one’s ability to act objectively. Lastly, abstract, objective thought is also 
undermined by the systemic pressures which characterise the business environment. Such pressures 
include the amount of resources pumped into a project, tight deadlines etc. This serves to focus the 
attention of business people on the immediate job requirements. According to Stark (in Sorrell, 
1998: 18), business ethicists will only be successful if they turn from the question regarding the 
motivation of ethical practices, to the principles that should guide practitioners in the face of 
competing business considerations.   
 
In conclusion, one can argue that virtue ethics can, in principle, avoid the alienation problem. This 
is because the approach emphasises virtues above formal rules and principles, takes the moral 
character of agents into account, and stresses the context in which moral decision-making takes 
place. Virtue ethics, therefore, holds several advantages for business ethics. However, as argued in 
section 3.2.3., virtue ethics runs the risk of sliding into a ‘born-again’ communitarian position, if 
uncritically applied. In such cases, the individual discretion and judgement needed to make ethical 
decisions is sacrificed in favour of decisions that reflect the status quo. In an organisational context, 
the effects of a communitarian thinking can lead to groupthink, a phenomena which promotes 
cohesion and consensus at the expense of critical thought. This may lead to disastrous 
consequences, and necessitates an investigation of the relation between groupthink and unethical 
corporate behaviour (see Sims, 1992). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the standard normative tale was presented and evaluated. The chapter commenced 
with a short description of the two fields of business ethics – namely the descriptive or empirical 
field, and the prescriptive or normative field. After a brief motivation for why the study would 
constitute an evaluation of the normative field of business ethics, the standard normative tale 
(comprised of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and virtue ethics) was introduced and evaluated. Next, 
the depiction of this tale in the business ethics literature was introduced and critiqued. The 
importance of this step was motivated on the grounds that the presentation of these normative 
ethical theories influences the perceptions that business students have regarding the nature of ethical 
decision-making. As a last step, the success with which the standard normative tale can help 
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practitioners deal with ethical problems was investigated. The overall conclusion to be drawn from 
this analysis is that the standard normative tale presents several deficiencies on the theoretical level, 
on the level of presentation, and on the level of application.   
 
On the level of ethical theory, it was argued that utilitarianism and Kantian ethics emphasise 
procedure at the expense of substance, and that not one of the three normative theories can 
effectively deal with the relationship between individuals and society (including the manner in 
which moral beliefs are thought to be constituted in institutions such as organisations). On the level 
of presentation, it was firstly argued that the scope of the standard normative tale does not account 
for 20th century philosophy. Ancient philosophy (Aristotle) and modern philosophy (Kant, 
Bentham, and Mill) constitute the basic normative picture. Secondly, it was argued that the way in 
which the normative theories are presented in the applied literature shows a gross simplification of 
the substantive content of these theories. Related to this critique is the fact that the theories are often 
presented in terms of easy-to-follow-and-apply rules or principles. Ethical thinking and decision-
making are, thus, reduced to instrumental or procedural reasoning. On the level of application, it 
was shown that distilling ethical decision-making to abstract principles and rules also often holds 
little value for practitioners; and, moreover, lead to the alienation problem. Even virtue ethics (when 
given a communitarian slant) leads to problems in practice, as focusing on the status quo is often 
not conducive to making good ethical decisions.     
 
Much of the critique highlighted in this chapter deals with the consequence of what happens when 
we push ‘decision, judgement and ultimately ethics until they tell us what they have to contain’: 
ethics becomes dominated by a type of machine logic, which simply ignores the problems (Parker, 
1998b: 293). Applying this logic to business means that ethics becomes a strategy for helping 
managers to formulate moral rules, which – instead of promoting ethical action – serves to 
undermine the basis of morality (interpretation of Bauman in ten Bos, 1997: 1008; 1009).  
According to Bauman (1993: 68), moral sentiments cannot be tamed and domesticated ‘through 
lodging them safely in a straitjacket of formal (or formalizable) rules.’ This leads us to the 
conclusion that just as modernity could not guarantee progress, ethics can also not guarantee the 
good (Parker, 1998b: 295). This type of critique is not meant to completely discredit the standard 
normative tale, but does force us to rethink the status of this tale, particular in terms of the 
purported value that it holds for business ethics. In other words, our questioning must be directed 
beyond the moral certainties that prevent us from contemplating the ethical. Parker (289) sums up 
this sentiment as follows: 
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The warm embrace given to ethics – through professorships in business schools, conference 
papers, journals, course designs, books… – could all too rapidly turn to suffocation unless 
we allow ethics some room to breathe. Perhaps it would be better to open a window.   
 
In opening a window on the normative field of business ethics, we must take note of positions that 
promote ethical decision-making that can account for the complexities that characterise our 
embedded positions in the world. Furthermore, we must seek out positions that have dispelled the 
illusion that there is a vantage point from which the ethical horison becomes clear. This study is 
dedicated to the exposition of two such positions, namely deconstruction (which, broadly-speaking, 
can be identified as a postmodern philosophical position); and, critical complexity theory (which, 
although not born out of philosophy, nevertheless, holds several important philosophical 
implications regarding the nature of humans, the world, and ethics). However, before analysing the 
main tenets and specific normative implications that deconstruction and critical complexity hold for 
our understanding of ethics, it is firstly necessary to give a broad overview of postmodern 
philosophy. The importance of this step lies in the general challenge that it poses to the standard 
normative tale. As such, chapter two, in which postmodernism is introduced as an alternative tale 
for normative ethics, paves the way for the more concrete and specific discussion to follow in later 
chapters.      
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Chapter 2 
An Alternative Tale for Business Ethics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Throughout chapter one, we have seen that business ethics (conceived of as a formal subject or 
enterprise) is ineffective when instrumentalised in a set of formal prescriptions and procedures. In 
the recent study designed to improve the teaching of business ethics to accounting students 
(mentioned in chapter one, footnote 24), students were asked during focus group sessions what they 
believed to be the main goal of business ethics. It is indicative that none of the respondents 
mentioned the internalisation of formal prescriptions and procedures as the goal of a business ethics 
education. Rather, responses that indicated the value of a ‘broader education’ (see Verstraeten, 
2000) were popular. For example, one respondent said that the goal of business ethics is ‘to get 
someone to start thinking critically – it motivates students to ask why we are here… [Business 
ethics focuses on] more than just money or more than just enjoying life.’ Another respondent 
echoed these sentiments saying that business ethics is about developing a ‘conscious lifestyle’ 
(Woermann & Hattingh, 2008: 6-7).  
 
Several students also exhibited positive attitudes regarding courses in business ethics. The reasons 
for these positive attitudes echoed (what they determined to be) the goal of a business ethics 
education. Personal reasons that were offered in this regard included the perception that business 
ethics ‘helps you to think’ and ‘brings the world of ethics closer to home and lets you look at 
yourself, [and] critique your own decision…’; whereas professional reasons included the perception 
that ‘ethics is a very integral part of being an accountant, especially with more reliance on good 
information in the capitalistic markets today’; and, that ‘without due trust in the integrity of our 
professionals, we have little reason for them’ (8).     
 
What these responses have in common is the view that business ethics is primarily concerned with – 
what Painter-Morland (2008: 237) calls – ‘the enhancement of life’.  As the title of her book, 
Business Ethics as Practice: Ethics as the Everyday Business of Business suggests, Painter-Morland 
begins with the view that, in order to be effective, ethics should become an integral part of business. 
When ethics is seen as part of business practice – rather than an afterthought to business-as-usual – 
our understanding of business ethics also shifts from ethics as a mere insurance policy or 
compliance model, to ethics as a careful (and continuous) consideration of how we wish to live and 
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who we want to be (2). It is ultimately this goal that business ethicists should advance in their work. 
In this chapter, an alternative model for business ethics (one which takes cognisance of the 
developments in postmodern philosophy) is introduced, as it is postulated that postmodern 
philosophy can contribute to the agenda of business, defined as the enhancement of life. As stated in 
the conclusion of the previous chapter, a discussion on postmodernism also serves as a general 
introduction to the discussions to follow. In chapter three, it will become clear that the postmodern 
position presents us with a more complex view on ethics, and it is specifically this ethical 
complexity that forms a central focus of this study. In chapters four and five, the idea of ethical 
complexity is elaborated upon at the hand of Derrida’s deconstructive ethics. As such, this broad 
introduction (and the implications that follow from it) paves the way for more nuanced and in depth 
analyses in subsequent chapters.  
 
There are many different interpretations of postmodernism, and in the first section of the analysis, a 
formal classification of postmodernism will be attempted. However, in order to introduce the 
analysis, it is necessary to briefly distinguish between two opposing views of postmodernism. The 
first view is referred to as ‘sceptical postmodernism’, which is the perspective that ‘all 
interpretations of phenomena are equally valid’ (Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 455). Protagonists of this 
perspective view the world as so complicated that prediction and causality are irrelevant. On this 
take, we are left with, what Rosenau (1992: 15) terms ‘a pessimistic, negative, gloomy’ assessment 
of social science. In contrast to sceptical postmodernism, ‘affirmative postmodernists’ (who support 
the second view of postmodernism) are of the opinion that not all texts are ‘equally valid or 
valuable’ (Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 455). It is worthwhile to note that, contrary to the opinion of his 
critics, the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida (1988a: 146), supports this latter view, as is evident 
from the following citation: ‘it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of 
discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy.’ Since this study is 
largely informed by a Derridean perspective, affirmative postmodernism will be taken as a starting 
point for this analysis.         
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: In the first section, post(-)modern and post-structural ideas are 
introduced, with the intent of providing a theoretical framework for the discussion. Post(-
)modernism and post-structuralism are explored at the hand of the analytic distinctions made 
between these terms (only to show that such distinctions cannot hold definitely), as well as in terms 
of how these ideas challenge and respond to modernist and structuralist ideologies. In the second 
section, the distinction between the descriptive and normative fields of business ethics (introduced 
at the beginning of chapter one) is revisited, in order to show that such a distinction collapses if one 
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takes seriously the insights gleaned from the discussion on postmodernism.  In the third section, an 
overview is provided of the business ethics and organisation studies literature that deals with the 
question of postmodernism in these fields. These texts make little substantive reference to the work 
of individual postmodernists (and of how these ideas can be applied to business ethics). Rather, 
these texts address the meta-question of whether it is useful or not to import postmodern ideas (per 
se) into business ethics and organisation studies.  Critical commentary on the analysis undertaken 
during the course of the chapter follows in the fourth section. In the concluding section, the 
criticisms against the standard normative tale (which were raised in the previous chapter) are 
addressed, with reference to the characteristics of a postmodern ethics. The implications that these 
characteristics hold for the practice of business ethics are also elaborated upon.   
 
2. Post(-)modern and post-structural roots 
 
‘Postmodernism’ is a very broad term, designating a number of developments in various fields. 
Indeed, postmodernism is quite the buzzword, often denoting a state where everything is possible, 
but nothing is certain (Havel, 1994). This, however, is not a helpful basis for undertaking an 
analysis of postmodernism, and, therefore, some (provisional) categories must be constructed, 
despite the fact that some (like Featherstone, 1988: 207) claim that ‘there may be as many 
postmodernisms as there are postmodernists.’ One such categorisation strategy is to draw analytic 
distinctions between the various movements that are generally included under the banner of 
postmodernism; whereas a second strategy involves studying postmodernism as a response to 
modernism, and, from there, determining certain features that characterise postmodern positions. 
Both these strategies will be employed in this section. 
 
2.1. Analytic distinctions 
 
According to Easthope (2001: 17), three main uses of the term ‘postmodernism’ can be identified: 
one current in art history and architecture, a second in philosophy, and a third in a more general 
account of contemporary culture. The term ‘postmodernism’ first appeared in the late 1960s, but 
was popularised in Charles Jencks’s book, entitled The Language of Post-Modern Architecture 
(1975) (Easthope, 2001: 17). In this book, Jencks contrasts the postmodern architectural style, 
which is typified by asymmetrical and decentred buildings, with modernist buildings, which are 
designed around the centre (18). This decentred and anti-foundational approach is also promulgated 
in what is commonly recognised as the ‘most powerful theoretical expression’ (Sim, 2001: 3) of 
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philosophical postmodernism, namely Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report of Knowledge (1984).   
 
During the 1980s, sociologists further differentiated between the terms ‘postmodernism’ and ‘post-
structuralism’25. According to this categorisation, post-structuralists (such as Derrida and Foucault) 
tend to concentrate on the work of language and discourse, whereas postmodernists (such as 
Baudrillard and Lyotard) ‘analyse the contemporary social conditions of an epoch’ or ‘concentrate 
on the theoretical milieu which has developed to sustain these conditions as a response, or a variety 
of responses, to modernism’ (Linstead, 2004b: 3). Parker (1992) distinguishes between these two 
understandings of the term ‘postmodernism’ by employing a hyphen: postmodernism as a signifier 
of a historical periodisation is written with a hyphen (post-modernism); whereas postmodernism as 
a theoretical perspective is written without the hyphen (postmodernism)26 (see Linstead, 2004b: 3; 
Hassard, 1993: 2).     
 
John Hassard (1993: 2) further elaborates on this latter categorisation, stating that the goal of post-
modernism (as an epoch) is ‘to identify features of the external world that support the hypothesis 
that society is moving towards a new postmodern era.’ Although social and economic structures are 
viewed as fragmented across diverse networks (3), this group of post-modernists still support ‘the 
realist notion that we simply need to find the right way of describing the world ‘out there’’ (2). In 
contrast to this view, Hassard (3) maintains that postmodernism (as an epistemology) reflects post-
structural developments. Here, the task of postmodernism ‘is to recognize [the] elusive nature of 
language, but never with the aim of creating a meta-discourse to explain all language forms’, since 
the idea of a final structure is debunked as a myth’27.    
 
Stephen Linstead (2004b: 3), however, warns that the above distinctions are not hard and fast, 
because despite family resemblances, many differences prevail under the post(-) modern and post-
structural writers. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that most of the key figures (such as Derrida, 
Foucault and Baudrillard) who typify these movements, have renounced the labels given to them, 
and even the terms that they themselves have coined. This is not a frivolous or rhetorical move, but 
shows a genuine concern for labelling and ‘the deadening effects which reduce the multiplicity, 
                                                    
25
 This distinction has become popular in organisation studies.  
26
 Hassard (1993: 2) points to a similar distinction in Bauman’s (1988a, 1988b) work, where post-modernism 
is identified as a ‘postmodern sociology’, and postmodernism is associated with ‘a sociology of 
postmodernity’.  
27
 Hassard’s distinction between post-modernism as an epoch and postmodernism as an epistemology 
corresponds with Morin’s (2007) views on restricted complexity and general complexity, as described in the 
introduction of chapter three. For a more in depth discussion on the implications of Hassard’s distinction, see 
section 5.   
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paradox and struggle with ideas to a series of homogenous ‘positions’’ (4). For this reason, Linstead 
(3; 5) wearily treats postmodernism as encompassing post-structuralism. The same cautious 
categorisation will be used in the context of this study.  
 
2.2. (Anti)ideological distinctions 
  
2.2.1. Postmodernism as para-modernism 
 
Before concluding this introduction to postmodernism/post-structuralism, a second (arguably more 
common) categorisation strategy will also be considered, in the hope that such a strategy can help 
us to gain more of a feel for the agenda of postmodernism/post-structuralism. Typically, this 
strategy involves viewing postmodernism/post-structuralism as both a rejection of the ‘grand 
narratives’ of modernism (Lyotard, 1984), and of Ferdinand Saussure’s (1960) structuralist view 
that language is a relatively stable system of signs that can yield predictable responses.  In this 
regard, Huyssen (1986: 209) writes: 
 
if poststructuralism can be seen as the revenant of modernism in the guise of theory, then 
that would also be precisely what makes it postmodern. It is a postmodernism that… in 
some cases, is fully aware of modernism’s limitations and failed ambitions. 
 
This citation characterises postmodernism as a response to ‘modernist exhaustion’ (Calás & 
Smircich, 1999: 652). The postmodern movement, however, should not be seen as a linear 
unfolding of events. The postmodern, as Lyotard (in Linstead, 2004b: 4) maintains, is that which 
comes before the modern. Linstead (2004b: 4) interprets this as meaning that the postmodern 
simultaneously precedes the modern, yet is also something that can only be understood through and 
after the modern. The nature of human experience has always been complex, yet different epochs 
dealt with this complexity in different ways: whereas pre-modern societies responded to this 
complexity through myth, magic and religion; modern societies viewed the world as being guided 
by rationality, logic, order and scientific objectivity. The belief was that if we could attain 
knowledge of the inner workings of nature, we would be able to control (and resolve) this 
complexity. Postmodernists, on the other hand, embrace this complexity; and, through historical 
analysis, reveal the ‘reductions, aporia, hidden oppositions and binaries and other inevitable 
representational inadequacies’ (4-5) upon which modernist assumptions are based. Postmodernists, 
therefore, attempt to uncover the postmodern within the structures of modernity.  In this regard, 
Linstead (5) writes that ‘the roots of postmodernism lie alongside the roots of modernism.’ Or, 
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otherwise stated, whereas the modernist movement focuses on the centre, the postmodernist 
movement focuses on the margins. The postmodern is therefore the ‘para-modern’ or ‘paratheory’, 
which: 
 
looks for the fissures in [the] cosy state of [modernist] affairs, the failures, the immanences, 
the bursts of energy, the collapses, the silences and the refusals of the unsaid and the non-
known to become the said or the known (5).  
 
This argument clearly debunks the common accusations that postmodernism has no history. 
Postmodernists think history differently, in order to highlight the ways in which ‘history lives in and 
exerts pressure on its recreation in the present’ (2). On this take, it is wrong to view postmodernism 
‘as just another anti-modern intellectual current’ (Rosenau, 1992: 169). Rather, affirmative 
postmodernists engage with tradition so as to undermine the solid foundation and great Truths of 
modernism, and to break down institutional, social, and disciplinary boundaries in order to give a 
voice to those who are not represented in the dominant discourse (Giroux, 1992: 56).  
Postmodernism can, therefore, also be seen as a political movement which seeks to destabilise 
powerful entrenched interests, and, thereby, challenge the status quo (Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 460). 
In fact, Sim (2001: 4) notes that a common feature shared by most postmodernists is ‘an almost 
reflexive dislike of authority’, accompanied by a gesture of scepticism and an anti-foundational 
bias.    
 
Apart from these three common features identified by Sim, many postmodernists also share some 
other basic ideas, including an interest in the crisis of representation, the provisionality of meaning, 
reflexivity, and the decentering of the subject. These ideas will only be dealt with briefly here, as 
more attention will be given to these postmodern problematics in the following chapters. 
  
2.2.2. Four basic postmodernist ideas 
 
The crisis of representation refers to the postmodernist view that a theory-neutral observation 
language is impossible (Hassard, 1993: 11). Pure thought cannot be represented in a continuous and 
unproblematic fashion in speech (an ideal designated by the term ‘phonocentrism’). Rather than 
being simply representative, thought constitutes us. In other words, thinking is about living in 
different ways – not about gaining direct access to reality (Dillon, 2000: 3). This implies that ‘there 
is no methodology capable of achieving an unmediated, objective representation of the facts’ 
(Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 464; see Willmott, 1998).  Whatever counts as ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ are, in the 
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words of Friedrich Nietzsche (1995: 92), ‘illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions’. On Kilduff and Mehra’s (1997: 463) interpretation, this means that: 
  
Truth is not something that inheres in nature; it is rooted in conventions fabricated by 
humans… Each linguistic community, and even each individual, can potentially perceive the 
truth about the world differently.   
 
What the above implies is that meaning is provisional. Any attempt at fixing ‘truth’ represents a 
‘professional self-justification’ (Hassard, 1993: 12); which, according to Lyotard (1984), has the 
character of a ‘little narrative’ (petit récit) (Sim, 2001: 8). These little narratives can also be viewed 
as language games embodying a particular set of knowledge criteria. Knowledge is embedded in a 
number of diverse discourses each with its own rules and structures, and no one discourse is 
privileged. The postmodern condition is, therefore, characterised by diversity and conflict (Hassard, 
1993: 9). On this view, professional self-justification – or doing science – involves a form of 
‘serious play’ through which we make value judgements on a case-by-case basis, and through 
which we ‘seek to oppose the moves and positions of other players while advancing our own 
positions’ (10; see Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985).  Knowledge and texts ‘represent a series of choices 
concerning how arguments should be presented, and these choices are embodied in the text’ 
(Kilduff & Mehra, 1997: 465).  In this regard, the work of the postmodern writer is to violate the 
norms and destabilise the language games in order to show that knowledge is not governed by pre-
established rules (Lyotard, 1984: 81).  
 
Nowhere is the insight regarding the provisionality of meaning and knowledge more prevalent than 
in the writings of Derrida. Derrida deconstructs Saussure’s system of language, in order to show 
how signification is the result of a constant deferral of meaning from one linguistic unit to another 
(Derrida, 1976). There is no original core of signification: all meaning is already mediated through 
signifiers that are differentiated from one another. Meaning, therefore, resides in the relations 
between words and concepts, and not in some intrinsic property (see chapter four, 2.2.2). This again 
affirms the idea that, contrary to modernist beliefs, there is no stable form of phenomena (which our 
ideas and theories capture in a natural, intuitive way).  This insight on the nature of language is 
well-illustrated in the following citation taken from the carnivalesque literature of the Russian 
scholar, Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 202):  
 
For the word is not a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, eternallly fickle medium 
of dialogic interaction. It never gravitates towards a single conscience or a single voice. The 
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life of the word is contained in its transfer from one mouth to another, from one context to 
another context, from one social collective to another, from one generation to another 
generation. In this process the word does not forget its own path and cannot completely free 
itself from the power of these concrete contexts into which it has entered. 
 
However, even if language and meaning is best described as ‘the eternally fickle medium of 
dialogic interaction’, Derrida (1988a: 150-151) (as with Lyotard) allows for the relative stability of 
contexts of interaction. Derrida writes that in putting into doubt the possibility of the values and 
norms that guide our perceptions of truth, he is not denying that we should submit to the norms of 
pragmatically-determined contexts, only that we should account for the perceived stability of such 
practices (a stability which is inevitably characterised by historicity, non-naturalness, ethics, politics 
and institutionality).    
 
This last point captures something of the postmodern attitude of reflexivity. The postmodern 
approach to knowledge means that ‘we must possess the ability to be critical or suspicious of our 
own intellectual assumptions’ (interpretation of Lawson in Hassard, 1993: 12).  Postmodern writers 
employ various strategies (such as erasure, double writing, irony, puns, the use of expressions that 
are nonsensical in traditional conventions, paradoxes, and so forth) to focus attention on the 
provisionality of knowledge, and thereby to undermine the view of knowledge ‘as a prestigious and 
objective estate divorced from the mundane activities of everyday life’ (Hassard, 1993: 13). Not 
only does this reflexive view characterise the postmodern approach to knowledge, but also of how 
postmodernists view humans and human agency.   
 
The modernist view of human agency is founded upon a ‘personal, subjective core of awareness in 
which actions and emotions are coordinated from a knowing self’ (15). This view, where ‘[t]he 
agent acts within its own dynamic presence’ (15) in known as logocentrism (Derrida, 1976; 1978a). 
In the postmodern tradition, this stable, monolithic self is replaced by the ‘image of a dynamic, 
differentiated self’, where the structure of self-concept is viewed as ‘complex and multifaceted and 
the process of self-conception as active and fluid’ (Seabright & Kurke, 1997: 99).  This postmodern 
structure of self-concept is aptly described in the anthropologist, Plessner’s (1972: 160) dictum: ‘I 
am, but do not possess myself’; whereas the postmodern process of self-conception is captured by 
Bloch’s (1969; epigraph) reply to Plessner’s dictum: ‘That is why we must become.’  
 
Before concluding this section, a caveat is necessary. The postmodern ideas described above 
(namely, the crisis of representation, the provisionality of meaning, an emphasis on reflexivity, and 
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the decentering of the subject) have been explained at the hand of Nietzsche’s view on truth, 
Lyotard’s rejection of grand narratives, and Derrida’s view on language. This selective reading by 
no means exhausts the body of ideas presented by these philosophers, nor does it represent a 
unanimous view espoused by all postmodernists.  No reference in this analysis of postmodern 
thought was made to Gilles Deleuze’s eclectic philosophical tomes or his work on the radical 
relationality of bodies; Michel Foucault’s treatment of power relations; Henri-Louise Bergson’s 
work on time, intuition, creativity and virtuality; Georges Bataille’s work on desire and 
transgression; or, to the discussions on post-feminism by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler (to 
mention but a few other postmodern philosophers). Any attempt at giving a comprehensive analysis 
of postmodernism, will always fail as postmodern thought ‘cannot be captured in a summary 
definition’ (Dillon, 2000: 2). Not only can postmodern ideas not be captured in succinct or concise 
definitions, but we should also (in the spirit of postmodernism) be critical of our own assumptions 
regarding these ideas. As Richard Feynman (2005: 396) once wrote in a letter to Armando Garcia 
J.: ‘I was born not knowing and have had only a little time to change that here and there.’  
 
3. Revisiting the tale of two cities: the sprawling landscape of business ethics 
 
At the beginning of chapter one, the normative and descriptive fields of business ethics were 
defined. Although the focus of this study has thus far been on the normative approach to business 
ethics, it should be clear at this juncture that the distinction between the two fields (although alive 
and well in practice) is conceptually problematic. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, since 
knowledge is provisional, our descriptions of the world do not accord with an a priori view of 
reality, but involves certain choices of how to portray reality. This means that all our decisions and 
actions are characterised by a normative dimension. Secondly, normative considerations cannot be 
viewed in abstract-terms (or in relation to an Ideal realm), but must be considered within specific 
practices and language games. In other words, our decisions and actions are contextually-defined. 
The above implies that any account of human behaviour will be characterised by both a descriptive 
and a normative dimension, and that the descriptive and normative dimensions are interrelated. This 
insight presents a challenge to the manner in which both the descriptive and the normative fields of 
business ethics are characterised. Below follows a more in depth discussion of the implications of 
this challenge.  
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3.1. Problematising the fact-value distinction: an argument against objective truths 
 
The business ethicist, Hugh Willmott (1998: 80), explicitly places the fact-value distinction – i.e. 
the idea that the description of what ethics is can be neatly separated from our value judgements – 
into doubt. His argument is as follows (80): if our ethical models cannot be justified on 
epistemological or ontological grounds, then the very idea of descriptive ethics is untenable. In 
other words, the category of a purely descriptive ethics is only coherent if ethics can provide us with 
descriptions of that which exists prior to our interpretations, and, therefore, independently of 
language (79). However, as Rorty (1979) reminds us, we do not hold a mirror up to nature. 
Knowledge is always, already interpreted knowledge; and our interpretations are, by definition, 
contextual, temporal, and limited constructions. As a result, the category of descriptive ethics 
collapses into normative ethics, and any attempt at pursuing ‘truth for its own sake’ always 
translates into:  
 
a tacit quest for something more than truth, for other values may have been obscured, 
denied, and perhaps even forbidden… In this sense, ‘truth for its own sake’ is a crypto-ethic 
of concealment of other substantive values (Gouldner, 1973: 65). 
 
Willmott (1998: 80) argues that, as ethicists, merely acknowledging the normative component is not 
enough. We should also engage in analytical ethics, which, more than ‘simply voicing an evaluation 
or judgement of an issue… prompts reflection on the basis of such judgement’. More specifically, 
he maintains that ‘the ‘analytical ethics’ of post-structuralism has a normative thrust as it challenges 
the coherence of ‘descriptive ethics’.’ He states that poststructuralist thinking is particularly helpful 
‘in re-membering the connectedness of what appears to be antimonies – such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, 
‘fact’ and ‘value’ or ‘self’ and ‘other’’ (87). Willmott’s reinscription of the normative field, 
therefore, resonates well with a poststructuralist position.  
 
3.2. An argument in defence of ‘thicker’ descriptions 
 
The later Parker28 (1998b: 284) takes a different view with regard to the collapse of the fact-value 
distinction. He argues that, if normativity pervades every decision and action, then every element 
(and description) of organisational life is construed as analytically inseparable from the 
                                                    
28
 Parker’s earlier work (referenced in sections four and five) endorses critical modernism and is explicitly 
opposed to postmodernism. However, as will be argued in this section, his later stance is compatible with a 
postmodern position. Therefore, to avoid confusion, the analysis makes specific reference to the earlier and 
later Parker, in order to distinguish between these ideological differences.  
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philosopher’s ethics. As a result, ethics becomes thoroughly ‘sociologized’, as it is drawn from the 
lofty ivory tower of academia into the flow of the ordinary (284). Parker argues that since the 
ethical cannot claim a special position anywhere, one should ‘attempt to go beyond any 
metaphysics of good and evil and gesture at relativism in the interests of a thicker description’ (285; 
my italics).  
 
Instead of providing prescriptive arguments for people’s actions, Parker contemplates the merits of 
engaging more intensely on the descriptive level, in order to see how people live, and how they 
draw conclusions concerning right and wrong. The drawback of this approach is that such an 
analysis cannot yield general results, because conceptions of right and wrong vary in, and between, 
contexts. This leads to what Kilduff and Mehra (1997: 465) term the ‘crisis of generalizability’. The 
outcome of this strategy is that it ‘squeezes [ethics] so flat that it gets everywhere, and hence is 
really nowhere’ (Parker, 1998b: 294). Decisions and judgements reverberate through endless 
networks, making it impossible for us to say: here is an instance of ethical action, there is not.  
 
To prevent such a conclusion, Parker (295) suggests that we should embrace the paradox that being 
ethical may mean giving up on ethics. This strategy presents a more provisional and contextual way 
of thinking about ethics, as it focuses on the ambivalence of actions and judgements. This, 
according to Parker (295), might mean that we need to reassess the manner in which business ethics 
questions are asked, and possibly argue that such questions are best left unanswered. Cronbach 
(1986: 91) summarises this sentiment as follows: ‘Social science is cumulative, not in possessing 
ever-more refined answers about fixed questions, but in possessing an ever-richer repertoire of 
questions.’ 
 
Although not explicitly mentioned, Parker’s position is not incompatible with a postmodern 
position. In an earlier article (referenced extensively in sections 4 and 5), Parker (1993: 212) argues 
against such a position, stating that a postmodern epistemology distracts us ‘from rigorous analysis 
of organizational changes within global capitalism’. However, in the article cited in this section, 
Parker (1998b: 295) supports forms of thought that ‘encourages us to question our deeply felt 
beliefs and not merely wrap us in certainties that prevent us from thinking the absurd.’ According to 
Jones (2003: 227), Parker’s agenda can be explained as an attempt to prioritise questions of 
axiology, position, ethics, and politics over ontology and epistemology. Such goals resonate well 
with postmodern thinking. 
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3.3. Evaluation 
 
The difference between Willmott’s (1998) and Parker’s (1998b) views illustrates the wide divisions 
that exist regarding how ‘we should describe theorizing and theorize description’ (Parker, 1998a: 
4). The former strategy is represented by Willmott’s (1998) approach, where emphasis is placed on 
a close examination of ‘texts’ in contemporary social sciences, in order to unveil the normative 
assumptions that are smuggled into seemingly neutral descriptions. The latter strategy is more in 
line with Parker’s (1998b) own attempt at foregrounding empirical contexts (including the local, 
institutional and historical context), in order to develop thicker descriptions of our practices.  
 
As stated above, both these positions are compatible with postmodern positions, which – unlike the 
standard normative tale discussed in chapter one – are sensitive to interpretations that do not 
attempt to fix the definition of ethics. Furthermore, Willmott’s and Parker’s arguments hold 
important implications for the circumscription of business ethics – either as a normative, or as a 
descriptive field.  Firstly, the description of the normative approach to business ethics is challenged 
if we reposition ethics in ‘the flow of the ordinary’. The reason for this is because our decisions and 
actions become thoroughly contextualised, which means that abstract, ideal, prescriptive moral 
judgements may prove insufficient as a basis for evaluating and critiquing corporate actions. 
Furthermore, the idea that moral agents make free, informed, and responsible choices on the basis 
of these principles alone is hardly credible. This is because the actions of moral agents are 
influenced and limited by contextual factors, and because moral agents are rationally-bounded i.e. 
we are limited by the information that we have, by our cognitive capacity, and by the amount of 
time that we have to make decisions.  
 
Secondly, and with reference to descriptive approach, it should be clear that moral agents function 
in complex environments. The idea that we can obtain objective knowledge about the social world, 
and the idea that the social world is inherently stable and certain – in fact so certain that we can give 
accurate explanations and predictions of human behaviour – are predicated on a functionalist 
paradigm, which has long been discredited. Whilst the strength of the descriptive approach lies in 
its consideration of the impact of external determinants on human behaviour, the objectivist 
paradigm within which many social scientists work  is undermined by Willmott’s argument.  
 
If neither the traditional circumscription of the normative nor the descriptive approach to business 
ethics ring true to our lived experiences, it seems that this classification is not very useful at a 
practical level. Furthermore, at the beginning of section 3 it was stated that it is difficult to draw 
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hard and fast distinctions between postmodern positions that emphasise context (Parker’s (1998b) 
standpoint) and post-structural positions that emphasise language and text (Willmott’s (1998) 
standpoint). In this regard, Linstead (2004b: 4) offers Derrida’s work as an example. Derrida is 
renowned for his work on language and textual analysis. However, Linstead argues that there has 
always been an implicit political dimension in Derrida’s work, which became much more explicit 
during the 1990s. Here we see how textual analysis becomes inextricably interwoven with social 
context, to the point where the distinction between text and context, or post-structuralism and 
postmodernism no longer proves helpful.  For this reason, the approach that will be followed in this 
study is one that shows sensitivity for social context, whilst also endorsing a close reading of 
business ethics texts.  
 
4. Postmodern thought in business ethics and organisation studies 
 
The advantage of the approach to postmodernism identified above is that, on this view, 
postmodernists avoid the problems of relativism (associated with sceptical postmodernism) and 
universalism (associated with modernism). This is because affirmative postmodernists still work 
with principles, rules and standards, whilst denying these principles, rules and standards a universal 
and incontestable status. As such, affirmative postmodernists recognise, and take cognisance of, 
both the contextual contingencies that define business practices, and the particularity of the 
normative assumptions that underlie these practices. Affirmative postmodernists, therefore, support 
a more complex understanding of ethics. In attempting to account for the complexities of our 
realities, Bauman (1993: 15) argues that the postmodern vantage point is not likely to make life 
easier. At most, it can dream of making life ‘a bit more moral.’ Wakefield (1990: 151) expresses a 
similar sentiment. He writes (in reference to the postmodern discourse) that: 
   
we find ourselves left with something more modest, but perhaps more urgent… That is the 
task, not of finding ends, solutions and finalities, but of living in a world from which these 
privileges and certainties have been withdrawn.  
 
This modest, but hopeful, agenda for a postmodern ethics is not shared by all. With regard to 
business ethics and organisation studies, a cursory glance at the extant literature shows that a good 
many authors do not hold out much hope for employing a productive postmodernism in the fields of 
business ethics and organisation studies. Below follows a summary of two articles written by 
Clarence Walton and Andrew Gustafson for a special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly, in which 
the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating postmodern ideas into business ethics is debated. 
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Corresponding viewpoints of prominent organisational theorists are also presented in the footnotes 
at relevant points in the analysis.  
 
4.1. Walton’s view of postmodernism and business ethics 
 
In his article entitled, ‘Business ethics and postmodernism: a dangerous dalliance’, Walton (1993) 
shows scepticism regarding the value of introducing postmodern ideas to business ethics. Indeed, he 
argues that an overview of the literature suggests that postmodernism ‘is more threat than promise 
to the healthy development of business ethics’ (286). Before looking at the criticisms against a 
postmodernist business ethics, it is important to firstly give a description of Walton’s understanding 
of postmodernism (which is premised on the deconstructive methodology). Walton (286) describes 
the aims of postmodernism as follows: ‘postmodernism seeks to unfix boundaries that conceal 
domination and authority; to provide an umbrella for diverse ideologies (whose main tilt, 
incidentally, is to the left); to reorder the present by reordering the past; and, finally, to concentrate 
mainly on Cartesian theorists in order to expose their defects.’   
 
4.1.1. Postmodern difficulties 
 
The first challenge that Walton identifies with postmodernism is the issue of definitional 
difficulties. According to Walton, this problematises any attempt at defining postmodernism as an 
identifiable movement. In this regard, he cites Jameson (1991: 342) – a major American analyst of 
postmodernism – who states that postmodernists’ ‘effort of conceptual unification is, to say the 
least, strikingly inconsistent with the spirit of postmodernism itself’, but also adds that Jameson 
himself later recognised that a theory can ‘embrace diverse strands and yet remain a coherent 
theory’ (Walton, 1993: 287). However, for Walton, the point remains that the lack of conceptual 
clarification regarding both the definition and the content of postmodernism may stretch the limits 
of tolerance to an unacceptable point29. In Walton’s (288) words: ‘the toleration urged upon 
ethicians as the primary virtue in moral debate may become its greatest vice.’ This is an important 
                                                    
29
 In arguing that postmodernism is characterised by incommensurability and polarisation between 
competing groups or factions, the organisational theorist, Michael Reed (1993: 177), shares this concern with 
Walton. According to Reed, postmodernism sets up an absolute choice between foundationalism and 
relativism, and therein, ‘has ignored – or at the very least radically underestimated – the modest, but 
nonetheless significant, grounded rationality inherent within those intellectual practices, traditions and 
histories through which the study of organizations has been conducted and developed’ (177). As an 
alternative to postmodernism, Reed (176) is of the opinion that organisation theory is better understood in 
terms of intellectual, traditional, and narrative practices; and, therefore, suggests a return to older narratives. 
As an example, he argues that, through critical engagement with the Weberian tradition, we will be able to 
work through the micro-politics of control and the macro-politics of order so as to further our understanding of 
the organisation as a strategic institutional site (182).   
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criticism, which Walton (288) further expands on by citing a number of questions raised by Prangle 
(1992:208):  
 
If, in the face of conflict, postmodernism’s “categorical imperative” is to respond to others 
with responsiveness, what is responsiveness? If one should be tolerant of others who do not 
agree, is this the debater’s technique of turning away criticism? Does toleration in the 
postmodern sense move ethical discussion perilously close to moral indifference? Or to 
moral subjectivism? 
 
This line of critique will be dealt with in detail in chapter five. At this point, however, we turn to the 
second problem that Walton (1993: 289) identifies with the postmodern approach, namely that, 
ultimately, postmodernism revels in a paradox. This is because postmodernism ‘does not abandon 
modernist notions despite its opposition to them. It allows for a description of its essential identity 
at the same time as it undermines such a rigorous claim to truth.’ Walton (289) argues that the 
essential distinction between the traditional normative tale and the postmodern tale of business 
ethics rests on the postmodernist’s emphasis on the provisional nature of all things as opposed to the 
modernist’s unconditional emphasis on the ethical certainty of things that may transcend common 
sense, such as prohibitions against rape, murder, and torture. Although not explicitly stated, Walton 
seems to prefer the modernist approach above the postmodernist approach, which often leaves one 
performatively powerless (see section 6.2.)  
 
The postmodern emphasis on the provisional and tentative nature of the moral world leads to the 
third problem (identified by Walton), namely that no universal, external standard of ethical 
behaviour exists. In other words, no solid base for business ethics can be found, which – for Walton 
– means that, in principle, all moral judgements must be treated as equally valid. Although such a 
conception preserves individual autonomy, it becomes impossible to act as an authoritative source 
on ethical issues.  Walton (292) contextualises this point by stating that ‘while there are solid 
reasons to worry about financial capitalism and global corporations, their pathologies will not be 
addressed effectively by an ethics that, at this level of discussion, treats contradictory moral 
judgments as equally valid’30. This lack of ethical clarity is, according to Walton (293), further 
                                                    
30The earlier Parker (1993: 209) takes this line of argument even further in reasoning that, without standards 
of evaluation, it is not clear in the name of what we are criticising. For Parker, ethics is essentially about 
saying that ‘I think the world would be a better place if such and such were the case’ (209).This might mean 
dealing with contesting ethical-political claims (which, according to Parker (1993), Walton (1993), and 
Prangle (1992), postmodernists are ill-equipped in doing). Parker (1993: 211) views the epistemological 
relativity of postmodernism as an ‘escape route’ in dealing with ethical and political responsibilities, and an 
excuse for leaving the difficult choices up to others. For this reason, Parker (205; 209) ascribes to a critical 
modernist perspective (see Habermas, 1987), which can allow for ‘rigorous analysis of organizational 
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compounded by postmodern rhetoric, which revels in puns, irony, gesture and ruse. Postmodern 
rhetoric distances itself from statements which claim to be either true or false, and instead indulges 
‘in the virtuosity of performance – a kind of midair tap dance in which…the ground is no longer 
sought’ (Shell, 1989).  This raises worrying questions regarding the status of ethical judgements.  
 
Lastly, Walton (1993: 294) argues that whilst ‘postmodernist ethicians are skittish about fixed 
moral standards, they are quite dogmatic in their denunciations of the market economy.’ Walton 
turns the postmodern epithet on the postmodernists themselves urging them to ‘examine the 
margins’ (296) before drawing hasty and biased conclusions (that rest on limited evidence) about 
the evils of capitalism. Although Walton (296) is himself opposed to unfettered market capitalism, 
he warns that ‘in their zeal to make liberal capitalism the incarnation of Mephistopheles, 
postmodernists have neglected to emphasize one important item: although capitalism is single-
mindedly directed towards efficient production… people in a relatively free society can discipline 
it.’ What is needed here is innovative thinking, grounded not in a loud condemnation of capitalism 
in all of its forms, but rather in an exercise in theory building that rests on a normative basis. Such a 
normative basis should be able to say something about human rights, as well as immoral, 
proscribed, and prescribed behaviour. As such, too strong an emphasis on toleration and 
interpretative autonomy may aid in turning a ‘compromising society into a compromised society’ 
(297).  
 
4.1.2. Postmodernism: weaknesses and strengths 
 
Although the above account seems to suggest that Walton (1993: 297) is completely opposed to 
postmodernism, he also admits that ‘[m]uch in it is good.’ Walton ends his article with a list of 
strengths and weaknesses regarding the application of postmodernism to business ethics. The 
weaknesses offer a partial summary of the preceding discussion, and some of these weaknesses 
include the following propositions (298-299): 1) Postmodernism is good at destroying philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                                            
changes within global capitalism’ (Parker, 1993: 212). Parker (205) contrasts critical modernism with 
comprehensive or systematic modernism (i.e. the position in support of totalising theories) and 
postmodernism (i.e. positions – typified in the writings of Lyotard and Baudrillard – that express ‘incredulity 
towards any [grand] narratives’). Not included in Parker’s critique are positions that emphasise reflexivity (i.e. 
post-structural positions).  
Paul Thompson (1993) is another organisational theorist who rejects the postmodernist viewpoint, in favour 
of critical modernism. He argues that postmodern interpretations have both limited relevance and lead to 
distorted application. He attributes these problems to the fact that postmodern approaches designed for 
literary and cultural purposes, have (away from this context) become ‘conceptual catch-alls, conflating quite 
distinct social processes’ (200). As an alternative to the postmodern approaches, Thompson (203) suggest 
we again take up the ‘intellectual tools of the critical tradition of modern theory’, as these tools remain 
indispensible to ‘recognis[ing] the differentiation and fragmentation within modernity, while also providing the 
language that addresses its integrative and macroscopic features’ (Best & Kellner, 1991: 258). 
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positions, but is unable to replace these positions with a consistent philosophy. 2) The postmodern 
emphasis on tolerance creates ethical indifference and destroys the possibility of establishing 
objective measures for ethics. 3) The implication that postmodernism is the first movement to show 
interest for, and stress responsibility towards, the marginalised is nonsense. 4) In denying the 
existence of external moral rules, postmodernists make moral reality a human construction, which 
means that we can no longer refute arguments on principle-grounded logic. 5) Postmodernism may 
very well lead to an aesthetic (as opposed to an ethical) morality. 6) Ethical discussions are severely 
constrained due to the improper attention given to the contributions made by philosophers in the 
history of the discourse. 7) Postmodern rhetoric may reduce moral theorists to jargonists in the eyes 
of other scholars. 8) Deconstructive analyses are not new to postmodernism – in fact, every great 
thinker has engaged in such analyses.  
 
In contrast to these weaknesses, some of the strengths of postmodernism (as identified by Walton 
(297-298)) are as follows: 1) Postmodernism extends the definition of what is considered as 
ethical/unethical by drawing attention to the challenges posed by second-order principles, such as 
job rights, employee privacy etc. (The counter-argument here is that, in the absence of first order 
normative principles, morality is reduced to these second-order principles.) 2) The insistence on 
ethical pluralism encourages people to consider diverse ethical perspectives before making moral 
judgements. 3) Postmodernism nurtures respect for cultural and value diversity. 4) Tolerance is 
presented as postmodernism’s greatest virtue31. 5) Postmodernists avoid making scapegoats of 
individuals by emphasising contextual issues. 5) The deconstructive technique employed by 
postmodernists allows for continuous revision and interpretation, which is conducive to decision-
making in a complex world. 6) Postmodernists support minority voices (such as feminism). 7) 
Postmodernism is a constant reminder of the fact that capitalism is flawed, that it has gone wrong in 
the past, and that it may again go wrong in the future.  
 
4.2. Gustafson takes up the debate 
 
4.2.1. Gustafson engages with Walton 
 
In an article published seven years later, Gustafson (2000) offers a critical commentary on Walton’s 
article on the viability of a postmodern business ethics. He (648) argues that although 
postmodernism is susceptible to some of the weaknesses identified above, the theory is not 
                                                    
31
 Despite Walton’s critique of tolerance, it seems that his attitude towards the postmodern emphasis on 
tolerance remains ambivalent, as here he presents the focus on tolerance as a strength of postmodernism. 
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necessarily subject to all these weaknesses. Walton’s first criticism, namely ‘that postmodernism 
fails to present an alternative for what it destroys, and does not provide a basis of thinking’ (Walton, 
1993: 298), does not hold for all forms of postmodern thinking. Indeed, Gustafson (2000: 648) 
follows Nielsen (1961) in arguing that ‘[t]here have been many people, explicitly postmodern or 
otherwise, who have explained various ways of having morality without having any ultimate truths 
or meanings for the world.’ Deconstruction is one such movement that attempts to reinscribe values 
in ‘more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts’ (Derrida, 1988a: 146; see chap. 5, sec. 7.1.).  
Linked to this, is Gustafson’s (2000: 649) denial of Walton’s assertion that postmodern morality 
cannot be justified on principle-based grounds: postmodernists do accept, employ, and justify the 
use of certain principles. This is evidenced by Derrida’s concern with justice, Levinas’ concern for 
the Other, and Foucault’s focus on freedom, to name but a few examples. As such, Walton’s claim 
that postmodernism necessarily leads to Nietzschean nihilism is also not fair (649).  
 
Another weakness identified by Walton that Gustafson contests, is the idea that the emphasis on 
tolerance causes ethical indifference. This may be true of certain relativist positions, but many 
postmodern theorists – such as Levinas or Bauman – are critical of the limits of responsibility, as 
defined within a modernist perspective, and, instead, argue for ‘more responsibility and a louder 
call to vigilance than any modern theory normally invokes.’ (649). Gustafson further argues that 
postmodernists were successful in drawing attention to the interests of the marginalised and have (to 
a large degree) revitalised this interest ‘by bringing modernity to face its own principles and to 
show the hypocrisy within modernity itself’ (649). Otherwise stated, by highlighting the limits of 
our knowledge, or ability to know the truth, postmodernism has de-naturalised standard ethical 
positions. However, Gustafson does concede that, although not necessarily anti-theistic or pagan, 
postmodernism can – in the very recognition of our limitations – ‘bring about a sense of awe and 
humility, akin to worship’ (649).   
 
Gustafson (650) does, however, agree with Walton’s claim that postmodern philosophy is jargon-
filled, and argues that this may be the primary reason for why postmodernism will not enjoy a large 
reception in business ethics. But despite this, he is interested in the challenge that Walton brings to 
the table, namely: ‘can we adequately provide a position that can distinctively and reasonably be 
called “postmodern” that does not devolve into a cover for a particular ideology that is not 
essentially pagan (non-theistic)?’ (650) Gustafson believes that this challenge can indeed be met, 
and proposes an outline for a postmodern ethics, which follows below.  
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4.2.2. Gustafson’s two-fold hope 
 
Gustafson (2000: 650) argues that the value of postmodernism cannot lie in providing us with a 
foundational set of principles – a ‘one-size-fits-all ethical theory’ (see Rasmussen, 1993: 273; 
Walton, 1993: 386). The value of postmodern philosophy rather lies in posing ‘questions that can be 
used as an ongoing strategy to be used when developing a theory’ (Gustafson, 2000: 650) In other 
words, postmodernists are much better in asking questions, than in providing answers32. However, 
such philosophers are also needed, and if postmodernism experiences a successful uptake in the 
applied field, its primary value will lie in this ability to pose difficult questions (650).  
    
Gustafson outlines (not very optimistically, he adds!) the following two-fold hope for 
postmodernism: that it may find an application in the field of business ethics; and that business 
ethics will, in its appropriation of postmodern philosophy, find a stronger philosophical connection 
(650). In order to realise this dual hope, Gustafson argues that it is necessary to re-inscribe the 
status of the field, as a development of, rather than a reaction to, modernism. In justification of this 
statement he quotes Bauman (1995: 4) who says that the value of postmodernism lies: 
 
not in the abandoning of characteristically modern moral concerns’ [such as equality, 
justice, suspicion of dogma], but in the rejection of the typically modern ways of going 
about its moral problems (that is, responding to moral challenges with coercive normative 
regulation in political practice, and the philosophical search for absolutes, universals and 
foundations in theory). 
 
The ambiguity that characterises many of the moral dilemmas that impact on business today has 
been dealt with either in terms of ethical cynicism (which is the outcome of a disappointed 
optimism in unrestrained enlightenment and trust in human reason), or in terms of what Gustafson 
(2000: 651) calls a ‘healthy temperance’. The latter attitude can be characterised as ‘a rugged and 
flexible desire to find workable solutions, maintaining the regulative ideas of justice, freedom, and 
equality, while working in a world where these things are virtually impossible’ (651). 
Postmodernists strive towards many of the same goals that characterised modernism. However, they 
do so without the hope of finding foundations in which to finally ground their efforts. Therefore, 
Gustafson (653; 656) is of the opinion that: 
 
                                                    
32
 This view corresponds with the later Parker’s (1998b) views in his article ‘Against ethics’.   
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postmodernist business ethicists need not discontinue the quest for ethics, but their quest is 
not a quest for certainty, but a tempered quest, a striving for conceptions of ethical 
behaviour that have a better fit, an ethics that just makes more sense, for an ethics that can 
work better than other approaches, at least for now… [However], much more work and 
thinking needs to be done.  
 
In light of the above characterisation, Gustafson (2000: 651-654) proposes the following 
characteristics of what might be called a ‘postmodern business ethics’. Firstly, a postmodern 
business ethics will be premised on the realisation that one is always a human being, regardless of 
what role one inhabits. This means that there ‘should be no separation between personal and 
professional ethical behaviour’ (652). Secondly, a postmodern business ethics will proceed by 
narrative, as opposed to abstract theory in which the basis of ethics is formalised. Thirdly, grand, 
universal narratives will be rejected in favour of coming up with local rules, and building particular 
pockets of consensus (which are temporally and spatially bound). And, lastly, a postmodern 
business ethics will acquire a certain degree of plasticity, without adopting a relativistic stance.  
 
5. Evaluating the arguments for and against incorporating postmodernism in business 
ethics 
 
Much of the preceding analysis developed at the hand of secondary literature – most of which is to 
be found in the organisational and business ethics literature. This move was intentional, as the point 
of this analysis was not only to introduce postmodern thought, but also to present an overview of 
how postmodernism is understood in the social sciences, particularly business ethics and 
organisation theory. In the section to follow, some of the views espoused by various theorists in the 
preceding analysis are critically analysed in terms of how these theorists view the theoretical 
landscape that inform their opinions.   
 
5.1. Distinguishing between systematic modernism, critical modernism, and postmodernism  
 
The critique of modernism presented in this study correlates with the earlier Parker’s (1993) view of 
systematic or comprehensive modernism, defined as a position in support of totalising theories (see 
footnote 30). This critique translates in a rejection of all universal forms of rationality and ethics. 
Most of the theorists cited in this chapter are opposed to this view of modernism. However, what 
should be clear is that a rejection of universal theories does not necessarily translate into support for 
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postmodern positions. In order to illustrate this point, it is necessary to briefly elaborate on the 
distinction between systematic modernism, critical modernism, and post(-)modernism.  
 
Hassard (1993: 4) defines the objective of systemic modernism as the attempt ‘to facilitate the 
control of complex and large-scale operations through a range of highly programmed knowledge 
technologies.’ On this definition, it is difficult to see how systemic modernism differs from 
Hassard’s view of post-modernism (as an epoch), which – to recall – is a movement that supports 
‘the realist notion that we simply need to find the right way of describing the [admittedly complex 
and fragmented] world ‘out there’’ (2). Or, more accurately, it is unclear that this view of post-
modernism does in fact present us with a postmodern position. It seems that the ideal of 
universality, or the belief that we can (through the correct technologies) find the perfect means to 
describe objective reality, is still alive and well. The only thing that has changed is the 
sophistication of the technologies that must be employed, in order to uncover the mechanisation of 
the social order. 
 
Critical modernism (see footnote 30), on the other hand, presents a more contextually-sensitive 
philosophical position. The main contemporary advocate of this position is Jürgen Habermas, who, 
in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987), analyses the radical critique of reason, which 
he associates with the paradoxes of self-referential critique (i.e. the position that there is no vantage 
point from which to criticise Enlightenment rationality outside of critical reason (see sec. 6.2.)) 
(Fleming, 1996: 169). Because of their support for a radical critique of reason, many post-
Enlightenment thinkers and postmodernists are (according to Habermas) unable to provide a sound 
basis for social critique. McCarthy (1987: ix) argues this point forcefully in the introduction to 
Discourse of Modernity, stating that Habermas is of the opinion that, as a result of the radical 
critique of reason, ‘the epistemological and moral subject has been definitively decentered and the 
conception of reason linked to it irrevocably desublimated.’ According to McCarthy (x), Habermas 
is very much aware of our essential finitude, but wishes to avoid the consequences of a radical 
critique of reason. Thus, the strategy that he follows in this book, is to reject ‘“the paradigm of 
consciousness” and its associated “philosophy of the subject” in favor of the through-and-through 
intersubjective paradigm of “communicative action”’(x).   
 
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984) explains this paradigm as follows: we are 
able to recover a form of natural reason – or ‘the lost sense of the enlightenment that Kant first 
revealed to us’ (Power in Hassard, 1993: 5) – through experiencing the common sense of ordinary 
language. Habermas claims that we can recognise a certain sphere of validity through 
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argumentation, and that this sphere of validity acts as the sole criterion according to which we can 
judge and critique knowledge claims. Rational argumentation is, therefore, the means through 
which we can reach consensus. In this regard, Habermas (1984: 17-18) writes: 
 
Thus the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the 
practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue 
communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired with 
everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by direct or strategic use of force.   
 
What, therefore, distinguishes the critical modernist approach from the postmodern view, is that 
critical modernists still work with the regulative idea that an ideal horison of inter-subjective truth 
can be accessed.  
 
Given this definition of critical modernism, Walton’s (1993) belief that we are relatively free to 
influence the workings of capitalism through an exercise in theory building that rests on a 
normative basis can be interpreted as corresponding with the project of critical modernism. 
Organisational theorists such as Thompson (1993), the earlier Parker (1993), and Reed (1993) are 
explicit in their support of critical modernism, and view critical modernism as a better alternative to 
systemic modernism and postmodernism. All three these organisational theorists are of the opinion 
that postmodernists dismiss outright the significantly grounded rationality inherent in practices, in 
favour of an approach that propagates radical incommensurability and polarisation in, and between, 
discourses. These theorists are, therefore, also opposed to a radical critique of reason. 
 
5.2. In support of affirmative postmodernism 
 
Such blanket dismissals of postmodernism are not fair. Whilst sceptical postmodernists may portray 
an ethical cynicism that verges on nihilism, affirmative postmodernists exhibit a healthy temperance 
in trying to find working solutions in the absence of any fixed truth (see Kilduff & Mehra, 1997; 
Gustafson, 2000). In this sense, one should be cautious of accepting Parker’s (1993), Walton’s 
(1993), Thompson’s (1993), or Reed’s (1993) conclusion that all moral judgements should be 
treated as equally valid from a postmodern perspective, simply because there is no firm basis for 
ethics. In Linstead’s (2004a: 177) words: ‘just because the terrain of ideas may be problematic, 
doesn’t mean we can’t act’.  Moreover, we have seen examples in this chapter of both Lyotard’s 
(1984) and Derrida’s (1988a) explicit defence of contextually-based perceptions of truth. Gustafson 
(2000) also reiterates the point that certain postmodern positions can espouse various forms of 
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morality without referring to ultimate truths, and further argues that postmodernists, such as 
Derrida, Foucault, and Levinas, can defend their positions on principle-based grounds.  On this 
more nuanced reading, Parker’s (1993: 210) project of defending ethical-political claims against the 
postmodern attempt to put all productive disagreement into question is misguided, or represents  –  
as Linstead (2004a: 177) states (rather more forcefully!) – ‘that old modernist non sequitur which 
seems to be based on a misreading of the fable of Buridan’s Ass’33.    
 
Linstead (175) reads these blanket dismissals of postmodernism (mostly in the name of some form 
of universal, instrumental, or emancipatory rationality) as arrogant attempts to ‘take postmodernism 
back, either as a discursive retraction or in time to a golden age prior to all misunderstanding.’ 
According to him, ‘we can’t recall... postmodernism because the problem is not with the product 
and the product is any case not ours to recall.’ In this context, he specifically mentions Hassard and 
Parker’s (1993) jointly edited book Postmodernism and Organizations (in which Thompson’s and 
Reed’s articles also appear) as an example of a project which claims to debunk postmodernism. 
Linstead (2004a: 174) notes that in this book, he counted twenty-one actual references to Derrida 
(most of which appear in his own contribution), twenty references to Lyotard, and three references 
to Deleuze. Parker, on the other hand, is referenced twelve times! Linstead (174) critically describes 
this project as follows:  
 
Having effectively mounted its arguments on a simulacrum of postmodernism, this Matrix 
of a book ends by dismissing the arguments of simulation, thereby warranting its own 
reality. Which just goes to show that if you think that everything that happens is real, and 
everything that is real happens, what can you expect?    
 
Linstead’s criticism of Parker’s project does not necessarily translate in a support of 
postmodernism, but does present a  challenge to the manner in which postmodern thought has been 
treated in organisational and (one could also argue, in business ethics) thought. Given this situation, 
Linstead (174-177) makes an impassioned appeal to return to the primary literature, and to explore 
the postmodern ideas in their own right, rather than to continue thinking in general frameworks of 
‘isms’.   
 
                                                    
33
 Buridan's ass is a paradox in philosophy. It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass, placed 
exactly in the middle between two stacks of hay of equal size and quality, will starve to death since it cannot 
make any rational decision to start eating one rather than the other. The paradox is named after the 14th 
century French philosopher Jean Buridan. (Taken from: Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buridan's_ass) 
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The strategy followed in chapter four and five is influenced by both Linstead’s plea for a more 
careful appraisal and reading of postmodern ideas, and Gustafson’s two-fold hope for business 
ethics. To recall: Gustafson’s two-fold hope for business ethics embodies the dual aims of taking 
seriously postmodern ideas, whilst still remaining focused on the practical context in which these 
ideas are enacted. As such, Gustafson’s hope calls for a reconciliation of Willmott’s (1998) position 
(where the moral task is described as not only voicing, but also reflecting on moral judgement) and 
Parker’s (1998b) later stance (where he argues in favour of thicker descriptions, so as to re-inscribe 
ethics as a ‘contextual, situational [and] highly specific’ practice (Jackall, 1988: 6)). 
 
Both these agendas must be simultaneously followed. This is because if the ethical task is only 
construed in terms of reflecting on moral judgements, one risks turning ethics into a technology for 
textual critique, whereby the normative exclusions in discourses are exposed. However, if one 
views the ethical task as merely producing thicker descriptions of highly-contextual practices, one 
risks developing a relative and incommensurable view of ethics. Only by simultaneously engaging 
in textual critique, and in investigating the contexts in which our ethical decisions are enacted, is it 
possible to develop a productive reading of ethics. Such a reading can account for the norms that 
guide our relatively stable practices, but prevent these norms from being naturalised and turned into 
transcendental, categorically-binding rules and principles.  
 
Derrida’s deconstructive ethics is an example of a postmodern position that does work on both these 
fronts. In chapters four and five, Derrida’s theory of deconstruction will be explained, and 
illustrated with specific reference to the implications that this theory holds for our understanding of 
corporate social responsibility. However, at this juncture it is necessary to provide some general 
remarks on how the postmodern view of ethics (presented in this chapter) can overcome some of the 
problems associated with the standard normative tale discussed in chapter one.  
 
6. Postmodern insights: redefining the agenda for business ethics 
 
In this last section, the main tenets of an affirmative postmodern ethics are discussed in terms of the 
implications that they hold for the ethical task generally, and the business ethics task specifically. 
This section is also meant to practically illustrate the possibility of finding working solutions to 
business ethics problems in the absence of fixed truths. This section should, therefore, also be read 
as a further argument against Parker’s (1993), Walton’s (1993), Thompson’s (1993), and Reed’s 
(1993) view that all moral judgements should be treated as equally valid from a postmodern view, 
simply because there is no firm basis for ethics. Furthermore, the characteristics and implications 
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discussed in this section form the basis of the arguments to follow, as both critical complexity and 
deconstruction build on the type of insights developed in this section.  
 
6.1. Tenet 1: Limited knowledge is not ‘any’ knowledge  
 
As was seen from the analysis in chapter one, the hallmark of both utilitarianism and deontology is 
to determine rules that would amount to decision-making procedures for stipulating the right actions 
in any given case; and, to explicate these rules in a manner that is directly accessible to (and can 
easily be applied by) everyone34. However, what is evident from the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter is that the hope of uncovering a categorically-binding ethics rests on an outdated and 
incorrect modernist assumption regarding the nature of reality and human experience. Therefore, as 
it stands, no normative theory can solve all of one’s moral dilemmas or completely define the rules 
and procedures that will categorically result in moral decisions and actions. Despite this, we (like 
affirmative postmodernists, such as Derrida and Lyotard) should actively resist a subjectivist or 
relativist position to ethical decision-making.  
 
The charge of relativism only works if one assumes that such an all-embracing, categorically-
binding principle should exist. In other words, the term ‘relativism’ only makes sense when 
contrasted with ‘absolutism’ or ‘universalism’. The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy distinguishes 
between relativism and absolutism as follows: everything stands in relation to other things (is 
relative to other things), except the absolute (which stands in no relation to anything) (Mautner, 
2005: 529).  The fear of relativism is, therefore, something that has always haunted absolutist 
transcendental or universal projects, and something that such projects always thought that they 
could overcome. Bauman (1993: 42) explains as follows: 
 
However difficult the practicing of moral universality proved to be, no practical difficulty 
was allowed to cast doubt on universality as an ideal and horizon of history. Relativism was 
always merely ‘current’; its persistence in spite of present efforts tended to be played down 
as merely a momentary hitch in an otherwise unstoppable movement toward the ideal 
[namely, ‘[t]he dream of universality as the ultimate destination of human kind’].   
 
In business ethics we see that the attitude expressed in the above citation is often adopted by the 
architects of moral codes, who view codes as the way to improve upon human conduct. What such 
                                                    
34
 See ‘Virtue ethics’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ First published on July 18, 2003; revised on July 18, 2007. 
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architects strive for is non-ambivalent, non-aporetic codes which surely await us ‘round the next 
corner. Or the corner after [the] next’ (9).  However, if we forgo this dream of universality, or the 
idea that the perfect code awaits us around the next corner, then the charge of relativism also loses 
its sting. This is, in effect, a very liberating move, since the modernist project has always been 
accompanied by radical doubt, which follows it like a shadow that threatens to subsume the light of 
the ideal, and expose the project in all its brittleness.  
 
But, where does this leave us? As argued during the course of this chapter, to say that all ethical 
positions are relative to other ethical positions need not mean that all ethical positions are equally 
valued. Paul Cilliers (2005: 260; 263), who is also a supporter of affirmative postmodernism, states 
that ‘[l]imited knowledge is not “any” knowledge… We can make strong claims, but since these 
claims are limited, we have to be modest about them.’ To make a strong claim means that we must 
actively resist vagueness in our practices and thought processes. Our statements and our positions 
must be intelligible, even though they account only for a limited perspective. There can be no 
excuses for ‘ethical’ sloppiness that leads to bad decisions and actions (262-263). 
 
6.1.1. The ethical task: learning to reflect on, and engage with, ethical problems 
 
If all ethical positions are not equally valid, then it is important for the moral agent to learn how to 
engage in moral thinking and decision-making. Although introductions to normative ethical theories 
have an important pedagogical value, the moral agent should not be seduced into thinking that 
‘ethical problems can be solved in a quasi-technical way through the application of certain 
procedures or through the application of formal models of reasoning’ (Verstraeten, 2000: 3). 
Normative theories must become tools for ethical argumentation and decision-making, not 
blueprints that can dictate to us how we should act. This implies that apart from considering moral 
problems from the perspective of these theories, the moral agent must also ‘clarify what the 
problem means, what meanings are connected with the problem, and how the problem fits into the 
wider social context’, before ethically reflecting on the solution to a moral problem (van Tongeren 
in Verstraeten, 2000: viii).  
 
In organisational terms this means that one should focus on how ethics is formed and contested in 
practice, the discourse in which ethics is enacted, and the manner in which ethical subjectivity is 
formed within organisations (Clegg et al., 2007: 107). One of the most important goals of business 
ethics should be to teach students how to reflect upon moral problems. Business ethics has an 
undeniable practical component, and to forget this is to engage in fundamental ethics which is 
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concerned ‘with the rational foundation of norms’ (Verstraeten, 2000: 5). Reflecting on ethical 
problems, therefore, cannot be divorced from the complexities of real-life management practices; 
and, theoretical and conceptual frameworks should be employed that take account of the ways in 
which ethics is ‘differentially embedded in practices that operate in an active and contextualized 
manner’ (Clegg et al., 2007: 108; 111).  On this count, moral codes and models cannot determine 
ethical practice. Rather (to reiterate the point), ‘[t]hey become instruments that skilful and 
knowledgeable [organisational] members can engage and play with freely in their everyday 
management of their own and others’ affairs’ (112).  
 
This argument is, therefore, not against ethical rules. Contrary to the dichotomy that Bauman (1993) 
sets up between the irrational moral impulse and rational rules, a more fruitful approach is to view 
rational rules as being in service of ethical decision-making. To this end, ten Bos (1997: 1001) 
argues that ‘ethical rules can do much more with people than just desensitize or stupefy them.’ To 
make the point more clearly, ten Bos (1012) refers to Foucault’s (1982: 33) distinction between 
l’agent moral (who follows the ethical code to the letter) and le sujet moral (who consciously 
chooses a certain attitude with regard to the code)35. Business ethics, as a technology, creates moral 
agents; whereas the view on business ethics supported in this study, is one that promotes the 
development of moral subjects, who use rules and instruments to ‘legitimize and to negotiate 
organizational realities’ (Clegg et al., 2007: 113). 
 
6.2. Tenet 2: Ethics implies choice and performative reflexivity 
 
A subtle implication that emerges from this discussion is that, since ethical theories cannot provide 
us with all the answers, we are also bound to run up against the limits of rationality and procedural 
argumentation. If we endow too much faith in logical argumentation, we risk reducing ethics to a 
‘happy positivism’ (Culler, 1983). We should, therefore, acknowledge the inherent limitations and 
exclusions that characterise our ethical models, as well as the complexity with which we have to 
grapple in making ethical decisions. 
 
Moral judgement cannot merely be a question of reasoning: choosing a certain interpretation of the 
good life, and deciding on a hierarchy of values is as much a matter of personal conviction and 
individual moral judgement as it is of reason (Verstraeten, 2000:4). Therefore, it is impossible to 
speak of ethics without also speaking of personal choice. If there is no pure, universal description of 
                                                    
35
 In this study, the terms ‘(moral) agent’ and ‘(moral) subject’ are used interchangeably. However, the terms 
are employed in the spirit of Foucault’s description of the moral subject as someone who consciously 
chooses a certain attitude with regard to the code. 
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how we should act or be, then we inevitably have to choose (to abstain from choosing is also a 
choice) (Cilliers, de Villiers & Roodt, 2002:16). This is not a comfortable situation. As Bauman (in 
Bauman & Tester, 2001: 46) states: ‘being moral means being bound to make choices under 
conditions of acute and painful uncertainty’. Being uncertain not only means that we do not know 
what the best possible course of action is, but also implies that we must acknowledge and grapple 
with the aporia and impasse that we encounter the moment our arguments run up against the limits 
of logic. Often it is exactly these moments that reveal the deepest insights into the nature of ethics, 
and being as such.  
 
Such encounters, however, also open up this characterisation of ethics to the charge of the 
performative contradiction. Such a contradiction occurs when we assert the limits of reason at the 
locutionary level, whilst still conducting our arguments in the language of reason at the 
performative level (Fleming, 1996: 169). As stated earlier, this radical critique of reason is 
vehemently opposed by Habermas (1987), who argues that such a critique results in the decentering 
of the subject and the desublimation of our conception of reason. Nevertheless, as Cilliers 
(2005:261) reminds us, if we acknowledge that things are complex, then we must also acknowledge 
the fact that ‘some form of performative tension is inevitable’. Cilliers (261) continues by stating 
that: 
 
We are playing in what Wood (1990:150) calls the “theatre of difficulty”, and this requires a 
certain “performative reflexivity” (132). We need to demonstrate the difficulties we are in, 
also in the way we talk about them. Our discourse should reflect the complexities. To talk 
about the complex world as if it can be understood clearly is a contradiction of another kind, 
and this is a contradiction with ethical implications... It is only by acknowledging that we 
are in trouble that we can start grappling with the complexities around us... In Derrida’s 
(2000:467) words: ‘There is ethics precisely where I am in a performative powerlessness.’ 
 
This complex, postmodern characterisation of ethics denotes a modest position. However, as 
Cilliers states (2005: 261), ‘[the] modest position is not weak, it is responsible.’  The modest 
position – which emphasises both choice and a measure of performative reflexivity – does not, 
however, imply that we shouldn’t do the necessary calculation and groundwork that precedes any 
responsible judgement or decision. Rather, the point is that such calculations cannot absolve us 
from making decisions. In this regard, Derrida (1988a: 116) writes that an ethical ‘decision can only 
come into being in the space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all 
responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate causes.’ Bennington 
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(2000: 15) spells out this insight in terms of ethics: ‘Ethics’ he writes ‘begins where the case does 
not correspond to any rule, and where the decision has to be taken without subsumption.’   
 
6.2.1. The ethical task: broadening  perspectives on available choices 
 
If, as Clegg et al. (2007: 111) rightly maintain, choice does not involve complete free play, but 
‘proposes an oscillation between possibilities, where these possibilities are determined 
situationally’, then business ethicists should help students and practitioners to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the different choices and decisions that are open to them in any 
given situation. In order to facilitate this process of reflection, business ethicists should also provide 
students and practitioners with the means of ‘breaking out of their closed or limited hermeneutic 
circles’ (Verstraeten, 2000: ix). Although this will not dispel the anxiety that characterises ethical 
decision-making, it may help to broaden the perspectives of students and practitioners alike, thereby 
teaching them ‘to attend to [the] gestures of exclusion’ (Ryan, 1982: 3) that accompanies any 
decision, and to gain more robust and diverse perspectives on situations.    
 
In order to illustrate this point, consider the following example by Munro (1998: 206): ‘much of the 
workings of society’ he states ‘are excluded from the machinations of bookkeeping’. He quotes 
Cooper (1988: 183) in this regard: ‘Clean air, trust, social harmony, community health and safety do 
not have market prices. Without a price their worth tends to be devalued’. By exposing students and 
business practitioners to literary and philosophical texts that offer a horison of interpretation which 
is different to the scientific or positivist paradigm in which they have been trained (Verstraeten, 
2000: ix-x), business ethicists can help students and practitioners to consider more factors and make 
‘better’ calculations before undertaking decisions36. In this regard, Verstraeten (x) recalls the words 
of Marcel Proust: the true voyage of discovery is not to seek out new territory, but to learn to see 
with new eyes.     
 
                                                    
36
 In terms of developing business ethics pedagogy, the book Business Ethics: Broadening the Perspective 
(edited by Verstraeten (2000) and initiated by the European Ethics Network) addresses the issue of teaching 
business ethics and attempts to heighten the applicability of business ethics courses by framing business 
ethics as an ‘integral life-enabling education’ (vii). The argument here is that: 
actual and future professionals are not sufficiently prepared to deal with the ethical aspects of their 
professional decisions and with the social consequences of their work. They need a broader 
education in which their professional knowledge and expertise is completed with the ability to resolve 
ethical dilemmas and with the capacity to discern the values that are at stake in every professional 
decision (viii).  
Such an education would be comprised of ‘a broadly literary, philosophical, and cultural education that 
provides future professionals with the capacity to ‘meaning-fully’ interpret the reality within which they live 
and act’ (x).  
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6.3. Tenet 3: Ethics is a contextually-defined practice 
 
Although the possibility of ethical action rests with the individual moral agent as ethical decision-
maker, it is impossible to consider the questions ‘what ought I to do?’ and ‘what type of person 
should I be?’ without accounting for the particular context in which the moral agent is embedded. 
To recall: this point is specifically emphasised by the later Parker (1998b) who argues that we must 
go beyond the metaphysics of good and evil, in the interest of providing a thicker description of the 
specific contexts in which ethical decisions and actions are undertaken. In this regard, Painter-
Morland (2008: 87) describes the moral task as follows:  
 
Moral agents are required to remain fully engaged with the concrete contingencies and 
dynamics of the world. Instead of an abstract cognitive exercise, ethics as practice is all 
about participation, relationships and responsiveness.  
 
Our ethical responses and the type of people we become are inseparable in a world where the 
descriptions that we attribute to ourselves and our actions are never neutral. In the absence of a 
grand universal scheme, all our decisions and actions take on political and ethical significance 
(Cilliers et al., 2002: 11). This is because we act, and are acted, upon by each other; and are, 
therefore, constituted through practice and through engagement with the world. This process of 
identity formation also helps to shape our conceptions of what it means to be human, how we 
should relate with the world, and even what the world is (Cilliers & de Villiers, 2000:238). 
Therefore, contrary to the modernist project, which presents the self as a fixed and coherent 
individual (accessible to both herself and others), we see that knowledge about the self is limited, 
contextual, and temporal. On this understanding, ethics is ‘one of the many practices in which 
individuals engage in order to constitute themselves into subjects’ (Keleman & Peltonen, 2001: 
162).  
 
This point reaffirms the insight that the normative dimension of business is inseparable from the 
more instrumental or descriptive dimensions (see sec. 3; chap. 3, sec. 6.1); and, that our actions are 
not determined by a priori schemes, but by contextually-based frames of meaning. Dillon (2000: 2) 
sums up this view as follows:  
 
Human existence [is] understood as always already ethical... [where ethics should not be 
understood] by reference to a command issued by some superior being or moral law. [Ethics 
should be understood] instead, in terms of the ethos or way of being of things derived from 
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their location within an inescapable matrix of relationality that is both diachronic as well as 
synchronic, temporal as well as spatial.   
 
Let us turn to the example of affirmative action programmes in order to illustrate the above point: 
despite the active propagation of equal employment opportunity (EEO) legislation in America, it 
has not been sufficient to gain equal status for women in organisations. Drawing from the literature 
on affirmative action (by Martin (2000), Meyerson and Kolb (2001), and Thorne and Saunders 
(2002)), Clegg et al. (2007: 112) argue that the reason for this is because the legislation does not 
reach ‘the tacit micropractices of everyday organizational life’ through which discrimination is 
enacted. Here we see, how organisational stereotypes and prejudices cannot be eradicated 
completely through legislation, but are – to a large extent – the product of the power and agency of 
those organisational members who interact to create gender inequality. This example serves to make 
both the point that ethics is culturally-driven and enacted within a specific context (112), and that 
ethics is not defined by a priori schemes, but concerns processes of self-formation amongst 
organisational members (115). As such, ethics always comes with a history; we are embedded (or 
‘emplaced’ (Munro (1998)) within certain circumstances that serve to structure our ethical 
paradigms.  
 
6.3.1. The ethical task: nurturing a critical disposition 
 
Given the above situation, business ethicists should train students and professionals to exercise 
vigilance, and to reflect upon the specific values to which they attach importance, and which inform 
their frames of meaning. Reflecting on one’s values and frames of meaning also necessitates 
consideration of the tradition to which one belongs, since as both Willmott (1998) and Verstraeten 
(2000) reminds us, there is no vantage point from which we can act in a neutral or disinterested 
fashion: 
 
Like it or not, one always belongs to a tradition of thought or belief or, in a fragmented 
culture, to various traditions from which one draws inspiration. Even when one tries a priori 
to put the influence of tradition out of play, one belongs to a tradition, namely the tradition 
that uses this conception (Verstraeten, 2000: xi). 
 
Unlike a depolitcised communitarian response to tradition, business ethicists should help students 
and practitioners to provide ‘a critical account of how we came to believe what we do about 
ourselves and the world’ (Painter-Morland, 2008: 90; my italics) when we reflect on our frames of 
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meaning. Such frames of meaning cannot be justified on the basis of epistemological or ontological 
arguments. We must, rather offer ethical-political reasons for why we judge our ethical schemes and 
values to be important, whilst simultaneously accepting the exclusions, limitations, and 
provisionality of such schemes.  
 
6.4. Ethics as practice: Implications  
 
Ethics as practice, involves the continuous task of ‘removing the conceptual and procedural 
restraints with which we have tried to secure morality’ and thereby ‘allow ourselves to be 
challenged by the various contextual and relational realities that fill our everyday lives’ (Painter-
Morland, 2008: 93). In unpacking this last citation, it becomes clear that affirmative postmodernism 
can help us to address the procedural, substantive and individual-vs.-communal concerns that were 
raised in chapter one in relation to the standard normative tale of business ethics. 
 
When business ethics becomes a practice, self-aware moral subjects have to account for their 
conceptions of the good (along with the traditions that support such conceptions), as well as how 
their morals are enacted in practice. On this account, substantive concerns can never be done away 
with as – contrary to the modernist conception – we are not autonomous individuals making our 
own rational and optimal choices. In this regard, Bauman (in Bauman & Tester, 2001: 46) writes: 
‘being moral means knowing that things may be good or bad. But it does not mean knowing, let 
alone knowing for sure, which things are good and which things are bad.’ We have to thus be 
continuously aware of how our actions both form us, and affect others. Note, however, that this 
stance is not the same as the version of self-surveillance propagated by Kant (where we must avoid 
despising or condemning ourselves secretly in our own eyes (Kant, 2008: 75)). We can never have 
knowledge of the correct decision ahead of the fact (Munro, 1998: 208). Morality is not abstract, 
but grounded in the everyday problems of real people living their lives. As such, our decisions are 
not undertaken in a state of free play, but are limited by the structures, power relations, and 
networks in which we partake (see chap. 3, secs 5.2. & 6.2.).   
 
Ethics, therefore, requires both self-awareness and an awareness of the communities in which we 
live and work. We need to be able to deal simultaneously with the individual and the communal, the 
personal and the structural. We need to be able to affirm the ‘strange in the self’, instead of turning 
away and saying ‘this is not me’ (Keleman & Peltonen, 2001: 163). And, lastly, we need to focus on 
relationships and not attributes, and employ performative definitions where our understanding of 
things depends on their use (Czarniawska, 2001: 256).  
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter commenced with an analytic and substantive circumscription of the postmodern 
paradigm, which presents us with an alternative to the standard normative tale – one that resonates 
better with the nature of our experiences, ethical and otherwise. An important implication of 
postmodernism concerns the challenge that this position poses for the distinction between the 
normative and the descriptive views of business ethics. It was shown that such a distinction is 
conceptually untenable, as it relies on problematic modernist assumptions concerning the nature of 
humans and of the world. However, despite its challenge to modernist ideas, the postmodern 
paradigm is not unanimously well-received in the business ethics world. The merits of importing 
postmodern thought to business ethics was, therefore, evaluated at the hand of a number of studies 
undertaken by business ethicists and organisational theorists. This discussion was followed by a few 
conceptual clarifications and critical remarks concerning the analysis presented in this chapter. The 
chapter concluded with a summary of the main tenets of a postmodernism ethics identified during 
the course of the chapter. These tenets focus on the provisional nature of ethical knowledge, the 
importance of choice in making ethical decision-making, and the embeddedness of ethical practices. 
For each of these features, the ethical task was outlined, and the implications for this view of ethics 
as practice were spelt out.  
 
The insights to emerge from this last section are compatible with many of the specific claims made 
in deconstruction, as well as with a number of critical complexity insights. This last section can, 
therefore, be read as an introduction to both a deconstructive ethics and a complex ethics. Earlier it 
was mentioned that Derrida’s deconstructive theory will be explained and applied in chapter four 
and five. However, before moving on to a more detailed discussion of Derrida’s position, it is first 
necessary to develop our understanding of a complex ethics (of which a deconstructive ethics serves 
as an example). To this end, chapter three presents an overview of the paradigm of complexity. 
Specifically, it will be shown that critical complexity theory is a position that is sensitive to the 
normative implications of our systems of meaning and ways of being in the world. The discussion 
on complexity (particularly critical complexity), therefore, strengthens and helps to explain the view 
of ethics, which is being developed in this study. In other words, the complexity vocabulary 
supplements the philosophical position supported in this study, and may lead to additional insights 
regarding our understanding and practice of business ethics.  
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Part II:  
Complexity Theory and Deconstruction: Rethinking the Normative Basis of 
Business Ethics   
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Chapter 3: 
The Paradigm of Complexity 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The French complexity theorist, Edgar Morin (2008: 19) argues that, in popular parlance, 
complexity has traditionally been understood as a term which ‘always carried with it a warning to 
our understanding, a cautioning against clarification, simplification, and overly rapid reduction.’ In 
a certain sense, this understanding of complexity represents both the starting point and the end point 
of the analysis given in this chapter. However, much ground needs to be covered before complexity 
can be adequately understood – both as a paradigm, and as a position that can hold important 
consequences for our understanding of ethics.    
 
Stengers (1997: 43) writes that ‘the theme of complexity has played an ambiguous role in 
discourses on science’. ‘Moreover’ Dillon (2000: 4) notes that ‘its genealogy, while different from, 
is in many ways as diverse as that of poststructuralism’.  This chapter proceeds with an introduction 
to some of the positions that have contributed to the development of the paradigm of complexity. 
These developments do not allow for clear chronological distinctions. However, in broad terms, one 
can state that interest in the theory of complexity developed in the first-half of the twentieth 
century. During this time, many scientists concerned themselves with problems of complexity in 
micro and macro-physics, as opposed to problems of simplicity (Rasch, 1991: 65). As noted by 
Dillon, the theory of complexity did not emerge from a single discipline, but from the interplay of 
several disciplines, including physics, mathematics, biology, economy, engineering, and computer 
science (Chu, Strand & Fjelland, 2003: 19). Although space does not allow for a full analysis of the 
complexity developments in all of these fields, the focus of the first half of this chapter will be on 
three significant movements, namely cybernetics, restricted complexity (explained below), and 
general systems theory37.  
 
The decision to focus on these three movements is grounded on the impact that these movements 
have had on critical complexity theory. Generally-speaking, two dominant views of complexity 
theory can be identified. The first view is the scientific view, in which the laws and rules of 
complexity are explored. Within this paradigm, it is believed that complex reality is guided by 
simple rules, which can, in principle, be discovered. Morin (2007: 10) refers to this scientific view 
                                                    
37
 Attention will also be given to the recent complexity-related developments in fields such as organisation 
studies, leadership studies, and business ethics.  
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as restricted complexity, because complexity is attached as a kind of wagon behind the truth 
locomotive, and, therefore, still remains within the epistemology of the classical sciences.  In this 
regard, restricted complexity resonates well with the realist view of post-modernism (with a 
hyphen), systemic modernism, and critical modernism – all of which are movements that support 
the notion that, although the world is complicated, it is inherently ‘solvable’ (see chap. 2, sec. 5.1.). 
 
Over-and-against this understanding of complexity, one has a more philosophical understanding of 
complexity, which Morin (10) refers to as generalised complexity. Within this paradigm, the notion 
of complexity itself is taken seriously, which necessitates that we undertake an epistemological, 
cognitive, and paradigmatic shift, which bears on the whole organisation of knowledge (10). 
Therefore, just as postmodern ideas present a challenge to the universal knowledge claims of 
modernism; this notion of complexity presents a challenge to the way in which we view science and 
the world. It is this latter understanding of complexity which will be denoted by the term critical 
complexity within the context of this study. 
 
The term critical complexity was coined by Cilliers (2010a). Although it encompasses Morin’s 
(2007) understanding of generalised complexity, the emphasis is on a self-critical rationality, which 
Cilliers (2010a: 14) defines as ‘a rationality that makes no claim for objectivity, or for any special 
status for the grounds from which the claim is made’. A self-critical rationality is, therefore, the 
outcome of acknowledging the irreducible nature of complexity (2). The implications that a critical 
position holds, especially for our understanding of ethic, will be further explored at the end of the 
chapter. However, before extrapolating on these implications, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of what critical complexity entails.  
 
The second half of the chapter, therefore, presents an introduction to critical complexity (at the hand 
of similarities and differences to cybernetics, restricted complexity, and general systems theory). 
This is followed by a circumscription of the features that characterise the paradigm of critical 
complexity. Once it is clear what critical complexity theory is, the implications of the critical 
position are spelt out. These implications provide the context for understanding Derrida’s 
deconstructive theory, which is introduced in the following chapter. 
 
Before proceeding with the discussion, it must be stressed that this chapter constitutes a theoretical 
analysis. The practical implications to emerge from the paradigm of (critical) complexity will 
become clear in subsequent chapters (specifically chapters five, six, and seven).  
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2. The origins of critical complexity theory 
 
2.1. Cybernetics 
 
One of the earliest movements to have impacted significantly on the development of complexity 
theory is cybernetics. Of specific significance is the influence that cybernetics has had on our 
understanding of how complex systems function. In order to provide a chronology of ideas, the 
following discussion treats cybernetics in terms of three phases, namely: first-order, second-order, 
and third-order cybernetics.  
 
2.1.1. First-order cybernetics and information theory 
 
According to Lafontaine (2007: 28), the field of cybernetics ‘took root at the core of the techno-
scientific project implemented by the American government during the Second World War’, and 
served as the precursor of Robotics and Computer Information Ethics. Norbert Wiener, a prominent 
mathematician, originally coined the term ‘cybernetics’ (which is derived from the Greek word 
kybernts, which means steersman, governor, pilot, or rudder), and is generally considered to be 
the founding father of cybernetics. However, many influential academics were involved in the 
establishment of cybernetics as a field, including the mathematicians, John von Neumann and 
Warren Weaver; the engineer, Claude Shannon; the physicist, Heinz von Foerster; and the cultural 
anthropologists Margaret Mead and (her third husband) Gregory Bateson.  
 
Lafontaine (30) argues that – despite the interdisciplinary nature of the field – cybernetics is based 
on three major principles (namely entropy, information, and feedback) and that these principles lay 
the foundation for a new science. Lafontaine (30) further argues that, although important advances 
in cybernetics were made during the wartime years, it was only at the end of the war that some of 
the above-mentioned acclaimed thinkers met to discuss questions of control and feedback. The 
forum for the discussion was the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, which were held between 1946 
and 1953 (Hayles, 1994: 441).  
 
The first Macy Conference, which was led by von Neumann and Wiener, marked the triumph of 
‘information over materiality’ in demonstrating that ‘the important entity in the man-machine 
equation was information, not energy’ (Hayles, 1999: 51). Apart from arguing for the construction 
of information as a theoretical entity, Katherine Hayles (50) maintains that members of the Macy 
Conference also deployed arguments concerning: the construction of (human) neural structures as 
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flows of information, and the construction of artifacts in a manner that translated information flows 
into observable operations. 
 
Morin (2008: 13) explains that information emerged with Hartley, and especially Shannon and 
Weaver, as communicational on the one hand, and statistical on the other. Whereas the former view 
is concerned with the transmission of messages and integrated into a theory of communication, the 
latter view deals with the probability of an elementary unit of information appearing. The concept 
of entropy – which refers to the level of disorder in a system (Horgan, 1995: 107) – gained 
significance at the beginning of the 20th century, with the formulation of the second law of 
thermodynamics, which states that the universe tends towards general entropy or maximal disorder 
(Morin, 2008: 40). The link between the Shannonian equation of information and entropy lies in the 
discovery that entropy is inversely proportional to information. Or, otherwise stated, ‘there is 
equivalence between information and negative entropy or negenentropy’ (14). Not only is this 
theory relevant to the communication of messages on a computer (for example), but information 
theory could also be extrapolated to the biological realm, where, for example, genetic mutation is 
likened to noise or ‘entropy’ that disrupts the reproduction of a message (information), thereby 
provoking an ‘error’ (with respect to the original message) in the constitution of a new message. 
The novel element is, therefore, that information theory ‘could, on the one hand, be integrated into 
the notion of biological organization… [and], on the other hand, somewhat surprisingly link 
thermodynamics, or physics, to biology’ (13).  
 
This new science, therefore, also marks an epistemological revolution in that the intrinsic study of 
beings and objects is rejected in favour of an approach that focuses on ‘interactions between 
objects, regardless of their nature (physical, biological, artificial or human)’ (Lafontaine, 2007: 29). 
In this sense, cybernetics poses a challenge to the distinction between human and machine, since the 
behaviour of both thermostats and people, for example, can be explained ‘through theories of 
feedback, hierarchical structure, and control’ (Hayles, 1999: 84; see Haraway, 1985). 
 
The brief description provided above serves to introduce the premises of first-order cybernetics, 
which dates from 1945 to 1960 (Hayles, 1994: 441). Although cybernetics presents a radical 
epistemological break in science, one element of the old paradigm still remains, namely the idea of 
scientific objectivity. During the conference, however, the question of reflexivity arose – and 
although some of the physicists steered the debate to more comfortable grounds – a group of 
thinkers (led by Heinz von Foerster) continued to think about the problem of reflexivity after the 
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conference (Hayles, 1999: 10). The central issue that preoccupied this group was ‘how to redefine 
homeostatic systems so that the observer can be taken into account’ (10).  
 
The foundational stage of cybernetics is, therefore, characterised by the emergence of two 
constellations, which were in competition with each other, namely a conservative constellation, 
which privileged ‘constancy over change, predictability over complexity, [and] equilibrium over 
evolution’ (Hayles, 1994: 446); and a constellation which privileged ‘change over constancy, 
evolution over equilibrium, [and] complexity over predictability’ (446). Whereas, the conservative 
constellation focused on the concept of homeostasis, defined as ‘the ability of an organism to 
maintain itself in a stable state’ (446), the central concept that interested researchers from the 
second constellation was reflexivity, which Hayles (446) defines as ‘turning a system’s rules back 
on itself so as to cause it to engage in more complex behavior.’  
 
2.1.2. Second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis  
 
Thus, during the 1960s second-order cybernetics developed in an attempt to account for the 
observers of systems, who themselves are also systems. The initiative was driven by von Foerster, 
who experimented with various ways in which to formulate reflexivity38. Von Foerster (in von 
Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 110) describes the difference between first and second-order 
cybernetics as follows: 
 
First order cybernetics separates the subject from the object and refers to an assumed world 
“out there”. Second order cybernetics or cybernetics of cybernetics is itself circular. You 
learn to understand yourself as a part of the world that you wish to observe. The entire 
observational situation ends up in another area in which you suddenly have to take 
responsibility for your observations.  
 
One of the biggest problems with which von Foerster grappled was finding a way of speaking about 
reflexivity without sliding into a solipsistic position. Of this problem, Hayles (1999: 133-134) 
writes: ‘The message from the Macy Conferences was clear: if reflexivity was to be credible, it had 
to be insulated against subjectivity and presented in a context which had at least the potential for 
rigorous (preferably mathematical) formulation.’ 
 
                                                    
38
 In this regard, see von Foerster’s (1984) influential book, entitled Observing Systems.  
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According to Hayles (134), a breakthrough occurred in 1969, when the Chilean biologist, Humberto 
Maturana, unveiled his ideas of treating cognition as a biological phenomenon at a conference to 
which von Foerster had invited him. This idea was presented in the seminal paper, entitled ‘What 
the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain’, in which Maturana and his co-authors demonstrated ‘that the 
[frog’s] eye speaks to the brain in a language already highly organized and interpreted instead of 
transmitting some more or less accurate copy of the distribution of light upon the receptors’ 
(Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch & Pitts, 1959: 1950). In other words, instead of registering reality, 
the frog’s perceptual system constructs reality (Hayles, 1999:135). According to Hayles (1994: 
461), this article – which discredits the idea of a transcendental position from which to observe 
reality – served to blow ‘a frog-sized hole in objectivist epistemology.’ Maturana makes similar 
observations in his work on colour vision, in which he demonstrates that there is no direct 
correlation between an animal’s colour perception and the world. Rather, a correlation exists 
between the activity in an animal’s retina and its experience of colour (135; see Maturana, Uribe & 
Frenk, 1968). Both his work on the frog’s perceptual system and colour vision, led Maturana to 
conclude that there can be no unmediated understanding of reality. Rather, as Hayles (1999:136) 
states: ‘[reality] comes into existence for us, and all living creatures, only through the interactive 
processes determined solely by the organism’s own organization.’  
 
Hayles (10) argues that second order cybernetics reached its mature stage with the publication of 
Humberto Maturana and his co-author, Francisco Varela’s (another Chilean biologist’s), book 
entitled, Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of Living. Their main premise is that all 
systems are autonomous, self-referential, and organisationally-closed. In other words, ‘living 
systems operate within the boundaries of an organization that closes in on itself and leaves the 
world on the outside’ (136). This means that systems are only open to the environment from an 
observer’s perspective. Therefore, ‘[e]verything said is said by an observer’ (Maturana & Varela, 
1980: xxii). This, however, does not mean that organisationally-closed systems are isolated systems. 
The point is rather that the ‘environment’ is drawn into the system, in order to facilitate is own 
production and maintenance (Morgan, 2006: 244). Poli (2009: 8) explains the consequence of this 
view as follows: ‘the system’s connection with the environment is no longer a kind of immediate 
and direct relation between the system and its environment but becomes a reflexive relation, 
mediated by the self-referential loops that constitute the system itself.’ Self-reference is thus the key 
to understanding organisationally-closed systems. To illustrate this point, consider Maturana and 
Varela’s (1980: xv) treatment of the nervous system as an activity ‘determined by the nervous 
system itself and not by the external world’. The external world is only accorded ‘a triggering role’ 
in releasing ‘the internally-determined activity of the nervous system.’  
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Maturana and Varela (1980) further maintain that, because systems are organisationally-closed, 
their ability to self-create or self-renew is due to the system’s capacity for self-production through 
feedback loops – a process which they call autopoiesis. In Autopoiesis and Cognition, Maturana 
explains the origins of the word autopoiesis: he and Varela initially used the term ‘circular 
organisation’ to refer to the system’s capacity for self-production through feedback loops, but found 
this term to be inadequate, since it did not ‘convey the central feature of the organization of the 
living, which is autonomy’ (xvii). The term ‘poiesis’ followed after a conversation with a friend 
regarding ‘Don Quixote’s dilemma of whether to follow the path of arms (praxis, action) or the path 
of letters (poiesis, creation and production)’. It was after this conversation, that Maturana claims to 
have understood ‘for the first time the power of the word ‘poiesis’ and thus ‘invented the word that 
[they] needed: autopoiesis’ (xvii). A few pages on, Maturana and Varela (9) provide the following 
description of autopoiesis:  
 
It is the circularity of its organization that makes a living system a unit of interactions, and it 
is the circularity that it must maintain in order to remain a living system and to retain its 
identity through different interactions. 
 
What differentiates the reflexivity in autopoietic systems from the understanding accorded to 
reflexivity in the Macy Conferences is the fact that reflexivity is no longer associated with 
‘psychological complexity’, but is rather ‘constituted through the interplay between a system and its 
components… [which] mutually define each other in the bootstrap operation characteristic of 
reflexive self-constitution’ (Hayles, 1994: 462).   
 
In the early 1980s, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, appropriated and generalised Maturana and 
Varela’s notion of autopoiesis to describe the autonomous and self-referential operations of social 
systems, which he elucidated in his book, entitled Social Systems (1995) (Rasch & Knodt, 1994: 3). 
Luhmann was one of Habermas’s most prominent critics, opposing his view of universal principles 
in favour of principles that are self-referential, and, therefore, paradoxically based on themselves 
(Arnoldi, 2001: 2). Poli (2009: 9-11) explains Luhmann’s application of the theory of autopoiesis to 
social systems as follows: for social systems to be seen as self-referential systems, it is important to 
acknowledge a degree of systemic stability. Luhmann follows Parsons (1951) in viewing the 
reproduction of social systems as provided by the reproduction of its (social) roles (i.e. patterns of 
action typical of a specific system) (Poli, 2009: 9). Luhmann, however, goes further than Parsons in 
providing a firmer basis for social roles in terms of meaning: ‘the reproduction of a social system is 
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grounded on the reproduction of meaning, e.g. through education and other socializing functions’ 
(9).  
 
Citing Luhmann (1986: 174), Poli (2009: 10) further explains that the units of meaning used by a 
social system for its reproduction are communications, which Luhmann (building on Bühler, 1934) 
views as consisting of information, utterances, and understanding. This latter component of 
communication ‘refers to what the receiver grasps from the previous two aspects of a 
communication’ (10). Since all three components are necessary to form a communication, 
communication can never be attributed to a single individual (due to the role of the receiver). As 
such, Luhmann defines communications as the basis for social acts (10).  
 
Using this theory, Luhmann distinguishes modern social systems into different functional systems, 
depending on the domains of practice e.g. law, economy, science, art etc. Each of these subsystems 
is further evaluated in terms of relevant and irrelevant communication, (which is a distinction valid 
to all subsystems), as well as a function-specific distinction. This function specific distinction is 
unique to the given domain e.g. the distinction of legal or illegal communication applies to the legal 
system, whereas the distinction between true and untrue propositions/theories applies to the 
scientific system. Luhmann also draws distinctions between social systems based on specific 
subtypes (such as interaction or organisation). These subtypes are based on types of communication, 
for example face-to-face communication is applicable to interpersonal interactions, whereas 
decisions are applicable for organisations (10).  
 
What is of note for this discussion is that ‘[a]ll the communication takes place within the system; 
there is no communicative exchange between the system and its environment’ (11). Although not 
thermodynamically closed, social systems are informationally-closed. However, systems are able to 
reproduce the system/environment distinction (wherein the environment perturbs the system and 
triggers internal processes) within the system itself. This ability of the system ‘to apply to itself the 
distinction between the system and its environment requires that the system be capable of observing 
itself’ (11). Poli (11) claims that it is this ‘observational re-entry’ that both ‘generates the structure 
of the system [and] constitutes the second level (or cycle) of autopoietic reproduction’39. 
 
                                                    
39
 For Luhmann, the complexity generated by these self-referential processes cannot be resolved, and in this 
sense, his perspective coincides with the perspectives of those who support the agenda of critical 
complexity. However, what distinguishes Luhmann from these critical complexity theorists is his emphasis on 
operationally-closed systems, which gives his work a constructionist dimension.   
100 
 
The theory of autopoiesis not only had a profound impact on Luhmann’s understanding of social 
systems, but also radically altered the cybernetics paradigm (Hayles, 1999:10). More specifically, it 
brought about two major shifts: namely, a shift from observed systems to the observer of systems; 
and a shift from message, signal, and information as that which circulates through systems to the 
mutually constitutive interactions between the components of a system (11). As such, Hayles (158) 
accredits Maturana and Varela with introducing important insights regarding reflexivity and the role 
of the observer (along with the implications that this holds for the notion of scientific objectivity), 
and for drawing attention to the specificity and concreteness of embodied processes. However, 
Hayles (158-159) is critical of the idea of organisationally-closed systems, and remains 
unconvinced that Maturana and Varela are able to solve the problem of solipsism. Although Hayles 
(158) concedes that Maturana and Varela’s (1987: 242) statement that: ‘We do not see what we do 
not see, and what we do not see does not exist’ cannot be properly understood without 
contextualising it in terms of the observer’s sensory perceptions, she, nevertheless questions the 
consequences that the notion of operational closure holds for our understanding of reality. In this 
regard, consider the following citation (Hayles, 1999: 158): 
 
But what if “the observer” ceases to be constructed as a generic marker and becomes 
invested with a specific psychology, including highly idiosyncratic and possibly psychotic 
tendencies? Will the domains of self-conscious observers fail to stabilize external reality? 
Will the uncertainties then go beyond questions of epistemology and become questions of 
ontology? Will the observation that “what we do not see does not exist” sink deep into the 
structure of reality, undermining not only our ability to know but the ability of the world to 
be? 
 
Ultimately, therefore, the constructivist dimension of operationally-closed systems carries 
solipsistic and relativist implications that cannot easily be overcome.  
 
2.1.3. Third-order cybernetics and artificial life 
 
As stated in the previous section, Maturana and Varela understood autonomy to be the central 
feature of the organisation of the living, and it is precisely the concept of autonomy that led Varela 
to the field of artificial life. In the proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life, 
Varela and his co-author, Bourgine (1992: xi), write that ‘[a]utonomy in this context refers to [the 
living’s] basic and fundamental capacity to be, to assert their existence and bring forth a world that 
is significant and pertinent without being predigested in advance.’ What differentiates third-order 
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cybernetics from second-order cybernetics is the emphasis on the capacity to bring forth a world 
through self-organisation – a capacity which is referred to as emergence. Here again, we see a 
subtle shift in how the characteristic of self-organisation functions in the cybernetic theory: whereas 
in second order cybernetics, self-organisation is associated with homeostasis (or system’s 
maintenance), in third-order cybernetics, self-organisation refers to a system’s ability to ‘evolve in 
unpredictable and often highly complex ways through emergent processes’ (Hayles, 1994: 463).   
 
Emergence is also the quality that distinguishes artificial intelligence (AI) from artificial life (AL). 
Hayles (1999: 239) succinctly explains as follows: ‘Whereas AI dreamed of creating consciousness 
inside a machine, AL sees human consciousness, understood as an epiphenomenon, perching on top 
of the machinelike functions that distributed systems carry out.’ One of the most famous examples 
of artificial life software in von Neuman’s self-reproducing cellular automata. As early as 1949, 
John von Neumann was already observing a phenomenon for which he had no proper name, but 
which he later referred to as complexity (Rasch, 1991: 66). This complex phenomenon which von 
Neumann was observing was the ability of a simple structure to produce a structure more complex 
than itself through a process of emergence.  
 
In terms of the cellular automata, one sees how extremely complex patterns emerge from initially 
undifferentiated cellular automata, which are presented as pixels on a computer screen. These 
automata function as finite state machines that follow simple rules such as ‘on if two neighbours are 
on, otherwise off’. The automata’s states are continuously updated as they move through successive 
generations. On a computer screen, these automata give the impression of being alive, which has led 
some researchers to view them as a model for life (Hayles, 1999: 240). In this regard, Christopher 
Langton (1995: xi) –who supports a view of ‘strong a-life’ – writes that not only will artificial life 
teach us much about reality, but it ‘will ultimately reach beyond biology… [to] include culture and 
technology in an extended view of nature.’    
 
Although von Neumann’s work predates third-order cybernetics, it is definitely a forerunner to the 
simulated worlds of virtual reality and artificial life that have entered both professional and 
consumer markets today, and that has created the hope of transforming consciousness into a 
informational pattern, which can be downloaded into a computer (Moravec, 1988: 109-110). A 
prominent question which baffled von Neumann, and subsequent researchers, and which is still 
relevant today, is how high-level computations can emerge from the underlying structure of the 
cellular automata (Hayles, 1999: 241). To explain this phenomenon, von Neumann postulated a 
‘complexity barrier’, which is the point past which systems experience not only quantitative, but 
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also qualitative changes (Rasch, 1991: 67). Von Neumann (1966: 80) offers the following 
description of the complexity barrier:  
 
There is thus this completely decisive property of complexity, that there exists a critical size 
below which the process of synthesis is degenerative, but above which the phenomenon of 
synthesis, if properly arranged, can become explosive, in other words, where synthesis of 
automata can proceed in such a manner that each automaton will produce other automata 
which are more complex and of higher potentialities than itself.   
 
This idea of complexity barrier was further explored by Langton, Norman Packard, and Stuart 
Kaufmann. All three these theorists postulated that the requisite variety and creative tension needed 
for emergent behaviour exists in the boundary area between order and chaos (Horgan, 1995: 106). 
Horgan (106) reports that Langton and Packard noted in their experiments with cellular automata 
that ‘a system’s computational capacity… peaks in a narrow regime between highly periodic and 
chaotic behavior.’ As a result, they coined the popular term ‘the edge of chaos’ (Langton, 1992), 
which is widely used in definitions of complex systems.  
 
2.2. The Santa Fe Institute, chaos theory, and restricted complexity 
 
Concepts such as feedback, hierarchical structure, control, reflexivity, boundaries, self-organisation, 
emergence, and artificial life have played a vital role not only in the development of the cybernetics 
paradigm, but also in contemporary formulations of complexity theory.   
 
Although Hayles categorises the work of Langton, Packard, and Kauffman in the cybernetics 
paradigm, these three theorists are more commonly associated with their work on complexity at the 
Sante Fe Institute. Indeed, Kauffman and Langton were amongst the scientific pioneers of the 
Institute, which was founded in 1984, and which is dedicated to the study of complex systems. One 
of the ambitions of the Sante Fe Institute is to construct a unified theory of complex systems. John 
Holland (1993) explicitly articulates this goal, stating that despite appearances, a range of complex 
systems ‘do share significant characteristics, so much so that we group them under a single 
classification at the Santa Fe Institute, calling them complex adaptive systems [CAS].’ Holland 
(1993) continues by stating that CAS ‘signals [the Institute’s] intuition that there are general 
principles that govern all complex behavior, principles that point to ways of solving… [our] 
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problems.’ Not much has changed since this formulation, as a quick glance at the Institute’s 
website40 reveals that the aim is still: 
 
to discover, comprehend, and communicate the common fundamental principles in complex 
physical, computational, biological, and social systems that underlie many of the most 
profound problems facing science and society today. 
 
Despite this ambitious agenda, complexity theorists have encountered numerous problems, 
beginning with the term itself. In the words of Horgan (1995: 105): ‘Complexologists have 
struggled to distinguish their field from a closely related pop-science movement, chaos.’ The 
phenomenon of chaos is often described with reference to the butterfly effect, which encapsulates 
the idea that one butterfly could eventually have a far-reaching ripple effect on subsequent historic 
events (an idea first introduced by Ray Bradbury in a 1952 short story on time-travel, entitled A 
Sound of Thunder, but which was later popularised by one of the pioneer’s of chaos theory, Edward 
Lorenz). Chaos theory is used to describe systems that display non-linear dynamics, bifurcation, a 
sensitivity to initial conditions, and other mathematically-defined behaviour (Horgan, 1995: 109). 
These characteristics constitute the general principles of chaos theory, but despite the initial 
excitement over this new theory, ‘chaos turned out to refer to a restricted set of phenomena that 
evolve in predictably unpredictable ways’ (105-106). This prompted another pioneer in the field, 
David Ruelle (in Horgan, 1995: 109), to state that ‘in spite of frequent triumphant announcements 
of ‘novel’ breakthroughs, [chaos] has had a declining output of interesting discoveries.’ Although 
chaos theory did not achieve the success envisioned, chaos theorists did achieve something that 
complexity theorists at the Santa Fe Institute long hoped for: a precise description of the systems 
under observation.  
 
Complexity theorists, such as Holland, Casti, and Fontana and Ballati are of the opinion that a 
unified theory of complexity, also known as a Theory of Complexity (TOC) or a Theory of 
Everything (TOE), is necessary ‘in order to make the science of complexity more coherent, general 
and precise’ (Chu et al. 2003: 19). Indeed, Chu et al. (19) note that this ‘search for universal and 
unifying theories is something of an ideal in most scientific disciplines.’ Some of the more 
prominent attempts at formulating the principles of complexity include Langton’s (1992) ideas on 
life at the edge of chaos (described in the previous section), Per Bak’s (1997) work on self-
organised criticality, and Kauffman’s (1993) work on attractors, strange attractors, and 
autocatalysis. However, despite the substantial contributions that these theorists have made to the 
                                                    
40
 http://www.santafe.edu/ 
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theoretical debate, and to work on the formalisation and modelling of complex systems, attempts at 
unifying theories have been repeatedly criticised.  
 
Indeed, Jack Cowan (in Horgan, 1995: 104), one of the Institute’s founders, notes that the major 
discovery to have emerged from the Santa Fe Institute is that ‘it’s very hard to do science on 
complex systems.’ Chu et al. (2003: 20 -21) states that although there is no litmus test for 
determining what counts as a scientific theory or not, scientific theories must necessary conform to 
three aims, namely: 
 
 Prediction of the future behavior of a system given a set of observational data about 
it (predictive component) 
 Theoretical understanding and/or description of a system (explanatory component) 
 Provision of guidelines and control mechanisms for the intervention and 
manipulation of systems (control component).  
 
Additionally, Chu et al. (21) point to three extra features of a scientific theory, designed to 
simultaneously foster explanation, prediction, and facilitation of control. The first element concerns 
the language in which a TOC is formulated. A TOC is commonly defined in a mathematical 
language, as mathematical formulations lead to high precision and generalisability, and may 
facilitate prediction and control. The second element concerns the idea that natural systems can be 
understood by studying their components. In other words, the idea is that simple principles underlie 
complex phenomena, and that it is possible to express these principles in a TOC. The third element 
concerns universalibity: a TOC should be able to explain a wide range of different complex systems 
(although Chu et al. (21) note that one could expect a possible trade-off between universality and 
mathematical quantifiability).  
 
The traditional scientific paradigm, however, does not hold up when it comes to complex 
phenomena. There is no ‘magic criterion’ (Landauer in Horgan, 1995: 105) by which to unravel the 
complexities of nature. Indeed, Horgan (1995: 107) states that the entire field of complexity and 
artificial life is based on the following seductive syllogism: 
 
[Premise 1:] There are simple sets of mathematical rules that when followed by a computer 
give rise to extremely complicated patterns.  
[Premise 2:] The world also contains many extremely complicated patterns. 
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Conclusion: Simple rules underlie many extremely complicated phenomena in the world. 
With the help of powerful computers scientists can root those rules out.  
 
In their implicit acceptance of this syllogism, researchers at the Institute typically follow a restricted 
approach to complexity (Morin, 2007:10). As described in the introduction, within this paradigm, 
‘complexity’ is used to describe systems that are empirically presented as a multiplicity of inter-
related processes, which are retroactively associated with one another in order to establish the ‘laws 
of complexity’. A restricted approach to complexity is, therefore, a purely descriptive approach in 
that one strives to grasp and explain the interplay of the elements of a system in terms of rules. In 
this sense, cyberneticians and restricted complexity theorists share the dream of discovering the 
rules of complexity, which will allow them to accurately model living systems and to apply 
‘biological insights to engineered computational systems’41, thereby forever altering the relation 
between humans and intelligent machines (Hayles, 1994: 467).  
 
2.3. General systems theory 
 
Another approach that shares certain features and aspirations with cybernetics is general systems 
theory; however, Morin (2008: 9) argues that general systems theory has a much wider scope than 
cybernetics. Indeed, it is quasi-universal in a certain sense, since ‘all known reality, from the 
molecule to the cell to an organism to a society, can be conceived of as systems.’ The biologist, 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1972: 414), provides a good description of the commonalities between 
systems theory and cybernetics. He remarks that although general systems theory did not spring out 
of the war effort (as is the case with cybernetics), both movements, nevertheless, share an interest in 
the organisational and teleological behaviour of systems. Von Bertalanffy (413-414) also notes that, 
despite the fact that cyberneticians and systems theorists have different starting points (technology 
versus science (especially biology)) and use different basic models (feedback circuits versus 
dynamic systems of interaction), both approaches present a challenge to the mechanistic conception 
of the universe (413-414).  In this sense, general systems theory shares the cybernetics agenda, 
which is defined by Frank, Hutchinson, Livingstone, McCulloch and Wiener (in von Bertalanffy, 
1972: 414) as ‘the search for new approaches, for new and more comprehensive concepts, and for 
methods capable of dealing with the large wholes of organisms and personalities’.  
 
Von Bertalanffy (1972: 407), however, is also quick to remind us that the system’s approach is not 
new to the history of ideas. One formulation of the basic system’s problem, which still remains 
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 http://www.santafe.edu/research/topics-information-processing-computation.php 
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valid today, is Aristotle’s statement that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Other systems 
thinkers that von Bertalanffy (408) mentions are Dionysius (who introduced the term hierarchic 
order); Nicholas of Cusa (who introduced the notion of coincidentia oppositorum, which refers to 
the fight amongst components of a system that nevertheless form a unified whole); Leibniz (whose 
hierarchy of monads closely resembles modern systems), and Hegel and Marx (especially in terms 
of their work on dialectics). As such, von Bertalanffy notes that: 
  
the problems with which we are nowadays concerned under the term “system” were not 
“born yesterday” out of current questions of mathematics, science, and technology. Rather, 
they are a contemporary expression of perennial problems which have been recognized for 
centuries and discussed in the language available at the time (408).   
 
Modern day system’s theory developed from the recognition that the paradigm of classic science, 
wherein phenomena are studied in terms of isolable elements, was no longer adequate for 
explaining complex phenomena. One of the fields in which this problem became very pertinent was 
biology. Already in the 1920’s, von Bertalanffy had identified the organisation of organisms as ‘the 
fundamental character of the living thing’ (410). This organisation42 referred to the ‘set of elements 
of a system standing in interrelation among themselves and with the environment’ (417). Von 
Bertalanffy (412) further defined the relation between systems and their environment as open. This 
means that systems exchange matter with their environment, which, according to von Bertalanffy 
(412), is the hallmark of living systems.  
 
Critical complexity theorists such as Morin (2008) and Cilliers (1998) support this understanding of 
‘open systems’. However, this understanding is at odds with Maturana and Varela’s conception of 
openness and closure in autopoietic systems (an idea, which as stated earlier, is appropriated by 
Niklas Luhmann in his description of social systems). To recall: Maturana and Varela’s theory of 
autopoiesis rejects the classical difference between open and closed systems (which is contingent on 
whether the system’s boundary is porous enough to let the system and the environment exchange 
                                                    
42
 In order to capture this idea of organisation, von Bertalanffy coined the terms ‘organismic biology’ and ‘the 
system theory of the organism’ (von Berthalanffy, 1972: 410). This organismic programme was the germ for 
what later became known as general systems theory. Von Bertalanffy (411) states that he first formulated the 
notion of general systems theory orally in the 1930s, and then in various publications after the Second World 
War. This formulation reads as follows: 
General Systems Theory is a logico-mathematical field whose task is the formulation and derivation 
of those general principles that are applicable to “systems” in general. In this way, exact formulations 
of terms such as wholeness and sum, differentiation, progressive mechanization, centralization, 
hierarchical order, finality and equifinality, etc., become possible, terms which occur in all sciences 
dealing with “systems” and imply their logical homology (411).  
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matter) in favour of an understanding of closure which denotes ‘the generation of structure, 
understood as the set of constraints governing the system’s internal processes.’43 (Poli, 2009: 8).  
 
The idea of open systems originated as a thermodynamic concept (Morin, 2008:10). In 
thermodynamics, systems equilibrium equates to systems death as a constant source of energy is 
needed for system’s maintenance. However, if systems are completely random, then they also have 
no capacity for complex behaviour. For living systems to function, they must, therefore, be in a 
state of disequilibrium or energetic flux, but must simultaneously retain a measure of stability and 
continuity. Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian chemist, and prominent complexity theorist, demonstrated 
this principle in his work on dissipative structure for which he received a Nobel Prize. Dissipative 
structures are ‘“pumped” chemical cells that never achieve equilibrium but oscillate between 
multiple states’ (Horgan, 1995: 108). Prigogine and Stengers (1984: 143) state that these dissipative 
states – or the formation of new dynamic states of matter – illustrates ‘[t]he interaction of a system 
with the outside world, [and] its embedding in nonequilibrium conditions’. These nonequilibrium 
conditions further show that ‘[d]isorder does not simply destroy order, structure and organization 
but is also a condition of their formation and reformation’ (Taylor, 2001: 121). Taylor (121) 
summarises the implications of this insight as follows: ‘life depends on parasites as much as 
information depends on noise [or entropy].’ 
 
Two important points can be drawn from this description of open systems: firstly, the laws of the 
organisation of the living are laws of disequilibrium or stabilised dynamics; and secondly, the 
intelligibility of the system can only be understood in terms of its relation with the environment, 
which is not a relationship of simple dependence, but which is constitutive of the system (11). With 
regard to the system’s relation with the environment (i.e. the second consequence), one must 
recognise that, methodologically, it is difficult to study open systems. This is because, as Morin 
(11) remarks, ‘[t]he environment is at the same time intimate and foreign: it is part of the system 
while remaining exterior to it’. Even though we can only know the environment in terms of the 
system, the environment should not be reduced to a feature of the system itself. Rather the 
environment should be viewed as something which stands apart from the system, but, nevertheless, 
interacts with the system, in order to constitute the system. In other words, a system and its 
environment should be treated as both a real, physical category, and a mental category or ideal 
model (Morin, 1992: 379). This consequence is further elaborated upon in section 5.3. At this stage, 
                                                    
43
 Openness, as understood from the perspective of autopoietic theory, retains its classical meaning of 
energy exchange with the environment (Poli, 2009: 8).  
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it is sufficient to take note of the crucial, yet complex role played by the environment in any 
sophisticated account of system’s theory. 
 
3. Complexity theory in organisation studies, leadership studies, and business ethics 
 
Before introducing the paradigm of critical complexity, it is important to briefly investigate the 
impact of complexity theory in general. Complexity theory not only has a very diverse genealogy, 
but also a wide uptake in a number of applied fields. Of specific importance in the context, is the 
increasing significant role that complexity theory is playing in organisation studies, leadership 
studies, and even business ethics. As cited in the introduction to this study, Allen (2001: 29) 
attributes the reason for this to the fact that complexity theory offers an integrated, 
multidimensional approach, which can successfully be related to the real-world situation.  As such, 
complexity theory provides a broader and richer alternative to the reductionist and partial theories 
that have been developed in, and applied to organisation and management studies over the last 30 
years (Ghoshal, 2005: 88). 
 
Although space does not allow for a detailed discussion of these developments, it is worthwhile to 
take note of the following contributions44: In the field of organisation and management studies, the 
work of Allen (2001; 2000), which is focused on evolutionary complex systems and the limits to 
modelling knowledge, has been significant. Lissack and Letiche’s (2007) analysis on the 
importance of coherence, emergence, and resilience for a complexity theory of organisations and 
organisational identity has proved insightful. Stacey’s (2003, 2001, 1996; 1995); and, Stacey, 
Griffen, and Shaw’s (2000) work on complex responsive processes in organisations and 
management practices has also received much attention in these fields. In leadership studies, the 
work of Uhl-Bien (2006); Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey (2007); Lichtenstein and Plowman 
(2009); and, Plowman, Solansky, Beck, Baker, Kulkarni, and Travis (2007) should be noted. These 
theorists use complexity theory in order to develop a relational (as opposed to agent-centric) 
understanding of leadership, and to investigate the role of leadership in emergent, self-organising 
systems. In business ethics, Collier and Esteban (1999; 2000) have made important contributions in 
terms of illustrating the role that complex processes play in ethical leadership and governance 
practices; Maak and Pless (2006) have explored the concept of a complex, relational form of 
leadership, and what this implies for ethical and responsive leadership practices; and, Painter-
                                                    
44
 This description presents a partial list of management theorists, leadership theorists, and business 
ethicists using complexity theory in their work. The references to their works are also merely illustrative of the 
type of subjects that they are tackling in their research, and by no means provide an exhaustive description 
of their research.   
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Morland (2008) has incorporated elements of complexity theory in her work on relational 
responsiveness, leadership, accountability, and business ethics management.   
 
Despite the diversity of fields and topics covered, one common characteristic which differentiates 
the above-mentioned studies from other, more traditional contributions in the various fields is that 
the focus of analysis has shifted from individuals (whether they are construed as managers, leader, 
or ethical agents) to the processes and systems in which individuals partake. Individual behaviour 
is, therefore, analysed in terms of the influence that they exert on systemic structure through their 
various cooperative and competitive activities, but also in terms of the constraints that these systems 
and contexts exert on individual behaviour (see secs 5.2. & 6.2.). Due to the complexity of these 
processes, it is impossible to maintain the traditional Cartesian view of the subject as a ‘“knowing”’ 
individual’ who is ‘understood as the architect and controller of an internal and external order’ 
(Uhl-Bien, 2006: 655). This further has implications for how we model our realities. In this regard, 
Allen (2000: 88) argues that the simple and predictive models traditionally used in these fields, are 
‘bought’ at the price of certain reductive assumptions. An important question that guides some of 
the above-mentioned studies is, therefore, what can we know about complex systems, and how do 
we deal with the unpredictable and non-linear consequences of our actions. As a theoretical 
approach, complexity theory does not offer what Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 276) call ‘“problem-
solving tools and solutions kits”’, but rather helps us to come to terms with the real-world problems 
that emerge because of complexity. More attention will be accorded to this discussion in section 6 
of this chapter. At this point it is merely important to note that complexity theory has not only been 
influential in the hard sciences, but also in the social sciences, and that the uptake of complexity in 
the social sciences is a growing trend (as determined from the increasing number of references to 
complexity theory in organisation and management studies, leadership studies, and business ethics).     
   
4. Introduction to critical complexity 
 
In the previous sections, some of the movements that have had an influence on the development of 
critical complexity were briefly schematised, albeit not chronologically. Although critical 
complexity shares significant similarities with these movements (including the use and 
understanding of much of the terminology), there are also several ideological differences between 
critical complexity and these movements. As such, this section commences with a summary of the 
major insights derived from these various movements, followed by a discussion of how critical 
complexity differs from restricted complexity and systems theory specifically.  
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4.1. Summary of the influences on critical complexity 
 
Below follows a list of the most important insights that emerged from the preceding discussion on 
cybernetics, restricted complexity, and systems theory. These insights have had a significant impact 
on our understanding of generalised or critical complexity:  
 
• In focusing attention on the principles of entropy, information, and feedback, first-order 
cybernetics influenced the development of critical complexity theory through placing the 
emphasis on the interactions between objects (regardless of their nature), rather than on the 
objects themselves.  
• Self-reflexivity (which characterises second-order cybernetics) brought forth a shift from 
observed systems to the observers of systems, which has impacted on our understanding of 
our ability to know complex systems (psychological complexity). Maturana and Varela’s 
emphasis on autopoiesis has also influenced critical complexity theory, by drawing attention 
to questions regarding the relations between systems and the environment, as well as to the 
constitutive nature of systems. 
• Third-order cybernetics (which focuses on artificial life) has significantly influenced critical 
complexity in introducing the concepts of self-organisation and emergence – both of which 
are central to any understanding of complex systems. 
• The field of restricted complexity further developed the above ideas, and contributed to our 
understanding of complex systems through making important advances in terms of 
formalising and modelling complex systems. 
• General systems theory – like cybernetics and restricted complexity – has provided 
important challenges to the mechanistic conception of the universe, and has greatly enriched 
our knowledge on the organisation of systems (as a set of elements standing in interaction 
amongst themselves and with the environment).  
 
Despite the positive influence that the above movements have had on the development of critical 
complexity, critical complexity also differs in important respects from these movements. Below, 
follows a brief discussion of the most important differences between critical complexity versus 
restricted complexity and general systems theory.  
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4.2. Critical complexity vs. restricted complexity: the problem of reductionism 
 
In section 2.2., it was argued that restricted complexity or a Theory of Everything still remains 
within the epistemology of the classical sciences. In this paradigm, the explanatory principle is the 
principle of  reduction, which is supported by the principle of disjunction (that consists in separating 
cognitive difficulties from one another) and the principle of universal determinism (that is, the idea 
that deterministic principles govern the course of cosmic events, past and future) (Morin, 2007: 5).  
Although it is conceded that the world is a complicated affair, within this paradigm the phenomenon 
of complexity (10) is never seriously questioned. This is because – following the syllogism 
mentioned in section 2.2. – it is believed that, with a lot of hard work and computational power, we 
can expose a set of simple rules that underlie complex systems. On this understanding, complexity 
is related to original simplicity (Rasch, 1991: 69) and one, therefore, ‘recognizes complexity by 
decomplexifying it’ (Morin, 2007: 10).  
 
In order to further support this argument, consider Holland’s (1998: 24-26) approach to complexity, 
which is based on formal models consisting of ‘atomistic building blocks... whose interactions are 
determined by a set of formal production rules’. Holland views these models as descriptions of 
reality, although he also talks of rule-governed models. This, according to Cilliers (2000: 43), 
suggests that formal rules are fundamental to complex systems. Cilliers (43) criticises Holland’s 
view of complexity, arguing that something which can be fully-understood in terms of a set of rules, 
can at best be understood as complicated.  As explained in the introduction, the term critical 
complexity (Cilliers, 2010a) or generalised complexity (Morin, 2007) takes account of the nature of 
complexity itself45, which characterises systems that are ‘the result of countless, local nonlinear, 
non-algorithmic, dynamic interactions, [which]... cannot be described completely in terms of a set 
of rules’ (Cilliers, 2000: 46).  
 
In this context, non-linearity means that systems cannot be compressed without discounting some of 
the complexity. Any model of a complex system, will, therefore, exclude a degree of complexity 
(43). Furthermore, one cannot determine in advance the significance of that which has been omitted 
                                                    
45
 This broader understanding of complexity – which takes seriously the implications of non-linear, emergent 
behaviour – is not new: indeed Weaver (in Morin, 2007: 11) already stated in 1948 that whereas the 19th 
century was the century of disorganised complexity (which refers to the eruption of the second law of 
thermodynamics and its consequences for our understanding of entropy), the twentieth century must be the 
century of organised complexity (which refers to the idea that systems are inherently complex due to their 
organising processes). Similarly, the biologist, Robert Rosen (who described evolution in terms of a 
complexifying process), is another early theorist who supports the idea of organised complexity, and who 
identifies – and asserts himself against traditional science – which he describes as having the goal of 
resolving ‘a given system into a spectrum of subsystems, and to reconstruct the properties of the entire 
system from those of the subsystems into which it has resolved’ (Rosen, 1985: 322).  
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from the model, because unlike linear phenomena (where the system is the additive result of its 
components), complex, nonlinear phenomena interact with the environment in intricate and 
complex ways, which results in novel and often surprising configurations of the system’s 
components. It is, therefore, not clear where the boundaries of the system are (Dyke & Dyke 2002: 
72; Cilliers, 2000: 43). As such, Cilliers (46-47) is of the opinion that although we cannot avoid 
using rules, formal rule-based systems (such as described by Holland) cannot fully capture 
complexity.  This point is supported by Rosen’s (1985: 424) work on ‘encodings’ (or 
representations/models), in which a system is defined as complex precisely ‘to the extent that it 
admits non-equivalent encodings; encodings which cannot be reduced to one another.’   
 
Compounding the matter further, is the fact that complexity is also generated by the descriptions 
that we give to systems: in other words, complexity is generated by a reflexive mode of 
investigation, or ‘from the number of ways in which we are able to interact with a system’ (322). 
Therefore, following a reductive mode of investigation not only results in the negation of systemic 
complexity, but also obviates the difficulties associated with a process of observation. In this 
regard, Dyke (1988: 5) writes: ‘Not only are the phenomenon to be studied complex, but scientific 
practice itself is a phenomenon of organized complexity. The complexity of the investigation must 
be studied along with the complexities investigated.’  As such, the central insight to emerge from 
this discussion is that we need to account for the manner in which we generate models, as well as 
the status of these models (this point is elaborated upon in section 6.1).  
 
4.3. Critical complexity vs. systems theory: the problem of holism 
 
Morin (2008: 10) summarises the virtues of systems theory as: placing the notion of the system 
(construed not as an elementary discreet unity, but as a complex whole) at the centre of the theory; 
conceiving of the system in  ‘ambiguous, ghostly’ terms, rather than real, formal terms; and, 
situating the study of systems at an interdisciplinary level, which allows for both the unity of 
science (under the general banner of systems theory) and the differentiation of sciences (according 
to the material nature of the objects under investigation, as well as the types and complexities of 
organisational phenomena). Despite these virtues, one finds that much of the work in this field is 
also characterised by the problem of reductionism. However, unlike the traditional scientific 
approach (in which the basic constituting elements are studied in order to gain knowledge of a 
composite (Morin, 2007: 5)), systems theorists tend to simplify and reduce the constituting elements 
to the composite. More specifically, systems theorists are often guilty of employing the principle of 
holism. Morin (1992: 372) offers the following description of holism: 
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Holism is a partial, one-dimensional, and simplifying vision of the whole. It reduces all 
other systems-related ideas to the idea of the totality, whereas it should be a question of 
confluence. Holism thus arises from the paradigm of simplification (or reduction of the 
complex to a master-concept or master-category).   
 
Instead of conceiving of systems in terms of a global unity, Morin (373) argues that we should view 
systems and their component parts in terms of a ‘unitas multiplex’ where ‘antagonistic terms are 
necessarily coupled’. The terms or parts remain antagonistic to the extent that they retain their own 
individual identities that cannot be reduced to one another or to the whole. At the same time, 
however, the coupling of the parts implies a common identity, which constitutes their citizenship in 
the system. In other words, the parts have a double-identity (373). Therefore, the ‘system is not only 
a composition of unity out of diversity, but also a composition of internal diversity out of unity’ 
(373).  When thinking about systems, this double-identity needs to be accounted for, because – on 
the one hand – if we forego the diversity-principle, our thinking becomes increasingly homogenised 
(holism); and – on the other hand – if we forego the unity-principle, our ‘thinking becomes a mere 
catalogue and loses unity’ (373).  
 
However, taking cognisance of this double-identity is not enough: Morin (374) states that we should 
also account for the complex character of these interrelations. This means not only respecting the 
age-old truism that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the parts’, but also that ‘the whole is less 
than the sum of the parts’ (since some of the qualities of the parts are suppressed under the 
constraints that result from systems organisation); and, that ‘the whole is greater than the whole’. 
This last systemic feature is due to the dynamic organisation or emergence that takes place in 
systems where local interactions allow for global structure, which – in turn – feed back to constrain 
the behaviour of the parts through a process of downward causation (374) (see secs 5.2. & 6.2.).   
 
In summary: in contrast to reductionism and holism, critical complexity requires that one try to 
comprehend the relation between the whole and the parts. What is important here is the relation 
itself: knowledge of the whole is not enough, and knowledge of the parts is not enough. One must 
substitute the principle of reductionism with a principle that conceives of whole-part mutual 
interaction (Morin, 2007: 10).  
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5. Features of critical complexity46 
 
Having traced a selective history of complexity, and having made a couple of critical comments on 
how the paradigm of critical complexity compares with some of the movements that characterise 
this history, we are now in a position to elaborate on a number of features that constitute the 
paradigm of critical complexity. However, before doing so, it is important to note that the concept 
of a ‘paradigm’ comes with its own difficulties. Whilst it is impossible to formulate the premises of 
a meta-paradigm (that is, a superior system which is both meta-human and meta-social (Morin, 
2008: 51)), the paradigm of critical complexity does claim a certain ‘universality for its grasp of its 
object in the sense that it deals with [all complex systems] and not just sections’ (Luhmann, 1995: 
xlvii). However, the paradigm of critical complexity simultaneously ‘claims neither to reflect the 
complete reality of its object, nor to exhaust all the possibilities of knowing its object’ (xlvii). Allen 
(2000: 78) describes this difficulty in terms of a paradox: on the one hand we wish to gather 
systemic knowledge about the objects of study; yet, on the other hand, the objects of study are 
characterised as intricate or hard (indeed, impossible!) to unravel.  
 
The features of critical complexity described in this section are meant to illuminate aspects of our 
reality ‘exactly like the towers in a concentration camp, which were built to allow the captors to 
better look at the society and its outside environment’ (Morin, 2008: 50). However, it must also be 
kept in mind that the paradigm of critical complexity demands an attitude of modesty on the part of 
the theorist, and a concession that we are also captives in our theoretical models in that ‘complex 
thought requires the integration of the observer and the conceiver in its observation and conception’ 
(51). Having provided this caveat, the analysis can proceed with a summary of the features of 
critical complexity: 
 
5.1. Complex systems are not complicated systems 
 
Cilliers (1998: 3) states that an important distinction exists between complicated and complex 
systems47: whereas a complicated system may initially look complex (due to the large number of 
components that may constitute the system, and/or the sophistication of the tasks that the systems 
can perform), the hallmark of a complicated system is that it is – in principle – solvable. In other 
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 For a description of how these features correspond with the insights of affirmative postmodernism, see: 
McKelvey, 2002: 13-14.  
47
 Also see Richardson (2001; 2002) for a description of the differences between complex and complicated 
systems.   
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words, given enough information and resources, the dynamics of a complicated system can be fully 
understood. Cilliers (3) offers the jumbo jet as an example of a complicated system.  
 
As opposed to complicated systems, complex systems are ‘constituted by such intricate sets of non-
linear relationships and feedback loops that only certain aspects of them can be understood at a 
time’ (3). Following Weaver (see footnote 45), we can state that complex systems display organised 
complexity (which, as explained earlier, means that systems are inherently complex due to their 
organising processes). Since only certain aspects of complex systems can be understood at a time, it 
also means that complex systems are not reducible or compressible (or, to reiterate Rosen’s (1985) 
words, a system is complex precisely ‘to the extent that it admits non-equivalent encodings; 
encodings which cannot be reduced to one another).  Moreover, because complex systems cannot be 
fully understood, our descriptions of complex systems cause further distortions. In other words, we 
model complex systems in order to better understand them, but since our models are imperfect 
renditions of complex systems, they introduce further uncertainties. Luhmann (2000: 46) describes 
this consequence of modelling as a paradox:  
 
The self-description of the self-transparent system has to use the form of a paradox, a form 
with infinite burdens of information and it has to look for one or more distinguishable 
identities that “unfold” the paradox, reduce the amount of needed information, construct 
redundancies, and transform unconditioned into conditioned knowledge… [but] the question 
of the unity of the distinction always leads back to the paradox – and one can show this to 
others and accept it for oneself. 
 
The issue at stake here is not so much the paradox itself: if we concede to the fact that the world is 
complex, then the paradox of framing or modelling is part of the complexity with which we have to 
grapple. In other words, we have to frame. Rather, the issue is whether we accept the paradoxical 
status of frames (or, in Luhmann’s words, whether ‘one can show this to others and accept it for 
oneself.’)   
 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that those wishing to create unified theories of complexity are 
of the opinion that complex systems are merely complicated systems. In other words, complexity – 
in their eyes – is a function of our knowledge (epistemology) rather than an inherent characteristic 
of certain systems (ontology). It is believed that, with enough computing power, we will be able to 
establish the laws of complexity. Admittedly, the distinction between complicated and complex 
systems is often undermined in practice by powerful new technologies, where complex phenomena 
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turns out (on further inspection) to be merely complicated (Cilliers, 1998: 3). However, despite the 
fact that the distinction between complicated and complex systems cannot be drawn in any 
unproblematic manner, the distinction, nevertheless, remains a useful analytical tool as it 
determines whether the study of complexity constitutes a search for underlying mathematical rules 
and formulae, or whether the study of complexity constitutes a considered engagement with 
complexity (Cilliers, 1998; Morin, 2007).  
 
Whereas the former group of complexity theorists implicitly accepts the scientific ideals of 
explanation, prediction, and facilitation of control (Chu et al., 2003), the latter group tries to 
develop strategies and models to help us better deal with the complexity that characterises not only 
living systems, but also social systems. In terms of ethics, one can state that those who seek meta-
frames (constituted by categorically-binding moral laws) to map out the moral world follow a 
restricted approach to ethical complexity, whereas those who attempt to engage with the 
contingencies and provisionality that characterise our moral experiences treat ethical complexity as 
an instance of critical complexity.    
 
5.2. Complex systems display emergent behaviour due to dynamic self-organisation  
 
5.2.1. Interactions in complex systems 
 
In sections 4.3., the complex nature of the interactions (or more generally, the interrelations) 
between systems and their components was elaborated upon. The main insight derived from this 
section is that systemic relations are complex relations, meaning that they cannot be described by 
the principle of reduction (i.e. explaining the whole in terms of the parts), or by the principle of 
holism (i.e. explaining the parts in terms of the whole). This is, in part, due to the diversity and 
entropy which characterises open systems.  
 
Equally important, however, is the non-linear dynamic organisation or emergence that takes place 
in systems where local interactions allow for global structures. As such, the interaction between 
systemic components can be described in terms of the following additional features (Cilliers, 1998: 
3-4): the interactions between the components of a system can be physical or informational; the 
interactions are fairly rich ‘i.e. any element in the system influences and is influenced by quite a 
few other ones’ (3); the interactions have a short range, but these local interactions can have large 
systemic effects, which implies that systems-level order emerges because of interactions amongst 
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components at lower levels of the system (Andersen 1999); and, there are positive (stimulating) and 
negative (inhibiting) feedback loops in the interactions.  
 
This last feature is also referred to as ‘organizational recursion’ (Morin, 2008: 49), where a 
recursive process is defined as ‘a process where the products and the effects are at the same time 
causes and producers of what produces them’ (49). Therefore, just like the interactions between 
components create systemic structures and constraints, so too feedback loops allow for the system 
itself to constrain the behaviour of the parts by means of framing the identity of the components in a 
systemic context. Morin (50) uses the idea of the hologram to explain this last point: ‘[i]n a physical 
hologram, the smallest point of the hologram image contains the quasi-totality of information of the 
represented object. [Therefore,] not only is the part in the whole, but the whole is also in the part.’ 
Morin (50) offers the example of society to illustrate this point: not only do individuals produce 
society through their interactions, but from as early as childhood, society enters us through a 
process of socialisation, which supplies us with language and culture (50).  
 
5.2.2. Structure, self-organisation and emergence  
 
When the components of systems interact, dynamic structures emerge over time due to self-
organisation. Self-organisation can be defined as ‘a process whereby a system can develop a 
complex structure from fairly unstructured beginnings’ (Cilliers 1998: 12). Contrary to popular 
opinion, complex systems are not flat systems. In other word, ‘[c]omplex systems are neither 
homogenous nor chaotic’ (Cilliers, 2001: 139). Instead, the interactions between components create 
systemic structures (including nested systems within the larger system (Ashmos & Huber 1987)). 
Whereas some structures are more durable, others are more volatile and ephemeral (Cilliers, 2001: 
140). Cilliers (1998: 89) defines the notion of structure as: 
  
the internal mechanism developed by the system to receive, encode, transform and store 
information on the one hand, and to react to such information by some form of output on the 
other.  
 
In order to make the case for self-organisation, it is necessary to show that ‘internal structure can 
evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the presence of some centralised form of 
internal control’ (89).  In other words, one must show that complex, self-organising systems are 
emergent, where emergence is defined as a quality that is ‘indeductible from the qualities of the 
parts, and thus irreducible’ (Morin, 2007: 12). This is only possible if we treat the concept of self-
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organisation not merely as a structural concept, but also as a temporal concept: a self-organising 
system must not only have structure, but also a history. Complex systems must be able to ‘learn’ 
from experience, and ‘remember’ past encounters (Cilliers, 1998: 92). Cilliers (92) explains that 
‘[i]f more ‘previous information’ can be stored, the system will be able to make better comparisons. 
This increase in complexity implies a local reversal of entropy, which necessitates a flow of 
information through the system.’ It is, therefore, only possible for systems to develop complex 
structures by processing information, and developing ‘memory’. The example of neural networks 
offers a good explanation of this principle: neural networks are chemically-connected or 
functionally-associated neurons. The interconnections between these neurons are called synapses. 
Over time, certain pathways are established in the brain, meaning that some of the synapses are 
reinforced through impulses, whereas others die off. In this way, structure develops as ‘groups [of 
neurons] are selected, altered and maintained in a dynamic way through interaction with the 
environment’ (105). This implies that a fairly undifferentiated brain develops structure or 
consciousness over time.  
 
What should be clear from the above description is that the structural and temporal dimensions of 
self-organisation (as an emergent process) do not allow for an understanding of complexity in terms 
of absolute thresholds (as implied by von Neuman’s use of the term ‘complexity barrier’). It is not 
the case that simple systems suddenly start showing emergent behaviour. As soon as dynamic and 
complex interactions between systemic components exist, systems start developing structures. 
However, complexity is also not an additive process, since the interactions between components are 
non-linear and allow for surprising reconfigurations of systemic structures.  As such, trying to 
pinpoint optimal levels of organisation, through recourse to terms such as ‘self-organised 
criticality’, again denies a measure of complexity.  
 
5.3. Complex systems interact with their environment in ways that constitute the system itself 
 
The principle of homeostasis that underlies both the cybernetics paradigm and autopoietic systems 
is grounded in the supposition that systems are operationally-closed (that is, systems facilitate their 
own production and maintenance through feedback loops). Over and against this view, Prigogine’s 
work on dissipative structures shows that living systems are open systems.  Without a constant 
exchange of energy with the environment, systems are likely to reach an equilibrium point and die. 
To reiterate: disequilibrium is an essential feature of complex systems, because it is a precondition 
for self-organisation and system’s survival (Cilliers, 1998: 4).  
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Morin (2008: 49) calls this feature of complex systems the ‘dialogic principle’. The dialogic 
principle combines the idea of structure, order, and stability with disorder, degradation, and change. 
Morin (49) explains this term with reference to the two types of chemico-physical entities with 
which we are born, namely DNA and amino-acids: on the one hand, DNA represents a stable entity, 
which carries memory and is hereditary; on the other hand, amino-acids – which live in contact with 
the environment – are extremely unstable and are constantly degrading, in order to recreate 
themselves from messages that emanate from the DNA.  Therefore, counter-intuitively, we would 
not be alive if it was not for the fact that our organism constantly degrades its energy, in order to 
produce new cells (Morin, 2007: 16). In this regard, Morin (16) recalls the illuminating phrase 
spoken by Heraclitus in the 6th century BC: ‘live of death, die of life’. Morin (2008: 49) further 
writes that we should understand these two logics, ‘that of transindividual reproduction and that of 
individual existence here and now’, as both complementary and antagonistic. In other words, we 
must think in terms of a double logic.  
 
With regard to living organisms, the idea of open systems can be adequately explained with 
reference to the second law of thermodynamics. However, applying this insight to social systems 
creates a problem: according to Luhmann, social systems are necessarily operationally-closed, in 
that the system and the environment can only be known from the observer’s perspective. In defining 
a social system, the observer not only constitutes the system, but also defines herself and the 
environment in terms of the given system. Therefore, the observer constitutes the observation in as 
much as the observation constitutes the observer (Arnoldi, 2001: 5; see also: Luhmann, 1996: 24; 
1995: 76). Additionally, there can be no external point from which to talk about a system, and new 
operations can only be built upon the system’s own previous operations. In other words, observation 
is a reflexive process, which never stabilises, and which generates additional complexity precisely 
because ‘[a]n observing system observes itself failing to observe itself fully’ (Rasch, 1991: 77; see 
also: Luhmann, 1990: 83).  For Luhmann, there can, in other words, be no breach in a system.  
 
Over-and-against this perspective, Derrida’s work on deconstruction and the double-movement, as 
well as his use of terms such as différance and trace all present attempts to find a breach or gap in 
the system. As described in the next chapter (see sec. 3.2.), this breach constitutes the event as an 
experience of the impossible. Caputo (1997a: 51) writes that the impossible should not be 
understood as the modal opposite of the possible, but as a rupture or a passage to the limits. In this 
regard, he states that ‘[t]he desire of deconstruction for the more-than-possible impossible is a 
passion that it shares with apophatic theology’ (51). This breach also functions according to the 
dialogic principle: the impossible is mediated through the possible. The moment of the event is both 
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an experience of the possible (that is, of calculation, stability, and order), and a momentary 
transgression of the possible. As such, Derrida’s philosophy provides an opening for thinking of 
social systems as open systems.  However, this opening cannot be thought of logically, but demands 
a complex thinking. With regard to différance, Teubner (2001: 41) writes:  
 
The open dance of heterogeneous operations, the infinite network of relations, the interplay of 
various aspects which occurs continuously without transferring them to a closed system – these 
are dangerous supplements to autopoietic closure. This understanding of différance cannot be 
systematically integrated into autopoiesis, it comes from outside as a threatening affliction of 
closed systems.  
 
This point can only be fully grasped once the theory of deconstruction is adequately explained 
(chapter 4), and the understanding of deconstruction as a complex position is clearly elucidated 
(chapter 5 and 6). However, it is important to introduce the reader to the two main camps with 
regard to system-environment interactions, as this distinction holds implications for how we view 
the ethics of complexity48. Although Luhmann’s work undoubtedly holds important insights for 
conceptualising social systems as radically immanent systems, the problem with endorsing a strong 
view of recursivity (where a system maintains itself in terms of its own operationally-closed 
systems) is that it leads to solipsistic or relativist implications. As such, Derrida’s work presents an 
important step in thinking about the relation between systems and their environments in more open 
terms. This study, therefore, simultaneously takes seriously the implications that our embedded, 
complex, and immanent perspectives hold for the status of our knowledge claims (Luhmann’s 
position), and the implications that arise from attempting to think beyond this conceptual, logical 
level (Derrida’s position).   
 
Although the purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the paradigm of complexity, the 
ethics of complexity is briefly introduced in the concluding section. In this regard, specific attention 
is accorded to the importance of choice in modelling complex systems, the embeddedness of ethical 
practices, and the provisional nature of ethical knowledge49 – in order to summarise the 
implications that the above analysis holds for understanding the ethics of complexity.   
 
                                                    
48
 This issue is revisted and explored in more detail in chapter six, section 2.  
49
 These three categories correspond closely to the three postmodern tenets introduced in chapter two, 
section 6.  
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6. Introduction to the ethics of critical complexity 
 
Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 278) write that complexity theory ‘is ultimately not a strategy that aims 
at finding perfect solutions for unsolvable questions’. Rather, as stated by Richardson and Cilliers 
(2001: 22), it presents us with a conceptual strategy that ‘helps us in coming to terms with the 
ethical problems associated with complex (social) systems.' In this last section, the ethics of critical 
complexity is explicated50 in order to introduce the reader to this conceptual strategy. 
 
6.1. The importance of choice in modelling complex systems 
 
The first ethical point to emerge from the above discussion relates to the fact that the theory of 
critical complexity requires an epistemological shift (Morin, 2007:10). In other words, we must 
rethink the nature and limits of knowledge. As stated earlier, our models of complex systems are 
always incomplete, and may introduce further uncertainties. Therefore, instead of trying to 
represent reality in formal terms, the critical complexity theorist has as her goal the establishment of 
models that accord with her experiences of the world. In this regard, a model is more like a novel 
than a formula in that: 
 
like a novel, [a model] may resonate with nature, but it is not the “real” thing. Like a novel, 
a model may be convincing – it may “ring true” if it is consistent with our experiences of the 
natural [and the social] world. But just as we may wonder how much the characters in a 
novel are drawn from real life, and how much is artifice, we might ask the same of a model: 
how much is based on observation and measurement of accessible phenomena, how much is 
based on informed judgement, and how much is based on convenience? (Oreskes, Shrader-
Frechette & Belitz, 1994: 644).    
 
Oreskes and her colleagues, although not directly referring to the problem of complexity, are 
sensitive to the fact that we do not have full access to the phenomena of interest. This lack of full 
access is due to the complexity with which we have to grapple, and introduces questions of 
                                                    
50
 This objective (namely, to determine the specific challenge that critical complexity holds for our 
understanding of ethics) raises an important question, namely, can one use a general model of a complex 
system to describe both living systems (such as cells) and social systems. A danger of generalising 
complexity is that the theory itself is at risk of becoming unfalsifiable. In this sense, the term ‘complexity’ 
operates as a sophisticated metaphor: it can be considered as a generic marker, but complexity is, 
simultaneously, case-specific. Complexity, therefore, deals with both similarities and dissimilarities between 
systems. The challenge for the social scientist is to simultaneously think these paradoxical aspects of 
complexity. In this regard, also see Lissack and Letiche’s (2002: 71-81) discussion on homologies (which 
they define as metaphors that can withstand critical examination). 
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convenience and judgement, neither of which are questions of description, but of normativity. How 
we frame systems (in other words, the boundaries that we draw around systems) are not just a 
function of the activity of the system itself, but are also a product of the description that we give to 
the system (Cilliers, 2001:141). Luhmann (2000: 46) defines boundaries or frames as ‘the self-
produced and reproduced difference between a system and its environment’. Our boundaries are, 
therefore, to a large extent, contingent upon the resources at our disposal: we do not frame objective 
reality, but our own observations (46). Conceptually-speaking, there is no logical way out of this 
problem, or otherwise stated, there is no grand Theory of Frames.  
 
Rosen (2005: 42) also remarks on this problem in his description of the notion of systemhood in 
science, in which the environment is typically reduced to the system. In this regard, he writes: ‘[t]he 
partition of ambience into system and environment, and even more, the imputation of that partition 
to the ambience itself as an inherent property thereof, is a basic though fateful step for science’. 
Although partitioning the world into systems and environments is a fateful step, it is also a 
necessary step, since as Quine (1969: 55) reminds us in his work on ontological relativity, ‘[w]e 
cannot know what something is without knowing how it is marked off from other things.’ In other 
words, boundaries are also enabling: we need to construct boundaries between systems and their 
environments, even though these boundaries introduce further complexities and uncertainties (since 
our descriptions are imperfect) (see Cilliers, 2001).  
 
However, the problem comes in when this weak form of reductionism transforms into a strong form 
of reductionism. This happens when the scientist negates the problem of organised complexity in an 
attempt to determine: 
 
special classes of systems into which the ambience may be partitioned, such that (1) the 
systems in that special class are more directly apprehensible than others, and (2) everything 
in the ambience… is generated by, or reducible to, what happens in that fundamental class 
(Rosen, 2005: 42).   
 
Once this distinction is made, all attention is focused on the system (at the expense of the 
environment), and all properties of the given system are described in terms of the system as a 
whole.  In other words, when the problem of operational closure is viewed as a systemic feature and 
not as an observational-difficulty, one is led ‘to a vision of the world that is classificatory, 
analytical, [and] reductionist, with linear causality’ (interpretation of Maruyama in Morin, 2008: 
12).  
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Allen (2000: 80-81) also discusses the problem of strong reductionism in the social sciences, 
specifically the management sciences. In this context, he identifies the following five reductionist 
assumption: 1) we can clearly define the boundaries between the system and the environment; 2) we 
already possess rules needed to classify objects into relevant typologies, which will enable us to 
understand what is going on; 3) individuals are considered as average types that are not affected by 
experiences; 4) individual behaviours can be described by their average interaction parameters; and, 
5) stability or equilibrium defines reality. Many of these same reductions are made in the standard 
normative tale, where it is assumed that the rational individual is capable of engaging in abstract 
ethical thought, and, thereby, capable of coming to appropriate ethical conclusions, which can then 
be applied to a situation. Allen (81) notes that the problem with these reductions are that they do not 
allow us to represent evolution and learning within systems, or to describe systemic 
transformations.    
 
The fact that our models cannot provide a full description of reality does not, however, imply that 
we should forego modelling. In the previous chapter (sec. 6.2.1.), Clegg et al. (2007) was cited as 
saying that choice does not involve complete free play, but an oscillation between possibilities.  
Allen (2000: 93) makes a similar point with regard to the modelling of complex systems: ‘[a] 
representation or model with no assumptions whatsoever is clearly simply subjective reality…. In 
this way, we could say that it does not therefore fall within the science of complexity, since it does 
not concern systemic knowledge.’ Allen continues in arguing that what is of importance ‘is not 
whether something is absolutely true or false, but whether the apparent systemic knowledge being 
provided is useful.’ Instead of viewing models as absolute representations of reality, we must be 
aware of, and ‘apply our “complexity reduction” assumptions honestly’ (94) and take note of when 
these models need to be transformed and replaced by other more appropriate models. Allen’s point 
reinforces both Cilliers’ (2005) statement that the modest position is a responsible position, and 
Verstraeten’s point (2000) that such a position requires work: one must actively develop the skill to 
‘see with new eyes’, as Proust states (see chap. 1, secs 6.1. & 6.2.). In acknowledging complexity 
we, therefore, acknowledge the limited status of our models. Here, the emphasis shifts from 
discovering truth to a process of making choices and developing strategies for living, and for 
dealing with the often unexpected outcomes of these strategies. Morin (2007: 21; my italics) 
elaborates on this point in stating that:  
 
There is no science of science, and even the science of science would be insufficient if it did 
not include epistemological problems. Science is a tumultuous building site, science is a 
process that could not be programmed in advance, because one can never program what one 
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will find, since the characteristic of a discovery is in its unexpectedness. This uncontrolled 
process has led today to the development of potentialities of destruction and manipulation, 
which must bring the introduction into science of a double conscience: a conscience of itself 
and an ethical conscience.  
 
In developing an ethical conscience, the scientist must, therefore, learn to take responsibility for her 
choices. Our models are the outcome of framing strategies, which, as Allen (2000: 102) notes, 
represent possible choices amongst others, where each choice gives rise to ‘a different spectrum of 
possible consequences, different successes and failures, and different strengths and weaknesses’ – 
most of which can probably not be known beforehand. Therefore, although we must exercise 
vigilance when choosing our strategies, we should also recognise that no matter how carefully we 
consider and reflect upon these actions, they may turn out to be a mistake (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 
274). Preiser and Cilliers (274) summarise the implication of this point as follows: 
 
acknowledging that values and choice are involved [therefore] does not provide any 
guarantee that good will come of what we do. Complexity tells us that ethics will be 
involved, but does not tell us what that ethics actually entails. The ethics of complexity is 
thus radically or perpetually ethical… We do not escape the realm of choice.   
 
In summary, critical complexity cannot be construed as a value-free programme, aimed at 
establishing a priori laws and rules through reductive reasoning. This is because such a conception 
is not only a negation of complexity, but also ‘destroys the autonomy of one who seeks’ (Morin, 
2007: 28). Engaging with the problematic of complexity, therefore, necessitates what Morin (28) 
calls ‘an autonomous strategy’ which obliges us ‘in the field of action… to reconsider our decisions 
like bets and incites us to develop an adequate strategy to more or less control the action.’ 
 
6.2. The embeddedness of ethical practices51 
 
What should be clear from the above analysis is that our models of the world have a profound 
impact on the way in which we view the world, and the status that we accord to our knowledge 
claims.  Furthermore, the models we subscribe to not only have theoretical, but also practical and 
ethical implications. As an illustration of this point, Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 278) refer to the 
disastrous effects that reductive thinking has had on the social, political, environmental, and 
                                                    
51
 The insights that complexity theory holds for our ethical practices is illustrated in chapter seven (sec. 2) at 
the hand of the example of corporate social responsibility/corporate citizenship.  
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economic spheres. What this point implies is that if one subscribes to a critical complexity model of 
the world, one also has to accept the consequences that this model holds, in terms of ontology 
(including how we are to view our own identities), as well as in terms of the ethics of our practices.  
 
In much of the ethical literature, moral responsibility is ascribed to rational and autonomous 
individual agents who make decisions based on reasonable principles and calculations. It is also 
commonly assumed that these moral agents act intentionally. In other words, it is assumed that there 
is ‘a direct cause and effect relationship between the willing and acting agent and the consequences 
of his or her decisions and behavior’ (Painter-Morland 2006: 90). Such a view identifies individuals 
as ontologically prior to the systems in which they function, due to the fact that the identity 
conditions of individuals (namely, intentionality, autonomy, and rationality) are assumed to be a 
priori givens (Woermann, 2010: 178). What should be clear at this juncture, however, is that 
individual identity is not an a priori construct but a relational and emergent property. In other 
words, identities must be contextualised in terms of a spatial network of relationships in which they 
are co-constituted, as well as in terms of a temporal process of becoming (Woermann, 2010; 
Cilliers, 2010b).  
 
What this means is that the focus of any ethical analysis should not be on individual agents, but on 
relations between individuals and the systemic properties that emerge from these relations. Through 
participating in competitive and cooperative activities, the intentional and unintentional actions of 
individuals give rise to certain patterns of behaviour, which is turn lead to the emergence of 
systemic structures. Systemic structures, on their part, serve to constrain the behaviour of individual 
components through feedback loops, but also create opportunities in the structure and thereby 
facilitate purposive action (see sec. 5.2.2.). Over time, these feedback loops reinforce or undermine 
certain patterns of behaviour, which then become institutionalised in formal or informal rules, 
norms, policies, laws etc. Radical systemic transformations are, however, possible due to the non-
linearity (Woermann, 2010; Grebe & Woermann, 2010). This means that, although there cannot be 
a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the actions of an intentional agent and the 
consequences of her actions upon a system; we can, nevertheless, help shape and transform our 
systems through engaging in ‘morally imaginative arrangements’ that ‘emerge through dialectical 
processes that are influenced by actors’ relative power and political skill’ (Hargrave, 2009: 87).  
 
This process of identity formation reaffirms the point made in the previous chapter (sec. 6.3.) that 
the questions ‘what ought I to do?’ and ‘what type of person should I be?’ are inseparable, given the 
embeddedness of our practices and identities. In other words, individuals and the systems within 
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which they participate are co-terminus i.e. they arise and die together (see Seabright & Kurke, 
1997).The moral agent should, therefore, not be construed ‘as an independent or socially isolated 
decision-maker, but rather as a social actor embedded in a complex network of intra- and inter-
group relationships’ (Kramer, 1991: 195). This means that if we wish to talk about intentionality 
and moral agency, we can only do so by considering the specific ‘context of relevant group 
memberships, the systems within which groups are embedded, the power relations that exist 
between groups and the permeability of boundaries that define group membership’ (Paulsen, 
2003:17). Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 268) sum up this insight for business ethics as follows:  
 
“Ethics” is not something that gets integrated into organisational or corporate culture but lies 
at the heart of establishing and envisioning a culture to begin with; it is part of all the 
different levels of activities in an organisation. The ethical stance is not something imposed 
on an organisation, or something that is expected of it. It is an inevitable result of the 
inability of a theory of complexity to provide a complete description of all aspects of the 
system.   
 
6.3. The provisional nature of ethical knowledge 
 
Thus far, two important ethical insights have emerged from the discussion on the ethics of critical 
complexity. Firstly, from this perspective, cognisance must be taken of the normativity of our 
models, which results from our incomplete understanding of complex phenomena; and, secondly, 
ethics is something that can only be understood in terms of dynamic, nonlinear, emergent, and 
relational practices and group dynamics. When we put these two insights together we come to the 
third important insight, namely that since no objective reality exists, all knowledge claims must be 
accepted as provisional claims because, in the words of Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 270): ‘We know 
that we cannot get it right.’  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that objective knowledge does not exist does not mean that we are incapable 
of purposive action. More specifically, it was argued in the previous chapter (sec. 6.1.) that limited 
knowledge does not equal any knowledge, and that the lack of an objective, meta-perspective 
cannot serve as an excuse for ethical sloppiness. Furthermore, employing models and rules is what 
allows us to undertake meaningful actions. However, we should be aware of the fact that these tools 
are not timeless or fixed. As such, our knowledge claims (which are based on our models and rules) 
should be the result of, and subject to, careful reflection (271), and – as stated in the previous 
chapter (sec. 6.1.1.) – one of the most important goals of studies in ethics (especially business 
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ethics) should be to teach students to reflect. Here again, we see the important role played by 
critique, especially self-critique. Only by being critical of our own positions is it possible to make 
our value judgements explicit, articulate alternative to these positions, and avoid claiming a false 
objectivity (274).  
 
Preiser and Cilliers (283) offer the following three characteristics of the critical position52: 
 ‘A critical position informed by complexity will have to be transgressive. It can never 
simply re-enforce that which is current. Transformation takes place continually, despite all 
efforts to contain it.’  
 ‘A critical position will, in the most positive sense of the word, be an ironical position. 
There is no final truth which operationalises our actions in an objective way. Irony also 
implies, in a very systemic way, a self-critical position.’ 
 ‘In the third place, a central role for the imagination is indispensable when we deal with 
complex things. Since we cannot calculate what will or should happen, we have to make a 
creative leap in order to imagine what things could be like.’  
 
Since the aim of this section was merely to introduce the ethics of complexity, these ideas will not 
be explored in any greater detail at this stage. However, the above conception of ethics as a 
transgressive, ironical, and imaginative activity is important because it allows us to rethink the 
value of normative ethical theories in terms of the critical enterprise. Although not all normative 
ethical theories are compatible with the critical enterprise, theories such as deconstruction are. The 
value of such a theory lies in its ability to become a ‘mechanism’ for critically and carefully 
negotiating ethical complexity. As such, the above three characteristics will be returned to in 
chapter six (sec 3). In this chapter, the critical enterprise will be elaborated in more detail with 
specific reference to both complexity theory and deconstructive insights.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the history of complexity theory was investigated in order to introduce and 
contextualise the paradigm of critical complexity, and to put into question the traditional scientific 
paradigm of reduction, disjunction, and simplification. In this regard, theories such as cybernetics 
                                                    
52
 It may be asked how the transgressive and ironical attitude that typifies the critical position can be 
reconciled with the modesty that underlies responsible action in complex systems. In this regard, it is argued 
that modesty is the impetus of the critical position. To be modest means to try and overcome or transgress 
the limitations of one’s conceptual schema. Furthermore, modesty means to adopt a self-deprecating 
humour, and to not take oneself or one’s ideas too seriously, as this may prevent one from exercising the 
openness and tolerance needed to act responsibly in the face of complexity.  
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and information theory, autopoiesis, and artificial life; restricted complexity and chaos theory; and, 
systems theory were analysed, in order to reveal both similarities and differences to critical 
complexity. What emerged from the discussion was a view of complexity that presents a radical 
challenge to the manner in which we view not only natural systems, but also the nature of ‘reality’ 
itself – because, as Morin (2008: 34) writes: 
 
What affects a paradigm, that is, the vault key of a whole system of thought, affects the 
ontology, the methodology, the epistemology, the logic, and by consequence, the practices, 
the society, and the politics.  
 
What is of interest in the context of this study is the implications that critical complexity theory 
hold for our understanding and practice of ethics in general, and business ethics in particular. To 
this end, the main ethical insights to emerge from this perspective were briefly summarised in the 
last section. It was argued that if we forego the idea of a universal, contextless ethics in favour of a 
complex view of ethics, then ethics becomes an inherent property of the descriptions and decisions 
that we make, and of the actions that we undertake. This is both because these descriptions, 
decisions, and actions cannot adequately account for complexity (i.e. they are incomplete), and 
because, in an emergent and relational context, we are (in part) constituted by our views and 
practices. As such, we have an ethical responsibility to take care in choosing the frameworks that 
guide our actions, and be critically aware of when these frameworks are in need of revision.  
 
Allen (2000: 10) argues that in a radically immanent and complex world, the best one can hope to 
do is ‘to put in place the mechanisms that allow us always to question our “knowledge” and 
continue exploring. We must try to imagine possible futures, and carry on modifying our views 
about reality and about what it is that we want.’ A central premise of this study is that the theory of 
deconstruction provides one such mechanism for questioning and continually exploring our 
knowledge claims. Thus, in the following chapter, the theory of deconstruction is presented. In 
chapter five, it will be shown that by treating deconstruction as an instance of a complex ethics, 
several important insights emerge for our understanding and practice of business ethics.  
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Chapter 4: 
Reading Derrida: On the (Im)Possibility of an Alternative Tale 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘deconstruction’ is notoriously difficult to define. Indeed, Derrida states that ‘[a]ll 
sentences of the type “deconstruction is X” or “deconstruction is not X” a priori miss the point’ 
(Derrida, 1988b: 4). The problem with defining the term stems from the fact that all the predicates 
which lend themselves to the definition are also deconstructable, including the unity of the word 
itself (‘It deconstructs it-self’ (4)). Therefore, as soon as we have meaning, it can be deconstructed. 
In other words, deconstruction takes place whenever there is something (Critchley, 1999a: 23). 
Conversely, if something is not deconstructable, then it is transcendental and, hence, impossible 
(see sec. 3; chap. 5, sec. 6).   
 
Deconstruction intervenes in our systems of meaning, in order to open these systems to new 
interpretations. In this regard, Derrida (1988b:4) writes that deconstruction is ‘the delimiting of 
ontology’. Deconstruction represents an attempt to undermine the very stability of our systems of 
meaning, and thereby shift the limits of our understanding. Deconstruction, therefore, provides us 
with a clôtural reading, which according to Simon Critchley (1999a: 30) ‘articulates the ethical 
interruption of ontological closure, thereby disrupting the text’s claims to comprehensive unity and 
self-understanding’. To conclusively define deconstruction as an analysis, a critique, a method, or 
even an act or operation (Derrida, 1988b: 3) closes the term off to alternative understandings. This 
neutralises the force of a disruption or an interruption brought about by deconstruction (see 
Critchley, 1999a: 20) – hence, Derrida’s (1988b: 5) statement: ‘What deconstruction is not? 
everything of course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!’ These definitional difficulties 
also make it problematic to claim that deconstruction is a postmodern position, because such a 
claim presupposes that deconstruction can be identified with an existing body of knowledge or 
movement (albeit a highly fragmented one!) 
 
Conceptualising deconstruction as a type of analytic strategy or method that can be 
unproblematically applied (as has often been the case in organisation studies53) holds three 
additional dangers (as identified by Jones, 2004: 41): firstly, there is the danger of reducing 
deconstruction to only a method, thereby negating the epistemological, ontological, ethical, and 
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 In this regard, Jones (2004: 40) mentions the work of Calás (1993), Boje (1998) and Martin (1990).  
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political aspects of deconstruction; secondly, deconstructing can easily be construed as an activity 
conducted from outside the text (‘a position of safe exteriority, if not objectivity’ (41)); and, thirdly, 
deconstruction might be applied as a method by which to read a text, rather than a manner in which 
to renegotiate textual limits and relations (also see Jones, 2007: 518; Jones, 2003: 240; Critchley, 
1999a: 21-22).  
 
Despite these difficulties, a provisional description of the strategy of deconstruction (which is, of 
course, also open to deconstruction) will be provided in this chapter. The chapter begins with an 
analysis of Derrida’s understanding of meaning. In this section, the issues of hierarchy, authority, 
text, and context are examined. The insights gleaned are illustrated at the hand of the example of 
speech and writing. Once the nature of meaning is adequately explained, the analysis moves on to a 
discussion of the double movement of deconstruction. Here, the nature of deconstruction (as an 
intervention or operation) is explained, and once again illustrated at the hand of the example of 
speech and writing. Attention is also given to Derrida’s understanding of the supplement, play, 
différance, and trace. The logic of these ‘concepts’ (or ‘non-concepts’) serves to illustrate why 
deconstruction cannot be reduced to a mere methodology by which to read texts. The way in which 
these concepts operate in texts is explained at the hand of Derrida’s example of the pharamakon. In 
the next section, it is shown why deconstruction – as an operation and an intervention – is always 
undertaken in the name of the ethical. Derrida’s understanding of ethical decision-making is also 
introduced in this section, and the promise and threat that characterise the ethical moment are 
expounded upon. The chapter concludes with a brief look at how deconstruction, and a 
deconstructive ethics, has been received by some in the academic world, specifically within the 
context of organisation studies and business ethics.  
 
It must be noted that the aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Derrida’s thoughts. This is 
deemed necessary in order to prepare for the close reading that will be undertaken in the next 
chapter, in which the viability of a deconstructive ethics for business ethics will be assessed at the 
hand of the example of corporate social responsibility. As with the last chapter, this chapter is 
theoretical in nature, and the implications that a deconstructive ethics holds for business ethics will 
only be discussed in subsequent chapters. It must also be noted that, although Derrida’s 
understanding of ethics is discussed in this chapter, this discussion is only introductory in nature, as 
most of the specific implications that his ideas hold for understanding ethics will be presented in the 
following chapter.  
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2. Understanding deconstruction 
 
2.1. Authority, hierarchy and (con)text 
 
2.1.1. The significance of deconstructing hierarchies 
 
Deconstruction works from the premise that in order for there to be meaning, reality must be 
interpreted and ordered. This ordering of reality into conceptual schema creates hierarchies, where 
certain terms are necessarily privileged over others. The logos or privileged term operates at the 
expense of the marginal or secondary term, which is often employed to secure the status of the 
logos.  Therefore, as Derrida (1981: 41) explains in ‘Positions’, in any system of meaning ‘we have 
not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms but a violent hierarchy. One of the terms dominates the 
other (axiologically, logically, etc.), occupies the commanding position.’ The term which is in the 
commanding position – or in the authoritarian position – can only maintain its status by suppressing 
the secondary term, and by assimilating any differences into the logos.  
 
It is precisely because of this assimilation of difference that Derrida takes exception with 
hierarchies and authority, as he explains in Negotiations: 
 
I have, it seems, a quasi-aesthetic aversion to authority and hierarchy… The aesthetic 
aversion has to do more with the fact that, most often, the most common forms of authority 
and hierarchy, of power and hegemony, have something in them which is vulgar, 
insufficiently refined, or insufficiently differentiated: thus my aversion to authority, in this 
case, is also an aversion to what is still too homogenous, insufficiently refined or 
differentiated, or else egalitarian (Derrida, 2002a: 20).   
 
However, Derrida is also quick to qualify that we cannot do without hierarchies and authority, as is 
clear from the following two citations:  ‘… I do not think that there are nonhierarchical structures. I 
do not think they exist’ (21); and ‘… I am not an enemy of hierarchy in general and of preference 
nor even of authority’ (21). Hierarchies are the means by which we structure reality. In other words, 
hierarchies are a necessary condition for meaning (see chap. 3, sec. 5.2.2.), but – as stated above – 
as soon as we have meaning it can be deconstructed. Hierarchies are conceptual constructions, and 
deconstruction is necessary to guard against the naturalisation of hierarchies. Deconstruction, 
therefore, serves to destabilise hierarchies, which, in turn, opens up our systems of meaning in ways 
that allow for more differentiation and qualitative difference (21).  For Cooper (1989: 480), 
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deconstruction, therefore, addresses the ‘the logics of structure and process and their interaction’, 
by showing that ‘our traditional ways of thinking are structure-biased and therefore incapable of 
revealing the nomadic and often paradoxical character of process.’  
 
2.1.2. There is nothing outside (con)text 
 
What makes the task of deconstruction difficult, however, is that we have no bird’s eye, from which 
to deconstruct. To understand this statement from a Derridean perspective, we turn to an oft quoted 
(and controversially interpreted) passage from Of Grammatology. Here Derrida states ‘There is no 
outside text’ (Derrida, 1976: 158) [‘Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ (Derrida, 1967: 227)] or ‘There is 
nothing outside of the text’ (Derrida, 1976: 163) [‘Il n’y a rien hors du texte’ (Derrida, 1967: 233)]. 
Critchley (1999a: 25) notes the difference in formulations here: the first citation claims that there is 
no ‘outside-text’, whereas the second formulation claims that one cannot move outside textuality – 
there is nothing outside textuality. Both these formulations reinforce the fact that there is no 
Archimedean point that is ‘out there’ or independent of language (Betz, 2009: 334), and one is 
consequently bound within the limits of textuality (Critchley, 1999a: 26)54.  
 
Derrida’s claim that there is nothing outside the text is not a constructivist claim i.e. a claim that 
reduces all our experiences of the world to language. Rather, as Schalkwyk (1997: 387) explains, 
both language and perception are regarded as ‘species of the genus representation-in-general’, or 
what Derrida sometimes calls the ‘general text’, but more often just ‘the text’. Derrida, therefore, 
does not conflate language and the world, but ‘insists on the imbrication of language and the world’ 
(387). To say that there is nothing outside the text, is also, therefore, to say that there is nothing 
outside context, a move which Derrida (1988a: 136) makes explicit in the ‘Afterword’, in stating 
that: 
 
The phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of 
deconstruction (“there is nothing outside the text: [il n’y a pas de hors-texte]), means 
nothing else: there is nothing outside context. In this form, which says exactly the same 
thing, the formula would doubtless have been less shocking.  
 
It was noted that stating that there is nothing outside the text, or stating that there is no outside text, 
is not an argument for the primacy of language, but rather an argument against any Archimedean 
point – which Derrida designates by the term logocentrism, and which is to be understood as ‘the 
                                                    
54
 Also see the arguments on embeddedness in chapter two (sec. 6.3.), and chapter three (sec. 6.2.).   
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determination of the being of the entity as presence’ (Derrida, 1976: 12). Derrida further argues that 
positioning oneself against logocentrism, means positioning oneself against the history of 
metaphysics, the history of the West, and the history of Being. In this regard, Derrida writes that 
‘[i]t could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have 
always designated an invariable presence – eidos, arche, telos, energia, ousia (essence, existence, 
substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth’ (Derrida, 
1978a: 279-280).  
 
Therefore, far from presenting an argument for constructivism (or the primacy of language), 
Derrida’s philosophy is constituted by arguments against logocentrism. Perhaps a possible reason 
for why critics continue to misunderstand Derrida’s statement that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ 
is because he develops his most famous argument against logocentrism (in Of Grammatology) with 
reference to the opposition between speech and writing in language.  
 
2.1.3. The example of speech and writing 
 
Traditionally, writing has always been characterised as materiality and exteriority, ‘two explicitly 
excremental epithets’; whereas speech has been understood as the ‘diaphanous, diaphonic ideality 
and interiority of the voice qui s’entend parler [who is waiting to speak]’ (Krell, 1988: 8). The 
philosophical voice, which hears and understands itself, is a fully present voice, which represents 
the ‘dream of [a] totalising self-presence, perfectly fulfilled, utterly slaked desire’ (9). As such, 
philosophical discourse has always defined itself against writing, and the threat posed by writing is 
that it would affect or infect the meaning it is supposed to represent (Culler, 1983: 91). Thus, 
according to this conception, the ideal would be to contemplate thought directly; and, since this is 
not possible, we should strive for a language that is as transparent as possible (and, therefore, as free 
of writing as possible) (91). By analysing the hierarchy in which our understanding of language is 
structured, Derrida shows how logocentrism – or in this case, phonocentrism as ‘the privileging of 
voice’ (92) – denotes a metaphysics of presence, which not only privileges speech before writing, 
but also: 
 
the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, 
the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just 
one metaphysical gesture among others; it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has been 
the most constant, most profound, and most potent (Derrida, 1988c: 93). 
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In summary, to say that there is nothing outside of (con)text is  a way of asserting oneself against 
‘the Logos, the undeconstructable origin of the meaning of being, the rationality of thought, the 
absolute interiority of truth’ (Lucy, 2004: 71); or, of positioning philosophy inside the text. The 
question which now arises, is: if there is nothing outside of con(text), how is one supposed to go 
about opening up texts or destabilising hierarchies? In other words, how does deconstruction take 
place?  
 
2.2. On deconstructing 
 
The answer to the above question lies in the double movement of deconstruction. Deconstruction 
works on two fronts: on the one hand, to deconstruct means to concede to one’s complicity in the 
systems of meaning which one seeks to challenge; and, on the other hand, it means to traverse 
beyond the system. These two movements of deconstruction do not follow chronologically, but take 
place simultaneously, and, therefore, require a double-thinking on the part of the deconstructionist.  
 
2.2.1. The double movement of deconstruction 
 
The first movement of deconstruction, demands that one engages with the dominant interpretation 
of a text or context. In order for one to successfully engage with a text, one must be competent at 
reading and writing so that ‘the dominant interpretation of a text can be reconstructed as a necessary 
and indispensible layer or moment of reading’ (Critchley, 1999a: 24). If this were not possible, ‘one 
could indeed say just anything at all’ (Derrida, 1976: 158), which is a strategy that Derrida 
explicitly renounces, in stating that ‘…I have never accepted saying, or being encouraged to say, 
just anything at all’ (158)55.  
 
It might seem strange that deconstruction – as a strategy employed against traditional structures of 
meaning – places such a significant emphasis on the dominant understanding of texts, but Derrida 
(1978a: 280) notes that all attempts at destructive discourses are trapped within a circle (and here he 
cites the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics; the Freudian critique of self-presence; and, the 
                                                    
55 This argument not only applies to reading certain texts (although Derrida was a greater reader of texts, 
including the texts of Husserl, Hegel, Heidegger, Freud, Nietzsche and Saussure), but also of contexts. In 
this regard, Derrida (1999: 67) writes:  
I would assume that political, ethical and juridical responsibility requires a task of infinite close 
reading. I believe this to be the condition of political responsibility: politicians should read. Now to 
read does not mean to spend nights in the library; to read events, to analyse the situation, to criticize 
the media, to listen to the rhetoric of demagogues, that’s close reading, and it is required more today 
than ever. So I would urge politicians and citizens to practice close reading in this new sense, and 
not simply to stay in the library.  
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Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, and of the determination of Being as 
presence). This circle can be described as a performative contradiction, in which the destruction of 
the history of metaphysics can only be undertaken on the basis of this very history (see chap. 2, sec. 
6.2.). In this regard, Derrida (280) writes: 
 
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake 
metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this 
history: we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to 
contest56.  
 
However, despite these difficulties, a deconstructive reading ‘cannot simply be that of commentary 
nor that of interpretation’ (Derrida, 1973a: 88). As stated before, to deconstruct means to destablise 
the dominant interpretation, whilst simultaneously engaging with this interpretation (Critchley, 
1999a: 26). The destabilisation of hierarchies should not be seen as a negative, or destructive 
enterprise. Rather, deconstruction (and destabilisation) is required for progress, for ‘what remains to 
be thought beyond the constructivist or destructionist schema’ (Derrida, 1988a: 147).   
 
The deconstructionist, therefore, takes the status quo seriously and works from within the existing 
system of meaning, in order to break it open to new interpretations. In the words of Derrida, 
deconstruction ‘interven[es] in the field of oppositions it criticizes’ (Derrida, 1988d: 21). This is 
done so as to reveal the text’s blind spot (or the repression and marginalisation of difference). This 
operation typically characterises the second movement of deconstruction (which, to reiterate, takes 
place alongside the first movement). In showing how that which is relegated to the margins of the 
dominant discourse or schema is needed to maintain the privileged status of the logos, the text starts 
to undo itself, thereby creating an opening for a new interpretation or way of being.  
 
2.2.2. Revisiting the example of speech and writing 
 
In returning to the example of language, Derrida (1976) notes that if writing has always threatened 
the purity of speech, then the relationship between speech and writing is more complex than is 
portrayed in the traditional hierarchical schema, which gives precedence to speech over writing 
(Culler, 1983: 101). In order to show how the hierarchical opposition between speech and writing 
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 In this regard, it is useful to recall Whitehead’s (1979: 39) famous claim that the ‘safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.’  
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can be reversed, Derrida begins his deconstruction with reference to the Saussurian understanding 
of language as a system of differences. Following Saussure (1960), Derrida argues that there is no 
exact or literal meaning that is inherent to language – rather, all we have is a dynamic system of 
differences, where every event or every speech act is itself made possible by prior structures 
(Culler, 1983: 95). In other words, Derrida appropriates the Saussurian insight that we do not have a 
substantive understanding of words or concepts; rather, our understanding of language is premised 
on how words and concepts differ from one another. 
 
The notion of the sign, as a differential unit, is best illustrated in the written form, where, for 
example, we recognise the letter ‘m’ as distinct from the other letters in the alphabet, which allows 
us to form a relational understanding of the letter ‘m’ (101). In explaining the differential nature of 
speech, Saussure (1960: 119) writes: ‘Since an identical state of affairs is observable in writing, 
another system of signs, we shall use writing to draw some comparisons that will clarify the whole 
issue.’  
 
Hence, as Jonathan Culler (1983: 101) explains, we see that writing, which, for Saussure, should 
‘not be the object of linguistic enquiry, turns out to be the best illustration of the nature of linguistic 
units.’ In this regard, Derrida (1976: 44) states:  
 
If ‘writing’ means inscription and especially the durable instituting of signs (and this is the 
only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), then writing in general covers the entire 
domain of linguistic signs… The very idea of institution, hence of the arbitrariness of the 
sign, is unthinkable prior to or outside the horizon of writing. 
 
In the second movement of deconstruction, the hierarchy of language is destabilised through 
reversing or overturning (Cooper, 1989: 483) the binary opposition between speech and writing. 
This, in turn, gives us a new concept of writing, as a generalised writing (or arche-writing), ‘which 
is both the condition of speech and writing in the narrow sense’ (Culler, 1983: 102); or, which has, 
as its subspecies, ‘a vocal writing and a graphic writing’ (101). However, one must be careful not to 
immediately institute writing as the dominant term, as this won’t result in a destabilisation of 
hierarchy, but rather in the reinstutionalisation of another rigid structure. To avoid this, one must 
also be sensitive to the process of displacement or metaphorisation (Cooper, 1989: 483) of meaning 
that takes place in deconstruction.    
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Derrida warns that ‘[d]econstruction cannot be restricted or immediately pass to neutralization’ 
(Derrida, 1988d: 21). Instead, just as Derrida insists on the imbrication of language and the world; 
so too, the example of arche-writing points to the imbrication of speech and writing. In other words, 
the individual terms inhabit each other (Cooper, 1989: 483), or give way ‘to a process where 
opposites merge in a constant undecidable exchange of attributes’ (Norris, 1987: 35). This process 
guards against the naturalisation of hierarchies. In order to explain what is meant by the constant 
displacement of meaning, it is useful to turn to Derrida’s discussion of the supplement, play, 
différance, and trace, which is well-explained by the example of the pharmakon in Plato.  
 
2.3. The logic of the supplement and the notion of différance 
 
2.3.1. A supplementary complication 
 
Derrida (1988a: 117) reminds us in the ‘Afterword’ that the oppositional logic of hierarchies is 
necessary for us to generate concepts and meaning (we can have no non-hierarchical structures). 
However, Derrida also warns that ‘the ideal purity of the distinctions proposed… is inaccessible’ 
(117) and that ‘its practice would necessitate excluding certain essential traits of what it claims to 
explain or describe – and yet cannot integrate into the “general theory.”’ As such, ‘all conceptual 
production appeals to idealization’ (117). For this reason, deconstruction (as the destabilisation of 
hierarchies) is necessary to provide: 
 
a supplementary complication that calls for other concepts, for other thoughts beyond the 
concept and another form of “general theory,” or rather another discourse, another “logic” 
that accounts for the impossibility of concluding such a “general theory” (117).  
 
To understand what Derrida means by a supplementary complication, we turn to his reading of 
Rossouw in Of Grammatology. Derrida (1976: 163) writes that the word supplément is the ‘blind 
spot’ in Rossouw’s texts, in that he employs the word without accounting for its logic (Critchley, 
1999a: 23). Rossouw uses the term supplement to describe the relationship between speech and 
writing: writing is a technique which is foreign to speech, and which is, therefore, an add-on. 
However, writing can only function as a supplement to speech, if speech is not ‘a self-sufficient, 
natural plenitude’ (Culler, 1983: 103). Derrida (1976: 103), therefore, argues that writing is a 
derivative to speech ‘only on one condition: that the ‘original,’ ‘natural’ etc. language never existed, 
was never intact or untouched by writing, that it has itself always been a writing’, an arche-writing.  
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The work of the supplement is, therefore, to substitute for an absence or lack in the logos, but as 
Derrida (1978a: 289) notes in his discussion on supplementarity in the work of Levi-Strauss (1966), 
such an absence or lack is not something that we can recover through rigorous work, but is rather 
inherent to the nature of concepts: ‘One cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization 
because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements it, taking the center’s place in its 
absence – this sign occurs as a surplus, as a supplement’ (Derrida, 1978a: 289). Absence, therefore, 
defines the very heart of the logos, which must be supplemented.  
 
2.3.2. Play, différance, and the logic of the trace  
 
The logic of supplementarity is always at play in our concepts. All systems of meaning can be 
conceptualised on a continuum between no centre (absolute free play) and a fixed centre (absolute 
structure). The concept of play (jeu) is a term employed by Derrida to denote the fact that no 
completeness or totalisation is possible. Derrida (1978a: 289) notes that, in the classical style, 
totalisation refers to a subject or finite richness which cannot be empirically mastered, simply 
because the subject matter lends itself to a conceptual richness that cannot be captured in a finite 
discourse. However, for Derrida, the impossibility of totalisation is not due to empirical limitations, 
but rather due to the nature of the subject or field:  
 
The field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because 
it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical 
hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions (289).  
     
Derrida (290) goes on to describe the function and nature of play: ‘Play is the disruption of 
presence’ and is ‘always the play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play 
must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence.’ This description of play is 
remarkably similar to Derrida description of différance, which he characterises as:  
 
a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition 
presence/absence. Différance is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, 
of the spacing [espacement] by which elements relate to one another. This spacing is the 
production, simultaneously active and passive (the a of différance indicates this indecision 
as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed and organized by that 
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opposition), of intervals without which the “full” terms could not signify, could not function 
(Derrida, 1981b: 27).  
 
In French, the word for ‘difference’ is différence; however, the difference between différence (with 
an ‘e’) and différance (with an ‘a’) is inaudible. In other words, the identity of différance only exists 
in writing (Lucy, 2004: 25). Différance as ‘the systematic play of differences’ not only refers to the 
space between ‘a’ and ‘e’ (the spacing of difference), but also to the necessity of spacing, as the 
means by which elements are related to one another (spacing as difference). Whereas the ‘spacing 
of difference’ is a passive spacing, ‘spacing as difference’ constitutes an active movement in time 
(26). Différance is, therefore, both a spatial and a temporal concept, where the meaning of an 
element constantly differs (differ) from the meaning of other elements, but where meaning and 
identity are also constantly deferred (différer). This means that identity is constituted by relational 
difference (Saussure’s insight), but also that – because identity is constituted by difference – an 
element’s ‘‘own’ constitution as an autonomous or fully complete entity’ is always deferred (27). 
Derrida (1982: 13) writes that ‘[i]t is because of différance that the movement of signification is 
possible’, which means that ‘[d]ifférance [like play] is neither a word nor a concept’ (Derrida, 
1973b: 130) but rather the condition of possibility for conceptuality and words as such (Critchley, 
1999a: 37). 
 
Whereas binary and logocentric schemas emphasise the difference between opposing terms, 
deconstruction, supplementarity, play and différance, show how our signifying systems are 
constituted by a difference that both separates and joins. In so doing, attention is drawn to ‘a rupture 
within metaphysics, a pattern of incongruities where the metaphysical rubs up against the non-
metaphysical, that it is deconstruction’s job to juxtapose as best as it can’ (Reynolds, 2005). Derrida 
marks this rupture by employing the term ‘trace’, which Spivak characterises as ‘the mark of the 
absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the 
condition of thought and experience’ (preface to Of Grammatology, Derrida, 1976: xvii). The trace 
never appears as such (Derrida, 1976: 65) as it has ‘no place, for effacement belongs to the very 
structure of the trace’ (Derrida, 1973b: 156). However, according to Reynolds (2005), a 
deconstructive intervention can mime the logic of the trace in a text, and bring it to the fore. This is 
necessary in order to prevent metaphysical closure; or, in order to prevent the naturalisation of 
hierarchies – which, as Derrida points out, is an important task, because ‘one always inhabits, and 
all the more when one does not suspect it’ (Derrida, 1976, 24).  
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In layman’s terms, the logic of play, différance, and the trace reveal how the meaning of our 
concepts are always-already contaminated by the meaning of other concepts. This serves to 
undermine the rigidity of our conceptual distinctions. In order to illustrate the nature of the trace, as 
well as the temporal or processual nature of différance, we turn to the example of the pharmakon.  
 
2.4. An example and a summary 
 
2.4.1. Plato’s pharmacy 
 
In the essay entitled ‘Plato’s pharmacy’ (2004a), Derrida deconstructs several texts by Plato, 
including Phaedrus, in order to reveal the interconnections between pharmakon and pharmakeus, 
and the notable absence of the word pharmakos. 
 
The word pharmakon means both remedy/cure and poison. In Phaedrus, Plato (1997) uses the term 
to describe writing: writing is a supplement – the artificial add-on which both poisons and cures. In 
this text, Plato employs the term in a fashion, which suggests that the meaning of the term (as either 
remedy or poison) is clear (Culler, 1983: 142). However, what Derrida shows in ‘Plato’s pharmacy’ 
is that the character of the pharmakon is indeterminate and ambivalent. According to Derrida 
(2004a: 13), the pharmakon ‘constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement 
and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross into the 
other’. In other words, one can never be entirely sure whether pharmakon refers to a poison or a 
cure, since traces of each meaning pervades the other. Cooper (1989: 489) elaborates on Derrida’s 
understanding of the pharmakon, by writing that the two meanings of pharmakon ‘actively defer 
each other, the deferred term being postponed for the present, waiting for an opportunity to flow 
back to the medium from which it was severed.’ The pharmakon is, therefore, ‘(the production of) 
difference. It is the difference of difference’ (Derrida, 2004a: 130).  
 
The logic of the pharmakon infects speech and writing, by showing how the oppositional difference 
between these terms is unsustainable; or, by showing how the play of difference always precedes an 
oppositional difference. In this regard, Derrida (113) writes:  
 
Plato maintains both the exteriority of writing and its power of maleficent penetration, its 
ability to affect and infect what lies deepest inside. The pharmakon is that dangerous 
supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to do without it yet lets 
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itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, completed by the very trace 
through which the present increases itself in the act of disappearing.   
 
Culler (1983: 143) writes that ‘this role of the pharmakon as a condition of difference is further 
confirmed by the link with pharmakos, “scapegoat”.’ Just as Socrates wished to exclude the poison 
of writing from the purity of speech, so too the exclusion of the scapegoat from the city is meant to 
represent the casting out of evil (Derrida, 2004a: 133).  In fact, the Greeks held a special 
purification and expiatory ceremony on the sixth day of the Thargelia (135) (an Athenian festival in 
honour of Apollo and Artemis), in which two pharmakoi were chosen to die. However, Derrida 
(133) makes the significant point that the evil of the pharmakos can only be defined from within the 
city walls, even though the aim is its ‘exclusion out of the body (and out) of the city’. This leads 
him to conclude that: 
 
The ceremony of the pharmakos is, thus played out on the boundary line between the inside 
and the outside, which it has as its function ceaselessly to trace and retrace. Intra 
muros/extra muros. The origin of difference and division, the pharmakos represents evil 
both introjected and projected (134). 
 
The word pharmakos is also a synonym for pharmakeus, which means ‘wizard, magician, poisoner’ 
(133). In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is often described as a pharmakeus – as a sorcerer – whose 
philosophy represents a pharmakon; a medicine or cure in the form of ‘[t]he eidos, truth, law, the 
episteme, dialectics [and] philosophy’ (127). However, Socrates’ pharmakon ‘must be opposed to 
the pharmakon of the Sophists and to the bewitching fear of death’ (127). As such, the Sophists are 
also portrayed as pharmakeia, but instead of healing, these witches prescribe poisonous sophistry! 
Therefore, as Derrida (127) notes, Plato pits ‘pharmakeus against pharmakeus, pharamkon against 
pharmakon.’  
 
Ironically, however, Socrates also becomes Athens’s most famous scapegoat, and is eventually 
killed by ingesting poison. What is even more remarkable is that the date designated for the 
ceremony of the pharmakos (namely, the sixth day of the Thargelia) marks ‘the day of the birth of 
him whose death – and not only because a pharmakon was its direct cause – resembles that of a 
pharmakos from the inside: Socrates’ (135). Today, we can recall this incident due to its inscription 
in writing, which, to Socrates, represented ‘a harmful drug [and] a philter of forgetfulness’ (129) i.e. 
the most dangerous pharmakon of all!  
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The interplay of the words pharmakon-pharmakos-pharmakeus illustrates the play of meaning and 
of différance. In this regard, Derrida (128) notes that ‘the essence of the pharmakon lies in the way 
in which, having no stable essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, 
physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance.’ There is no sure way of keeping the 
poison and the cure, the magician and sorcerer, speech and writing, or logic and rhetoric apart. All 
these concepts bear the mark of the trace: their meanings are established by an endless chain of 
supplements, by the play of competing interpretations, and by relations and deferrals that are 
constantly at work.  
 
2.4.2. Deconstruction is hymeneal  
 
In summary, we can say that all meaning is characterised by the double movement, which like the 
hymen – i.e. that fold of tissue that covers the jewel box of virginity – simultaneously presents the 
membrane of meaning, and signifies a penetration of that membrane and meaning. The hymen does 
not belong to the inside or to the outside: it is the ‘in-between’; it signifies the space of the partition, 
or the spatio-temporal interval between ‘the presence of this’ and ‘the presence of that’. The hymen 
serves to deontlogise the centre, by ontologising the margin (between inside and outside), and is 
thus the movement of work which joins and separates, connects and divides (see Derrida, 2004b: 
222-226; Culler, 1983: 144-145).   
 
With regard to the first movement, deconstruction is hymeneal in the sense that, on the one hand, it 
marks the place of difference. As with a traditional reading which necessitates engagement with the 
dominant interpretation of texts, the hymen marks the acceptance of the distinctions between the 
surface features of a discourse and the underlying logic; between the empirical features of language 
and thought itself; and, between the inside of the system and the outside of the system (Culler, 
1983: 146).  
 
These distinctions become prevalent in the second movement57 of deconstruction, where attention is 
drawn to the text’s blind spots, including the metaphors, apparently marginal features of the text, 
and the different meanings of the words in the text. This is done in order to reveal the inherent 
paradoxical logic of texts, and to set forth a reversal of the dominant interpretation. In this regard, 
Culler (146) writes: ‘Derrida is not playing with words, he is betting with words, employing them 
                                                    
57
 Culler (1983: 146) refers to the first and second movement as the right-handed and left-handed operations 
of deconstruction. This classification works well, as – unlike the chronology implied in the terms ‘first’ and 
‘second’ – the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ draw attention to the simultaneous nature of the task at hand.  
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strategically with an eye on larger stakes.’ However, merely reversing the dominant interpretation is 
not enough: a displacement of meaning must also take place.   
 
Deconstruction is hymeneal in that it destabilises concepts. By teasing out textual and linguistic 
configurations (as in ‘Plato’s pharmacy’), the deconstructionist puts into question the possibility of 
distinguishing with surety between the oppositional concepts and operations that govern texts. In 
this regard, it is useful to bear in mind that the hymen is etymologically related to sewing, weaving, 
or spinning. Meanings are intertwined: there is always a trace of alterity or difference that pervades 
our concepts. As such, the hymen is the space of difference itself, or difference within concepts – 
which also serves to prevent concepts from closing in upon themselves.  
 
3. Towards a deconstructive ethics 
 
3.1. Deconstruction and ethical testimony 
 
In recent years, there has been much discussion regarding what appears to be an ‘ethical turn’ in 
Derrida’s later works (Jones, 2003: 224). Whereas some see the ethical turn as constituting a break 
with the themes that dominate his earlier works, others maintain that the more explicit focus on 
ethics ‘is nothing but a clarification or extension of themes ever present in deconstruction’ (224). 
During the interview, ‘Hospitality, justice and responsibility: a dialogue with Jacques Derrida’ 
(1999: 80), Derrida is asked a question regarding the continuity in his thinking, as the questioner is 
unconvinced that there is indeed something like a ‘Kehre or Heideggerean turning’ in his thought. 
In response to this question, Derrida (81) states ‘I am grateful that you don’t want to cut me in two; 
I do wish to be cut, but in more that two places!’ Derrida wrote on many themes and published 
extensively during his lifetime, and, as such, one should be weary of identifying an explicit turn in 
his work. Despite his sheer output, one can provide a stronger reason against an explicit ethical turn 
in his work, namely that Derrida has been writing on ethics (even if it is not the only thing he has 
been writing on), since coining the term deconstruction.  
 
During the above-mentioned interview, Derrida is asked whether there is ‘a logic of ethical 
testimony at work in deconstruction?’ To this he answers:  
 
Yes, it is absolutely central to it. Testimony, which implies faith or promise, governs the entire 
social space. I would say that theoretical knowledge is circumscribed within this testimonial 
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space. It is only by reference to the possibility of testimony that deconstruction can begin to ask 
questions concerning knowledge and meaning (82).  
 
Ethical testimony is the impetus for deconstruction. Without the promise of accounting for that 
which is excluded from our systems of meaning, or without deconstructing in the name of ethics or 
the Other, deconstruction would be an endless and pointless exercise.  Indeed, it is this 
transcendental promise that safeguards deconstruction against empiricism or relativism. In this 
regard, Derrida (2002b: 367) asks: ‘Is it empiricist or relativist to seriously take into account what 
arrives – differences of every order, beginning with the differences of contexts?’ Deconstruction, as 
a project aimed at safeguarding difference, is, therefore, through-and-through an ethical enterprise. 
At this juncture it should also be quite clear why deconstruction is compatible with the critical 
enterprise: deconstruction provides us with a ‘mechanism’ for continually questioning and 
exploring our knowledge claims and beliefs. Deconstruction, therefore, draws attention to, and 
facilitates, the important task of imaging a better future, and thereby leads to modifications and 
transformations of our views on reality.  
 
3.2. Deconstruction as promise and threat 
 
This idea of a transcendental promise sits uncomfortable with an otherwise radically immanent 
project, targeted against metaphysics itself. However, as will be explained in more detail in the next 
chapter (secs 5 & 6), the ethical moment (like the just moment) needs to take place beyond the 
calculable programme (i.e. beyond the possibility of deconstruction, and, therefore, beyond 
meaning).  
 
For now, it is useful to return to the insights presented in section 6 of chapter two in order to explain 
the idea of a transcendental promise. In this section, it was argued that substantive ethical theories – 
although helpful in providing us with the means to think about ethical problems – cannot provide us 
with blueprints, which prescribe the ‘correct’ course of action. Rather, ethical decision-making is a 
highly contextual practice. The ethical decision-maker must grapple with competing demands and 
interpretations, and must struggle with the insolvable impasse that characterise the moment of 
decision-making. Rationality and calculation cannot resolve the aporia, yet a decision must be 
taken. The deconstructionist grapples with a similar paradox: on the one hand, we cannot totally 
renounce our systems of meaning (we need rational tools and we need to calculate); but, on the 
other hand, it is exactly these tools and systems (including the ethics of language) that must be 
challenged, if we wish to act justly. This ties in with the point that – because our models of reality 
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are necessarily partial and incomplete (i.e. our models cannot fully account for the complexity of 
phenomena) – our descriptions of phenomena are defined by an inevitable normativity.  
 
There is no way out of this ethical complexity – to plot the trajectory of an ethical decision is not 
only to ignore the complexity, but also to exclude anything that may reasonably be called a just 
decision. The only place in which a just decision can find its expression is in the very moment of 
the decision, which is always a singular event.  After the decision is taken and the action assumed, 
the ethical moment is transformed into something that can be defined, justified, and criticised. In 
other words, the transcendental promise is ruined because the logic of the event is destroyed, 
assimilated into a generalised hierarchy of meaning that transforms ethics and justice into codes and 
law, and that is once again open to deconstruction. The ethical task must, therefore, take place anew 
every time a decision is made. Again, this point reinforces the importance of critique, and in this 
context, it is especially helpful to recall Preiser and Cilliers’ (2010) point that it is only through 
being critical of our own positions that we can make our value judgements explicit, and avoid 
claiming a false sense of objectivity.  
 
Deconstruction, as the means by which to articulate the ethical interruption of ontological closure, 
therefore, operates in service of the singularity of the event. In other words, Derrida’s entire body of 
philosophy serves as a constant reminder of the necessity of remaining open to the Other, who 
cannot be assimilated into our systems of meaning; but who, nevertheless, demands our 
consideration. In this regard, Derrida (2002b: 364) writes that ‘[t]he deconstruction of 
logocentricism, of linguisticism, of economism... etc., as well as the affirmation of the impossible 
are always put forward in the name of the real, of the irreducible reality of the real’. Derrida (264) 
warns that it is important not to think about the real as an ‘attribute of the objective, present, 
perceptible or intelligible thing (res)’. Rather, for him, the real constitutes the transcendental 
moment, also understood as a promise, or ‘as the coming or event of the other, where the other 
resists all reappropriation, be it ana-onto-phenomenological appropriation’ (367). The ‘real’ is, 
therefore, a concept that designates the (im)possibility of the ethical moment.  
 
Although deconstruction is undertaken in the name of the real, deconstruction – like negotiation – is 
also the very place of threat: ‘one must [il faut] with vigilance venture as far as possible into what 
appears threatening and at the same time maintain a minimum of security – and also an internal 
security not to be carried away by this threat’ (Derrida, 2002a: 16-17). This threat is constituted by 
the fact that, in acting justly, we must renounce our systems of meaning, including consciousness, 
presence, and even language, even though we cannot do without these concepts. We must face the 
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uncertainty that results from renouncing (as far as possible) our existing systems of meaning, 
without adopting a nihilistic position.  
 
The nature of this argument becomes clearer if we consider the following remarks on forgiveness, 
which – like justice, hospitality and gift-giving – has the same structure as ethical decision-making. 
Derrida (2002b: 351) writes that true forgiveness cannot stem from duty: ‘One forgives, if one 
forgives beyond any categorical imperative, beyond debt and obligation.’ In other words, 
forgiveness must be unconditional. It must disavow the tradition of repentance, economic exchange, 
and identification, even though we can only think about forgiveness within this tradition. Derrida 
provides us with the following comments regarding this impossible situation: 
  
What would it mean to “inherit” a tradition under these conditions, from the moment one thinks 
on the basis of this tradition, in its name, certainly, but precisely against it in its name, against 
the very thing that tradition believed had to be saved to survive while losing itself? Again the 
possibility of the impossible: a legacy would only be possible where it becomes impossible. 
This is one of the possible definitions of deconstruction – precisely as legacy... deconstruction 
might perhaps be “the experience of the impossible” (352).  
 
4. Derrida’s reception in the academic world and in business ethics 
 
4.1. Deconstruction as a critical ethics 
 
From the above we see that deconstruction carries both a threat and a promise – and that both are 
necessary for ethical testimony. However, Derrida’s circumscriptions of deconstruction, and of 
ethics as an experience of the impossible, have also sparked much criticism. Indeed, one need only 
take note of the critical obituaries written in the popular press after his death (Kandell, 2004; 
Mendez-Opale, 2004), or the vehement protests voiced by a number of analytic philosophers at 
Cambridge, who tried to stop the university from awarding Derrida an honourary degree (Smith, 
2005: 4-6), in order to get a feel for the type of reactions that Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy 
elicits. The following example taken from an article by Stephens (1994), serves to illustrate the 
malicious nature of these attacks. In this article, Roger Kimball, a conservative critic and author of 
Tenured Radicals (2008), is quoted as saying: ‘Derrida's influence has been disastrous... He has 
helped foster a sort of anaemic nihilism, which has given imprimaturs to squads of imitators who no 
longer feel that what they are engaged in is a search for truth, who would find that notion risible.’ 
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Whilst some of his ardent followers have, no doubt, missed the point of deconstruction, it would be 
unfair to equate Derrida’s project with nihilism.   
 
All too often, deconstruction is construed as a negative ethics, intent on destroying rather than 
building-up. Such criticism confuses a critical ethics with a negative ethics, and is mostly 
propagated by those who wish to perpetuate the dream of a categorically-binding ethics. Derrida 
certainly aims to challenge conventional understandings of ethics, and in this sense he is critical of 
the Western tradition of philosophical thought. However, his criticisms are not intended to steer us 
towards the abyss of nothingness, but towards assuming a deeper responsibility for our decisions 
and actions. This also means foregoing the dream of a categorically-binding ethical framework; 
and, furthermore, necessitates engagement with the undecidable nature of ethical decision-making.  
 
To elaborate: a deconstructive ethics necessitates that we turn away from the ‘dreams of 
deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the 
necessity of interpretation as an exile’ (Derrida, 1978a: 292). In other words, we need to turn away 
from moral ‘recipes’ that claim to lead us to the heart of ethics, and instead examine the margins, in 
an attempt to account for that which is excluded from these moral recipes. We cannot get to these 
exclusions through only applying rational rules and principles. Although necessary, logic needs to 
be supplemented by imagination and creativity, and the ethical agent must assume an attitude of 
openness towards risk. 
 
When we make an ethical decision we take a risk, because the product of our deliberations and 
actions can never be determined in advance, even though we are infinitely responsible for the 
consequences of our decisions. Derrida (293) concedes that this is a daunting prospect; so daunting, 
in fact, that we tend to avert our eyes ‘when faced by the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming 
itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offering, only under the species 
of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.’ To reiterate: the 
risk that we take has to do with the fact that the product of our ethical deliberations is both a baby 
and a monster, or the unknown for which we have not accounted in our deliberations. 
 
For some, the deconstructionist perspective presents a threat that is too large, and a promise that is 
too elusive. This interpretation has often gives rise to criticism. In this regard, Derrida (1988a:140) 
states: ‘I have come to understand that, sometimes, certain bitter and compulsive enemies of 
deconstruction stand in a more vital relationship, even if not theorized, to what is in effect at stake 
in it than do certain avowed “deconstructionists.’ It is, ironically, precisely this recognition of what 
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is at stake that may lead to the perpetuation of the standard normative tale, in fields such as business 
ethics. From the viewpoint of a deconstructive ethics, it is no longer possible to distinguish with 
certainty between good and bad, right and wrong, and what deserves respect and what does not. 
Taking these insights seriously, therefore, poses a big challenge to the manner in which ethics is 
understood, practiced, and taught in business.  
 
4.2. Derrida, deconstruction, and business ethics 
 
Despite the controversy unleashed by Derrida’s insights, various authors have, since the early 
1980s, sought to incorporate Derrida’s ideas in the field of organisation studies58. A perfunctory 
glance at the organisation literature seems to suggest that, although popular in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Derrida’s reception in the field has been short-lived, as few organisational theorists continue to 
work with Derridean ideas. This is because it is generally believed that we have moved past 
postmodernism (and, therefore, past Derrida). Furthermore, in terms of the extant literature, we see 
that, whereas some of the studies constitute a more careful reading of Derridean philosophy 
(Cooper, 1989); others show a loose appropriation of Derrida’s insights in a manner that conforms 
to the author’s intentions (Boje, 1998). 
 
In comparison to organisation studies, Derrida has not enjoyed much of a reception in business 
ethics. However, contrary to developments in organisation studies, we see that the incorporation of 
Derridean philosophy in business ethics has been more recent (see Jones 2007, 2004, 2003; Jones, 
Parker and ten Bos, 2005; Weitzner, 2007; MacKenzie, 2000; Willmott, 1998). Indeed, a special 
issue of Business Ethics: a European Review (vol. 19; issue 3) on the relation between Derrida, 
business and ethics appeared in July 2010, following a conference held in 2008 on ‘Derrida and 
Business Ethics’.  
 
However, as in organisation studies (and philosophy in general), Derrida’s reception in business 
ethics has been mixed. In this regard, it is not surprising that two recent articles on the importance 
of Derrida for business ethics (by Weitzner (2007) and Jones (2007)) have met with almost 
instantaneous critique and dismissal (by Weiss (2007) and De George (2008) respectively). 
Although the criticisms are not lodged against Derrida as such, but rather against the usefulness of 
the interpretations given of Derrida, it is, nevertheless, clear that both Weis and De George are 
                                                    
58
 See Jones (2004: 34-35) for a full list of authors working in the field of organisation studies who have 
utilised Derridean ideas in their considerations of various organisational themes.  
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sceptical of the purported value that Derrida can bring to the boardroom. De George (85) explicitly 
conveys this sentiment in the conclusion of his article, in stating that: 
 
The onus is on Jones and other followers of Derrida to show how, by using ‘the categories 
made available in the writings of Jacques Derrida’ (Jones 2007), those in CSR and business 
ethics can do, and do more effectively, what they want to do and what they cannot do 
without these categories. 
 
Given the above analysis of a deconstructive ethics, it is not surprising that many business ethicists 
(who concern themselves with legitimising the ethics of business, with providing ethical criteria 
against which organisations can measure their ethical success, or with engaging in business ethics 
management practices) would react with hostility to an ethics which speaks of deconstruction, 
supplement, play, trace, and différance.  
 
As already mentioned, one reason for such hostility is that many business ethicists (in espousing 
codes, rules, norms, and procedures) wish to offer comfort in the name of business ethics, by 
offering tools to ‘solve’ moral dilemmas. Against this, a deconstructive ethics has as its goal the 
task of calling into question ‘the self-satisfying rules, excuses and alibis that produce a reassuring 
sense of comfort’ (Jones, 2003: 237; 238). 
 
Yet, there is a second reason for why many business ethicists are weary of bringing Derrida to 
business ethics, namely: the problem of application. Indeed, as Jones (234) argues, Derrida’s 
insights cannot be assimilated into a code, which can then be applied. In this regard, ‘the idea that 
Derrida could or would need to be applied seems foreign to his thought’ (234); and, more 
importantly, if deconstruction was reduced to a methodology, or Derridean insights taken up in a 
formula, ‘it would tend to efface the very idea of responsibility’ (234). This latter reason presents a 
pitfall to be avoided, and the way in which several business ethicists have tended to circumvent this 
problem, is by speaking ‘in vague generalities about ‘Derridean ethics’ and ‘poststructuralism’ 
rather than paying attention to Derrida’s works and the specific arguments he makes there’ (225). 
These vague generalities have indeed limited the appeal and usefulness of incorporating Derrida’s 
insights into business ethics. In the next chapter, the possibility of productively applying a 
deconstructive ethics to business ethics problems will be investigated in more detail.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, some of Derrida’s ideas were introduced in explaining deconstruction. Most notably, 
Derrida’s understanding of meaning as a textual and contextual phenomenon was elaborated upon. 
It was shown that, meaning is always grounded in a context. This context is defined by both 
structure and play. In other words, on the one hand, meaning is the product of hierarchy, authority, 
and structure. On the other hand, however, meaning can never be fixed, due to the logic of 
supplementarity, différance, and the trace that is always at play in our systems of meaning. Since 
meaning cannot be fixed, we should guard against the naturalisation of hierarchies. In this sense, the 
task of deconstruction – as an intervention – is to open up our systems of meaning to differences 
that have not been accounted for. Herein lies the ethics of deconstruction. What should also be clear 
from this analysis is that deconstruction addresses the dual challenges of text and context. 
Normative categories are employed, but these categories are inseparable from the contexts in which 
they derive their meaning. Not only does this analysis clearly illustrate the dissolution of fixed 
normative and descriptive categories, but also draws attention to the fact that – in the absence of 
objective meta-positions – deconstruction is a continual process. 
 
Deconstruction is always undertaken anew in an attempt to do justice to the irreducibility of the 
singular Other. The ethical moment manifests in the event, which cannot be prepared for in 
advance. The moment of the event, however, not only carries within it the promise of justice, but 
also a threat to internal security, or an abandonment of our preconceptions and prejudices, even if 
this proves impossible (hence, Derrida’s characterisation of ethics as an experience of the 
impossible). Not only is the ethical experience characterised by this impossibility, but making 
decisions and undertaking actions also implies a necessary measure of risk. This is because we have 
to take responsibility for the consequences of our decisions and actions, even though we cannot 
predict them in advance.  
 
This characterisation has led many to believe that deconstruction presents us with a negative ethics. 
It this chapter, it has been argued that these interpretations misconstrue the point of deconstruction – 
deconstruction is critical, not negative, and, moreover, urges us to assume greater responsibility, not 
abandon our responsibilities. Nevertheless, this negative characterisation of deconstruction is rife in 
the academic world, and the field of business ethics is no exception. Adding to the problem is the 
fact that deconstruction does not present us with a substantive theory, nor does the term allow for a 
fixed definition. These problems limit the appeal of applying Derrida’s ideas in the field of business 
ethics, and – as stated in the previous section – many of the attempts to outline a ‘Derridean ethics’ 
151 
 
have amounted to vague generalities, or have reduced Derrida’s work to a couple of general 
formulae.  
 
In order to avoid these pitfalls, the following chapter will not present an outline for a ‘Derridean 
ethics’. Rather, the strategy that will be followed in this chapter is to pay careful attention to 
Derrida’s work and arguments, in an attempt to engage with some of the specific ways in which he 
has been appropriated and criticised in business ethics. This is done in order to show how the 
categories made available by Derrida, do, indeed, allow for a new understanding of business ethics.   
  
As such, section 3 (in which a deconstructive ethics was presented), and section 4 (in which an 
overview of Derrida’s reception in the academic, and business ethics, world was given) should be 
read as a broad introduction to the following chapter. In chapter five, the normative implications of 
a deconstructive ethics are teased out at the hand of a specific business ethics example, namely the 
way in which corporate social responsibility should be understood. The discussion will be 
supplemented with insights gleaned from the complexity literature; and, through the analysis, it will 
become clear why deconstruction is an example of a complex ethics.  
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Chapter 5:  
Derrida and the Case for Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a close reading of two business ethics articles. The purpose of the close 
reading is to engage with the application of Derrida’s ideas to business ethics. The two readings are 
Richard De George’s (2008) article, entitled ‘An American perspective on corporate social 
responsibility and the tenuous relevance of Jacques Derrida’; and Campbell Jones’s (2007) article, 
entitled ‘Friedman with Derrida’. De George’s article constitutes a response to, and a critique of 
Jones’s article. The primary focus of the chapter will be on De George’s critique. Jones’s article 
will be read through this critique, and various readings of, and by, Derrida will be grafted onto the 
text. This is done in order to respond to De George’s criticism of Jones and Derrida, and to present 
an argument for the timely relevance of Derrida in business ethics.  
 
The reasons for engaging with De George’s and Jones’ texts specifically are threefold: firstly, 
Jones, and particularly De George have substantial reputations in the field of business ethics. 
Moreover, Jones is one of the few established business ethicists working on business ethics and 
postmodernism. In this context, his texts on Derrida warrant specific mention (see Jones 2007, 
2004, 2003). Given the above, one can argue that both the articles to be analysed in this chapter 
present ‘anchor points’ in the debate regarding the viability of Derrida for business ethics.  
Secondly, the specific focus of both authors’ texts is on corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
which is a central topic in business ethics, and, therefore, a good place to start when investigating 
the purported value of Derrida’s thoughts for business ethics. Thirdly, De George’s account of CSR 
(and business ethics in general) represents a stance which, although common, is at odds with a 
Derridean notion of ethics and responsibility. As such, the stark juxtaposition between De George 
and Derrida/Jones helps to show why the categories made available in the writings of Derrida, do 
indeed bring something new to the table, specifically with regard to CSR.  
 
With regard to this third point, one can summarise the central difference between De George’s and 
Derrida’s position as follows: whereas De George presents an approach that stresses the 
commonalities in our human experiences, Derrida’s approach urges us to account for the differences 
that characterise ways of being in the world. Although De George (2008: 74) starts his article by 
drawing a distinction between how corporations are viewed in Europe versus North America, and 
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although he – at points in the argument – stresses contextual and conceptual differences that inform 
our understanding of business ethics themes, his overall position, nevertheless, grounds morality in 
human conventions and common experiences (78). De George’s position is only tenable if we 
accept the rigid distinction between the normative and the descriptive categories, since this is the 
only way in which it makes sense to speak of our common morality (as necessarily corresponding to 
the transcendental ideal), whilst simultaneously allowing for conceptual (descriptive) differences. 
Over and against this, a Derridean approach is one that provides a challenge to our systems of 
meaning (as was explained in chapter four). In drawing attention to the normative implications 
generated by our conceptual schema, Derrida attempts to both open up our systems of meaning to 
those who resist assimilation into the logos, and to prevent these systems from becoming 
naturalised under the banner of our ‘common’ human experiences. During the course of this 
analysis, the ethical implications of this central difference will become clear, as will the fact that 
deconstruction (unlike De George’s position) presents us with an example of a complex ethics.   
 
This chapter will proceed as follows: the criticism regarding Derrida’s use of language will be 
addressed in section two. Not only does De George specifically raise this criticism in his article, but 
a discussion on Derrida’s use of language also presents a good starting point for further elaborating 
on the differences between Derrida’s approach and De George’s approach. In section three, a 
summary will be presented of De George’s understanding of ethical theory, business ethics, and 
CSR; as well as Jones’s deconstructive reading of CSR. This will be followed by a critical 
evaluation of both De George’s and Jones’s positions. Section four will serve as a bridge between 
the discussion on CSR specifically, and the discussion on responsibility generally. The analysis will 
be conducted at the hand of Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the master-slave dialectic in Hegel, 
and Aristotle’s distinction between the oikos and chrematistics. The implications that this analysis 
holds for the capital-labour dialectic, as well as for our understanding of responsibility will also be 
addressed. The question of responsibility is elaborated upon in section five. Jones’s circumscription 
of a Derridean notion of responsibility is presented, and the explicit criticism that De George raises 
with regard to this circumscription, is also addressed. In section six, specific emphasis is placed on 
Derrida’s understanding of the ethical relation, undecidability, and justice, as these notions further 
help to clarify a Derridean understanding of responsibility. Section seven follows with an 
explanation of why a Derridean circumscription of responsibility does not imply ethical impotence 
– as is maintained by De George. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main insights 
gleaned during the course of the analysis. The summary takes the form of several short arguments 
for incorporating Derridean ideas (and complexity-based ideas) in our thinking on CSR and 
business ethics.  
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2. Language, deconstruction, and ethics 
 
In chapter two (sec. 4), it was stated that both Walton (1993) and Gustafson (2000) take issue with 
the postmodernists’ use of jargon, arguing that postmodernism will enjoy a larger reception in 
business ethics, if postmodernists stuck to clear formulations. In terms of jargon, the writings of 
Derrida are a case in point, and many critics have complained bitterly about his style of writing59. 
As such, before embarking on a substantive discussion of CSR, it is first necessary to comment on 
this methodological issue. The frustration with Derrida’s use of language is summarised by De 
George (2008: 80) in the question: why does the text not simply state clearly what it holds, and 
present the arguments supporting it claims? Although Derrida is difficult to understand at times, and 
although some of his comments do border on the obscure, De George’s question is addressed in this 
section, in order to show why Derrida’s use of language presents an attempt to respect otherness. 
An argument will also be made for why reducing our complex reality to simple formulations – 
which are often also purported to represent objective or truthful accounts of our reality – can hold 
ethical implications.   
 
2.1. On the possibility of unambiguous statements: a Derridean understanding of language 
 
De George’s (2008) own ‘Derridean’ answer to the question posed above (namely, why can 
Derrida’s claims and arguments not be clearly stated?) is that if a text ‘could be stated boldly, it 
would be false’ (81); or, more subtly – and with specific reference to Jones’s text, in which 
Derrida’s style of writing is mimicked – any attempt to state the point simply would reduce the 
‘complex, dialectical, fluid and pregnant cogitations to static, flat, truisms, or more accurately 
falsehoods’ (81). According to De George then, the simple answer to the above question is that 
Jones’s text ‘says exactly what it means, just as Derrida does’ (81). De George is correct in saying 
that Derrida’s (and Jones’s) writing styles try to capture something of the ambiguity and complexity 
of speech and writing; but, the assertion that simple language is equal to falsehoods, or that Derrida 
says ‘exactly what he means’, are at odds with a view on language that tries to account for the 
complexities that define communication.   
 
As was explained in chapter four (sec. 2.2.2.), Derrida follows Saussure in his understanding of 
language as a system of differences. However, Derrida departs from Saussure with regard to 
                                                    
59
 In this regard, consider the following two comments published in articles in the popular press:  
‘Many otherwise unmalicious people have in fact been guilty of wishing for deconstruction's demise - if only 
to relieve themselves of the burden of trying to understand it’ (Stephens, 1994). 
‘The trouble with reading Mr. Derrida is that there is too much perspiration for too little inspiration’ (Kandell 
(2004) citing a 1992 editorial from The Economist in which the Cambridge affair was commented upon). 
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Saussure’s understanding of the sign. For Saussure (1960), the sign is still constituted by a signifier 
(that which a word refers to) and a signified (the physical referent). Despite Saussure’s insistence on 
the purely differential nature of the sign, Derrida argues that there still remains a rigorous 
distinction between the signifier and the signified in Saussure’s work. This makes it possible to 
think of the signified as a ‘transcendental signified’, or as a concept that is simply present to 
thought, and hence, is independent of the linguistic system (Culler, 1983: 188). Derrida (1981: 19-
20) argues that once one ‘recognizes that every signified is also in the position of a signifier, the 
distinction between signifier and signified and thus the notion of the sign becomes problematic at its 
roots.’  
 
According to Culler (1983: 188), this does not mean that we should abolish the distinction between 
signifier and signified, but only that the difference between the two is non-substantial. In other 
words, ‘[t]here are no final meanings that arrest the movement of signification’ (188). This means 
that no matter how lucidly we state our arguments, our words and concepts will never correspond 
with the proper, the truth, absolute proximity or self-presence. Writing and speech – even arche-
writing (the original grunt for food, so-to-speak) – already represent a mode of cutting, the 
‘worlding of the world’ (Grosz, 2000: 191), or a certain arche-violence that marks the word as 
‘always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance’ 
(Derrida, 1976: 112). This argument is further supported by the logic of the supplement, play, 
différance, and the trace which pervades our systems of meaning, and which prevents us from 
determining the origin of truth; and, therefore, the truth of our assertions (see chap. 4, sec. 2.3.). In 
other words, De George’s remark that, for Derrida, simple language is equal to falsehoods is simply 
wrong! Rather, in writing in a particular style, Derrida is trying to demonstrate the difficulties that 
we experience in using categories such as right and wrong, truth and falsehood.   
 
The same point can be made with a complexity argument: as stated in chapter three (secs 5.1. & 
5.2.), the complexity of a system does not reside in the individual components that constitute the 
system, but in the non-linear, dynamic relations between the components of the system. If systems 
were homogenous and symmetrical, it would, in principle, be possible to figure the system out 
(Cilliers, 1998). However, since this is not the case, one has to reckon with the dynamic nature of 
the play of differences that constitute meaning in complex systems. Again, one can argue that there 
is no pure origin that one can get at with enough work, although many people – including those who 
support a restricted view of complexity – still succumb to this seductive belief. Rather, complexity 
is an inherent characteristic of systems. Applied to language, this means that we can never say 
exactly what we mean, as is maintained by De George.  
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2.2. The violence of language and ethical implications  
 
As shown above, the dynamic play of differences, which give rise to irreducible or  generalised 
complexity, means that language is not a substantial, transparent medium with a fixed meaning. A 
second argument against the clarity of language can also be made when one considers the violence 
inherent to language. 
 
In the ‘Afterword’, Derrida (1988a: 113) asks whether it is certain that we can eliminate the 
violence and ambiguity of texts, or whether it is ‘even certain that we should try at all costs’? This 
single question looms behind Derrida’s entire philosophical project, as becomes clear from 
Elizabeth Grosz’s (2000) exploration of violence in Derrida’s work. She raises the question of 
violence in Derrida’s work not only with regard to obvious and manifest violence – i.e. street 
violence, war, discrimination etc. – but also in terms of more subtle forms of violence (which are 
rarely termed violence), namely the violence that manifests in the ‘domain of knowledge, reflection, 
thinking and writing’ (190). In these domains, we have to account for not only the primordial or 
arche-violence or the splitting of the world, but also for reparatory or compensatory violence, which 
Grosz (193) defines as: 
 
the violence whose function it is to erase the traces of this primordial violence, akind of 
counter-violence whose violence consists in the denial of violence… This is a violence that 
describes and designates itself as the moral counter of violence. This is the violence that we 
sometimes name the law, right, or reason.  
 
In light of the above, Derrida certainly doesn’t say exactly what he means (as if such a thing were 
possible); nor would it be fair to say that trying to capture something of the ambiguity of language 
or pregnant cognitions of language represents an attempt to avoid falsehoods, if by falsehoods one 
means the opposite of truths. However, denying a certain privileged status to truth does not mean 
that one is impotent to act.  Grosz not only argues for the primacy of violence in Derrida’s work, 
but also for politics and ethics. Indeed, it is because of the inescapable violence in language and in 
being, that ethics and politics are such central themes in Derrida’s work. Grosz argues that – far 
from immobilising the practices of politics and ethics, or of refusing to provide answers to political 
or ethical problems (as is often alleged by his critics) – Derrida offers a profound reconfiguration of 
the ethical and political activity that centres on the question of violence (190-191). In this regard, 
Grosz (190) states: 
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What makes Derrida’s work at once intensely political and ethical, while he remains acutely 
aware of the problems involved in any straightforward avowal of one’s commitments to 
political and ethical values, is his readiness to accept that no protocol, no rhetorical or 
intellectual ploy is simply innocent, motivated by reason, knowledge or truth alone, but 
carries with it an inherent undecidability and repeatability that recontextualizes it and frees it 
from any origin or end.    
 
The type of falsehood that Derrida is, therefore, trying to avoid in his writings is a moral falsehood: 
a complacent denial of the violence that we employ every time that we use language, every time 
that we argue for a specific position, or every time that we proclaim the Truth of our assertions. 
Language – like our systems of meaning – is limited and exclusionary: in voicing one position, we 
deny another, which may be no less relevant. Once again, complexity theory can help us to make 
this argument. This is because the ethics of modelling, which bears on the organisation of 
knowledge itself (Morin, 2007), is critical to our understanding of complexity. As explained in 
chapter three (sec. 6.1.), we do not have full access to the phenomena of interest due to the 
irreducible complexity with which we have to grapple. This incompressibility of complexity 
introduces a normative dimension to our descriptions and explanations of the world because we are 
forced to make certain choices, judgements, and decisions when modelling our world. There is, 
therefore, no way in which we can escape ethics.  
 
Given the above, what should be called into question are positions, which – like De George’s (2008: 
80) – gain their status on the basis of being ‘not idiosyncratic’ but ‘compatible with most other 
presentations’, simply because such positions are in danger of perpetuating an even greater 
violence, namely the denial of violence in the name of law, right, or reason. This is not to say that 
we cannot develop a body of knowledge, or a community of practice. Rather, the point is that we 
should guard against the naturalisation of meaning that scholarship can bring about. This point is 
particularly crucial in the context of ethics, and we should be very weary of relegating differences 
between contexts and practices to ‘non-moral responsibilities’ (as does De George (76)). Once we 
naturalise ethics in this way, any understanding of ethics which may deviate from the dominant 
interpretation can easily be construed as patently wrong, or as something which threatens to poison 
the purity of our common experiences. In order to make this argument in more detail, let us turn to a 
more specific account of De George’s understanding of business ethics and CSR.  
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3. Explaining and evaluating De George’s and Jones’s perspectives on corporate social 
responsibility  
 
3.1. De George’s account of corporate social responsibility, ethical theory and business ethics  
 
As mentioned, De George (2008) starts his article with a distinction between North American and 
European CSR practices, but  also adds the qualification that ‘[o]f course, there are broad areas of 
overlap’ (74).  De George maintains that, whereas the European emphasis in business ethics is on 
structures and systems, North American business ethicists have focused more on individuals (74-
75). He traces this divide back to the historical development of CSR, arguing that corporate social 
responsibilities ‘to the extent that they are not ethical or moral responsibilities, reflect the 
expectations and demands of the societies in which the corporations are found and/or where they 
operate’ (76; my italics). It is not entirely clear what De George means when he refers to social 
responsibilities that are not ‘morally motivated’, especially since, in the next paragraph, he states 
that societal demands that go beyond the law ‘arise from considerations of what is sometimes 
disparagingly called conventional morality’ (77). 
 
In his discussion on ethical theory two pages on, De George (78) again refers to this notion of 
conventional morality, stating that ‘[e]very society has a morality’ and that ‘[t]he function of an 
ethical theory, on this view, is to make sense of our common human and individual moral 
experience’. Herein perhaps lies the clue to why only non-moral corporate social responsibilities 
differ depending on the context. If we have a common human and moral experience, any differences 
that arise cannot be as a result of a difference in our fundamental conceptions of morality. This 
argument is made more explicit in the following paragraph, where De George (78) states that 
‘[b]ecause all ethical theories start from the conventional morality found in society, all of them 
provide a justification for prohibitions on murder, theft, perjury, rape, incest, and so on.’ De George 
is critical of textbooks that emphasise the differences between normative ethical theories, arguing 
instead that these theories have a lot more similarities than differences. In other words, they all 
affirm our sense of common morality, whether the arguments are grounded in consequences (Mill), 
virtues (Aristotle), or duty (Kant). On this view, moral progress is made ‘by coming to learn new 
facts about the world and society’, and ‘by developing a greater insight into what it is that we hold 
as our core moral beliefs’ (78).  
 
De George (78-79) further argues that ‘[w]hat is the case for ethics and morality in general is the 
case as well for business ethics’ and that different views of CSR cannot be ascribed to differences in 
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common morality, but difference in how societies are structured. Therefore, he maintains that in 
terms of business ethics and CSR, we see that the roles and responsibilities of individual managers 
form the focus of scholarship in the USA, whereas European business ethicists have been more 
concerned with whether the systems in which business and government operate are just (79) – but, 
to reiterate, the responses to these issues are presumably motivated from the same moral base.   
 
After these introductory remarks, De George turns his attention to a critique of Jones’s (2007) 
article, entitled ‘Friedman with Derrida’. After briefly summarising the deconstructive approach as 
an ‘attack on foundationlist thinking’, De George asks ‘what the approach of Derrida and his 
followers can add to the concept and practice of CSR or more broadly to ethics in general or 
business ethics in particular’ considering that deconstructionists are not interested in constructing 
systems or in replacing existing systems with new ones (De George, 2008: 80)? This is the central 
question posed, and judging by the conclusion cited in chapter four (sec 4.2.)60, De George is 
evidently not happy with Jones’s attempt to show why business ethicists should engage in a 
deconstructive ethics. But, this is jumping the gun: let us start with an overview of Jones’s (2007) 
deconstructive reading of CSR in his article, entitled ‘Friedman with Derrida’.  
 
3.2. Friedman with Derrida: Jones’s deconstruction of the shareholder-stakeholder perspectives 
 
In his article, Jones (2007) cautiously reads Friedman with Derrida, in an attempt to give something 
back to Friedman i.e. ‘[f]irst of all his own words’ (512). Jones treats Friedman as an exemplary for 
CSR, and moreover argues that Friedman represents the shareholder perspective on CSR (which is 
typically contrasted with the stakeholder perspective). Jones describes the shareholder-stakeholder 
debate as presenting a binary opposition, which he attempts to destabilise through considering ‘the 
texture of [Friedman’s] text’ (514), or – in Friedman’s own words (1953: 43) – to seek ‘the vision 
of something new in familiar material’61. The familiar material Jones concentrates on is Friedman’s 
‘golden 48 words’: 
 
there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
                                                    
60
 The citation referred to is the following: ‘The onus is on Jones and other followers of Derrida to show, how, 
by using ‘the categories made available in the writings of Jacques Derrida’ (Jones, 2007), those in CSR and 
business ethics can do, and do more effectively, what they want to do and what they cannot do without these 
categories’ (De George, 2008: 85)  
61
 In a footnote, Jones (2007: 529) comments on how well these words resonate with Derrida’s own 
deconstructive strategy.  
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which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud (Friedman, 
1962: 133).    
 
The above quotation appears in Capitalism and Freedom (1962), but it again appears in 1970 in a 
New York Times Magazine article, where Friedman quotes himself in explaining that Capitalism 
and Freedom represents an account of what happens in a free society. However, Jones (2007: 515) 
notes that these two quotes are not exactly alike: 
 
The problem is that this quote [the 1970 quote] is not a quote, or better, it is a quote but the 
quote does not say what he says it says. Friedman quotes himself accurately within the 
quotation marks, that is to say, he reproduces the 48 words exactly, including the 
punctuation... The crucial slip is that Friedman’s misquotation that appears just before the 
quotation marks begin. The slip: in the 1970 New York Times Magazine essay he claims that 
these 48 words describe a “free society”; in Capitalism and Freedom these 48 words 
describe a “free economy”. 
 
Apart from the slippage that occurs due to this ‘misquotation’ before the beginning of the citation in 
the 1970 text, Jones also notes that a similar problem occurs at the end of the citation in the 1970 
text: the text stops abruptly after the citation. This is in contrast to the 1962 text, which ends with 
the sentence: ‘Similarly, the ‘social responsibility’ of labor leaders is to serve the interests of the 
members of their unions’ (Friedman, 1962: 133). Thus, in the 1962 text we see that a free economy 
is characterised by two parties (each with their own responsibility): namely, corporate officials and 
labour leaders (Jones, 2007: 516-517). Jones argues that, contrary to the common perception that 
Friedman views profit as the only interest to be protected in a free economy, in the 1962 text we 
read that ‘capitalism is organized around a basic contradiction or conflict of interest between capital 
and labour’ (517).  
 
This reading destabilises the binary opposition that governs the shareholder-stakeholder 
perspectives, as it is no longer possible to claim that the stakeholder position sets itself apart from 
the shareholder position on the grounds that it recognises several parties that might have a stake in 
business (517). 
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3.3. Meaning, intentionality, and slippages 
 
3.3.1.  Critical evaluation of De George’s argument: against slippages, for differences 
 
With regard to Jones’s reading of Friedman’s ‘golden 48 words’, De George (2008: 81) makes the 
comment that Friedman’s conflation of ‘free economy’ with ‘free society’ seems to suggest to Jones 
that Friedman does not know what he is talking about62. De George provides an alternative reading 
on this point, stating that Friedman’s claim ‘about the social responsibility of business is the same 
whether one speaks of a free economy or a free society, which for him requires a free economy. In 
this case there is no slippage or lapse’ (81). Firstly, with regard to De George’s interpretation, one 
could argue that a free economy does not necessarily lead to a free society (think of China which 
has a free economy, but not a free society – at least not by Western standards).  
 
Perhaps Friedman did, as De George suggests, knowingly conflate a free society with a free 
economy when deducing the responsibilities of business; but, in so doing, a whole series of 
questions pertinent to the matter at hand, are negated, such as: Do the mechanisms at work in a free 
society lead to the same expectations regarding businesses’ responsibilities, as do the mechanisms 
at work in a free economy? Do our notions of freedom vary, given different contexts? Can societies 
and economies be more or less free, and is there a direct correlation between the degree of societal 
freedom and the degree of economic freedom? In which ways do free economies support or even 
undermine societal notions of freedom? Jones (2007: 522) alludes to these type of questions when 
he states that it ‘should be apparent from the current and urgent global struggles [that we do not 
know] what it might mean to live and work in anything that might meaningfully be called a free 
economy or a free society.’  
 
                                                    
62
 In this regard, one could argue that Jones (2007) is once again mimicking Derrida’s style and strategy. In 
Of Grammatology, Derrida (1976: 163) explicitly argues that the word supplement constitutes a ‘blind spot’ in 
Rousseau’s text, because although he employs the word, its logic is veiled to him. This prompts Critchley 
(1999a: 54) to state that Derrida’s ‘formulation implies… a certain delusion on Rousseau’s part: namely, that 
he did not mean to say what he actually said, and that what he actually meant to say is in contradiction with 
what he said in the text’. Jones (2007) seems to be attributing a similar delusion to Friedman. However, this 
strategy has met with some criticism. Specifically, Paul de Man (1983: 139) argues that ‘Rousseau’s text has 
no blind spots’. Consequently, ‘there is no need to deconstruct Rousseau’. However, de Man is also critical 
of the established tradition of reading Rousseau, arguing that his texts have been systematically misread. In 
this vein, de Man calls Derrida ‘Rousseau’s best modern interpreter’ (135) (For an extended and more 
detailed discussion of this point, see Critchley, 1999a: 54-55).  
Viewed in a charitable light, one could argue that Jones’s argument is not directed against Friedman 
specifically, but against the dominant interpretation of Friedman’s works. As such, Jones is deconstructing a 
dominant reading, rather than a philosophical point.  
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However, in talking about the relation between society and the corporation (the instrument for 
securing the interests of business, and thus of a free economy on Friedman’s view), De George 
(2008: 82) writes:  
 
Central to making sense of CSR should be a discussion of what a corporation is, why it 
exits, what its relation to society or the common good, if any, is. Corporations are taken at 
face value, even though they differ in formation and structure and in the rights they enjoy 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
 
De George continues by arguing that how we view the corporation will have an effect on how we 
think about corporate responsibilities. He further contends that the third component of CSR – 
namely society – is often taken for granted (despite manifest differences between contexts). He 
concludes that ‘each part of the trio – corporations, society and responsibility – deserves analysis, as 
do the relations of the three, and the combination of the three into the whole’ (83). Here, De George 
is very sensitive to the different interpretations that we can assign to our concepts. It is, therefore, a 
bit surprising that De George would argue that there is no slippage or lapse when one speaks of 
businesses’ responsibilities in a free economy or in a free society.  De George’s own position seems 
to vacillate between arguments for a common humanity, and arguments for (non-moral) contextual 
differences that, nevertheless, have a bearing on our conceptions of responsibility.  
 
The fact that De George seems to want it both ways suggests that Jones (2007: 521-523) is correct 
in claiming that any notion of CSR is always already under deconstruction, because the ‘rules of the 
game’ are up for grabs, and because we cannot conclusively reconcile all the tensions or difficulties 
(the aporia) that permeate the question of what it means to be responsible (or what it means to live 
in a free society or a free economy). However, the manner in which Jones sets about making this 
point is problematic, although for different reasons than claimed by De George.   
 
3.3.2.  Critical evaluation of Jones’s argument: misunderstanding context 
 
Let us recall what Jones (2007: 515) says with reference to Friedman’s 1970 text: ‘The problem is 
that this quote is not a quote, or better, it is a quote but the quote does not say what he says it says… 
Friedman’s misquotation… appears just before the quotation marks begin’. Jones argument is that 
Friedman misquotes himself; or, rather, Friedman’s interpretation of the quote is an inaccurate or 
untruthful rendition of what the quote says. To push the point a bit further: Friedman is not true to 
his words, and it seems that the reason for this is largely due to the fact that Friedman uses these 
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words out of context. This is what leads De George to speculate that Jones seems to think that 
Friedman does not know what he is talking about.  
 
Jones’s project (i.e. giving Friedman back his own words) relies on a logocentric interpretation of 
context. Jones views the context of Capitalism and Freedom as the correct and proper context for 
Friedman’s ‘golden 48 words’ because it is the original context, whereas the context of the citation 
in the New York Times Magazine article results in a faulty derivative or a perversion of what 
Friedman meant to say. Only on this interpretation is it possible to undertake a deconstructive 
reading, and to show that our understanding of Friedman is wrong, or relies on a misreading (since 
it only accounts for capital and not labour). Although opening up Friedman’s texts to new and other 
interpretations conforms to the spirit of deconstruction, Jones’s understanding of context is very 
much at odds with what Derrida has to say on the matter. 
 
In ‘Living On: Border Lines’, Derrida (1979: 81) writes: ‘This is my starting point: no meaning can 
be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation. What I am referring to here is not 
richness of substance, semantic fertility, but rather structure, the structure of remnant or of 
iteration.’ In ‘Signature Event Context’, Derrida (1988d: 7) calls iterability ‘the logic that ties 
repetition to alterity’. For writing to be recognisable it needs to be repeatable (in other words, words 
must be understood across contexts). However, as soon as words enter a new context, their 
meanings change. Writing is iterable in the sense that its communicability depends neither on the 
intentions of the author, nor on the context of its composition (7-9). Writing disseminates, it moves 
out from the word resulting in a proliferation of meaning that cannot be controlled. Writing, like a 
complex view of moral agency, cannot be construed as the outcome of an intentional, causal 
process.  
 
However, even supposing that we could fix writing within a given context, we find that context is 
boundless (‘no context permits saturation’): every context is open to further description, and 
meaning changes as the interpretation of the context changes. Any attempt to fix context through 
codification ‘can always be grafted onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a new context 
which escapes the previous formulation’ (Culler, 1983: 123-124). The upshot of this is that I am 
always misquoting myself. Friedman’s words in Capitalism and Freedom can never convey exactly 
the same meaning as his words do in the New York Times Magazine article, even if there was no 
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‘misquotation’ in Jones’s sense. This radicalises the slippage that Jones speaks of: there is always 
already slippage63!  
 
Jones’s deconstructive reading of the dominant interpretation of Friedman’s texts reintroduces 
labour as a party in a free economy. However, capital and labour remain two separate parties, 
whose interests do not mix. De George (2008: 81) comments on this explicit opposition, stating that 
it ‘describes a real opposition that is lacking in many accounts of stakeholder theory, where the aim 
is often to manage competing interests.’ De George’s point is that to a large degree, Jones binary 
opposition between the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives is a set-up; and, for the most part, 
this binary conception does not inform the dominant understanding on CSR. Nevertheless, De 
George claims that such a binary evokes the master-slave dialectic in Hegel, which can be quite 
provocative in the context of a discussion on CSR. Although not mentioned in either De George’s 
(2008) or Jones’s (2007) texts, such an evocation recalls Derrida’s (1978b) own discussion on the 
master-slave dialectic (at the hand of Georges Bataille) in the article, entitled ‘From a restricted to 
general economy: a Hegelian without reserve’. Although analysing this article will represent a 
minor detour from the texts under discussion, the article, nevertheless, presents a good introduction 
to the question of responsibility, and will thus be addressed in the following section.  
 
4. Overcoming dialectics: implications for the question of responsibility   
 
The question of responsibility forms the focus of the second half of Jones’s article, as well as the 
remainder of De George’s critique. As such, some preliminary remarks on the possibility and the 
nature of responsibility are needed, before progressing to a more in depth and critical discussion of 
responsibility in the next section. In this section, it will be shown that the notion of responsibility 
commonly evoked in discussions on CSR still remains trapped within a dialectical process, which 
limits the meaning and impact of the term to that of maintaining an equalising justice. A Derridean 
notion of responsibility, on the other hand, breaks open the dialectical process and, thereby, 
momentarily overcomes this dialectic. This, as will be explained, creates the possibility of 
conceiving of justice as a gift, or of exercising a true responsibility that transcends the reciprocal 
demands and expectations of a circular economy.  
 
As noted above, the section proceeds with Derrida’s discussion on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. 
This is followed by a discussion on the logic of the oikos versus chrematistics, and the implications 
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 Also refer to the discussion on the logic of the supplement, différance, play, and the trace in chapter four, 
section 2.3.   
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that these economic views hold for the possibility of gift-giving. Lastly, the insights to emerge from 
these discussions are applied to our understanding of responsibility, particularly CSR.   
 
4.1. The master-slave dialectic in Hegel and the introduction of the sovereign 
 
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy64 offers the following introduction to Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), in which the master-slave dialectic is discussed: 
  
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is… to be regarded as a type of “propaedeutic” to 
philosophy rather than an exercise in it – a type of induction or education of the reader to the 
“standpoint” of purely conceptual thought of philosophy itself. As such, its structure has 
been compared to that of a “Bildungsroman” (educational novel), having an abstractly 
conceived protagonist – the bearer of an evolving series of “shapes of consciousness” or the 
inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds – whose progress and set-backs the 
reader follows and learns from.    
 
In the development towards self-consciousness, the master-slave dialectic plays a prominent role, 
and according to Kohn (2005: 497), Hegel’s description of this struggle between master and slave 
‘is one of the most powerful images in the history of philosophy’. The famous Hegelian scholar, 
Alexandre Kojève (1969: 3) writes that man becomes conscious of himself ‘at the moment when – 
for the “first” time – he says “I”’ (in other words, when he becomes conscious of his human reality 
and dignity). However, each ‘self-consciousness’ can only be certain of itself once another human 
recognises it as authoritative (Kohn, 2005: 497). The dissolution of the isolated ‘I’ is, therefore, the 
result of the first experience or the first ‘(murderous) fight’ (Kojève, 1969: 15) with another, in 
which both parties try to force the other to recognise him/her as a self-conscious subject, whilst 
withholding reciprocal recognition (Kohn, 2005: 497). The struggle ends when one party triumphs 
as an independent consciousness existing for itself (Hegel, 1977: 115). The other party chooses 
submission and life over death, thereby accepting its essential reality as animal-life, i.e. given-being 
for an other-entity. Whereas the former party is the master or lord, the latter party is the slave or 
bondsman (Kohn, 2005: 497; Kojève, 1969: 16). Hegel (1977: 115) describes the implications of 
this struggle as follows:  
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 See ‘Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/ First published on 13 February, 1997; revised on 26 June, 2006.  
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The lord is the consciousness that exists for itself, but no longer merely the Notion of such a 
consciousness. Rather, it is a consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself 
through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is to be bound 
up with as an existence that is dependent, or thinghood in general. The lord puts himself into 
relation with both these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to 
consciousness for which thinghood is the essential characteristic.  
 
In other words, the outcome of the struggle creates the dialectic between master and slave. On the 
one hand, the slave (in wanting to conserve his life) is held in the master’s domination, thereby 
providing the master with self-conscious certainty. This is because the master’s reality is no longer 
subjective and immediate, but objectified and mediated by the slave’s recognition. The master, 
however, recognises the slaves reality as a consciousness for whom ‘thingness’ is the essential 
entity (in that the slave, who refuses to risk, binds himself completely to the things on which he 
depends) (Kojève, 1969: 16-17). On the other hand, the master is related in a mediated way to the 
‘thing as such’ or the object of desire, through means of the slave. This is because it is the slave’s 
job to transform natural objects, or raw materials with the view of their consumption by the master 
(17).  
 
From the above description, Derrida (1978b: 254) defines lordship as ‘an obligatory stage in the 
history of self-consciousness and phenomenality’ and thus ‘in the presentation of meaning’. 
However, lordship, nevertheless, remains trapped within the dialectic, since the lord or master needs 
the bondsman or slave to confirm his independent self-conscious existence: ‘The truth of the 
independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman’ (Hegel, 1977: 
117). This is because lordship is premised not only on life, but also on the slave. The truth of the 
lord is the slave, and the master must do work to keep the slave repressed, in order to experience 
pure self-consciousness. Therefore, the master’s consciousness ‘is not an autonomous 
Consciousness, but all to the contrary, a dependent consciousness, that exists for [the slave]’ 
(Kojève, 1969: 20).  
 
The tragedy of the master is that the master’s being for itself is premised on the slave’s recognition 
of his essential being. However, the slave (whose consciousness remains ‘thingness’) is not a being 
worthy of respect and dignity. Thus, as Kojève (19) explains:  
 
The master has fought and risked his life for a recognition without value for him. For he can 
be satisfied only by recognition from one whom he recognizes as worthy of recognizing 
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him. The Master’s attitude, is an existential impasse. On the one hand, the Master is Master, 
only because his Desire was directed not toward a thing, but toward another desire – thus, it 
was a desire for recognition. On the other, when he has consequently become Master, it is as 
Master that he must desire to be recognized; and he can he recognized as such only by 
making the Other his Slave. But the Slave is for him an animal or a thing. He is, therefore, 
“recognized” by a thing. Thus, finally, his Desire is directed toward a thing, and not – as it 
seemed at first toward a (human) Desire.    
 
Ironically then, the master is enslaved by the consciousness of the bondsman, who represents an 
animal or thing, as opposed to the independent consciousness of an equal. Servility is, therefore, the 
condition of lordship (Derrida, 1978b: 255). Unlike the master, however, the slave can transcend 
lordship. Kojève (1969: 20) explains that the slave ‘as repressed Consciousness’ can ‘go within 
itself and reverse and transform itself into true autonomy’. The way in which the slave can 
overcome his slavery is through work, and by establishing a relationship with work which, as 
Derrida (1978b: 255) and Kojève (1969: 24-25) explain, is characterised by the deferral of pleasure. 
Unlike the master (who immediately negates desire, and, hence, life in pleasurable consumption), 
the slave must inhibit his desires (work is repressed desire), and delay the disappearance of the 
thing (by first transforming it through work).  Through trans-forming things in the world, the slave 
is thus able to transform himself into a formed and educated man (25). Therefore, in summary: 
 
just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too 
servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as 
a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a 
truly independent consciousness (25).  
 
Although the dialectic between master and slave is radically revised through Hegel’s analysis of this 
relationship, one can nevertheless argue (as does Derrida, 1978b) that the dialectic remains. Hegel 
replaces biological life, as the hallmark of lordship, with work and the repression of desire. In other 
words, Hegel has replaced abstract negation with determinate negation. Whereas the former implies 
a non-productive death in immediate consumption, the latter constitutes the ‘tarrying with the 
negative’ (Hegel, 1977: 19).  Hegel prefers the latter conception of negation, since the binary 
(between life and death) is not static, but mediated by desire and, therefore, refers to ‘the dialectical 
in his transcendental sense’ (Vitanza, 1997: 83). Derrida (1978b: 255-256) concludes that:  
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Through this recourse to the Aufhebung, which conserves the stakes, remains in control of 
the play, limiting it and elaborating it by giving it form and meaning (Die Arbeit… bildet), 
this economy of life restricts itself to conservation, to circulation and self-reproduction of 
meaning. 
 
It is specifically this economy that Bataille (1947) (in his engagement with Hegel) wishes to escape. 
Whereas Hegel’s position represents a totalising idealism (which manifests in the Aufhebung, and in 
the presence of meaning); Bataille’s position (although predicated on Hegel’s system) attempts to 
break out of this system, and to live in excess of death. In other words, Bataille introduces a third 
term – namely, sovereignty – which liberates itself from enslavement to meaning (to which lordship 
is bound). Sovereignty finds its expression in a radical, or absolute negativity – in ‘a negativity that 
never takes place, that never presents itself, because in doing so it would start to work again’ 
(Derrida, 1978b: 256). In living the excess of death, Bataille pulls sovereignty out of the dialectic, 
frees it from the stakes, and thereby causes a disruption that prevents the system from playing out in 
terms of the Hegelian Aufhebung. In other words, sovereignty is the singular event in which 
meaning sinks and vanishes, before being taken up again in the dialectic (255-256).  
 
Wherein does meaning sink and vanish? According to Derrida (255-256): in a burst of laughter that 
never literally appears because it exceeds the possibility of meaning. The system of the sovereign 
operation (which, according to Bataille (1947), is characterised by ‘drunkenness, erotic effusion, 
sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic behaviour, anger, absurdity’) represents the attempt to 
overcome the Hegelian system, and to engage with an excess that leads to freedom. The system of 
the sovereign operation is thus referred to as a general economy.  
 
It is noteworthy that Derrida (1978b) frames the difference between a Hegelian and Bataillian 
economy in terms of a restricted and a general economy. As discussed in the introduction of chapter 
three, Morin (2007) also uses these terms to refer to different paradigms of complexity. Whereas the 
term restricted complexity refers to complexity that can, in principle, be overcome; general 
complexity refers to a paradigm in which the term ‘complexity’ is taken seriously, hence 
necessitating an epistemological, cognitive, and paradigmatic shift in our view of knowledge. 
Applied to Derrida’s circumscription of Bataille’s sovereign operation, this means that Bataille’s 
general economy is characterised by a complexity that exceeds calculation and complete 
knowledge.  
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However, as argued in chapter three, the only way in which we can meaningfully engage with this 
complexity is to reduce it by modelling it. Thus, Derrida describes the general economy as 
something ‘totally other’ (Derrida, 1978b: 256), ‘an excess outside of reason’ (255), which never 
literally appears, because for it to be appear, it would need to be drawn back into the horizon of 
meaning and knowledge. However, despite the fact that the sovereign operation takes place beyond 
meaning, it, nevertheless, serves the important function of limiting the restricted economy, by 
making ‘the seriousness of meaning appear as an abstraction inscribed in play’ (256). The sovereign 
is the supplement, the trace, différance which prevents the Hegelian Aufhebung from playing out, 
thereby both frustrating the quest for perfect knowledge, and introducing a humility into our 
paradigms of meaning.   
 
4.2. Gift-giving: from a restricted to a general economy 
 
The idea of the restricted and general economy can also be conveyed in terms other than lordship 
and sovereignty. In Given Time (1992a), Derrida calls on the distinction between the economic and 
the an-economic – which has its origin in Aristotle’s Politics (1256a -1258b) –  in order to present 
us with another way of thinking about the differences between the restricted and general economy.  
 
In Aristotle, the sphere of the economic is the sphere of the proper or the oikos (what Derrida (1994: 
26) calls ‘la cloture économique’). It is the closed sphere of the home and the hearth, wherein a 
virtuous relation with the economic is possible. Such a virtuous relation is established through 
practicing an ‘equalising justice’ i.e. repaying good with good (Critchley, 1999b: 168). The an-
economic, on the other hand, represents the improper to ethical life i.e. money-making or 
chrematistics. This is because it refers to situation in which ‘the use value of an object has been 
exceeded by exchange value, that is to say, when the de(con)structable infiniteness of accumulation 
and desire has been introduced into the finite circle of the oikos’ (168). Once open-ended desire is 
introduced into the oikos, the calculable and symmetrical structure of an equalising justice is ruined. 
As Derrida (1992a:158-159) notes, the ethically proper is contingent upon limits, which can be 
controlled and mastered, whereas the ethically improper marks a transgression of these limits: ‘for 
Aristotle, it is a matter of an ideal and desirable limit, a limit between the limit and the unlimited, 
between the true and finite good (the economic) and the illusionary and indefinite good (the 
chrematistic)’.  
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Derrida (1992a: 158; 2002c: 321) reinscribes Aristotle’s understanding of limit and non-limit as 
‘need and desire’. Whereas our needs are limited, our desires are unlimited65. In other words, unlike 
our human needs (which can be sated), desire merely breeds desire: as soon as one desire is met, it 
is replaced by the next one. The difference between need and desire can be well-illustrated in terms 
of the difference between natural resources and money: whereas natural resources can spoil or be 
used up, ‘the fetishism of money’ (2002c: 321) overcomes these limits. For Derrida (1992a: 158) 
money (defined as the possibility of différance and credit), therefore, represents a kind of 
deconstruction: ‘As soon as there is money the oikos is opened and cannot operate its limit’.   
 
Chrematistics, as the expression of desire through the fetishism of money, therefore, ‘forms both 
the spirit of the market [l’esprit du marché] and the market spirit [l’esprit de marché]’, as Derrida 
(2002c: 321) explains in ‘On the “Priceless”’. He goes on to state that chrematistics is everything 
that infinitely exceeds ‘the limits of need, of the useful, of the natural, the reasonable, the 
calculable, the stable relation between production and consumption, between the chez soi and the 
chez l’autre’ (321). In other words, whereas the economy of the home and the hearth is intimate and 
known, the market economy is vast, and unknown, resulting in ‘consequences of the incalculable’ 
(321). 
 
One consequence resulting from the transgression of the oikos and the family is market speculation, 
which Derrida (321) defines as ‘the labor without labor of capital, the accumulation, the fetishism 
of the commodity and the monetary sign’. Whilst this is by no means a positive development, 
chrematistics, in ruining the ethicality of the proper, also creates the possibility for conceiving of an 
ethics that transcends the proper. In other words, just as the sovereign can transcend the master-
slave dialectic, in order to introduce play, possibility, and space within the system; so too 
chrematistics  (in creating infinite possibilities and incalculable consequences) offers ‘the chance 
for any kind of hospitality… the chance for the gift itself. The chance for the event.’ (Derrida, 
1992a: 158; see also: Derrida, 2002c).  
 
Critchley (1999b: 169) explains this citations as follows: money (in disrupting the restricted 
economy, or in passing beyond economic calculation) opens up the possibility for a form of an-
economic giving, for a donation without return (the opposite of ‘equalising justice’), and, therefore, 
for the possibility of the gift or of an irreducible justice. For Derrida the possibility of the gift is 
marked by its very impossibility. Following Derrida (1992a), John Caputo (1997b: 141-143) 
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 See Krell’s (1988: 7-11) text ‘Engorged philosophy: a note on Freud, Derrida, and Différance’ for a 
description of the economy of need and desire.   
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explains that within a circular economy, a gift begins to annul itself as soon as it is given, because a 
reciprocal expectation is created when I say ‘thank you’ for the gift. Gifts are, therefore, more-or-
less economic transaction, even though they do not appear as such. Pure gift-giving can only take 
place beyond intentionality, where one neither intends nor expects to give or receive a gift. Caputo 
(1997b: 144) writes that, for Derrida, the only way out of this aporia – this pollution of the gift – is 
‘to push against this limit, to transgress this boundary as far as possible, or (im)possible, to make a 
passage to the limits, to embrace this impossibility, to try to do the im-possible, which is not a 
simple logical contradiction.’ In other words, true gift-giving must take place beyond the calculable 
programme, and, therefore, within the domain of chrematistics. In this context, ‘the gift is precisely, 
and this is what it has in common with justice, something which cannot be reappropriated’ (Derrida, 
1997: 18). Elsewhere, Derrida (1992b: 25) offers the following characterisation of the structure of 
justice as gift:  
 
The “idea of justice” seems to be irreducible in its affirmative character, in its demand of 
gift without exchange, without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without 
economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without 
rationality. And so we can recognize in it, indeed accuse, identify a madness… And 
deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice. Mad about the desire for justice.   
 
4.3.  Beyond the capital-labour dialectic: CSR and the question of responsibility  
 
In returning to our discussion on CSR, we can say that – as with the introduction of the sovereign to 
the master-slave dialectic, or the introduction of chrematistics to the dialectic that governs the oikos 
– a Derridean notion of corporate responsibility can only take place in the space beyond the 
calculable programme of the capital-labour dialectic. If corporations only practice responsibility 
within the limits of the dialectic, responsibility becomes no more than the practice of corporate 
duties and responsibilities, as determined by society in exchange for certain corporate rights and 
privileges. In other words, responsibility, on this take, would be solely determined by the social 
contract – which stipulates the terms for an equalising justice or circular exchange between societal 
interest groups and economic interests groups.  
 
It is acknowledged that this view of responsibility (as an equalising or compensatory justice) 
informs the dominant understanding of responsibility in the CSR debate. However, what should be 
clear at this juncture is that Derrida has a much more radical notion of responsibility in mind – one 
that definitely introduces a new category to the CSR debate. In a nutshell, Derrida’s notion of 
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responsibility provides a challenge to ‘responsibility’ conceptualised within the framework of the 
status quo, by drawing attention to the incalculable possibilities and consequences deriving from 
different notions of responsibility. Such a reinscription of responsibility is certainly not premised on 
the idea of a common humanity, but rather represents an attempt to think beyond the possible, and 
view responsibility as a demand without exchange, without recognition, and without rules. On this 
view, responsibility becomes an expression of ethical complexity, and functions as a regulating or 
ideal concept – something which, in practice, always pushes the limits of its own expression.   
 
In order to determine what this notion of responsibility (defined as a new category in the CSR 
debate) can help us do (and do more effectively) what other available categories can’t, let us turn to 
a more in depth analysis of the Derridean view of responsibility.    
 
5. Responsibility and CSR 
 
It has been argued that Jones’s deconstruction of Friedman’s text is premised on a logocentric 
interpretation of context. However, it would be unfair to only interpret his text in terms of this 
argument. Jones’s text – especially in his careful consideration of how deconstruction is always 
already at work – shows a sensitivity for the Derridean view that there is always an excess which 
escapes the calculable programme of the restricted economy. As a starting point to the discussion on 
responsibility, we turn to Jones’s reading of a Derridean view of responsibility, in order to tease out 
what a notion of responsibility that exceeds calculation might entail. This is followed by De 
George’s critique of this circumscription of responsibility, which boils down to the charge of 
relativism. This critique is addressed at the hand of some empirical examples, which are analysed in 
order to show why Derrida’s position amounts to a modest and responsible stance, and not to a 
relativist stance.  
 
5.1. Jones reads Derrida 
 
In his discussion on responsibility, Jones (2007: 525) refers to Derrida’s book, The Gift of Death 
(1995a). Jones argues that this text draws from Emmanuel Levinas’s understanding of 
responsibility, but also constitutes a response to Levinas. The central question posed in this text is 
whom to give to? Or, which Other to respond to? Jones (2007: 525) contends that Derrida takes up, 
refines and extends the Levinasian view of responsibility as an event that calls the subject into 
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question by demanding a response to the needs of the Other66. Jones (525) states that Derrida treats 
the question of responsibility through ‘a thinking of the welcome, hospitality, and justice, and in the 
practical spheres of border control, immigration, xenophobia, war, globalization and the future of 
Europe.’ These subjects all gesture at what Jones (525) calls the general place of responsibility in 
deconstruction i.e. how one is to think of responsibility in the name of that which is still to come (in 
other words, that which lies beyond the calculable programme or the restricted economy). Jones 
(525) also speaks of the specific place of responsibility in deconstruction, with reference to 
Derrida’s ‘quasi-concepts’, which attest to responsibility. In this regard, Jones (525-526) references 
Derrida’s work on ‘the adieu, admiration, alibi, aporia, cosmopolitanism, enlightenment, Europe, 
forgiveness, friendship, hospitality, inheritance, justice, memory, mourning, paperlessness, the gift, 
the impossible, the rogue, touching.’ However, as with the subjects mentioned in relation to the 
general place of responsibility, Jones does not elaborate on what these ‘quasi-concepts’ entail.  
 
Jones (526) argues that both the general and the specific place of responsibility in deconstruction 
work to reinforce the point that ‘responsibility involves undecidability… [which] is the condition of 
possibility for ethics, politics and justice, and responsibility.’ Jones (526) continues by stating that 
‘[o]ne is only responsible when one is not sure if one has been responsible. If we have the certainty 
that we are in The Good, then it has slipped away.’ Both these citations refer to a notion of 
responsibility that escapes the dialectics of the restricted economy, where undecidability, as 
opposed to the certainty of circular exchange, determines the mode of responsible action.  Jones’s 
(526) concluding view is that ‘any conversation about responsibility [and, therefore, any 
conversation about corporate social responsibility] that failed to engage with these debates would be 
irresponsible’.  
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 Levinas understands ethics to be something prior to moral questions, and a fortiori to moral law. In other 
words, Levinas is first and foremost concerned with ‘the primordial ethical experience’ from which certain 
moral questions, maxims and judgements may be derived (Critchley, 1999a: 3). This ethical experience 
begins with recognising the otherness of the Other, which takes place in the face-to-face encounter with the 
other that serves to challenge my ‘subjecthood’ or ‘myself as ego or as subject with inalienable priority’ 
(Howells, 1998:124). It is through challenging or questioning my primacy as subject, that the face of the other 
frees me from reification, and consequently grounds the ethical (125). Levinas thus defines ethics as ‘the 
putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other’ (Levinas, 1969:43).  
However, the encounter with the face of the other is not a neutral experience of mutual confirmation and 
reciprocity, but rather an experience that both initiates and stops violence (hence, the experience places one 
in the position of the hostage). As described by Howells (1998: 125):  
the otherness of the other as free transcendent subject both arouses my hostility and is also what 
causes it to cease, in so far as the face initiates an experience of transcendence and freedom which 
commands respect for the Other. And, this respect is the primary [and immediate] imperative: the 
‘incarnation’ of non-violence. 
(The above description is taken from Vrba (Woermann), 2006: 70.)  
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5.2. De George’s critique 
 
De George (2008: 81-85) spends some time unpacking the view of responsibility sketched by Jones. 
His first point of critique is that Jones’s circumscription of a Derridean view of responsibility is not 
very helpful to the uninformed reader who is interested in CSR, and indeed, Jones perfunctory 
overview of the categories related to responsibility confirms this point. De George (81) continues 
by arguing that Jones leaves untouched a series of questions related to the notion of CSR, especially 
questions related to the interplay of responsibility, society, and the corporation. In this regard, De 
George asks whether a Derridean notion of responsibility translates into traditional moral or legal 
categories where intentional agents are causally accountable for their actions; and, if not, questions 
what a Derridean notion of responsibility amount to.  
 
More specifically, De George’s (81-82) critique is that the claims ‘responsibility involves 
undecidability’ or ‘[o]ne is only responsible when one is not sure if one has been responsible’ are 
not practically very helpful for those struggling with questions pertaining to CSR. These claims, on 
the contrary, seem to suggest that any answer to such questions would be inappropriate, since on De 
George’s (82) reading, ‘[i]t is not clear that Derrida recognizes any objectively right action, and 
hence one is always unsure because there is nothing to be sure about.’ Therefore, according to De 
George (81), a deconstructive reading of responsibility does not allow us to measure responsibility, 
to relate it to praise, blame, shame, punishment, or any other notions with which it forms a 
conceptual net. Although not explicitly stated, De George’s critique boils down to the charge of 
relativism. In this regard, consider specifically the following example used by De George (82): 
 
It appears that on Derrida’s view, if a corporate manager decides to pay much more than the 
going wage in a less developed country and to ensure safe and healthy working conditions, that 
decision is not one that the manager can feel secure is better than the alternative of running a 
sweatshop. And if he does feel secure, he is mistaken. If that is the proper conclusion, then those 
in CSR would be understandably puzzled.  
 
5.3. Counter-examples: In defence of Derrida  
 
As a counter to De George’s example – and in defence of a Derridean notion of responsibility – let 
us consider the example of labour practices and CSR as presented in a TIME article, entitled 
‘Manufacturing: the burden of good intentions’ (Power, 2008). This article addresses the issue of 
whether the same labour standards should be applied the world over. Specifically, it is argued that 
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the “comply-or-die” model to labour rights and corporate social responsibility can actually hurt 
workers. This is particularly true for workers in non-Western countries where manufacturers are 
pushed to develop products at increasing quicker and cheaper rates, whilst still maintaining Western 
standards of labour practice.  
 
Power (2008) explicitly argues that ‘living up to CSR’s high-minded ideals is proving 
extraordinarily hard in countries like China and India that are at the heart of global manufacturing.’ 
He describes how, in the face of increasing global competition, Chinese suppliers set up “five star 
factories” that comply with international labour standards, but that these factories run alongside 
“shadow” factories which operate to meet actual (often Western!) order deadlines. Citing Michael 
Kobori, head of supply chain social and environmental sustainability at Levi Strauss, Power argues 
that ‘[t]he craze for auditing has, paradoxically, led factory owners to create such [“shadow”] 
factories. It also sops up resources that could be channelled toward improving labor conditions.’  
 
Mukhtarul Amin (in Power, 2008), managing director of Superhouse Ltd., an Indian clothing 
manufacturer with clients such as Esprit and Diesl, candidly states that he, too, cannot meet all his 
CSR obligations. Some, he says, are too difficult to meet, whereas others are irrelevant for Indian 
society. One retailer expects of their suppliers to have official documentation of workers ages, but 
many rural Indians have no such documentation. Acquiring the documentation in an expensive and 
costly exercise and this eats into company profits. In order to offset these extra costs, companies 
often engage in shrewd labour practices, such as employing additional short-term workers instead of 
paying overtime.     
 
In yet another example, managers who refuse to let migrant workers, who wish to return home as 
soon as possible, work illegal overtime risk losing workers to less stringent factories (Power, 2008).  
All these examples lead Rosey Hurst, founder of Impactt, an ethical trade NGO based in London, to 
succinctly summarise the lesson that we can learn from this comparative study: ‘The world is a 
complicated place’ (Power, 2008). What these examples show is that context is important for 
understanding our responsibilities, and that one should be weary of imposing ‘universal’ notions of 
CSR on developing economies, since the effects can leave worker worse off, rather than better off.  
 
In contrast with ‘universal’ definitions, a Derridean notion of responsibility, and of a deconstructive 
ethics, focuses attention on that which has been relegated to the margins of dominant discourses. In 
other words, it demands of us to ‘reconsider in its totality the metaphysico-anthropocentric 
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axiomatic67 that dominates the thought of just and unjust’ in the West (Derrida, 1992b: 19). In this 
sense, Derrida is very cautious of the conceptual nets which De George speaks of, because in 
deciding how to measure responsibility, or how to assign praise or blame, we ‘reproduce, under the 
guise of describing [a certain ethicality] in its ideal purity, the given ethical conditions of a given 
ethics’ (Derrida, 1988a: 122).  
 
This given ethics, however, can never be equated with a universal ethics, and doing so excludes 
certain conditions no less essential to ‘this given ethics or of another, or of a law that would not 
answer to Western concepts of ethics, rights or politics’ (122). The task of deconstruction is, 
therefore, to challenge the ‘very concept of responsibility that regulates the justice and 
appropriateness (justesse) of our behaviour, of our theoretical, practical, ethico-political decisions’ 
(Derrida, 1992b: 20). Derrida (1988a: 122) further argues that in employing a deconstructive ethics, 
we not only draw attention to that which has been excluded, but we also create an opening for 
thinking anew about responsibility and the concepts related to responsibility (which, for him, 
include ‘property, intentionality, will, freedom, conscience, consciousness, self-consciousness, 
subject, self, person, community, decision, and so forth’ (Derrida, 1992b: 20)). In trying to account 
for other conditions of responsibility, one might even ‘open or recall the opening of another ethics, 
another right, another “declaration of rights,” transformation of constitutions, etc.’ (Derrida, 1988a: 
122). From the above it is clear that – far from resulting in a relativist position which allows us to 
say nothing about responsibility – Derrida’s deconstruction calls on an increase in responsibility 
(Derrida, 1992b: 20)!  
 
Again, it is useful to bear in mind the insights gleaned with regard to modelling complex systems 
(see chap. 3, sec. 6.1.). The descriptions that we accord to our models (including our models of 
CSR) are contingent on the resources at our disposal, and often reflect our prejudices and biases. As 
such, these models are unlikely to account for different conceptions of rights and responsibilities. 
Therefore, the only way in which we can do justice to different ways of being, is to subject our 
models to critical scrutiny in an attempt to recall the opening of another ethics, of which Derrida 
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 The schema Derrida is referring to here is one which privileges the man over the wife, the child over the 
animal etc. In this fraternal structure the superior term marks the higher presence, whereas the inferior term 
marks the fall or weakness.  Elsewhere, Derrida calls this schema the ‘carno-phallogocentric’ structure of 
subjectivity, in which the self-present, speaking, virile male eater of flesh is installed at the determinative 
centre of subjectivity (Derrida, 1995b: 280; Calarco, 2004: 190). The common denominator of this schema is 
the unquestioned assimilation of differences, which informs ‘the order of the political, the State, right, or 
morality’ and, therefore, subjectivity itself (Derrida, 1995b: 281). Anyone or anything that is relegated to the 
margins of this schema (including the celibate, homosexuals, femininity; or, in our example – China, India 
and Africa) will rarely be acknowledged, admitted to the head of anything (above all to the State or to the 
head of international bodies), unless somehow it lets itself be translated into this dominant schema. (The 
above description is modified from Vrba (Woermann), 2006: 77.)       
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speaks. In other words, ethics demands that we must transgress our current conceptions of CSR, and 
try to imaginatively seek out other alternatives in an attempt to enlarge our view on responsibility.  
 
De George’s attempt to define contextual differences in terms of non-moral responsibilities 
represents an effort to define a given ethics as the ethics, or the only way of being. In other words, 
De George does not take cognisance of the provisional or limited nature of our ethical models. This, 
of course, is not a new move. In ‘Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy’ Derrida (2002d: 
9) states that we should go ‘beyond the old, tiresome, worn-out, and wearisome opposition between 
Eurocentricism and anti-Eurocentricism.’ Derrida (9) argues that one way in which to achieve this 
is to ‘take into account and de-limit the assignation of philosophy to its Greco-European origin or 
memory.’ This neither means that we should reaffirm this history, nor discard of it68, but that that 
there must be: 
 
the active becoming-aware of the fact that philosophy is no longer determined by a program, 
an originary language or tongue [in De George’s terms, ‘a common humanity’] whose 
memory it would suffice to recover so as to discover its destination. Philosophy is no more 
assigned to its origin or by its origin, than it is simply, spontaneously, or abstractly 
cosmopolitical or universal…There are other ways for philosophy than those of 
appropriation or expropriation…Not only are there other ways for philosophy, but 
philosophy, if there is any such thing, is the other way (Derrida, 2002d: 10).  
 
Being attentive towards different ways of being and philosophising is not a relativist stance, but a 
modest stance, geared towards openness for otherness. As stated before, Derrida (1999: 78) firmly 
denies that he is a relativist (if by relativism, we understand a doctrine with its own history of 
denying absolutes). Derrida concedes that he refuses to reduce differences, but does not understand 
this to be an example of relativism, but rather an example of discernment. In this regard, he asks:  
 
Are you a relativist simply because you say, for instance, that the other is the other, and that 
every other is other than the other?... If I want to pay attention to the singularity of the other, the 
singularity of the situation, the singularity of language, is that relativism?’ (78).   
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 Refer to the first movement of deconstruction explained in chapter four, section 2.2.1.  
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6.  Justice, undecidability, and the relation that constitutes the ethical 
 
6.1. The figure of Hamlet 
 
Refusing to reduce differences means that we should be more vigilant with regard to how we 
philosophise about CSR and business ethics. Part of being vigilant means accepting that the 
predicates of responsibility cannot be conclusively decided upon. In other words, as cited by Jones 
(2007: 526) earlier in the analysis (sec 5.1.), ‘responsibility involves undecidability… [which] is the 
condition of possibility for ethics, politics and justice, and responsibility.’ For De George (2008), 
such an admission does not bring us closer to fulfilling our responsibilities, but instead implies that 
we are hopeless to act. For him,    ‘[t]he unsettling aspect of the act of deconstruction… is that we 
seem never to get to an answer, and that whenever we arrive at an answer we are assured that it 
must be wrong’ (82). Given this interpretation, he concludes that a deconstructive mindset ‘reduce 
those in business, who have to make decisions, or their critics, to the position of an undecided 
Hamlet.’ 
 
Ironically, it is exactly the figure of Hamlet that Derrida recalls in the opening pages of Spectres of 
Marx69. Of particular interest for Derrida is Hamlet’s feeling that ‘the time is out of joint’. Critchley 
(1999b: 156) argues that, in his analysis of Hamlet, Derrida (1994) weaves together Hamlet’s 
experience of disjuncture, with the disjuncture of the ethical relation in Levinas, as well as with 
Martin Heidegger’s meditation on time and justice. According to Critchley (1999b: 156-157), 
Derrida is attempting to show that the disjuncture, which Heidegger associates with calculative, 
metaphysical and deconstructive notions of law, cannot be neutralised. Contrary to how Heidegger 
would have it, there can be no presencing of the present in terms of a jointure or a donation of time, 
in which we experience the phenomenality of the being of beings as disclosure or unconcealment of 
what is present. The moment of justice as an event cannot come into presence (be present) in a 
manner that disrupts the flow of time. The reason for this is that this Heideggerian conception of 
justice demands absolute symmetry or the revelation of the proper of the other as presence (Derrida, 
1994: 27). For Derrida, the moment of justice resides in the disjoint, in the disjuncture of the ethical 
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 In his article ‘The end of history, spectres of Marx and business ethics’, Kerlin (1998: 1721) states that just 
as Hamlet curses his fate for being born into a certain time, and for having to do the work of mourning and 
pay the debts left to him by his spectral father, so too, Marx was haunted by ghosts.  Marx’s texts are 
deconstructive in the sense that they show respect for a logic of spectrality. In this regard, Derrida writes that 
(1994: 92) deconstruction proceeds ‘in a certain spirit of Marxism.’  However, he also argues that Marx 
wanted to exorcise the phantoms and spectres, in order to free philosophy and consciousness of the illusions 
(particularly the illusionary spectrality of religion) to which they had been historically subjected, and to bring 
them back to the world of labour, production and exchange (Critchley, 1999b: 145-146; Derrida, 1994: 170). 
As such, the Marxist project remains ‘pre-deconstructive’ (Derrida, 1994: 170).  
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relation with the Other. Justice as disjuncture, rather than ‘justice under the sign of presence’ (27), 
is the very ‘condition for the presencing of the present’. Justice (and, responsible action, as an 
instance of justice) cannot be assembled into a totality: it can only be experienced in the singularity 
and asymmetry of the event i.e. in the face-to-face encounter with the Other.    
 
De George (2008:84) argues that Derrida (in appropriating Levinas’s understanding of the ethical 
relation) supports a reforming notion of ethics, which is completely altruistic or other-orientated 
(and which, as we saw from the previous discussion, is premised on the logic of chrematistics or the 
general economy). De George (2008: 84) contends that ‘[c]ommutative justice [thus far referred to 
as an equalising justice], which involves exchanging equals for equals, has no place here’. In other 
words, De George’s contention is that there is no place for the oikos or the restricted economy in a 
Derridean notion of responsibility. Whilst he finds Derrida’s radical views on ethics laudable, he 
argues that it certainly does not constitute our ordinary understanding of ethics. This, he argues, 
forces us to ask: 
 
what is the relation that we previously thought constituted the ethical? Do we have to give it 
up? Do we rename it? Or contrary-wise, why not retain the term ‘ethics’ for the traditional 
meaning and call this new reformed relation by some other name, for instance, what is 
ordinarily thought of as an unconditional relation of love for another? (84)    
 
If Derrida is truly proposing a notion of ethics as an unconditional relation of love to a singular 
other, one may well ask (along with De George) what such a view could mean for the practice of 
business ethics generally, and CSR specifically? In other words, the question is: how is ethical 
action in business possible given the fact that justice and responsibility (as a relation to the Other) 
remain irreducible, undecidable, and non-subsumptive? In order to show why this characterisation 
of responsibility does not leave us impotent to act, we turn to a more detailed discussion of 
Derrida’s understanding of justice, law, and action. The discussion proceeds at the hand of his 
illuminating text entitled: ‘Force of Law: “The Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ (1992b). This 
discussion is followed by a response to De George, in which it is argued that heeding to the call of 
justice does indeed necessitate that one takes cognisance of the undecidability that marks the heart 
of responsibility, but that this view of justice cannot excuse one from taking action.  
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6.2. Unpacking Derrida’s understanding of justice 
 
Justice, Derrida (1992b: 17), argues is incalculable and ‘must always concern singularity, 
individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation.’ In 
contrast to the incalculability of justice, ‘law is the element of calculation’; it is the ‘rule, norm, 
value or the imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form’ (16; 17). Whereas law is 
deconstructable, justice is not, which also means that justice is impossible; or, ‘an experience of the 
impossible’ (16). This is what Jones (2007) means when he says one can only be responsible if one 
is not sure whether one has been responsible.  
 
As stated before, De George’s (2008: 82) interpretation of this statement is that it seems as if 
Derrida does not recognise objectively right actions and, therefore, one can never be sure of 
anything, including whether to judge when a moral risk has paid off or not. De George (83) 
criticises this viewpoint with reference to the 2005 book For Business Ethics by Jones, Parker and 
ten Bos. He argues that, despite claiming not to know what justice is, Jones and his co-authors can 
confidently discern between just and unjust actions and ‘somehow they, like the rest of us know that 
stealing from pension funds, false accounting, sweatshop labour, manipulative marketing, and a 
host of other practices are wrong’. How is it possible to condemn these practices whilst claiming 
that justice is an experience of the impossible?  
 
For Derrida, justice is a limit concept: it functions as a regulative ideal and thus is ‘quasi’ or ‘ultra-
transcendental’. In ‘As if it were Possible, “within such limits”...’, Derrida (2002b: 354) discusses 
the role of the quasi-transcendental in his work. On the one hand, the use of the quasi-
transcendental is a way of saving the legacy of philosophy, which we cannot do without (including 
all our metaphysical notions such as the a priori, origin, or foundation). On the other hand, 
however, the quasi-transcendental is a way of ‘rethinking the meaning of the “possible,” as well as 
the “impossible,” and to do so in terms of the so-called condition of possibility, often shown to be 
the “condition of impossibility”’ (354) (see chap. 4, sec. 3.2.). The status of justice as a quasi-
transcendental concept safeguards justice as a regulative ideal by reinscribing it as something that 
can only take place in a unique situation (the condition of possibility).  
 
Justice can never be encapsulated in a rule or norm (the condition of impossibility). However, 
justice also needs rules. As Derrida (1999: 72) puts it: ‘Justice requires the law. You can’t simply 
call for justice without trying to embody justice in the law.’ Therefore, justice demands that we 
interpret and judge the rules that we apply, each time we apply them. In this regard, Derrida (1992b: 
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23) writes: ‘No exercise of justice as law can be just unless there is a “fresh judgement”’, which 
means that we must take responsibility for the rules that we employ. Justice cannot amount to the 
application of a rule (a position known in law as ‘legal positivism’), since in such circumstances, 
there is no responsible action. It is useful to think of Derrida’s conception of justice as constituting 
an expression of ethical complexity. Since we cannot understand complexity in its fullness, we are 
forced to reduce it through modelling. Our models of justice, therefore, constitute law. Although we 
try to remain faithful to this ethical complexity, law is always a partial and incomplete model of 
justice, and must, therefore, continually be revised. In the following chapter (sec. 2.2.), the 
methodological complexity involved in thinking about limit concepts is explained from the 
viewpoint of open systems, which helps one in thinking through ‘the self-contradictory relation of 
unrevisable separation and permanent provocation’ (Teubner, 2001: 42) between limit concepts 
(such as justice) and immanent concepts (such as law), or between the environment and the system.  
 
If we translate Derrida’s discussion of justice and law into the language of business ethics, we can 
say that ethics and responsible action can never simply be encapsulated in codes and CSR 
statements. Although business ethics tools are useful in helping us to think through our 
responsibilities, they cannot be blindly applied. Doing so will result in ethical positivism (which is 
akin to legal positivism), and which results in a type of procedural ethics that, as argued in chapter 
one (sec. 4.1.4.), robots can learn and copy (Adorno, 1973). Ethical action (like justice) is only 
possible when we take responsibility for our decisions. This also means that responsibility must be 
assumed anew every time a decision is made or an action taken. Responsibility (like justice) is, 
therefore singular, and is something that manifests in the event.  
 
6.3. A Derridean response to De George 
 
From the above we can deduce that De George (2008: 84) is correct in stating that for Derrida, ‘one 
cannot simply be following a rule’. One has to choose whether to follow the rule or not. De George 
(84), however, argues that this account of responsible action is at odds with the phenomenology of 
our moral experience, and for this reason he supports an Aristotelian analysis, where one acts 
virtuously because one has developed the habit of acting virtuously. The difference between De 
George and Derrida is, therefore, that, for the former, responsible action is embodied in the rule 
(which we, as moral agents, then freely apply); whereas for the latter responsible action resides in 
the choice or decision of whether to follow the rule or not.  
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Although De George does not spell out the reasons for why merely following the rule accords better 
with our moral experiences, the answer presumably lies in some argument pertaining to our 
common human morality and our bounded rationality. But, it is precisely because we are boundedly 
rational, and because the world is a determinate place, that we have to go through what Derrida 
(1999: 66) calls ‘the terrible process of undecidability’. Derrida’s treatment of the question of 
‘undecidability’ (which so many of his critics confuse with ‘indeterminacy’) amounts to an 
acknowledgement of our limitations and of our inability to reconcile conflicting demands, rather 
than paralysis when faced with a decision. Derrida writes that those critics who charge him with 
saying that the text means anything70, usually betray an anxiety with regard to the fact that ‘texts 
may call for interpretation… there may be some complication in a text’ (79). With regard to the text 
(and, therefore, also with regard to context, and differences in and between contexts) Derrida (79) 
writes: 
 
I would say that the text is complicated, there are many meanings struggling with one 
another, there are tensions, there are overdeterminations, there are equivocations; but this 
doesn’t mean that there is indeterminacy. On the contrary, there is too much determinacy. 
That is the problem.   
 
We experience undecidability when confronted with a problem where ‘I know that the two 
determined solutions are as justifiable as one another’ and I must make a decision which is 
‘heterogeneous to the space of knowledge’ (66). Real choice (and hence, autonomy) is, therefore, 
always constrained by what Morin (2008) calls the hazards of existence. As will be described in 
more detail in the following chapter (sec. 4.2.2.), autonomy should be conceived ‘not in opposition 
to, but in complementarity with, the idea of dependence’ (114). Complexity is the outcome of 
freedom and structure (see chap. 3, sec. 5.2.2.), and it is these elements that, together, constitute the 
process of undecidability, which guards against the decision being reduced to the mere application 
of a rule.  
 
Derrida (1999: 66) states that ‘[e]thics and politics, therefore, starts with undecidability.’  The 
ethical moment, is the precise moment where, after I have ‘prepared as far as possible by 
knowledge, by information, by infinite analysis’ (66) I must go beyond knowledge, and act71.  For 
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 In this regard, consider again de George’s (2008: 82) interpretation of a deconstructive notion of 
responsibility: ‘It is not clear that Derrida recognizes any objectively right action, and hence one is always 
unsure because there is nothing to be sure about.’ 
71
 Derrida (1999: 67) warns that it is never ‘I’ who acts, but rather the other in me who must make the 
decision, because ‘as soon as I know that ‘I’ am the master of my decision, I am claiming that I know what to 
do and that everything depends on my knowledge, which in turn cancels the decision.’  
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this reason, the distinction between good and evil (i.e. ethics) cannot depend on knowledge: ‘we 
should not know, in terms of knowledge, what is the distinction between good and evil’ (66).  
Returning to the figure of Hamlet in Spectres of Marx, Derrida writes: ‘if we assume that Hamlet is 
a figure of paralysis or neurosis because of undecidability, he might also be a paradigm for action: 
he understands what actions should be and he undergoes the process of undecidability at the 
beginning’ (68). The cybernetician, Hans von Foerster (1990), makes a similar point in his 
discussion on undecidable questions (see chap. 6, sec. 4.2.2.), stating that ‘[o]nly those questions 
that are in principle undecidable, we can decide’ (italicised in the original).   
 
Therefore, to reiterate: in order for there to be an ethical relation, a decision must be taken. We 
cannot just follow a rule or a programme. In response to De George’s questions posed at the end of 
section 6.1.72, one can argue that the confrontation with the Other (as a moment of decision and of 
justice) is the ethical relation, and that which is traditionally thought to constitute the ethical (i.e. a 
commutative or equalising conception of ‘justice’) are the rules, norms, and calculations that 
precede the ethical moment. We, therefore, need give nothing up (as De George maintains), for, as 
Derrida argues, calculation is necessary; law is necessary; substantive ethical theories are necessary; 
but, these tools can never give us ethics. Decision and judgement is needed for responsible action to 
occur. Responsibility means assuming responsibility and taking a decision in the face of the 
undecidable.  
 
7. Judging action and taking action73 
 
Two questions arise from Derrida’s description of the terrible process of undecidability: firstly, if 
our decisions can only be undertaken beyond knowledge, how can we judge the truth of our 
decisions?  For De George (2008:84) the ‘Derridean’ answer to this question is that we can’t 
because ‘[n]either a corporation’s actions nor the actions of individuals acting for a corporation fall 
under any ethical rules’.  
 
Secondly, how are we to understand ethics and politics, especially given Derrida’s Levinasian 
understanding of responsibility? Here, De George (82) specifically argues that the ethical relation 
(typified by the meeting with the singular Other) cannot readily be applied to a business context. 
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 The question referred to is the following: ‘What is the relation that we previously thought constituted the 
ethical? Do we have to give it up? Do we rename it? Or contrary-wise, why not retain the term ‘ethics’ for the 
traditional meaning and call this new reformed relation by some other name, for instance, what is ordinarily 
thought of as an unconditional relation of love for another? (De George, 2008: 84).    
73
 See chapter six, section 2.1. for a more in depth discussion on the possibility of ethical judgement and 
action.  
184 
 
The reason for this is that the Levinasian view of responsible is applicable only between 
individuals, and that ‘[t]he task of CSR is a different task, namely influencing those in business to 
act in a way that is more positive in its effects on human beings, on the environment, on the 
common good than is often the case’ (82). De George’s argument is that if the ethical relation is 
constituted by the meeting with the singular other, then the term business ethics becomes an 
oxymoron (84). This is because the ethical relation is incompatible with the logic of organisations, 
defined as profit-seeking entities.  
 
If De George’s responses to these two questions do indeed constitute a valid interpretation and 
critique of the Derridean perspective, then he is right in claiming that Derrida’s ideas hold limited 
applicability to business. For this reason, it is necessary to turn to what Derrida has to say about 
these two issues. In the sections to follow, it will firstly be shown that although a deconstructive 
ethics confronts us with a modest position, this certainly does not mean that our evaluation of 
decisions and actions are not subject to rules, standards, or norms. Rather, the point is merely that 
these evaluative categories cannot be exhausted in terms of their conceptual content. Secondly, it 
will be argued that the ethical relation with the singular Other is always interrupted by a third. In 
practice, the ethical relation is always accompanied by a political dimension, which disrupts the 
ethical moment, and which demands business strategy and institutionalisation. As such, both De 
George’s criticisms are overcome.  
 
7.1. ‘This definition of the deconstructionist is false… and feeble’74  
 
With regard to the first question (namely, how can we judge the truth of our decisions?), De George 
interprets Derrida’s focus on individual judgement (as a necessary condition for ethics) as an 
argument against rules75. However, such an interpretation relies on a misreading of Derrida.  In 
response to this line of critique, Derrida argues that we need laws, rules, and norms. In fact, the 
deconstructable nature of law is exactly that which gives meaning to law or to our concepts (moral 
or otherwise). Concerning the structural conditions of concepts, Derrida (1988a: 117) writes: ‘Every 
concept that lays claim to any rigor whatsoever implies the alternative of “all or nothing.”… It is 
impossible or illegitimate to form a philosophical concept outside this logic of all or nothing.’ In 
other words, every time I utter a word or a phrase, I do so at the exclusion of all other words and 
phrases. Even vague statistical approaches cannot overcome this problem: relativism (as a concept) 
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 Derrida, 1988a: 146. 
75
 In this regard, consider the following statement: ‘Because [Derrida] questions foundationalism in any 
aspect of thought, he questions the foundations of morality… Yet how we as individuals or as a society or as 
the totality of humankind are to think about and decide upon what is right and what is wrong, and what these 
terms mean, remain problematic’ (De George, 2008: 83).   
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is just as determinate in its logic as absolutism (as concept) is. This is the nature of conceptual 
language: it is determined by rules and laws, and moreover, Derrida uses this example to show that 
the law is often enabling: we need law. ‘[T]he essence of law is not necessarily tied to negativity 
(prohibition, repression, etc.)’76 (133).  
 
However, the task of deconstruction is to challenge law in the name of justice and ethics. This is 
also not to say that our challenge to concepts of law, social responsibility, or business ethics cannot 
be a strong challenge. Derrida is quite clear in stating that deconstruction does not claim that there 
is no better or worse. In this context, consider the following citation, also taken from the 
‘Afterword’ (146), where Derrida responds to his critics’ charge of relativism: 
 
For of course there’s a “right track’ [une “bonne voie”], a better way, and let it be said in 
passing how surprised I have often been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my 
humour, by the use or abuse of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to 
say, isn’t it, the sceptical-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the 
unity of meaning, in intention or “meaning-to-say,” how can he demand of us that we read him 
with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand of us that his text be interpreted 
correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified, deformed it, 
etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer 
is simple enough: this definition of the deconstructionist is false (that’s right: false, not true) and 
feeble; it supposes a bad (that’s right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first 
of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread. Then perhaps it will be understood 
that the power and truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed 
in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And 
within interpretative contexts… that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently unshakable, it 
should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good 
faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism and pedagogy.  
 
This citation has been quoted at length in order to again make it clear that Derrida is not against 
rules, standards or norms. He merely wishes to challenge these rules and norms, in order to 
reinscribe truth in ‘more powerful, larger and more stratified contexts’. The deconstructionist is, 
therefore, intimately involved with truth, which Derrida (1999: 77) defines as ‘the quality of a 
statement, a judgement or an intuition related to something which you might call a fact, but truth is 
not reality’. The search for a better truth is not a search for absolutes or a pure science, but a way of 
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 In this regard, Derrida (1988a: 132) offers the example of a traffic light: ‘A red light is not repressive.’ 
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taking into account difference (79), or with ‘negotiating with alterity’ (Wood, 1999: 109).  In this 
regard, the Derridean scholar, David Wood (110) writes that ‘deconstruction “itself” and, indeed, 
the concept of “responsibility,” to which Jacques Derrida has recently given so much weight, are 
each nothing other than experience regained. Deconstruction is, if you like, the experience of 
experience.’  
 
In this sense, Derrida’s project – which focuses on different (better) ways of being – is at odds with 
De George’s way of doing business ethics, which is essentially a way of downplaying differences in 
the name of a common ethical experience, or a common moral foundation. Derrida (1999: 74) 
readily admits that his is a ‘poor work’ when it comes to spelling out ‘this is what you have to 
know’ or ‘this is what you have to do’. But the important point to understand here is that this does 
not imply that we can’t know or do anything. Wood (1999: 105) confirms this when he writes that 
‘[w]e owe to concepts like “justice,” “rights,” “duty,” “virtue,” “good,” “responsibility,” and 
“obligation,” our capacity for ethical judgement’ but warns that ‘the work of clarifying and 
codifying the scope and significance of these terms is the source of another danger – the calculation 
of our responsibility, in which the ethical as an openness to the incalculable is extinguished.’ 
 
To guard against this, we must deconstruct and employ the logic of terms such as différance, 
iterability, supplement etc. We do this not in the name of relativism or indeterminacy, but in the 
name of ethics, and when we do this, Derrida (1988a: 117) argues that ‘it is better to make explicit 
in the most conceptual, rigorous, formalizing, and pedagogical manner possible the reasons one has 
for doing so, for thus changing the rules and the contexts of discourse.’   
 
7.2. The aporia of hospitality: the interplay of infinite vigilance and urgent action  
 
To deconstruct in the name of the ethics, also means to deconstruct in the name of someone. This is 
the double-logic of pure hospitality, which consists in: 
 
welcoming whoever arrives before imposing any conditions on him, before knowing and 
asking anything at all, be it a name or an identity ‘paper’. But it supposes also that one 
address him, singularly, that he be called therefore, and that he be understood to have a 
proper name: “You, what is your name?”’ (Derrida, 2005: 7).  
 
As we have seen, the second part of this double movement – i.e. addressing the singular other – 
presents a problem for business ethics. How can those who practice business ethics (and aim to 
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ensure that business has good effects on others) account for the singular other? In De George’s 
(2008: 84) words: ‘Speaking of a corporation opening itself up to the Other makes little sense.’  
In order to explore this question, let us return to Derrida’s understanding of justice (as responsibility 
for, and to, the singular Other). We take, as a starting point, Critchley’s (1999b: 83-105) chapter on 
deconstruction and pragmatism, in which he questions whether Derrida is a private ironist or a 
public liberal77. Richard Rorty (1989) argues that despite attempts by Platonists, Christians, 
Marxists, and Kantians to reconcile the private and public domains, they remain theoretically 
irreconcilable. In other words – and as an example – self-actualisation, self-interest, and personal 
autonomy are fundamentally incompatible with justice, charity, and love for one’s neighbour 
(Critchley, 1999b: 85). Whereas the ironist ‘faces up to the contingency of their most central beliefs 
and desires’, the liberal is someone who is appalled by human suffering and cruelty. The heroine, 
for Rorty, is the figure of the liberal ironist: ‘someone who is committed to social justice and 
appalled by cruelty, but who recognizes that there is no metaphysical foundation to her concern for 
justice’ (85).    
 
Critchley’s (1999b: 98) hypothesis is that if we accept Rorty’s definition of the public domain and if 
‘deconstruction is ethical in the peculiarly Levinasian sense… then deconstruction would be 
concerned with the suffering of other human beings and would therefore qualify as public by 
Rorty’s criteria.’ In other words, it is precisely because deconstruction is concerned with the 
irreducibility of the ethical relation that it has significant practical consequences78. Critchley, 
however, argues that Derrida understands justice in an ethical (as opposed to a political) sense, but 
that this understanding doesn’t make justice apolitical. To explain this, it is necessary to follow 
Critchley (99) in his analysis of the Levinasian understanding of justice.  
 
In Totalité et Infini, justice functions as a synonym for ethics, understood as ‘la relation avec 
autrui’ (the relation with the other) (Levinas, 1990: 62). It is this specific understanding of justice 
that Derrida (1992b: 22) refers to in ‘Force of Law’. However, in his later works, Levinas 
differentiates between this understanding of justice and justice as distinguished from the ethical 
                                                    
77
 The categories of ‘private ironist’ and ‘public liberal’ are used by Richard Rorty (1989) to designate the 
private and public spheres.  
78
 Although Critchley (1999b) makes a convincing argument, which has interesting implications for this 
analysis, it is doubtful that Derrida would accept the distinctions that Rorty employs. In ‘Negotiations’, Derrida 
(2002a: 31) explicitly states that ‘I do not believe in the radical distinction between public and private.’ In 
speaking of negotiation (which is intimately tied to deconstruction (16)) Derrida (17) writes:  
Negotiation is constantly in a state of micro-transformation. Every day: this means it does not stop. 
This also means that between politics – that is, public life – and private life (interests, desires, etc.) 
the communication is never broken. I do not believe in the conceptual value of a rigorous distinction 
between the private and the public... In what I write one should be able to perceive that the boundary 
between the autobiographical and the political is subject to a certain strain.  
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relation. Critchley (1999b: 100) paraphrases Levinas’s understanding of justice in Autrement 
qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (1974) as a question that ‘arises when a third party arrives on the 
scene, obliging one to choose between competing ethical claims and reminding one that the ethical 
relation is always already situated in a specific socio-political context.’ The reason why Critchley 
claims that Derrida accepts an ethical (as opposed to political) notion of justice is because, for 
Derrida, the experience of justice (or ethics) cannot be encapsulated in law. Justice is the moment of 
the decision, or, following Søren Kierkegaard, the madness of the decision (Derrida, 1992b: 26). 
However, once the decision is made and the action undertaken, we enter into the realm of politics 
(which is also the realm of the institution, law or policy).  
 
In ‘Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility’, Derrida (1999: 68-69) elaborates on his understanding 
of the ethical relation. He argues that the face of the third does not appear after the confrontation 
with the face of the Other. The face of the third ‘is already involved in the face to face relation as a 
call for justice.’ The face of the third destroys the asymmetrical, but dual, relation that I experience 
in my confrontation with the Other. This forces me to abandon my unconditional concerns for the 
Other and engage in comparison and rationality (in other words, I must return to calculation). 
However, no amount of calculation can resolve this aporia. In the moment of the decision, I have to 
pass beyond knowledge. The ethical relation, therefore, means that ‘I have a relation to the other in 
his/her singularity or uniqueness, and at the same time the third one is already in place. The second 
one is a third one. ‘You are a third one’, that is the condition of justice’ (69). On this reading, it is 
not a matter of choosing between an ethical and a political notion of justice. For justice to take 
place, I must be both ethical and political, even though I destroy the very conditions of justice in the 
moment of justice; or, in the words of Spivak (1994: 22): ‘Responsibility annuls the call to which it 
seeks to respond.’ 
 
This implies that De George’s concern that Derrida collapse ethics into a unconditional, but 
impotent, relation of love for the other is invalid, because the third always intervenes, thereby 
politicising the ethical. The implication that this holds for our understanding of CSR is that we have 
to grapple with the contesting and irreconcilable demands of stakeholder groups – each of which 
make unique and singular claims upon the organisation. However, we cannot grapple with these 
claims indefinitely. At some point, management must decide (and decide as responsibly as possible) 
which claims will be honoured and how – even though this decision might constitute a denial of 
other claimants’ demands. This is the impossible nature of ethics and politics. Even if we 
acknowledge that value judgements and choices are involved in our decisions, this 
acknowledgement is not enough to guarantee that good will come from what we do, for the simple 
189 
 
reason that we do not carry full knowledge of the complexity of the situation (Preiser & Cilliers, 
2010: 269).  
 
In ‘Ethics and Politics Today’, Derrida (2002e: 296; 302) identifies the following determinants of 
ethics and politics: firstly, ethical and political responsibility commands action. Secondly, both 
demand a thoughtful answer to the question ‘What should I do?’ – A questioning without limit 
(which implies vigilance to the question). Thirdly, both ethics and politics demand that we make the 
decision with the utmost urgency and haste. The time of reflection is always interrupted by a 
situation. In short, the relation between a here and now are the common requisites of both ethics and 
politics. The double-bind of ethics and politics is, therefore, not urgency against non-urgency, but 
urgency against urgency (300). This double-bind also provides the impetus for the critical 
enterprise. It is precisely because we have to act despite the complexity, that the critical task is so 
important.  
 
In ‘Negotiations’, Derrida (2002a: 29) states that the infinite task of deconstruction, as negotiation, 
is ‘a work of mediation... a to-and-fro between impatience and patience.’  Here, impatience and 
patience are synonyms for urgency and vigilance, and Derrida warns that we need both – not in 
small measures, but we need them absolutely. Hence, vigilance/urgency and patience/impatience 
represents another aporia or double-bind, which we cannot do without. Spivak (1994: 26) sums up 
this point as follows: responsible thought describes responsibility – ‘caught in a question 
necessarily begged in action’ – as attending the call of the irreducible contamination of 
responsibility. Deconstruction positions itself in the fold of this aporia, or between, what Derrida 
(2002a: 25) call earlier on in this text, ‘affirmation’ and ‘position’. It is also here that we find one of 
Derrida’s strongest calls for political action: 
 
One must not be content with affirmation. One needs position. That is, one must create 
institutions. Therefore, one needs position. One needs a stance. Thus, negotiation, at this 
particular moment, does not simply take place between affirmation and negation, position 
and negation: it takes place between affirmation and position, because the position threatens 
the affirmation. That is to say that in itself institutionalization in its very success threatens 
the movement of unconditional affirmation. And yet this needs to happen, for if the 
affirmation were content to... wash its hand of the institution in order to remain at a distance, 
in order to say, “I affirm, and then the rest is of no interest to me, the institutions does not 
interest me... let the other take care of that,” them this affirmation would deny itself, it 
would not be an affirmation. Any affirmation, any promise in its very structure requires its 
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fulfilment. Affirmation requires a position. It requires that one move to action and that one 
do something, even if it is imperfect (25-26; my italics).  
 
De George’s concern is that in attending to the call of the Other, a Derridean notion of 
responsibility cannot further the task of CSR, which (to his mind) is to act in a way that is more 
positive in its effects on human beings, on the environment, and on the common good than is often 
the case. However, what the above discussion implies in that, in order to serve the good (the 
common good) we cannot escape this singularity, even though the singularity is always transgressed 
by a situation. De George is correct in thinking that Derrida expects the impossible, because, in 
order for an event to take place or to be possible – in order for there to be something like 
responsibility – it has to be ‘the coming of the impossible’ (Derrida, 2002b: 361). The im-possiblity 
of possibility is not only negative or dialectical; rather, as Derrida (361) qualifies, ‘it introduces the 
possible; it is its gatekeeper today.’  
 
Wood’s (1999: 117) understanding of Derrida’s notion of responsibility sheds light on the meaning 
of this last statement: responsibility ‘is not quantifiable (or even inquantifiably) large and, 
therefore, not a basis of guilt through failure to live up to it. It is rather a recursive modality, an 
always renewable openness.’ Here again, we can refer back to the critical enterprise. Since we do 
not have a bird’s eye view on reality, we need to continually engage with complexity, take 
cognisance of our models, and acknowledge when these models are in need of revision and 
transformation. To reiterate the words of Preiser and Cilliers (2010: 274): ‘The ethics of complexity 
is thus radically or perpetually ethical.’ De George’s (2008: 84) objects that Derrida’s view of 
responsibility means that companies must ‘open themselves up to hospitality and risk being taken 
advantage of by anyone who chooses to do so.’ To this we can respond with Wood’s (1999: 117) 
words: ‘Openness does not require that one leaves the door open, but that one is always willing to 
open the door. Responsibility then is the experience of that openness.’ A Derridean notion of 
responsibility, therefore, corresponds with the normative implications of critical complexity, which 
– to recall (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 274) – ‘tells us that ethics will be involved, but does not tell us 
what that ethics actually entails.’ 
 
8. Corporate social responsibility in practice: the timely relevance of Jacques Derrida  
 
In this final section, a summary is provided of the major arguments presented in this chapter, in 
order to show why Derrida does indeed introduce new categories that can be applied to CSR and to 
business ethics. Moreover, it will be shown why these categories are more effective in helping us to 
191 
 
navigate through some of the issues that arise in the context of CSR. The complexity-points, which 
were alluded to during the course of this chapter, and which will be expounded upon in the next 
chapter, are also briefly mentioned in this section. The section proceeds with summaries of the main 
objections against a deconstructive ethics that were presented in this chapter, each of which is then 
briefly responded to.  
 
i) Derrida’s philosophy would hold more appeal for business ethicists and practitioners if his 
texts stated clearly what they mean, and if he presented clear arguments in support of his 
claims. 
 
In response to this type of question, Derrida writes (1988a:119): ‘If things were simple, word 
would’ve gotten around’. Derrida warns against those who wish to simplify at all costs. He calls 
such people ‘dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists’ (119). In chapter two, Cilliers (2005) 
was quoted as saying that if we accept the fact that the world is complex, then we need to 
demonstrate the difficulties that we are in, also in the way in which we talk about them. To fail to 
do so is not only a technical failure, but also a moral failure. Technically-speaking, language is 
constituted by the dynamic play of differences, which gives rise to complexity, implying that no 
matter how hard we try, we cannot completely map-out meaning. Morally-speaking, this means that 
we cannot fully control the meaning of our utterances, nor account for differences excluded from 
our specific, limited, and, hence, violent positions.  
 
Taking cognisance of complexity, therefore, demands that we engage with the limitations and 
consequences of our concepts and paradigms, including the paradigm of CSR. CSR is a complex 
phenomenon, as demonstrated by Jones’s (2007) assertion that the current and urgent global 
struggles is testimony of the fact that we do not know what it might mean to live or work in a free 
economy or society. One way to acknowledge the trouble that we are in is through our discourse, 
even though this discourse is itself impure and impregnated with some of the most difficult and 
pressing ethico-political questions of our times, as will be discussed in chapter six (sec. 3.2.).   
  
ii) Derrida’s writings are so puzzling and confusing that they are unlikely to add to the debate 
on CSR, which is currently characterised by arguments which have been developed along 
historical, justificatory, and critical lines.  
 
Despite the amount of scholarship dedicated to developing our notions of CSR, there is still little 
clarity on what CSR should entail. This is confirmed by De George’s (2008: 83) statement that ‘[t]o 
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the extent that it has had any success in improving the lot of human beings, CSR is a positive force 
in the business arena, even if poorly understood by its practitioners, even if rife with irresolvable 
conflicts, and even if it is always under the process of deconstructing itself.’ Instead of applauding 
our successes and continuing on the same trajectory, it is time (now more so then ever before) to 
move beyond our current conceptions of CSR in a bid to reinscribe our understanding of CSR in 
larger, more powerful, and more stratified contexts (Derrida, 1988a), in an attempt to move towards 
a better future.  Derrida’s deconstructive ethics goes a long way towards providing us with tools for 
achieving this goal. In the next chapter, the idea of transgressing current modes of thinking, whilst 
simultaneously remaining critical of the provisionality of one’s own position is elaborated upon.   
 
iii) If Derridean scholars advocate reinscribing CSR in a manner that requires us to accept 
formulations such as ‘one is only responsible when one is not sure if one is being 
responsible’; ‘responsibility involves undecidability’; or, ‘ethics is the experience of the 
impossible’, then business practitioners are in danger of developing an ‘anything goes’ 
approach to their corporate social responsibilities. 
 
Derrida is not against employing ethical tools (including codes, normative theories, and governance 
reports – all of which advance responsible corporate actions). His concern is that an over-reliance 
on business ethics tools can numb the moral impulse to the extent that one forgets that ethics 
demands decision-making, and that each decision must be taken anew to account for the specificity 
of the situation. Derrida (1999) is not for relativism; rather, he is against conceptions of ethics that 
close us off to other ways of being. This represents a modest perspective, the importance of which 
is well-illustrated in the example of labour practices (Power, 2008) mentioned earlier in the analysis 
(see sec. 5.3.). In this regard, it is useful to also mention the case of Enron. Enron was awarded by 
the business community for its ethical behaviour and full compliance with all their explicit ethical 
requirements (Sims & Brinkmann, 2003: 243). Here are two good examples for why ethical tools 
cannot replace judgement. Responsibility cannot be embodied in a rule otherwise CSR is reduced to 
an expression of ethical positivism.  
 
In order to be ethical one must assume responsibility for one’s decisions, even when this means 
confronting certain difficult choices, where no single option presents one with the ‘correct’ choice. 
Hence, the characterisation of ethics as an experience of the impossible: ethics can only ever find its 
expression in the irreducible singularity that characterises the moment of the decision. This, as will 
be illustrated in chapter six, is no easy feat, since ethics and responsibility not only require self-
awareness, vigilance, and innovation in thought and action, but also mutual acceptance, trust, and 
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tolerance of viewpoints other than one’s own. These virtues are typically the character traits 
embodied by those who realise that rules cannot account for all the different possibilities of what it 
means to be human.   
 
iv) If ethical decision-making demands that one confronts the insolvable impasse, which 
characterise the moment of the decision, it is likely that the decision-maker will be reduced 
to an ‘undecided Hamlet’. 
 
The ethical moment, on a Derridean interpretation, is characterised by asymmetry. If we cannot 
assimilate the other into our existing frames of meaning, then the ethical moment will involve a 
measure of disjuncture and undecidability. But such a moment is also the moment of vigilance. In 
today’s global world, our actions have far-reaching effects, many of which can only be determined 
retrospectively. Yet, in acting, we are also responsible for the consequences that our decisions have 
for distant and unseen stakeholders. To limit the notion of responsibility to only account for those 
who are well-represented in our conceptual schema, is to ignore all those who fall to the margins of 
the dominant discourse. This includes those disenfranchised stakeholders who do not necessarily 
have the economic clout or the social support systems to make their voices heard. As such, the over-
determinations (i.e. the tensions and the competing interests) with which we have to grapple in 
order to be responsible, call for interpretation and imagination. A measure of undecidability is 
essential for ethical decision-making. In this sense, Derrida (1999) argues that Hamlet is the 
paradigm for action, because he understands what actions should be and goes through the process of 
undecidability. However, it must also be noted that undecidability can never be used as an argument 
for inaction. A similar argument will be made in the next chapter, at the hand of an analysis of the 
cybernetician, von Foerster’s, undecidable questions. With the help of Morin, it will also be shown 
why structure and constraints are necessary for exercising freedom and choice; and, hence, for 
deciding on undecidable questions.  
 
v) If actions can only be taken beyond the certainty gained from knowledge it is impossible to 
judge the effectiveness of these actions. 
 
Deconstruction, as stated before, is not against calculation. Before making any decisions we need to 
consider our moral tradition, including our concepts of justice, right, virtue, the good, and 
responsibility (Wood, 1999). However, reflecting on these concepts is not enough. We need to 
challenge these concepts, with the aim of finding a ‘better’ way forward. In other words, we need to 
be led by the regulative ideal of justice. Challenging the status quo also implies a measure of risk, 
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because in going against tradition, we are negotiating with alterity and the unknown. This is why we 
must provide rigorous and clear arguments for changing the rules of the discourse (Derrida, 1988a).  
 
This point is particularly poignant in the context of the larger sustainability issues that we face 
today, which are also related to good corporate social responsibility practices. We are far from clear 
on how to proceed in the face of problems such as global warming, food security, financial security, 
or even infectious disease outbreaks. In this regard, the top management of big companies 
(including oil and gas companies, NGOs, banks, and pharmaceuticals) might benefit from Derrida’s 
ideas, even though these ideas cannot provide them with substantive answers, regarding the best 
way forward.  Once again, complexity theory, which, as mentioned earlier, is characterised by a 
radical or perpetual ethics (Prieser & Cilliers, 2010), can help us to think more clearly through the 
implications of this point. In chapter seven (sec. 4), a complex understanding of sustainable 
development will be presented.    
 
vi) If one accepts that the ethical relationship is non-subsumptive, and if one accepts that the 
goal is to transgress existing frames of meaning, then the ethical decision-maker is likely to 
be left powerless in the face of action. 
 
Derrida (2002e; 2002a) is explicit about the fact that the infinite vigilance, which is demanded by 
ethical reflection, must always be interrupted by action. Ethics requires action, and moreover, 
urgent action. In other words, ethics without politics is impotent. We need position, we need to take 
a stance, and in so doing, to create institutions. However, the moment we create institutions is also 
the moment that we close ourselves off to the very alterity that we seek to safeguard. This is why 
we must always deconstruct anew (which is in itself a critical task). As Wood (1999) explains, our 
responsibility is not infinitely large, it is a recursive modality: an always renewable openness. What 
this implies is that CSR is as much a matter of signing off on policies and codes as it is of 
challenging these policies and codes. In other words, the complexity of the problem has to be 
constantly thought anew.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The British government recently ran an advertisement campaign to encourage the reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions in households79. The campaign featured a father reading a bedtime story 
to his little daughter, in which the potential future consequences of global warming were illustrated. 
                                                    
79
 See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/16/complaints-government-climate-change-ad 
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The consequences that featured in the bedtime story included temperature changes, which would 
result in heat waves and floods; and the possible disappearance of places, due to rising sea levels. 
The advertisement also stated that 40% of carbon dioxide emissions were caused by households 
(specifically heating and fuel consumption). The advertisement concluded with the little girl asking 
her father whether the story has a happy ending, and the punchline was that it is up to us how the 
story ends.  
 
In an article that appeared in The Guardian, it was reported that the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA) had received over two hundred complaints about the advertisement in the space of 
one week. Amongst the most popular reasons for the complaints were the claims that ‘there is no 
scientific evidence of climate change’ and that ‘there is a division of scientific opinion on this issue 
and therefore the ad should not have attributed global warming to human activity’ (Sweney, 2009). 
It is doubtful whether the British would outright object to the government dealing with the issue of 
climate change, since this issue may potentially impact on intergenerational welfare. Judging by the 
outrage, the manner in which the government went about dealing with the problem is, however, 
objectionable. The general opinion seems to be that – since we do not have clarity on what the 
consequences of global warming will be (or even whether climate change is a reality) – it is 
irresponsible and unethical to promote opinions as facts. 
 
What this example illustrates is that our current scientific and business ethics tools are inadequate in 
helping us to navigate our way through the complexities presented by issues such as climate change. 
In terms of CSR, we can conclude that – given the problems currently topping the global agenda – 
CSR cannot be limited to drawing up policies against fraud, deception, or discrimination (all of 
which can be quite well circumscribed in a utilitarian, virtue, or rights-based framework). Assuming 
responsibility also means dealing with the uncertainties and complexities that confront the world 
today. Given the fact that we do not know how the story is going to end, a Derridean framework for 
CSR, which actively engages with this complexity, is a more robust and better-suited model for 
dealing with our problems than is a notion of CSR, which is premised on common human and 
individual moral experiences.  
 
In this chapter it was argued that a complex, critical ethics, such as deconstruction, presents a better 
model for thinking about business ethics problems. In the following two chapters, the insights 
gleaned in part II of this study will be fleshed out in terms of the implications that such insights 
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hold for characterising a complex ethics (chapter six); as well as for thinking about prominent 
business ethics themes80, and for teaching business ethics (chapter seven).  
 
                                                    
80
 It is worthwhile noting that one of the business ethics themes to be addressed in chapter seven is CSR. 
During the course of this analysis, emphasis will be placed on the specific responsibilities of boards and 
organisational members, as well as on how these responsibilities can, in principle, be met. Therefore, 
whereas the aim of the current chapter was to make the case for a critical and complex notion of CSR, the 
aim of the analysis undertaken in chapter seven is to provide substantive points on what such a notion of 
CSR entails, practically-speaking.   
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Part III: 
Implications 
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Chapter 6: 
Theoretical Implications: Circumscribing a Complex Ethics      
 
1. Introduction 
  
At this juncture, it should be clear that a complex notion of ethics exposes, challenges, and 
problematises ‘the underlying assumptions that inform conventional theories and practices’ (Preiser 
& Cilliers, 2010: 276). In this penultimate chapter, we return to the introductory comments made at 
the end of chapter three regarding the ethics of critical complexity, in order to provide a more 
substantive argument for what a complex ethics might entail. In order to elaborate on the premises 
of a complex ethics, this chapter draws heavily on the insights gleaned from a deconstructive ethics 
(which, as previously argued, constitutes a good example of a complex ethics).  
 
In chapter three (sec. 6.1.), it was argued that, in order to undertake meaningful actions, we must 
model complex systems (i.e. we must reduce the complexity). If ethics is also a complex 
phenomenon, this insights holds important implications for how we view our ethical models. In the 
next section, it will be shown that our view of ethical models can lead to either ethical impotence, or 
promote ethical and political action. It is argued that the latter view of ethics – in which our ethical 
models are conceptualised as quasi-open systems – leads to a more productive reading of ethics. 
Within this view, one is still able to call upon limit or ideal concepts, such as justice, even though 
these concepts can never fully manifest in our models. Since our ethical models are neither 
solipsistic nor complete, ethical knowledge constitutes embedded and partial knowledge. In the 
second section, the implications of our limited understanding of ethics are explored in terms of what 
it means to be human, and how we view ourselves as humans (see chap. 3, sec. 6.2.). Part of what it 
means to be human, is to acknowledge what von Foerster (1990) calls the existence of undecidable 
questions (that is, questions with no right answers); to acknowledge the freedom and constraints in 
which we operate; and, to acknowledge the constitutive choices with which we are faced. In the 
third section, these acknowledgements are explored at the hand of a complex notion of ethics, 
which also implies a critical and provisional understanding of ethics (since there are no ‘right 
answers’). The implications that the critical task holds for our understanding of ethics is 
investigated at the hand of the three characteristics of the critical enterprise, namely that such an 
enterprise is transgressive in nature, and requires irony and imagination (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 
283; see chap. 3, sec. 6.3.).  
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The outcome of this analysis is to determine the substantive challenge that a complex ethics holds 
for our traditional understanding of ethical values such as moral responsibility and awareness, 
tolerance and openness, moral decision-making and strategy, and reciprocity. Again, it must be 
noted that, because a complex ethics is both case-specific, and process-orientated, it is difficult to 
provide firm principles or rules that, together, constitute the ethics of complexity. However, in 
reinscribing some of our traditional moral values in terms of the implications of a complex ethics, 
the reader will hopefully gain a sense of what the ethics of complexity entails. In the concluding 
chapter, the importance of these values will be illustrated in reference to a complex understanding 
of prominent business ethics themes, such as corporate citizenship/corporate social responsibility, 
responsible leadership, and sustainability.  
 
2. Modelling and the possibility of knowing the ethical  
 
In chapter two (sec. 6.1.), it was argued that, in order to be ethical, we need to take cognisance of 
the limits of our conceptual models. Not only are our models of complex phenomena necessarily 
partial and incomplete, but they are also the product of judgement and convenience. How we frame 
our models is also largely contingent upon the resources at our disposal. This means that the 
boundaries of our models are as much the outcome of reflexive processes, as they are of empirical 
observation regarding the activity of the system. It stands to reason that the more abstract the 
phenomena that we try to model, the more reflexive processes will impact upon our models, since 
we often only have our own intellectual resources to rely on in trying to understand these 
phenomena. This causes additional challenges, which need to be taken into account when reflecting 
on these models. In this section, the implications that reflexivity hold for the status of our ethical 
models will be investigated at the hand of both an operationally-closed and an open view of ethical 
models.    
 
2.1. Ethical models, reflexivity, and operational-closure 
 
As argued in chapter three (sec. 2.1.2.), the cybernetician, Hans von Foerster, ushered in the second-
wave of cybernetics by focusing on, and exploring the implications of reflexivity for our 
understanding of systems. In a talk given in 1990, von Foerster returns to the implications that 
reflexivity holds; however, in this context, he focuses on the consequences for ethics (not for 
scientific knowledge). Von Foerster (1990) notes that, for many, acknowledging reflexivity in 
scientific practices ‘is like having the cloven-hoofed foot of the Devil stuck in the door of 
orthodoxy’, and argues that the same holds true in the case of ethics.  A first important distinction 
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can, therefore, be made between ethicists who concede to the fact that we are implicated in our 
ethical models (i.e. that account for reflexivity) and ethicists who view our ethical models as 
corresponding with some ideal, Platonic realm. Von Foerster (1990) explains as follows the 
epistemological shift that occurs when we move from considering ourselves as independent 
observers who watch the world go by, to seeing ourselves as actors participating in the drama of 
mutual interaction:  
 
In the first case, because of my independence, I can tell others how to think and to act: 
“Thou shalt…,” “Thou shalt not…”: This is the origin of moral codes. In the second case, 
because of my interdependence, I can only tell to myself how to think and to act: ‘I shall…,” 
“I shall not…” 
This is the origin of ethics.  
 
The insight that our interdependent relations have an impact on our understanding of ethics is not 
new to this analysis: indeed, in chapter 2 (sec. 6.2.) it was argued (following Cilliers, de Villiers and 
Roodt (2002)) that our ethical responses and the type of people we become are inseparable in a 
world where the descriptions that we attribute to ourselves and our actions are never neutral. In 
other words, in the absence of a grand universal scheme, all our decisions and actions take on 
ethical significance. Although von Foerster draws attention to the ethical consequences of our 
actions in an interdependent world, it is also clear from the above citation that our actions cannot 
have political consequences. On von Foerster’s (1990) view, the fact that we do not occupy an 
external vantage point means that it is not possible for us to deliver judgement on the actions of 
others – only on our own actions. This view of ethics is explicitly apolitical, as politics demands 
that one takes a stand. Although compelling in its modesty, such an argument also bears solipsistic 
consequences (see footnote 90). To see why this is the case, it is necessary to trace the development 
of von Foerster’s argument. 
 
Von Foerster (1990) follows Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus 6.421), in defining ethics as 
transcendental, which, in the words of Rasch (2000: 77), means that ‘[e]thics… cannot deal with the 
world, and cannot leave describable evidence of itself in the world; it serves as the unspeakable 
limit or condition of the world.’ Any attempt to think ethics, implies the attempt to transcend the 
contingent world of sense-making, in order to contemplate the absolute (80). This is of course 
impossible – hence, Wittgenstein’s (Tractatus 6.421), famous words: ‘Es ist klar, dass sich Ethik 
nicht aussprechen lasst’ (It is clear that ethics cannot be articulated). As soon as we attempt to 
articulate ethics, ‘the inside turned outside is recaptured as an inside’ (Rasch, 2000: 80). According 
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to Rasch, this results in a large and oppressive immanence as we are left with systemic solipsism: 
‘The outside is acknowledged as the absolute condition for the existence of the inside, but it 
remains supremely unknowable. It is the silence that delimits the world’ (80).   
 
Note that the above view corresponds with Luhmann’s view of social systems as autopoietic 
systems. Since there is no external vantage point from which to conceptualise of ethics, any talk of 
ethics merely amounts to a system’s description of its own operations (see chap. 3, sec. 5.3). In 
other words, any projected identity is the result of a ‘normative distinction’ that can only have ‘a 
historical and not a transcendental or a linguistic justification’ (Luhmann, 2000: 39).  
 
In endorsing the notion of operationally-closed systems, von Foerster essentially agrees with both 
Wittgenstein’s and Luhmann’s positions: it is impossible to conceptualise of a transcendental ethics; 
the best we can do is to account for the way in which we describe our systems. According to 
Wittgenstein, this implies mastering the use of language so that ethics remains implicit to our 
practices (Tractatus, 6.422) – the implications of which are further discussed in section 3.1. 
Furthermore, as stated above, this view of ethics also implies that we are unable to judge the ethics 
of anyone else’s practices. In the absence of an a priori viewpoint, we can only guard over 
ourselves and our own practices.  
 
2.2. Ethical models and limit concepts: accounting for the quasi-transcendental  
 
In order for our understanding of ethics to carry political force, one must show that ethics is not 
recursive (in the strong sense of maintaining itself within its own operationally-closed system). 
Following the insights derived from critical complexity, we can say that complex systems are open 
systems, and that the environment is able to penetrate the system. If one can show that ethics can 
penetrate the system, then ethics can be imbued with political force (by still acting as a regulative 
ideal). Morin (2008: 92) supports this notion that – although there no omniscient vantage point – 
one, nevertheless, needs to construct a meta-point of view, in order to avoid total relativism or 
ethnocentrism. Therefore, a second important distinction can be drawn between ethicists who 
concede to the possibility of ‘knowing’ ethics and ethicists who view ethics as belonging to an 
external, transcendental realm.   
 
As stated in chapter three (sec. 5.3.), Derrida’s philosophy presents an attempt to find a breach or 
gap in the system, which serves to give ethics a voice. In this regard, it is specifically useful to 
reference Derrida’s work on ‘limit concepts’, such as justice and the gift, since – as argued in the 
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previous chapter (sec. 6.2.) – these concepts represent an attempt to think transcendental ethics 
within the world. This demands a measure of complex thinking, because to recall Morin’s (11) 
words, in an open system ‘[t]he environment is at the same time intimate and foreign: it is part of 
the system while remaining exterior to it’ (see chap. 3, sec. 2.3.). Teubner (2001:42; my italics) 
brilliantly captures the methodological complexity of thinking about open systems in his analysis of 
Derrida’s understanding of justice and the gift: 
 
This is Derrida’s central thesis: justice as transcendence in an irreconcilable contrast to the 
immanence of positive law which, however, is haunting law constantly. And it is here that 
the parallels to the relationship of gift to circulation of the economy become visible. The gift 
is not only… an ethical or political counter-principle to the cold economic logic of 
capitalism. The gift transcends every social relation and provokes it… as an unconditional 
demand for the Other (Derrida, 1992[a]: Ch. 2). The gift is not pure transcendence without 
any connection to the circulation to the economy, but in a self-contradictory relation of 
unrevisable separation and permanent provocation. Thus Derrida’s repeated calls for 
political engagement, which are provoked by the unsatiated demands of a transcendent 
justice and gift (Derrida, 1990: 933).81    
   
Although justice can never be encapsulated in law, and although the gift can never be given within 
the framework of the economy, these limit concepts, nonetheless, shape and drive the ethics of our 
institutions. As such, Teubner (2001: 43) argues, with reference to the practice of law, that it makes 
an important difference whether or not ‘one is exposed to a ‘deconstructive justice’, to extreme 
demands of justice that can never be realized… to a sense of fundamental failure of law, even a 
tragic experience that whatever you decide in law will end in injustice and guilt.’  
 
Note, that in terms of this argument, one remains an actor participating in the drama of mutual 
interaction (as opposed to an independent observer), but one is still forced to deliver judgement, to 
say “Thou shalt…” or “Thou shalt not…” However, the difference between a universal, objective 
conception of ethics and a complex ethics is that, in the latter case, one cannot pass judgement – one 
cannot moralise – without being acutely aware of the fact that one has failed to encapsulate justice, 
and of recognising that one’s meta-points of view are ‘limited and fragile’ (Morin, 2008: 92).  
 
                                                    
81 Teubner uses the following alternative reference for ‘Force of Law’ (which, elsewhere, is referenced as 
Derrida, 1992b): Derrida, J. (1990) ‘Force of law: the mystical foundation of authority’ in Cardozo Law 
Review, 11: 919 – 1046.   
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The continual deferral of the ethical is also, paradoxically, the very impetus of both politics and 
ethics (see Krell, 1988). Just as the environment feeds the system, so, too, the limit concepts feed 
our desire for the good, and prevent us from turning ethics into a mere moral code. Note, that this 
deferral of the ethical is also what feeds deconstruction: in chapter four (sec. 3.1.), Derrida (1999: 
82) was cited as saying that ethical ‘[t]estimony, which implies faith or promise, governs the entire 
social space…. It is only by reference to the possibility of testimony that deconstruction can begin 
to ask questions concerning knowledge and meaning.’  Deconstruction is, therefore, a means by 
which to articulate the ethical interruption of ontological closure which saves us from ethical 
solipsism, allows for the manifestation of justice in the singularity of the event, and prevents us 
from turning justice into a moral code. 
 
Therefore, in summary, it is not only important to take cognisance of the way in which we are 
implicated in our ethical models (i.e. that we, through means of our practices and beliefs, in part 
constitute our ethical models), but that these models are also regulated by the ideals of justice. This 
implies that although ethical models represent radically immanent expressions of our sense of 
ethics; they, nevertheless, call for transcendental justification, which, in practical terms, means that 
they are always subject to revision. Being responsible, therefore, means subjecting oneself and 
one’s models to an always renewable openness (to recall Wood’s (1999) words)  
   
3. The embeddedness of ethical practices 
 
3.1. Relating the other to the self and the self to the other 
 
Despite denying that we can know ethics in any transcendental sense (and thereby deliver 
judgement in terms of punishment and reward), Wittgenstein does maintain that a type of immanent 
expression of ethics can manifest itself it our use of language. In this regard, consider the following 
citation: ethics ‘must reside in the action itself… For any discourse I may have – say, in science, 
philosophy, epistemology, therapy, etc. – [sic] to master the use of my language so that ethics is 
implicit’ (Tractatus (6.422) cited in von Foerster, 1990). Von Foerster (1990) explores this view 
further, and argues that the way in which we can ‘hide ethics from all eyes and still let her 
determine language and action’ is through dialogics. Although this study attempts to move beyond 
the relativist and solipsitic implications that emerge from a strong view of recursivity, it is, 
nevertheless, also important to take note of the type of ethical considerations that emerge from the 
embeddedness of our ethical practices. In this regard, we follow von Foerster in his analysis of 
dialogics.   
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Von Foerster argues that language as function82 is dialogical in nature, and helps us to understand 
ourselves through interacting with others in the world83. Von Foerster (1990) uses the metaphor of 
dance to describe dialogics. Just as it takes two to tango, it also takes two to language: ‘[language] 
noises are invitations to the other to make some dance steps together’. In ‘Understanding Systems: 
Conversations on epistemology and ethics’ von Foerster (von Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 42) 
provides a description of the Language Tango, but a more forceful description is to be found in the 
last few lines of Martin Buber’s (2001) book, Das Problem des Menschen, which von Foerster 
(1990) cites as follows:  
 
Contemplate the human with the human, and you will see the dynamic duality, the human 
essence, together: here is the giving and the receiving, here the aggressive and defensive 
power, here the quality of searching and of responding, always both in one, mutually 
complementing in alternating action, demonstrating what it is: human. Now you can turn to 
the single one and recognize him as human for his potential of relating. We may come closer 
to answering the question “What is human?” when we come to understand him as the being 
in whose dialogic, in his mutually present two-getherness, the encounter of the one with the 
other is realized and recognized at all times.  
 
The reason for preferring Buber’s definition over von Foerster’s, is because in Buber’s definition, 
there is a certain acknowledgement of the fact that the Language Tango does not merely represent 
the act of ‘merg[ing] into one and the same person, to a being that see the world with four eyes’ 
(von Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 42), but is also an activity characterised by aggression and 
defence, by search and response. However, even Buber’s formulation is not radical enough, the 
reasons for this being that, 1) unlike a structured dance in which partners mirror each other, our 
                                                    
82
 Von Foerster (1990) identifies two different tracks of language: the first is appearance, and the second is 
function. With regard to appearance, von Foerster (1990) writes that, on this track, language is a monologue. 
The appearance of language has to do with the formal elements of language: the noises that we make when 
we utter words, the words themselves, and the rules of grammar and syntax that we employ to form 
sentences. This first track of language corresponds with Morin’s (2008: 73-78) understanding of language, as 
the means by which we develop a sense of identity through self-objectification and self-reference. In this 
regard, von Foerster (1990) writes that ‘[i]n its appearance, the language I speak is my language. It makes 
me aware of myself: this is the root of consciousness.’ Consciousness is, therefore, the process in which ‘I 
can possess myself’ and ‘refer to myself’ (Morin, 2008: 73). Language as appearance, thus, allows me to 
distinguish myself from others.  
83
 The question arises as to whether one can endorse a strong view of recursivity, whilst arguing for the 
interdependencies between people. The way in which these views can be reconciled is through recourse to 
the notion of structural coupling, which refers to ‘the process through which structurally-determined 
transformations in each of two or more systemic unities induces (for each) a trajectory of reciprocally-
triggered change’ (Encyclopedia Autopoietica). Structural coupling is an important concept in autopoietic 
theory, and is crucial to understanding the phenomenological aspects of the theory, such as language (See: 
‘Structural coupling’ in the Encyclopedia Autopoietica. Available online at: http://www.cybsoc.org/EA.html#S 
Published March 31, 1998.)     
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human relations are characterised by asymmetry, non-linearity, power, and competition (Cilliers, 
1998: 120); 2) the metaphor of dance cannot account for the face of the third, or the one who 
destroys the dual relation that I experience in my confrontation with the Other (Derrida, 1999: 68-
69); and, 3) the metaphor of dance assumes that we know who or what our dance partner is, and 
does not account for the way in which language as dialogical escapes the intentions of the author, 
and the context in which the speech-act or ‘dance’ is performed.   
 
What is positive about the metaphor of dance, however, is that it evokes the role of communicative 
action relayed via bodies (and conducted in the medium of proto-symbols) (Stacey, 2001: 166). It 
also draws attention to the rules of the language dance. Indeed, in speaking of the pragmatics of 
narrative knowledge, Lyotard (1984: 18) writes that narratives can only be successfully conveyed if 
they adhere to certain locally legitimised rules and standards. In other words, certain utterances are 
‘judged to be “good” because they conform to the relevant criteria (of justice, beauty, truth, and 
efficiency respectively) accepted in the social circles of the “knowers” interlocutors’. Such 
utterances are often related to knowledge pertaining to ‘“know-how,” “knowing how to live,” “how 
to listen” [savoir-faire, savoir-vivre, savoir-écouter], etc.’ These narrative rules evolve out of the 
social structure, and are subject to evaluation and transformation84. Therefore: 
  
It becomes the responsibility of every player in any discursive practice to know the rules of 
the game involved. These rules are local, i.e. ‘limited in time and space’ ([Lyotard, 1984:] 
66). In following such rules one has to assume responsibility both for the rules themselves 
and for the effects of that specific practice. This responsibility cannot be shifted to any 
universally guiding principles or institutions (Cilliers, 1998: 137).  
  
Apart from the above advantages, the main strength of the dance metaphor is that it draws attention 
to the dialectic of dance – the fact that one must give, but also receive. Von Foerster (1990) states 
that it is not a fact – as Descartes (1960: 110) would have it – that I think, therefore I am (‘Cogito 
ergo Sum’) but that I think, therefore we are (‘Cogito ergo sumus’). If we are relationally-
constituted, it would seem that one of the most important ethical obligations is to continually 
evaluate the way in which we relate with others. Indeed, von Foerster (1990) writes that ‘[i]n its 
function, my language reaches out for the other: this is the root of conscience.’ Derrida (1995b: 
281-282) supports this view, writing that  ‘…as concerns the “Good” [Bien] of every morality, the 
question will come back to determining the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most 
                                                    
84
 As an example, consider narratives about race in South Africa during Apartheid vs. Post-Apartheid.  
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giving way of relating to the other and of relating the other to the self.’ Derrida (1995b), however, 
does not depict this process of relating with the other as a dance, but as a way of eating.  
 
The metaphor of eating has the added advantage that it accounts not only for the way that we 
communicate, but also for all the other ways in which we asymmetrically appropriate each other, 
both in terms of physical nourishment (eating, suckling) and in terms of our being-together-with-
the-other in the world (in the sense of seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, touching, and talking). For 
Derrida, our relations with one another should be governed by the ethical mandate: ‘Il faut bien 
manger’’, which must be understood both as ‘one must eat well’ (475) (in the sense of ‘learning 
and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat’ (282)); as well as ‘everybody has to eat’. And, 
the adverb ‘bien’ must be nominalised into ‘Le Bien’, to imply ‘the eating of the Good’ (475). 
Furthermore, because one never eats entirely on one’s own, this ethical mandate is the rule offering 
infinite hospitality (282) (see Vrba (Woermann), 2006: 81-82). Derrida’s ethical mandate, in 
drawing attention to the many ways in which we relate with one another, shifts our understanding of 
responsibility as a causal process (in which we are accountable for our actions) to an understanding 
of responsibility that is grounded in a large explicit and tacit network of relations (in which we are 
accountable towards one another) (see Painter-Morland, 2008).   
 
3.2. The murkiness of identity 
 
An implication that emerges from the above analysis is that if we, in part, form our sense of identity 
through our interaction with one another, then the ‘I’ is impure. In Morin’s (2008: 80) words:  
 
when “I” speak, it is also a “we” that speaks, the we of that warm collectivity of which we are a 
part. But there is not only the “we”: “They” also speak when “I” speak, a “they” which is the 
voice of a more cold and anonymous collectivity. In every human “I” there is a “we” and a 
“they.” The I, therefore, is not something pure, nor is it alone.  
 
This relational, emergent, and impure understanding of identity also introduces a principle of 
uncertainty: I can never be sure to what extent it is I who is speaking (80). Therefore, as Derrida 
(1995b: 284-285) maintains, in order to understand language we need to account for the 
irreducibility that marks it from the inside. He notes that, in this context, he is thinking specifically 
‘of the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of différance’ (285) – all of which imply that an 
element’s ‘‘own constitution as an autonomous or fully complete entity’ is always deferred (Lucy, 
2004: 27; see chap. 5, sec. 2.3.2.). Once one accounts for the impurity of identity, one quickly 
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realises that there is no single linear, oppositional limit between an ‘I’ and the ‘other’, nor is there a 
single limit between the human and the infrahuman (285). Derrida (285) remarks that this insight 
bears consequences for ‘the ethics and politics of living.’ In this regard, consider the following 
concrete examples: 
 
There is no need to emphasize that this question of the subject and of the living “who” is at the 
heart of the most pressing concerns of modern societies, whether they are deciding birth or 
death, including what is presupposed in the treatment of sperm or the ovum, surrogate mothers, 
genetic engineering, so called bioethics or biopolitics (what should be the role of the State in 
determining or protecting a living subject?), the accredited criteriology for determining, indeed 
for “euthanastically” provoking death… organ removal and transplant… (283). 
 
Derrida (285) raises these examples to show that ‘[w]e know less than ever where to cut – either at 
birth or death. And this also means that we never know, and never have known, how to cut up a 
subject. Today less than ever.’ That we are less certain of how to deal with the question of the 
subject today is not only due to the fact that our identities are fluid, but is also an outcome of 
advances in all the sciences. This is because as they develop they create political problems (Morin, 
2008: 94). This, according to Morin (94), means that politics has become very complex, since it is 
now concerned with all dimensions of humanity. However, Morin (94-95) argues that the response 
to this complexity is dominated by economic and technical thinking, rather than forms of thinking 
capable of understanding politics in its multi-dimensionality.  
 
In summary: in order to nurture forms of thinking that allow us to account for the multi-
dimensionality of complex phenomena, we must concede to the fact that identity and language are 
characterised by différance and the trace. This means that there are no natural demarcations. 
Political decisions cannot be viewed as descriptive programmes, but are grounded in ethical 
decisions; and, these decisions have very real affects on us and on others.   
 
The implication of this analysis is that, since identity is not a pre-given, we need to continually 
examine and deconstruct our identities, including – as mentioned in chapter three (sec. 6.2.) – the 
systems within which we are embedded and which give rise to these identities, the power relations 
that exist between us and others, and the permeability of the boundaries that define our individual 
and group identities (Paulsen, 2003:17)). Only if we foster awareness of the status of our identities, 
will we be able to assume responsibility for the many ways in which we are dependent on, and 
formed by, others and by our operating environments. In other words, deconstruction helps protect 
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against an insular sense of identity by challenging the boundaries that define our conceptual systems 
of meaning, and by revealing the imbrications of the self and the world. In this sense, 
deconstruction points the way towards a more open and more responsible future, one in which our 
thinking of responsibility ‘does not stop at this determination of the neighbour, at the dominant 
schema of this determination’ (Derrida, 1995b: 284).  
 
4. Ethics as a critical, provisional position 
 
4.1. A complex ethics and the necessity of politics 
 
In chapter three (secs 1 & 6.3.), the idea of a critical position was introduced. Following Cilliers 
(2010a: 14), it was specifically argued that such a position rests on a self-critical rationality, which 
can be defined as ‘a rationality that makes no claim for objectivity, or for any special status for the 
grounds from which the claim is made’. A self-critical rationality is, therefore, the outcome of 
acknowledging the limited status of our ethical models, and of our partial understanding of the 
predicates of subjecthood (both in general terms, and in terms of the implications held for specific 
identities). Otherwise stated, a self-critical rationality is the outcome of acknowledging the 
irreducible nature of complexity (2). 
 
What makes the critical position difficult to deal with is that it does not serve as an excuse for 
inaction. We have no objective knowledge, and we cannot determine in advance how our actions 
affect ourselves and others, yet we have to act. In other words, we have to engage in politics. The 
critical position, therefore, also holds important implications for not only how we view ethics, but 
also politics. Politics – like ethics – cannot follow a predetermined programme, but must be shaped 
by strategies. Morin (2008: 96) explains as follows: politics should not rule, but must ‘navigate by 
sight, which is what is evoked, etymologically, in the word “cybernetic”’. He is, however, quick to 
qualify that this ‘doesn’t only mean that politics must navigate day by day; it must [also] have an 
idea that lights the way like a beacon’ (976).  
 
Although mechanistic projections and abstract programmes will always be thwarted by actual 
events, one can, nevertheless, project values and motivating ideas, which can guide the way into the 
future. To this, Derrida (2002a: 25) adds that the way into the future is through negotiation, which, 
as previously stated (chap. 5, sec. 7.2.), takes place between affirmation (ethics) and position 
(politics), because the position threatens the affirmation. However, he also adds that ‘[a]ffirmation 
requires a position. It requires that one move to action and do something, even if it is imperfect’ 
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(25). Both Derrida (29) and Morin (2007: 25) identify vigilance (‘the cautionary principle’) and 
urgency (‘the risk principle’) as the aporia which marks the double bind of ethics and politics. 
Morin (25) further offers Pericles’ speech to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war as a 
practical illustration of this principle: ‘we Athenians, we are capable of combining prudence and 
audacity, whereas the others are either timorous or bold’ (my italics).  
 
It is argued that the double-logic of ethics and politics marks the heart of the critical position. We 
need to act, even though we know that we cannot get it right (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 270), which 
again affirms the point that a complex ethics is necessarily a provisional ethics, in need of constant 
revision. It is this central insight that leads Preiser and Cilliers (283) to characterise the critical 
position as a position demanding transgression, irony, and imagination. They argue that identifying 
these three characteristics serves as a starting point in developing the critical position, but qualify 
that these characteristics need further elaboration. In the sections to follows, some additional 
remarks are made as to what these characteristics might entail.  
 
4.2. The critical position demands transgression 
 
4.2.1. Ethics as a desire to do justice to inexistance 
 
The fact that the critical position demands transgression is one of the central, if not the central 
insight of this analysis. Indeed, both the analysis of critical complexity and deconstruction support 
this point. We live in excess of meaning, and there is no way in which to do justice to this 
complexity, except to constantly revise and transgress our limited models and perspectives. At this 
juncture, it is useful to again briefly summarise the crux of this insight at the hand of Alain 
Badiou’s (2009) description of the deconstructive enterprise. In a beautiful tribute to Derrida, 
Badiou (132) writes that:  
 
what is at stake in Derrida’s work, in his never-ending work, in his writing, ramified as it is into 
so many varied works, into infinitely varied approaches, is the inscription of the non-existent. 
And the recognition, in the work of inscribing the non-existent, that its inscription is, strictly 
speaking, impossible. What is at stake in Derrida’s writing – and here ‘writing’ designates a 
thought-act – is the inscription of the impossibility of the non-existence as the form of its 
inscription.    
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Badiou (134) describes Derrida as the opposite of a hunter: a hunter hopes that the animal will 
arrest its movements, so that it can be shot. For Derrida, however, the animal cannot cease fleeing. 
Locating the animal does not mean grasping it. Badiou (133) calls this “Derrida’s problem’:  
 
what is grasping a fleeing [fluite]? Not grasping that which flees, not at all. But grasping fleeing 
qua vanishing point. The difficulty, which means that you always have to start again, is that, if 
you grasp fleeing, you suppress it at the same time. The vanishing point cannot be grasped qua 
vanishing point. It can only be located. 
 
Deconstruction operates in service of the endless flight. In trying to account for the inexistent 
(which, as Badiou (140) emphatically states, is not the same as nothingness), we inevitably pull the 
outside (i.e. that which is not accounted for (does not exist) in our conceptual paradigms) into our 
systems of meaning. In other words, seizing the non-existent would mean its death, because the 
alterity of the other is then assimilated into our systems of meaning. This is why we always have to 
start again in trying to do justice to the inexistent (hence, the fact that deconstruction implies an 
endless task). The nature of the inexistent does not conform to binary logic. Rather, the desire for 
inexistence is supported by the ‘monstration of the slippage’ (i.e. the slippage that occurs between 
saying that ‘the non-existent is’ (which fails to convey that it does not exist) and ‘the non-existent 
does not exists’ (which fails to convey that it is) (141)). As such, Badiou’s (143) tribute to Derrida 
lies in his decision to write inexistence with an ‘a’ (inexistance) in a similar fashion to différance, in 
order to also attempt to ‘couch non-existence’, and, thereby, to do justice to those who lie beyond 
our systems of meaning.  
 
On the one hand, inexistance implies ethics (i.e. the grasping of fleeing as vanishing point, which 
also entails an endless vigilance). On the other hand, one has a duty to transgress existing 
boundaries or limits and give voice to the non-existent (in this regard, the war cry of a Revolution 
rings ‘We are nothing, let us be all!’ (141)). In other words, one has a duty to take a position and 
engage in politics. The transgressive nature of the critical position is, therefore, fed by the slippages 
of ethics, but leads to the binaries of politics.  In this regard, a responsible, transgressive politics is 
characterised by the following three acknowledgements: the acknowledgement of an irreducible 
complexity to which we cannot do justice (as manifested in the inexistant); the acknowledgement of 
freedom and constraints (as necessary conditions for action and transformation); and the 
acknowledgement of choice. In the following section, the ethical implications associated with 
acknowledging our freedom, constraints, and choices are investigated.  
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4.2.2. Freedom, constraints, and choice 
 
Von Foerster (1990) argues that ‘[t]here are indeed among propositions, proposals, problems, 
questions, those that are decidable, and those that are in principle undecidable’ and further argues 
that ‘[o]nly those questions that are in principle undecidable, we can decide’ (italicised in the 
original).  The reason for this is because undecidable questions are questions related to complex 
phenomena, and, therefore, have no clear-cut answers, but rather require judgement, strategy, and 
choice. Von Foerster’s (1990) argument is remarkably similar to Derrida’s (1988a: 116) reasoning 
that ‘[a] decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable program… Even if 
a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by 
this experience and experiment of the undecidable’.  
 
Whereas Derrida (1999: 66) calls this ‘the terrible process of undecidability’ (see chap. 5, sec. 6.3.), 
von Foerster (1990) sees freedom in the moment of the decision: ‘We are free! The complement to 
necessity is not chance, it is choice! We can choose who we wish to become when we have decided 
on in principle undecidable questions.’85 This acknowledgement of freedom is, indeed, very 
important to any complex understanding of both ethics and politics. As with von Foerster’s account, 
Morin stresses the importance of freedom as a condition for choice and self-actualisation. However, 
Morin (2008) also introduces the element of constraint, which is imposed upon our freedom. In this 
regard, Morin (113) writes: ‘the complex notion of self-organization permits us to conceive of 
beings that are relatively autonomous as beings while remaining subject to the necessities and 
hazards of existence.’ Morin (114) further adds that these constraints or dependencies are necessary:  
 
The autonomy of individuals is acquired through innumerable dependencies: one must be 
nourished and loved by the parents, must learn to speak and to write, must go to school, 
university, and encode a highly diversified culture to acquire ever greater possibilities of 
autonomy. Autonomy, therefore, should always be conceived not in opposition to, but in 
complementarity with, the idea of dependence (my italics).  
 
In other word, in order for our choices to have meaning, we must be part of a system of relations 
and, therefore, be constrained. Derrida takes this argument even further. For him, the constraints 
                                                    
85
 Bauman (in Cilliers, 1998: 138) shares von Foerster’s (1990) understanding of responsibility as the 
freedom to choose. Whereas modernism’s attempts to structure our freedom resulted in imprisonment, a 
postmodernist attitude sets us free – not to do as we please, but to act ethically. For Bauman (1992: xxii), 
this attitude involves a paradox, which he describes as follows:  
[moral freedom] restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and responsibility while 
simultaneously depriving them of the comfort of the universal guidance that that modern self-
confidence once promised… Moral responsibility comes with the loneliness of moral choice.   
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themselves generate undecidable questions, in that conflicting demands compete with one another 
in the moment of choice. In this context, consider again the following passage:  
 
I would say that the text is complicated, there are many meanings struggling with one 
another, there are tensions, there are overdeterminations, there are equivocations; but this 
does not mean that there is indeterminacy. On the contrary, there is too much determinacy. 
That is the problem (Derrida, 1999: 79). 
 
What should be clear from the above is that undecidable and complex questions arise due to both 
relational dependencies and autonomy. The vision of life as either the product of pure determinism 
or free will is impossible (Morin, 2008: 115). Rather, the complexity of life is generated by both 
dependence and freedom; and, in order to understand the nature of choice, these aspects must be 
thought simultaneously. Our freedom, however, comes at a price: if we are free to choose, we are 
responsible for the consequences of our decisions and actions. Therefore, as recognised by von 
Foerster (1990), freedom is a terrible burden to some.    
 
Similar to Bauman’s (1989; 1993) arguments against bureaucracy (see chap. 1, sec. 4.1.1), which 
results in the effacement of the Other’s face, von Foerster (1990) argues that the sheer burden of 
responsibility imposed by undecidable questions has led people to construct entire hierarchies and 
institutions where it is impossible to localise responsibility: ‘Everyone in such a system can say: “I 
was told to do X.” This denial of responsibility has, in part, to do with the fear of admitting that we 
are responsible for the future effects of our decisions and actions, especially because we cannot 
predict what these effects will be.  To use Derrida’s word: our decisions and actions disseminate, 
because meaning, although sown in the moment of decision and action, is not determined by the 
particular moment or context, but rather scatters in several directions at once86. This same point can 
also be made from the perspective of critical complexity, with reference to what Morin (2008: 55; 
2007: 26) calls ‘the principle of ecology of action’: as soon as an action is taken, it begins to escape 
from the intentions and will of its creator, and is taken up in a network of interactions and multiple 
feedbacks, which deprives it of finality87. Sometimes an action can even have the opposite effect of 
what was initially intended. Morin (2007: 26) offers the following example:  
 
When one sees that a revolution was made in [Russia in] 1917 to suppress the exploitation 
of man by his fellow man, to create a new society, founded on the principles of community 
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 See Lucy (2004: 27 – 31) for a fuller description of Derrida’s use of the term ‘dissemination’.   
87
 This implies not only that we are responsible for our actions, but infinitely so, as they continue to 
reverberate through our systems.  
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and liberty, and that this revolution, not only caused immense losses of blood, destruction, 
and repression by a police system, but, after seventy years, it led to its contrary, i.e. to a 
capitalism even more fierce than that of the tsarist times, and with a return to religion! 
Everything that this revolution wanted to destroy resurrected. How not to think about the 
ecology of action! 
 
Morin (2008: 55) argues that if our actions ‘fly back at our heads like a boomerang’, we are obliged 
to follow the actions, in order to attempt to correct them. This will only be successfully achieved if 
we are aware from the outset that action implies ‘risk, hazard, initiative, decision… derailments and 
transformation.’ In other words, every ‘action is also a wager’ and ‘[w]e must be aware of our 
philosophical and political wagers’ (54). It is only when we refuse to engage in the complexity with 
which we are confronted when we undertake decisions and actions, and when we close down 
awareness of what lies outside of our immediate experiences, that we are in danger of reflecting the 
attitude of Pontius Pilate (Sontag, 2007: 227).    
 
To view the critical task as transgressive is not to see the goals of ethics and politics as ‘violat[ing] 
the basic laws or human civilization’, as is implied by some of the definitions of ‘transgression’88. 
Acting responsibly does not mean acting like the Lone Ranger, but rather necessitates that we 
concede to the inextricable ways in which our lives are bound up in our systems of meaning, whilst 
nevertheless remaining vigilant to the fact that we still have a responsibility to break open and 
transgress these systems of meaning to account for the non-existent, and to take responsibility for 
our choices and actions – even when they have undesirable consequences. To many, the type of 
responsibility implied by a complex ethics may seem overwhelming, and for this reason, we need to 
live with a degree of humour and irony, in order to both maintain our humanity (Preiser & Cilliers, 
2010: 283), and to develop fruitful strategies for living.  
 
4.3. The critical position demands irony   
 
There are various definitions of irony89, of which the following three are particularly noteworthy: 
‘the use of words expressing something other than their literal intention’; ‘characterized by an often 
poignant difference or incongruity between what is expected and what actually is’; and, ‘contrary to 
plan or expectation’. What these three definitions have in common is that they introduce an element 
of contingency and play into literal, objective language. As such, it is argued that irony requires 
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 http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=transgress 
89
 http://www.google.co.za/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&q=define%3a+irony 
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creativity and improvisation, and that there is ‘an important and potentially fruitful connection’ 
between these skills and ‘the lived experience of complexity’ (Montuori, 2003: 238). Montuori 
(238) further argues ‘that improvisation and creativity are capacities we would do well to develop in 
an increasingly unpredictable, complex, and at times chaotic experience.’ It is specifically in 
relation to developing fruitful and responsible strategies for living that the innovative, creative, and 
ironic dimension of the critical task will be investigated in this section.   
 
Von Foerster (1990) argues that there are two types of people in the world, namely ‘discoverers’ 
and ‘inventors’, and that he is ‘surprised again and again by the depth of the abyss that separates the 
two fundamentally different worlds’ created by choosing either the one path, or the other. He (1990) 
writes that ‘[t]he discoverers will most likely become astronomers, physicists and engineers; the 
inventors family therapists, poets and biologists.’ 
 
The distinction between the discoverer and the inventor is reminiscent of Claude Levi-Strauss’s 
distinction between the engineer and the bricoleur (or handy man). In ‘Structure, sign, and play’, 
Derrida (1978a:  285) writes that whereas the engineer ‘should be the one to construct the totality of 
his language, syntax, and lexicon’; the bricoleur ‘is someone who uses “the means at hand”’. 
However, since no absolute origin exists, the engineer remains a theological idea; or, more 
radically, ‘the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur.’ Derrida’s point is 
that the world is a complex place, and pretending that it is otherwise is also merely a bricolage or 
strategy for dealing with the world. As such, Derrida (285) deconstructs the opposition between 
engineer and bricoleur, by writing that: 
 
as soon as we admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain bricolage and that the 
engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolage is 
menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down.    
 
Von Foerster (1990) argues that the type of strategies that we employ for dealing with the world is 
the outcome of undecidable questions. The point is not ‘who is right, or who is wrong’, but whether 
people acknowledge the choices that they have made in deciding on a life strategy. In order to 
substantiate this point, he quotes José Ortega y Gasset (in von Foerster, 1990): 
 
Man does not have a nature, but a history. Man is no thing, but a drama. His life is 
something that has to be chosen, made up as he goes along, and a human consists in that 
choice and invention. Each human being is the novelist of himself, and though he may 
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choose between being an original writer and a plagiarist, he cannot escape choosing… He is 
condemned to be free.  
 
There can be no a priori basis from which to argue for the merits of one life strategy over another. 
However, it is important to assume responsibility for, and bear the consequences of, our choices and 
decisions. This is only possible if we are aware of the nature and status of our strategies, which 
Morin (2008: 96) refers to as ‘the art of working with uncertainty’. This awareness will undoubtedly 
expose the engineer to himself as a bricoleur, and this realisation will impact on further decisions 
and actions. Furthermore, as mentioned by Derrida, this realisation also serves to destabilise the 
meaning of bricolage, since one becomes acutely aware of the fact that ‘the discoverers discover 
inventors, and the inventors invent discoverers’ (von Foerster, 1990).  
 
We are all improvisers who not only tell a story, but become a story. We create interwoven 
narratives, which together, constitute a tapestry of stories (Montuori, 2003: 246; see also: Kearney, 
1988). The ethical moment lies in whether we concede to this or not, i.e. whether we accept – with 
irony and humour – our limited knowledge and fragile personal experiences, and focus these in the 
very moment that we are living in (Montuori, 2003: 244). To be able to improvise and to live with 
irony: 
  
requires a different discipline, a different way of organizing our thoughts and actions. It 
requires, and at best elicits, a social virtuosity which reflects our state of mind, our 
perceptions of who we are, and a willingness to take risks, to let go of the safety of the 
ready-made, the already written, and to think, create, and ‘write’ on the spot (244).   
 
Assuming an ironic disposition not only lightens the burden of self-awareness, but also leads to an 
acknowledgement of the strategies that we employ in constituting our life narratives. This is 
because those who live with irony find it easier to confess to the fact that their lives are not 
following a determinate course, but represent the outcome of undecidable decisions and actions. 
Without this acknowledgement (which implies a self-critical rationality), we potentially open the 
door to human evil. This is because, as Sontag (2007: 227) suggests, it is exactly ‘this refusal of an 
extended awareness’ (which she defines as taking in ‘more than is happening right now, right here’) 
that lies at the heart of ‘our ever-confused awareness of evil’ and ‘of the immense capacity of 
human beings to commit evil’. In a sense then, it is irony that allows us to face up to the seriousness 
of our responsibilities, which is an insight which accords beautifully with the definition of irony as 
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‘characterized by an often poignant difference or incongruity between what is expected and what 
actually is’.  
 
4.4. The critical position demands imagination 
 
In cultivating an ironic disposition, the ability to improvise allows us to react appropriately to 
events and to forge successful life strategies. However, improvisation also allows us to generate 
events in a creative and innovative fashion (see Montuori, 2003: 240). In this latter sense, the 
creative task lies not in cultivating an ironic disposition, but in imagining a better, and more 
sustainable future (see Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 283). In this regard, assuming a critical position can 
spur on transformation since, as Allen (2000: 103) notes, creativity and, one could add, imagination 
‘is the motor of change, and the hidden dynamic that underlies the rise and fall of civilizations, 
peoples, and regions, and evolution both encourages and feeds on invention’. Central to the 
imaginative dimension of the critical task, is the ability to generate requisite variety and options, 
and to break out of one’s ‘closed or limited hermeneutic circles’ (to again quote Verstraeten (2000: 
ix)).  This, in itself, requires respect for difference, and reinforces the need to deconstruct that which 
is still too homogenous, insufficiently refined or differentiated, or else egalitarian (Derrida, 2002a: 
20).  
 
Indeed, when pressed for an ethical mandate, von Foerster (in von Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 36; 
italicised in the original) offers the following imperative: ‘Act always as to increase the number of 
choices’90. Von Foerster further argues in support of what he calls ‘a mind that confounds’, stating 
that whereas ‘[t]he Devil tries to homogenize the different perspectives until everyone thinks, 
believes, and acts the same way’91, the ‘Confounder enlarges the field of vision, opening up new 
possibilities and revealing the abundance’ (36). Von Foerster use the term ‘confounder’ in an 
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 Both Derrida’s and von Foerster’s perspectives are compatible with a critical complexity perspective, which 
reinforces the importance of difference and diversity, in that a system is viewed not only as ‘a composition of 
unity out of diversity, but also a composition of internal diversity out of unity’ (Morin, 1992: 373). Despite 
these similarities in perspective, there is also a crucial difference which is based on the fact that von 
Foerster’s position is politically impotent. In this regard, consider the following example (von Foerster & 
Poerksen, 2002: 37): an interviewer (Poerksen) argues that one ‘can’t support the opportunity of a 
propagandist to distribute vicious and inflammatory literature’ on the basis that people’s choices should be 
expanded. To this von Foerster replies: ‘Why not? Should I ban his or her literature, and remove the books 
from the libraries because they contradict what I believe in?’  Ultimately, von Foerster is defending a relativist 
position, which makes it impossible for him to deliver judgement on whether certain ways of life are, ethically-
speaking, more desirable than others. Through recourse to the insights gleaned from the critical complexity 
perspective and Derrida’s work, one is able to circumvent this problem (as illustrated in section 2.2.). 
91
 Both Derrida and Morin also oppose homogenising strategies. As previously stated, Derrida (1988a: 119) 
calls those who wish to simplify at all costs ‘dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists’. Morin (2008) 
explicitly focuses on the ravages caused by simplifying visions – in both the intellectual world and in life. In 
this regard, he writes that: ‘[m]uch of the suffering of millions of beings results from the effects of fragmented 
and one-dimensional thought’ (57).  
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unorthodox manner, and it must be noted that he does not intend this term to designate a confused, 
or chaotic mind, but rather a mind capable of dealing with paradoxes and multiples realities; and, to 
do so in a way that does not overwhelm the individual ethical agent, but allows her to recognise her 
freedom, her choices, and her responsibilities; and, to encourage others to exercise the same degree 
of freedom, choice, and responsibility (von Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 37). To see how this relates 
to the imaginative task, we turn to Hargrave’s definition of moral imagination (which was also 
briefly referred to in chapter three, section 6.2., and which is described in detail in Woermann 
(2010)).   
 
Hargrave (2009: 87) defines moral imagination as a social process, which ‘emerges through 
dialectical processes that are influenced by actors’ relative power and political skill’. Therefore, far 
from being a passive activity, moral imagination is a skill that needs to be fostered and exercised 
within ‘pluralistic processes in which multiple actors with opposing moral viewpoints interact, and 
[where] no single actor is in control’ (90). An element of conflict is also always present in 
imaginative activities because of the ‘lived tensions between contradictory perspectives’ (91). 
Although Hargrave views moral imagination in terms of a collective action model, his analysis of 
moral imagination also has implications for individuals. In this regard, Hargrave (91) argues that 
‘morally imaginative actors recognise and integrate contradictory moral viewpoints, and also 
integrate moral sensitivity… [of] contextual considerations.’ Since these characteristics are also 
hallmarks of critical thought, one can argue that moral imagination is itself a critical activity 
(Woermann, 2010: 181). Another characteristic of moral imagination is that it involves an element 
of uncertainty or risk (186). Far from being a form of creative abandonment, moral imagination 
necessitates that we critically project and plan for the future (186). However, since this future 
cannot be known, and since uncertainty involves a real property of situations, we have to respond 
with judgement (Luntley, 2003: 325). The fact that moral imagination is a social process, involving 
an element of risk, also implies that we must be tolerant of each other’s opinions, and also tolerant 
of failure.  
 
When engaging in morally imaginative and critical activities, we must allow one another the space 
to exercise our freedom because, as von Foerster (in von Foerster & Poerksen, 2002: 37) states, ‘if 
you rob someone of their freedom and shackle them, you also take away their chance to act 
responsibly.’ Imagination, therefore, also requires trust in one another (which is a function of 
tolerance)92. Edmund Husserl (in Mensch, 2003: 143) explains that tolerance means that I affirm 
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 Von Foerster (1990) offers the following anecdote, in order to illustrate the importance of trust and 
tolerance:  
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‘his ideals as his, as ideals which I must affirm in him, just as he must affirm my ideals – not, 
indeed, as his ideals of life but as the ideals of my being and life.’ Mensch (142) explains that, in 
Latin, tolerance has the sense of supporting or sustaining, rather than enduring or suffering. He 
further states that ‘it can be understood as the attitude that actively sustains the maximum number of 
compatible possibilities of being human’ (142). As such, tolerance should be understood as the 
ideal of human fullness. The reason why Mensch views human fullness as an ideal is because 
human fullness demands more than can be achieved by a single individual (for example, we cannot 
simultaneously realise the possibility of being a professional weightlifter and sprinter). Therefore, 
for Mensch, tolerance ‘appears when we acknowledge our finitude in attempting to embody this 
ideal’ (142-143), as well as when we recognise the uniqueness and singularity of human beings (or 
the fact that even the most anonymous person is a ‘veritable cosmos’, who harbours ‘a fabulous and 
unknown world’ (Morin, 2008: 93)).  
 
From this argument, we can deduce that tolerance is the acceptance of human complexity, even 
though this complexity can never be fully understood, but only imagined. Tolerance, therefore, 
flourishes in diverse human societies, in which freedom and other aspects of disorder are accepted, 
and in which innovation and creativity blossom in defiance of perspectives that try to frame 
societies as fixed, homogenous systems (Morin, 2008: 90). In this context, it is worthwhile to take 
note of Cilliers (2005: 264) argument in favour of the importance of the arts in fostering 
imagination. He states that creative activities (such as ‘reading books, listening to music, 
appreciating art and film’) should not be viewed as a form of entertainment to be indulged in after 
the serious work is done, but as a manner in which to ‘stimulate the imagination and thereby 
transform the framework we apply when apprehending the world.’93 He further argues that we need 
better imaginations to imagine better futures (264), and that without the creative arts, ‘we will end 
up in the well-managed dystopia of the brave new world.’  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
I have a friend who grew up in Marrakech. The house of his family stood on the street that divide 
[sic] the Jewish and Arabic quarter. As a boy he played with all the others, listened to what they 
thought and said, and learned of their fundamentally different views. When I asked him once, “Who 
was right” he said, “They are both right.” 
“But this cannot be,” I argued from an Aristotelian platform, “Only one of them can have the truth!” 
“The problem is not truth,” he answered, “The problem is trust.” 
93
 Morin (1999: 53) also draws attention to the importance of the creative arts in arguing that the arts foster 
awareness of human complexity (which is necessary for understanding others), and draw attention to the full 
range of human subjectivity (which is necessary for developing compassion and sympathy). As an example, 
Morin (53) argues that fictional criminals – such as the gangster kings of Shakespeare, the royal gangsters of 
films noirs, Jean Valjean and Raskolnikov – are portrayed in all their fullness in literature and film, rather than 
the least or worst part of themselves (as is often the case with real life criminals). Morin also uses the 
example of the movie tramp, Charlie Chaplin, in order to illustrate how films use psychological techniques of 
projection and identification, which brings us to understand and sympathise with people that we would 
normally find foreign or disgusting. As such, books and films help us ‘to learn the greatest lesson of life: 
compassion and true understanding for the humiliated in their suffering’ (53).     
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5. Conclusion   
 
In this chapter, a complex notion of ethics was elucidated at the hand of an analysis on the status of 
our ethical models, on the implications arising from the embeddedness of our practices, and on 
ethics as a critical and provisional position. In the last section, it was specifically argued that the 
critical position demands transgression of existing frameworks of meaning (whilst acknowledging 
our freedoms, constraints, and choices); an attitude of self-awareness and irony; and, imagination, 
openness, and tolerance (which are qualities needed both to foster transformation and to plan for a 
better future). It is abundantly clear from the preceding analysis that a complex, critical ethics 
presents a significant challenge to the standard normative tale. Such a notion of ethics debunks the 
idea that our responsibilities can be determined through recourse to prescriptive, moral 
programmes. Rather, we need to forge strategies that allow us to take responsible decisions, despite 
the fact that we cannot calculate our responsibilities in advance. Essential to this complex 
understanding of responsibility is an awareness of the inexistant (Badiou, 2009) – or of those for 
whom we do not account in our decisions and strategies, due to both the embeddedness of our 
positions (i.e. that we are part of dynamic, temporal, and spatial networks of multiple complex 
actions and reactions), and the limitations of our models.  
 
A complex notion of ethics, in focusing on the inexistant, moves us ‘towards the celebration of the 
paralogical’, where paralogy is understood as a tool of epistemological subversion, and denotes the 
suppressed other in the game (Abraham, 2001: 171; see Lyotard, 1984). However, paralogy is also 
the very condition of the game, because as Kent (1993: 4) writes: ‘without the suppressed other, no 
logical construct can exist because every logical construct, such as a discursive argument, demand 
that we ignore and suppress elements outside the construct’ (see Derrida, 1988a: 117 in chap. 5, sec 
7.1.). This reinforces the point that, despite our best efforts to ‘couch non-existence’ (Badiou, 2009: 
143), we can never grasp the inexistant. If paralogy, however, is the condition of the game, then it 
stands to reason that a notion of ethics that attempts to account for the paralogical offers us a better 
tool for dealing with the world, than do modernist theories that deny the paralogical94.  
 
Although the merits of viewing ethics as a complex, transgressive, critical, and – hence – 
paralogical phenomenon were explained in detail in this chapter, the analysis also begs the question 
of what a complex ethics might mean in practice. In other words, what is the specific challenge that 
a complex ethics poses for the standard normative tale, and how does this challenge affect our 
                                                    
94
 In this regard, recall Linstead’s (2004a: 5) description of postmodernism as paramodernism, or as that 
which looks for the fissures in the cosy state of modernist affairs (see chap. 2, sec. 2.2.1.). 
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thinking on prominent business ethics themes? These questions will be addressed in the following 
chapter, and the insights yielded will also be analysed in terms of the consequences that they hold 
for teaching business ethics.  
221 
 
Chapter 7: 
Practical implications: The Case for Business Ethics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this study, it was argued that complexity theory leads to ‘new and different 
questions about what forms of intervention we should pursue’ (Midgley, 2003: 93). At this stage, it 
is important to investigate the ways in which a complex ethics impacts upon our understanding of 
prominent business ethics themes. How we think about these themes affects the type of 
interventions and strategies that we pursue, including the way in which we teach business ethics.  
 
Perhaps a first sceptical question that comes to mind is whether a complex ethics can, in fact, be 
institutionalised. In other words, can we translate the complexity insights into practice; and, if not, 
is business ethics a viable enterprise? In considering this question, let us first turn to Morin’s (2008: 
97) definition of complex thinking:  
 
complex thinking is not omniscient thinking. It is, on the contrary, a thinking which knows 
that it is always local, situated in a given time and place. Neither is it a complete thinking, 
for it knows in advance that there is always uncertainty. 
 
Since ethics is a complex phenomenon, the above description applies to ethical thinking as well: 
ethical thinking is always contextually and temporally determined, and implies an engagement with 
uncertainty. In the previous chapter (sec. 3.1.), we saw that, for von Foerster (1990), ethics must 
remain implicit, hidden from all eyes. Wittgenstein (Tractatus 6.421) offer an even more radical 
view on the possibility of articulating ethics: for him, ethics must remain completely silent, since 
we have no language with which to deal with the ethical. These descriptions of ethics do not bode 
well for business ethics – both as an academic discipline and as a professional practice – because, 
from the above, it seems obvious that ethics cannot be institutionalised.  
 
Although, the insights gleaned from a complex ethics requires a radical rethink of what we mean by 
business ethics, both Morin and Derrida are of the opinion that the complexities that characterise 
our lives cannot excuse us from taking action (see chap. 6, sec. 2.2.). Furthermore, if we follow 
Derrida in defining ethics as the interruption of ontological closure, several important and 
empowering insights emerge for our practices: Firstly, a complex view of ethics guards against the 
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ethical enterprise becoming a form of moralisation, since justice can only manifest in the singularity 
of the event (which implies that our practices are always subject to transformation). Secondly, 
because attempts to articulate ethics draw attention to the limits of our conceptual systems, ethics 
becomes a regulative ideal (although it remains both substantively and procedurally empty). This 
saves ethics from charges of ethnocentrism, relativism, and solipsism. Thirdly, ethical judgement, 
as guided by both moral precedent and the ideal, is possible. Ethics, on this understanding, is, 
therefore, politically potent, as one is able to take a stand (even though justice can never find its full 
expression in an action). And, finally, the fact that our immanent expressions cannot capture 
phenomena in their full complexity means that ethics can never be understood as a finished project. 
We must constantly account for the limits of our models, and, therefore, for the fact that complete 
understanding is continually deferred – a realisation which, ironically, also acts as the very impetus 
for ethics.   
 
These complexity insights open up new possibilities of being and of thinking, and should, therefore, 
not be interpreted as an insurmountable hurdle, but as an opportunity. In this regard Morin (2007: 
29) writes: 
 
complexity does not put us only in the distress of the uncertain, it allows us to see besides 
the probable, the possibilities of the improbable, because of those which have been put in 
the past and those that can be found in the future… The intelligence of complexity, isn’t it to 
explore the field of possibilities, without restricting it with what is formally probable? 
Doesn’t it invite us to reform, even to revolutionize? 
 
Far from leading to inaction, complexity, therefore, compels us to action, to fight for an 
epistemological reformation and revolution, and to engage in politics so as to assume a position 
(even if this position is itself subject to critique and transformation). Therefore, it is with this goal in 
mind that this concluding chapter commences. The analysis of a complex ethics undertaken in 
chapter six yielded several important insights for our understanding of values such as moral 
responsibility and awareness; ethical strategy development; and, tolerance and openness. In this 
chapter, these values will be explored in terms of the implications that they hold for major business 
ethics themes (specifically, corporate citizenship/corporate social responsibility, responsible and 
effective leadership, and sustainability95); the challenges that they pose to the standard view of 
                                                    
95
 The reason for focusing on the above-mentioned business ethics issues is that good corporate citizenship, 
responsible leadership, and sustainable practices are identified as the key aspects of the King III Report 
(IoD, 2010: 10-11) and King III Code (IoD, 2010: 9-10) on Corporate Governance.  As such, these three 
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business ethics; and, the implications that they hold for teaching business ethics96. This analysis is 
presented in terms of three separate cases, and is undertaken in order to show how business ethics 
can reform and revolutionise.  
 
2. Case one: a complex understanding of moral responsibility and awareness: 
implications for understanding corporate citizenship and teaching business ethics 
 
2.1. Corporate citizenship: more than corporate social responsibility?  
 
The third report on corporate governance in South Africa, named after Judge Mervyn King and 
henceforth referred to as the King III Report or the Report, became effective on 1 March 2010. The 
code applies to ‘entities incorporated in and resident in South Africa’ (intro., para. 13), and spells 
out the framework for governance compliance. As mentioned in footnote 95, corporate citizenship 
is viewed as one of the three key issues in ensuring good business practices in the South African 
context and is, therefore, discussed extensively in the King III Report. In the Report (intro., para. 
8.2.), it is stated that the concept of corporate citizenship ‘flows from the fact that the company is a 
person and should operate in a sustainable manner’97. According to Malcolm McIntosh (2003: 28), 
an international figure working in the field of corporate citizenship, the term corporate citizenship 
(CC) implies a concern for the social, environmental, and economic performance of companies; and 
a concern for the role, scope, and purpose of companies. The problem with these normative 
motivations for CC is that they in no way extend the definition of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), and also do not shed light on what corporate citizenship might entail (see Matten, Crane & 
Chapple, 2003). Indeed, McIntosh (2003: 28) views CC and CSR as synonymous terms, and 
explicitly states that the debate regarding the purpose of business is ‘sometimes called corporate 
social responsibility and at other times called corporate citizenship’. In order to ascertain whether 
the King III Report ascribes a specific meaning to CC, we turn to a more in depth analysis of how 
the term is used in the Report.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
issues are seen as critical in ensuring good business practices and corporate governance in the South 
African context.    
96
 The suggestions made in this analysis regarding the teaching of business ethics are based on a report that 
Morin (1999) wrote for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
entitled ‘Seven complex lessons in education for the future’. In the forward to this document, Morin (1) writes 
that his text ‘stands prior to any suggested guide or curriculum’ and that ‘[t]he intention is simply to identify 
fundamental problems that are overlooked or neglected in education, and should be taught in the future.’  
Although these fundamental problems are contextualised in terms of business ethics, this analysis also does 
not provide examples of specific pedagogical interventions. The aim of this analysis is, therefore, to focus 
awareness on the components that should be included in any curriculum in which the complexities of 
business ethics are addressed, rather than to present a prescriptive or substantive framework of what such a 
curriculum would entail. 
97
 In this analysis, the terms ‘company’ and ‘organisation’ are used interchangeably.  
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In viewing the company as a person, the King III Report draws attention to the fact that companies 
are ‘social entities with both rights and responsibilities, and as such, the Bill of Rights applies to 
them in a manner that goes beyond mere financial considerations’ (chap. 1, para. 23). These rights 
are reflected in the foundational values of ‘dignity, freedom and equality’ (chap. 1, para. 23). In this 
regard, the King III Report endorses not only a view of companies as legal entities, but also of 
companies as moral entities. Indeed, it is explicitly stated that companies have ‘social and moral 
standing in societies, with all the responsibilities attached to that status’ (chap. 1, para. 16) and that 
‘[r]esponsible corporate citizenship implies an ethical relationship between the company and the 
society in which it operates’ (chap. 1, para. 19). One could argue that extending moral responsibility 
to companies represents a way to start thinking about corporate citizenship (as a concept distinct 
from CSR). This is because such an extension entails an important step in conceptualising 
citizenship as active participation in a political community – which only becomes a viable notion if 
one is capable of making moral decisions.   
 
Attributing moral responsibility to companies is, however, plagued by several difficulties, and a 
central question in the business ethics literature is whether the concept of moral responsibility can 
be extended to organisations and their actions. In other words, the question is: can organisations be 
morally responsible for their actions in the same way that individuals are? In Woermann (2010: 
177), the gist of the debate is described as follows: on the one hand, it is argued that organisational 
systems and processes make it possible for organisations to undertake intentional actions that 
surpass the actions of individual corporate agents (French, 1984; French, 1979; French, Nesteruk, 
Risser, 1992; Erskine, 2003; and Petit, 2007). On the other hand, it is argued that organisations are 
incapable of undertaking moral obligations because they function like machines, and are, therefore, 
only able to pursue empirical objectives (Ladd 1970; Werhane, 1980); or, in a related argument, that 
organisations are incapable of moral motives and actions, as only biological agents can be defined 
as intentional agents (Keeley, 1981, 1988; Velasquez, 1983). Although the definition of 
intentionality may vary slightly within this debate, moral agency is – as previously argued (chap. 3, 
sec. 6.2.) – broadly conceptualised ‘as a direct cause and effect relationship between the willing and 
acting agent and the consequences of his or her decisions and behavior’ (Painter-Morland, 
2006:90). This view of moral agency informs the dominant paradigm for thinking about concepts 
such as accountability, corporate social responsibility, good governance, leadership, and a number 
of other business ethics themes.  
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It does not seem that the King III Report truly supports an extended view of agency to include 
companies, particularly since the responsibility for corporate citizenship lies with the board98. 
Furthermore, the Report also does not seem to work with an extended definition of CC. This is 
because – despite the fact that it is claimed that the company ‘is as much a citizen of a country as is 
a natural personal who has citizenship’ (intro., para. 9) – it is certainly not the case that companies 
can exercise any social (positive) rights, or political rights (as is the case for natural citizens) 
(Matten et al. 2003: 114). On closer inspection, the argument seems to be that, because companies 
are powerful public actors, they have a responsibility to respect the rights of natural citizens in 
society (115). With regard to this interpretation, Matten et al. (115) argue that ‘we see a tendency to 
collapse back into more conventional perspectives on CC [i.e. CC as an expression of CSR], albeit 
by referring to a new normative concept of citizenship such as the communitarian approach’.   
 
Since the term ‘corporate citizenship’ is employed in a very conventional sense in the Report, and 
since the idea of extending the notion of citizenship (which is a political concept) to companies is 
itself problematic, the analysis proceeds with an understanding of corporate citizenship as an 
expression of – rather than an extension of – corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, it is 
argued that the debate of whether organisations can be seen as moral persons is a fruitless avenue to 
pursue further, as it is based on the mistaken premise that the identity conditions of individuals 
(including, intentionality, autonomy, and rationality) are a priori givens (Woermann, 2010: 178).  
Following a complexity view of identity formation, it is more profitable to view the identity of 
individuals and organisations as coterminous (in that our practices lead to the emergence of 
institutions, and our institutions serve to constrain our practices through feedback loops) (see chap. 
3, sec. 6.2.). As such, the driving question should be what the emergence of corporate identity 
implies for our understanding of corporate social responsibility?  
 
Lesser and Storck (in Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 78) argue that ‘[a] sense of identity is important 
because it determines how an individual directs his or her attention.’ Albert, Ashforth and Dutton 
(in Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 79) add that ‘[a] sense of identity serves as a rudder for navigating 
difficult waters.’ This implies that – in order to foster resilience, moral awareness, and 
responsibility – our sense of identity should neither be too insular (as is the case in the Cartesian 
paradigm), nor too fragmented. It is particularly this latter problem that arises in the context of the 
modern organisation. In this regard, McIntosh (2003: 29) writes that ‘[w]e live in a society of 
organisations and networks’ – indeed individuals and organisations are embedded in various 
                                                    
98
 In principle 1.2., it is explicitly stated that ‘[t]he board should ensure that the company is and is seen to be 
a responsible corporate citizen’. 
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networks – ‘and [that] this poses enormous ethical questions about ‘whose values are they anyway – 
ours or theirs or nobody’s?’  
 
In the remainder of the analysis of this case, the insights that a complex understanding of values 
(specifically the values of moral responsibility and moral awareness) hold for our understanding of 
our corporate social responsibilities will be explored in detail. Specifically, it will be shown that 
rejecting the Cartesian dogma does not mean that it becomes impossible to assume individual 
responsibility.  
 
2.2. Understanding moral responsibility  
 
The traditional causal view of moral agency (which informs both the standard normative tale, and 
the debate on whether organisations are capable of moral agency) is also endorsed in the King III 
Report, as is clear from the following description of the board’s responsibilities:  
 
The board is responsible for corporate governance and has two main functions: first it is 
responsible for determining the company’s strategic direction (and, consequently, its 
ultimate performance); and second, it is responsible for the control of the company’ (chap. 
1; para. 7).  
 
According to this view, the individual moral agent is further conceptualised in terms of the 
Cartesian dogma, wherein it is assumed that ‘the “knowing” individual is understood as the 
architect99 and controller of an internal and external order’ (Uhl-Bien, 2006: 655).  From a 
complexity perspective, this understanding of moral agency proves mistaken, since agents are not 
independent decision-makers whose actions can be evaluated according to a linear causality. Rather, 
as previously argued, social actors are embedded in complex networks of relations (Kramer, 1991). 
Therefore, the practices to which we belong strongly influence our views on the scope of our 
responsibilities (see chap. 2, sec. 6.3.).   
 
Although the board of a company should assume responsibility for the given company, the board’s 
responsibilities should not be framed in terms of control. Since individuals contribute to the 
instantiation of companies, individuals are important role-players in influencing (rather than 
determining) the strategic direction of companies, and may even serve as catalysts of transformation 
                                                    
99
 Board members can only reasonably be expected to determine the strategic direction of a company if they 
are seen as architects of the company.  
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(Grebe & Woermann, 2010). Furthermore, it stands to reason that those vested with power (for 
example, board members), have a greater opportunity (and, therefore, a greater responsibility) to 
influence the direction of companies. However, as argued in chapter three (sec. 6.2.), the actions of 
individuals are also always constrained by feedback loops (or downward causation). These 
feedback loops serve to reinforce or undermine certain patterns of behaviour, which, over time, 
become institutionalised in formal or informal rules, norms, policies, laws etc. (Woermann, 2010; 
Grebe & Woermann, 2010). This means that a group of agents, such as a board, cannot ‘be isolated 
and be identified as the single cause of an event’ (Painter-Morland, 2006: 90).  
 
According to Painter-Morland (90-93), this point bears three further implications:  firstly, it is 
impossible to fully articulate in language the tacit understanding that corporate agents have of the 
way in which they function, or are supposed to function. Secondly, it is impossible for any single 
corporate actor ‘to ‘step out’ of the web of unarticulated expectations, obligations and pressures that 
make an organizational culture what is, in order to change or challenge it’ (92). And, thirdly, even if 
it were possible for any single corporate actor to fully identify all the aspects that determine a given 
organisation’s iterative themes, identity, or culture, this information would immediately feed back 
into the system and produce a number of new and unpredictable effects on the behaviour of 
employees. These implications are reinforced by Derrida’s (1979) analysis of writing, meaning, and 
context (see chap. 5, sec. 3.3.2.), where he argues that writing moves out from the word, resulting in 
a proliferation of meaning that cannot be controlled. Therefore, as previously argued, a complex 
view of moral agency – like writing – cannot be construed as the outcome of an intentional, causal 
process. This is because the original intentions of the moral agent start to disappear as soon as 
decisions and actions are disseminated through the network. 
 
In terms of a board, one can argue that – given a complexity understanding – the ethical 
responsibilities of the board and (indeed, to a lesser extent) of every organisational member requires 
a keen awareness of how their actions affect others, and of how their actions influence the direction 
of the company.  
 
2.3. Accounting for stakeholders  
 
The first point (i.e. that organisations should nurture awareness of how organisational actions 
influence others) is supported by both the analysis undertaken in chapter five, and by the King III 
Report. In the Report (intro., para. 9), it is specifically argued that the ‘[i]nclusivity of stakeholders 
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is essential to achieving sustainability and the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders 
must be taken into account in decision-making and strategy.’  
 
Given a complexity perspective of identity formation, it is sensible to follow Painter-Morland 
(2008: 225) in arguing that we are accountable towards those who co-constitute the network of 
relations to which we belong, as opposed to being merely accountable for the causal effects of our 
actions. The former represents a legal understanding of business responsibility, which amounts to a 
form of blame responsibility; whereas the latter represents an obligation responsibility (in that, to 
fail to act appropriately is to fail someone). In this regard, Painter-Morland (226) draws on the 
etymology of the word ‘responsibility’, arguing that in Latin, respondre means to answer, or to 
promise in return (pledge back) to those with whom one associates.  
 
From a complexity perspective, it is also important to consider what ‘association’ with other 
implies. The primary focus of the standard normative tale is ‘on the agent committing the actions, 
not the object (or patient) receiving those actions’ (Siponen, 2004: 281). The standard normative 
tale is, therefore, anthropocentric, logocentric, and egocentric (Floridi, 1999: 42).  Translated into 
organisational terms, this would imply an emphasis on the organisation or company, rather than on 
the stakeholders (who are affected and influenced by the organisation’s actions). Such a view 
creates the impression that organisations occupy the central position on stakeholder maps, which 
implies both that the organisation interacts freely with stakeholders on its own terms, and that it 
operates as a self-contained entity (Painter-Morland, 2006:90).  
 
From the complexity point of view, we are co-constituted over time in a societal network of 
relations. It is interesting to note that the King III Report (chap. 1, para. 21) touches on this point in 
emphasising the concept of Ubuntu, ‘which is captured in the expression ‘uMuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu’, ‘I am because you are; you are because we are’’. It is further stated that, in the African 
context, ‘moral duties find their expression in the concept of Ubuntu’, however, no further attention 
is given to the consequences that Ubuntu holds for our understanding of moral duty, and in the rest 
of the Report the traditional Western view of agency and intentionality is assumed (as previously 
argued).  
 
If we take a complexity (and Ubuntu) view of identity formation seriously, then critical questions 
regarding the logical and linear demarcation of agent-patient remain unsolvable – to recall the 
words of Derrida (1995b: 285), ‘we never know, and never have known, how to cut up a subject.’ 
We are continually appropriating each other through our verbal and physical relations. Therefore, 
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one needs to consider this complex, asymmetrical reciprocity between beings, in order to determine 
‘the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating to the other and of 
relating the other to the self’ (281-282) (see chap. 6, sec. 3.1.). This necessitates a complex 
thinking, which requires not only a move beyond agent-centred ethics, but also a move beyond 
biocentric and patient-orientated ethics, which ‘is centred on, and interested in, the entity itself that 
received the action, rather than its relation to or relevance to the agent’ (Floridi, 1999: 42). From the 
perspective of a complexity-centred ethics, one must think the inextricable relation between self 
and other (see chap. 3, sec. 5.2.1.), whilst simultaneously respecting the other’s difference – not 
only in terms of manifest differences, but also in terms of differences that cannot be thought within 
our conceptual models.  
 
Stakeholder theorists, such as Edward Freeman, have done important work in drawing attention to 
the groups (beyond shareholders) that affect and are affected by company actions. However, given 
this analysis, one can conclude that it is not only important to take cognisance of these groups, but 
also to account for the type of relations that emerge between companies and stakeholder groups. 
Freeman and Philips (2002: 336-340) view these relations in terms of value-creating exercises 
(which are defined as voluntary agreements that are the product of cooperating free wills). As such, 
stakeholder relations that cannot easily be accommodated in Freeman’s model are largely ignored.  
Much work, therefore, still needs to be done in order to find ways to account for disenfranchised, 
dispossessed, and distant stakeholders, who rarely feature in the board’s thinking. In Badiou’s 
(2009) terms: one must try to account for the inexistant – an act which is undermined by the 
monstration of a conceptual slippage (141) that we can never overcome (see chap. 6, sec. 4.2.1.), 
and by the face of the third (which necessitates a decision, even though such a decision will 
necessarily lead to the suppression on an other) (see chap. 5, sec. 7.2.).   
 
2.3.1. Pedagogical implications 
 
The above analysis helps to debunk the notion that ‘it is easy to be ethical’, and that individuals 
automatically know when they are faced with ethical problems, and how they should overcome the 
problems (Trevino & Brown, 2004: 70). As Trevino and Brown (70) note: ‘Rarely do decisions 
come with waving red flags that say, “Hey, I am an ethical issue. Think about me in moral terms!”’ 
Research has, however, shown that ‘moral judgment processes are not initiated unless the decision-
maker recognizes the ethical nature of an issue’ (70). Furthermore, a review of research on 
cognitive complexity (interpretation of Streufert & Nogami in Swenson & Rigoni, 1999: 577) 
indicates that less cognitively complex persons tend ‘to engage in search behaviour less when there 
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was an information overload.’ A willingness to consider ethical problems from complex 
perspectives is, in part, influenced by learning. What this implies is that business ethicists should 
concentrate on fostering moral awareness with regard to the nature of our interdependent human 
existence; which, in turn, leads to awareness of the fact that all our decisions and actions are, in 
effect, characterised by a normative component (see chap. 2, sec. 6.2.).  
 
In order to facilitate a broadened understanding of our responsibilities towards one another, 
business ethicists should develop strategies that centre on teaching pertinent knowledge and raising 
awareness of the human condition. Morin (1999: 15) identifies pertinent knowledge as an important 
component of education for the future. He argues that pertinent knowledge in education should 
confront complexity, especially the type of complexity that arises when various elements (e.g. 
economic, political, sociological, psychological, ethical etc.) that compose a whole are inseparable. 
Pertinent knowledge is, therefore, knowledge of the complex ‘inter-retroactive, interactive, 
interdependent tissue between the parts and the whole, the whole and the parts, [and] the parts 
amongst themselves’ (15). In a business ethics context, pertinent knowledge implies a focus on the 
coterminous formation of individual and corporate identities, corporate identities and socio-cultural 
identities, and the ethical implications that arise from a broadened understanding of our work 
practices. In this regard, it is important not to succumb to the principle of reductionism, or of 
holism, but rather to think both the similarities and differences between parts and whole (see chap. 
3, sec. 4.3.). A focus on such knowledge fosters cognitive complexity, which helps individuals to 
‘tolerate apparent inconsistencies and conflicts in information, avoid extreme judgments, more 
accurately predict outcomes, avoid dualistic categorizing, search for more diverse information, and 
entertain more questions about an event’ (interpretation of Streufert & Nogami in Swenson & 
Rigoni, 1999: 577).  
 
A further outcome of the above teaching strategy would be to generate ‘reciprocal commiseration 
from each to each and from all to all’ (Morin, 1999: 39). This is because acknowledging the 
complexity of the human condition implies an abandonment of the arrogant and egocentric 
implications that arise from subscribing to the Cartesian dogma, where humans are seen as isolated 
actors and decision-makers. Business ethics should, therefore, become a subject that contributes to 
teaching an ethics of not only inter-personal understanding, but also planetary understanding, in 
which the various dimensions of globalisation (including the role of global business) are 
conceptualised in terms of service for mankind (54). In order to facilitate this strategy, Morin 
recommends that the following two aspects be incorporated into our teaching:  
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 Methods ‘of grasping mutual relations and reciprocal influences between parts and the 
whole in a complex world’ (2). 
 Restoring awareness of the fact that ‘[h]umans are physical, biological, psychological, 
cultural, social, and historical beings’ so that ‘every person, wherever he might be, can 
become aware of both his complex identity and his shared identity with all other human 
beings’ (2).     
 
The above aspects help to draw attention to the embeddedness of our realities, or the fact that 
‘[t]here is nothing outside of the text’ (Derrida, 1976: 163). This necessitates that we also work 
through the complexities that arise from our relations with one another, including the fact that, 
although we have a shared identity (characterised by the dialogics of our two-getherness (Buber, in 
von Foerster, 1990)), our differences cannot be assimilated. In this regard, we function as 
‘antagonistic terms’ that are ‘necessarily coupled’ (Morin, 1992: 373; see chap. 3, sec. 4.3.; chap. 6, 
sec. 3). Deconstruction – defined as an ever-renewed quest to safeguard difference – is vital in 
allowing us to fully appreciate the implications of what it means to think on our double-identity. 
This is because engaging in deconstruction implies working on two fronts simultaneously: we must 
take seriously our shared and dominant traditions, whilst displacing these traditions, in order to 
open up our systems of meaning to differences not previously considered (see chap. 4, sec. 2.2.1.). 
In the context of CSR and stakeholder theory, a complex notion of responsibility helps us to move 
beyond the traditional predicates of responsibility (defined as an equalising justice), and further aids 
us in thinking about responsibility as an expression of ethical complexity (see chap. 5, sec. 4.3.). 
Even though the implications arising from the complex nature of our myriad interactions and 
associations with one another can never fully be grasped, our responsibility resides in the attempt to 
continually account for the incalculable possibilities and consequences that our actions hold for 
ourselves and for others. 
 
2.4. Accounting for a company’s strategic direction 
 
Despite the important insights that emerge from the above analysis, organisational members 
(including boards) are not only responsible towards stakeholders, but also have to take 
responsibility for the manner in which their actions influence the direction of ‘their’ companies. In 
other words, members of an organisation must acknowledge the impact that they have on what 
Grebe and Woermann (2010) refer to as ‘institutions of integrity’, and the ‘integrity of institutions’. 
‘Institutions of integrity’ represent the structurally and contextually-determined norms and codes 
that 'bind' individual behaviour. These norms and codes are, in part, based on underlying normative 
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principles, but also emerge from contextually-defined practices. The ‘integrity of institutions’, on 
the other hand, is understood as 'correct functioning' and fitness for purpose – which, in the case of 
companies, refers to the company’s ability to ethically and effectively achieve its goals.  
 
With regard to ‘institutions of integrity’, the board and other appropriately placed organisational 
members have a duty to exercise responsible leadership, which will be discussed in section 3. As 
will be argued, responsible leadership is partially characterised by a leader’s values. However, a 
large part of responsible leadership also has to do with a leader’s ability to build alliances between 
people, ideas, or technologies and promote collaborative efforts; foster normative congruence or 
coherence, so that – despite conflict and dissensus amongst stakeholders – institutional processes do 
not lose their functional unity or sense of purpose; and, to display an attitude of openness, modesty, 
and critical (self)-reflexivity (see Grebe & Woermann, 2010).  These dimensions of ethical 
leadership will be returned to later. At this stage, however, it is important to note that ‘institutions of 
integrity’ (i.e. our contextually-defined practices) have a large influence on the ‘integrity of 
institutions’ (i.e. whether organisations display fitness for purpose).  
 
An important element in ensuring fitness for purpose is organisational openness. Instead of being 
viewed as ‘core, distinctive and enduring’ (Albert & Whetten in Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 81), 
organisational identity should rather be conceptualised in terms of ‘the stability of the labels used 
by organizational members to express who or what they believe the organization to be’ (Gioia, 
Schultz & Corley in Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 81-82). Although these labels tend to be relatively 
durable, it is important that organisational members engage in dialogue regarding organisational 
change, emergence, boundaries and indexicals (Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 79). In other words, 
organisational members should recognise, and take responsibility for the fact that – to a large extent 
– their corporate identities are the product of a certain strategy or bricolage (see chap. 6, sec. 4.3.), 
so as to ensure that their organisational identities and practices remain open enough to respond to, 
and deal with, complexities100.  
 
Cilliers (2010b: 58) argues that no capacity for complex behaviour exists within a fully-constrained 
system. Therefore, when a certain work practice is no longer robust enough to cope with its 
operating environment, or when it causes destructive conflicts, it is – as Jane Collier and Rafael 
Esteban (1999:176) warn – a sure sign to start planning as ‘open systems’ in order to survive.  
Planning as open systems does not present a once-off organisational intervention, but is a process of 
                                                    
100
 The following three paragraphs are, in part, based on the argument presented in Woermann, 2010: 181-
184.  
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continual re-organisation (177) in an effort to create greater flexibility, and organisational 
robustness or resilience, where resilience is defined as an organisation’s capacity to deal with stress 
and promote ‘learning, self-organization, and adaptation at multiple scales’ (Lissack & Letiche, 
2002: 82). Michael Lissack and Hugo Letiche (82) further argue that an organisation’s capacity for 
resilience is determined by the structure of the system, and the interactions between the components 
of a system; as well by organisational perceptions regarding change (especially unexpected 
emergent events). From this description, one can deduce that more ‘loosely coupled’ organisational 
structures are better able to deal with current concerns such as globalisation, increased 
communication possibilities, technological change, financial innovation, freer trade possibilities, 
and heightened competition for market share (Collier & Esteban, 1999: 176). 
 
Opening up work practices and creating greater organisational flexibility demands both that work 
practices be aligned with organisational purpose, and that organisations be more responsive to 
environmental complexities and contingencies. In other words, boards and organisational members 
must seek to (re-)establish a sense of normative congruence within the organisation, as well as 
between the organisation and the environment.  In order to (re-) establish normative congruence 
within organisations, organisational members must recognise that ‘people are not merely ‘part of’ 
the organization, but actually ‘take part’ in every aspect of its existence’ (177). Lissack and Letiche 
(2002: 84) use the term ‘coherence’ to explain this sense of normative congruence or organisational 
purpose, stating that: 
 
It implies a shared meaning and signifying apparatus of some rigor and sustainability. 
Coherence may be temporary, but it is not entirely fleeting. It demands robustness, just as 
the fate of the modern organization or team demands resilience. It takes a special kind of 
coherence to provide that robustness; that is, the coherence of preparedness, of identity, of 
action. Such coherence entails being prepared to engage in dialog.    
 
Actively engaging in dialogue is important in generating a shared sense of meaning, and in 
facilitating relationships with internal and external stakeholders. The coherence of preparedness, of 
identity, and of action implies both that accountability and responsibility is shared by all 
organisational members (since coherence is fostered by dialogue), and that organisations should 
seek to redefine their relationship with the environment as one of symbiosis and adaptation (Collier 
& Esteban, 1999: 177), rather than disjuncture and otherness (this is because organisational actions 
need to be congruent with environmental forces if organsations wish to be resilient).  
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In order to help facilitate the development of resilient, coherent organisations – and, therefore, of 
institutions of integrity and of the integrity of institutions – boards and organisational members 
must be ethically aware, which is critical in planning as open systems, in avoiding blame-shifting 
and apathy, in promoting an extended view of our actions, and in nurturing an understanding of the 
nature of our models and strategies (including models and strategies pertaining to CSR/CC).  
Indeed, as stated in the King III Report (chap. 1, para. 30), ‘[t]here is no uniform or universally 
applicable approach to responsible citizenship programmes.’ Therefore, ‘[a]s a responsible citizen, 
each company should develop its own policies to define and guide its activities’.  
 
The success with which we fulfil our responsibilities is related to our ability to critically and 
creatively reflect upon (and, if need be, to modify) our conceptual models (which in turn, affect our 
practices). In other words, we need to recognise that our models are largely contingent upon the 
resources at our disposal, and that we employ framing strategies when describing our systems 
(Cilliers, 2001). As argued in chapter three (sec. 6.1.), these framing strategies do not constitute 
objective descriptions of reality, but are, to a large part, the outcome of judgement and convenience.  
Living with irony (as opposed to feigning objective certainty) makes it easier to accept the 
provisional status of our models, and to continuously evaluate this status in order to prevent our 
models from becoming naturalised (and thus closed-off to alternative ways of being) (see chap. 6, 
sec. 4.3.; chap. 4, sec. 2.1.1.).  Therefore, as stated in chapter five (sec. 8), it is imperative we 
attempt to nurture the type of organisational identities that allow us to understand and reinscribe our 
responsibilities in larger, more powerful, and more stratified contexts (Derrida, 1988a). 
 
Being morally aware and engaging with our responsibilities also necessitates that we take 
cognisance of the fact that organisational coherence may be temporary, and that our decisions and 
actions are subject to risks, hazards, derailments and transformations (Morin, 2008) – all of which 
impact upon the integrity of our institutions. In this regard, moral responsibility implies facing up to 
uncertainty, dealing with matters beyond the present (even if our long term perspectives are 
inherently flawed), and being flexible and responsive enough to try and correct decisions and 
actions with undesirable consequences (see chap. 6, sec. 4.2.2.) In this regard, moral responsibility 
implies a degree of courage, as argued in the King III Report (chap. 1, para. 15.5).   
 
2.4.1. Pedagogical implications 
 
In showing how our actions impact on ‘institutions of integrity’, and the ‘integrity of institutions’, 
the above analysis helps to further dispel the myth that being ethical is easy, since such a notion 
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also ignores the impact that our work practices and identities have on our views of our moral 
responsibilities (see Trevino & Brown, 2004: 71). Furthermore, the analysis also serves as a 
challenge to the commonly accepted view that unethical behaviour in business is simply the result 
of ‘bad apples’ (72). Although Trevino and Brown (72) concede that there are bad actors, they 
argue that ‘most people are the product of the context they find themselves in. They tend to “look 
up and look around,” and they do what others around them do or expect them to do.’ In order to 
promote ethical work environments, business ethicists should concentrate on fostering moral 
awareness with regard to the challenges that arise from our understanding of our organisations, of 
our organisational actions, and of ourselves – as organisational members.   
 
The above implies that business ethicists should develop teaching strategies that allow students and 
future practitioners to understand how their work practices influence, and are influenced by a larger 
internal and external operating environment; and, to deal with the uncertainties that characterise 
decision-making, and the unpredictable consequences that arise from our actions.    
 
With regard to this first point, Morin (1999: 14) argues that another important dimension of 
pertinent knowledge concerns an understanding of the multi-dimensionality of human experiences, 
which means that we should not isolate the parts from the whole, or isolate the parts from each 
other in our thinking. If a discipline such as business ethics operates as a self-enclosed realm (taught 
in isolation to other subjects), then the mind begins to lose its natural aptitude ‘to contextualize 
knowledge and integrate it into its natural entities’ (16). In Montuori’s (1996: 58) words: ‘The 
segmented, fragmented organization of education into small compartments, each engaged in the 
study of a rigidly defined discipline, leads to blinkered assembly-line over-specialization.’ Applied 
to the business context, this means that business activities will be viewed as standing apart from the 
totality of systems to which they in actual fact belong. The fragmentation of knowledge has 
detrimental consequences, in that ‘[a] weakened perception of the global leads to a weakened sense 
of responsibility (each individual tends to be responsible solely for his specialized task) and 
weakened solidarity (each individual loses the feeling of his ties to fellow citizens)’ (Morin, 1999: 
16)101. 
                                                    
101
 In this regard, consider the following example: In 1973, a behavioural scientist, David Frew, undertook a 
study, which illustrated the ‘ecologically schizophrenic’ behaviour of employees who worked for a corporation 
that was known as a substantial polluter. He found that although each of the corporate members recognised 
and deplored the corporation’s polluting activities, they nevertheless willingly contributed on a daily basis to 
the problem through their work practices. A possible reason for this could be the way in which work practices 
are delineated. In terms of this example, broadening the perceived scope of the workers’ practices would 
imply a concession that they are both employees and community members, and that their work identities 
(which are formed through practice) cannot be incongruent with their community identities. (The above 
description is taken from Grebe & Woermann, 2010.) 
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Morin (17) further argues that ‘[f]ragmented, compartmentalized, mechanized, disjunctive, 
reductionist intelligence... is nearsighted and often goes blind.’ By this he means that since 
individuals are unable to grasp a problem in its entirety, they are also unlikely to engage in 
reflection, meaning that ‘the chances of corrective judgement or a long term view are drastically 
reduced.’ Morin (17) draws on economics as an example of a field that has become extremely 
specialised (indeed, it is the mathematically most advanced social science), yet remains a ‘humanly 
backward science’. The reason for this is precisely because ‘it has abstracted itself from the social, 
historical, political, psychological, and ecological conditions inseparable from economic activity’ 
(17).   
 
If we wish to successfully deal with complex systems, we must engage in complex thought so as to 
foster robustness, resilience, and coherence. With regard to the second point (i.e. learning to deal 
with organisational uncertainties), the ability to engage in complex thought is also necessity. This is 
because we can only take cognisance of the wager involved in a decision, and implement (and when 
necessary, modify) a strategy, when we confront the complexities of our systems. Complex thought 
allows us to surmount short or medium term uncertainties, whilst remaining vigilant of the fact that 
we cannot claim to have eliminated uncertainty in the long term (47).  
 
In order to promote multidimensionality in thought, and the cultivation of robust strategies, business 
ethicists should: 
 
 Encourage learning that will assist students to ‘grasp subjects within their contexts, their 
complex, their totality’ (1). This requires both that lecturers teaching business and economic 
studies draw attention to the ethical dimensions of their subjects, and that business ethicists 
contextualise their subject in terms of wider business realities. As such, it is necessary to 
cultivate a stronger interdisciplinary focus in business ethics, since how we conceptualise of 
our practices affects the perceived scope of our identities. 
 Forsake determinist and reductive views of ethics, in which it is assumed that future 
consequences of actions can be predicted, and that our identities are static. Instead, we 
should work on preparing minds to engage with complexity, to expect the unexpected, and 
to confront it through means of strategy development and dialogue.  
 
For Morin (3), it is imperative that ‘[e]very person who takes on educational responsibilities must 
be ready to go to the forward posts of uncertainty in our times.’ To this one can add that, despite the 
uncertainty, every person taking on educational responsibilities should also focus attention on the 
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potential coherence (defined as a by-product of resilience or robustness (Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 
82)) that can emerge when role players show ‘a preparedness to engage in dialogue’102 (85; 
italicised in original), and to grasp subjects in their totality. This reaffirms the point made in chapter 
two (sec. 6.1.) that limited knowledge does not amount to any knowledge. Uncertainty is not an 
excuse for inaction or for assuming a relativist position. Rather, uncertainty compels us to work 
harder, to engage further, and to find robust and workable solutions in the absence of meta-
frameworks (see chap. 2, sec. 6.1.). In this regard, the role of leaders is essential in nurturing a sense 
of community, and in guiding the process of organisational becoming or identity formation. As 
such, effective, responsible leadership forms the focus of the second case.  
 
3. Case two: A complex understanding of tolerance and openness: implications for 
understanding effective, responsible leadership and teaching business ethics 
 
In the King III Report (chap. 1, para. 1), it is stated that ‘[g]ood corporate governance is essentially 
about effective, responsible leadership.’ According to the Report (chap. 1, para. 2-6), this involves 
building sustainable business; reflecting on the role of business in society; doing business ethically 
(which also implies valuing personal and institutional ethical fitness, and practicing corporate 
statesmanship); not compromising the natural environment or intergenerational welfare; and, 
embracing a shared future with all the company’s stakeholders. These are indeed noble goals, and in 
order to appreciate how responsible leadership can aid in achieving these goals, it is first necessary 
to gain a general understanding of what both leadership and ethical leadership entail.  
 
Mary Uhl-Bien (2006: 655) distinguishes between two broad leadership orientations, namely: the 
more traditional orientation, which she refers to as the ‘entity’ perspective; and the less-known 
orientation (currently gaining prominence), which she refers to as the ‘relational’ perspective. 
Whereas the former perspective focuses on leaders as independent, discrete entities (i.e. as 
individual agents); the latter view focuses on leadership as a socially constructed and distributed 
phenomenon (655), and has, therefore, also been referred to as distributed leadership (Bennett, 
Wise, Woods & Harvey, 2003) and systemic leadership (Collier & Esteban, 2000; Painter-Morland, 
2008)103.  
 
 
                                                    
102
 In section 3.2., the conditions necessary to successfully engage in dialogue will be discussed.  
103
 This paragraph and the following two sections are based on Woermann’s contribution to Grebe and 
Woermann’s (2010) scoping paper, entitled: ‘Institutions of integrity and the integrity of institutions: integrity 
and ethics in the politics of developmental leadership’.   
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3.1. The entity or agential perspective on leadership  
 
With regard to the entity or agential perspective, Uhl-Bien (2006: 655) writes that leadership is 
treated in terms of the Cartesian dogma. Translated into leadership terms, this means that leaders 
can exercise influence and control over followers, and, thereby mobilise people and resources. In 
this perspective, ‘organizational life is viewed as the result of individual action’ (Hosking, Dachler 
& Gergen, 1995: x), and it believed that it is primarily those in the top echelon of the corporate 
hierarchy who are in position to determine organisational life (see Painter-Morland, 2008: 179). The 
entity perspective can be divided into a normative interpretation (which focuses on what a leader 
‘ought’ to do) and a descriptive or social scientific interpretation (which focuses on what leaders 
do).  
 
The traditional understanding of responsible leadership is applicable to the normative interpretation 
of the entity perspective; since, within this orientation, emphasis is placed on the ethical qualities 
and standards demanded of ethical leaders. In this regard, authentic leadership (Aviolio, Luthans, & 
Wlaumbwa, 2004; Luthans & Aviolio, 2003), spiritual leadership (Fry, 2003; Reave, 2005; Fry, 
Vitucci, & Cedillo, 2005), transformational leadership (Burns, 1978), and servant leadership 
(Greenleaf, 1977) are all examples of leadership theories that address the moral potential of leaders. 
Within this perspective, it is generally assumed that individual leaders embody virtuous character 
traits, including integrity. In the business ethics literature, integrity is commonly understood as ‘the 
quality of moral self-governance’ (Paine, 1994: 225), moral ‘wholeness’ (Solomon, 1992b: 109), 
honesty in the wide sense of the word (Dalla Costa, 1998: 191), or as a set of consistently displayed 
characteristics (Gostick & Telford, 2003).  
 
Brown and Trevino (2006) are proponents of the descriptive approach, and are critical of these 
normative leadership theories, as they claim that these theories cannot account for the 
‘transactional’ or ‘behavioural’ aspects of leadership i.e. the proactive influence that leaders have 
on the ethical/unethical conduct of followers in the context of work processes (600). In the 
descriptive approach, the focus is on the leader’s influence on followers as relayed via 
communication and accountability processes (600). Schein (1985), an early supporter of the 
descriptive approach, maintains that, in this regard, aspects such as the issues that capture the 
leader’s attention, a leader’s values during crisis situations, the behavioural example set by a leader 
in terms of condoning or condemning unethical behaviour, the reward structures, and the selection 
and dismissal processes all convey what is acceptable behaviour within a given work forum or 
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institution104. One can, therefore, conclude that leadership processes – and not only leader character 
traits – can serve to reinforce or undermine the ethicality of a given organisational or institutional 
culture.  
 
Although the descriptive orientation goes some way towards overcoming the weakness identified in 
the normative approach (i.e. that the normative approach cannot account for actual leader-follower 
behaviours), this approach is itself too focused on the individual, who still represents a formally-
constituted locus of control (Painter-Morland, 2008). As argued earlier in this study (see chap. 2, 
sec. 3), in the messy business of real life, the normative and the descriptive dimensions cannot be 
kept neatly apart, and the ethical example set by leaders – although influential on followers’ 
behaviour – does not determine followers’ behaviour. In remaining within the Cartesian dogma, the 
entity perspective is too agent-centric to adequately deal with the complexities that define 
organisational life. Conceptualising leadership within this paradigm, therefore, does not provide 
much insight as to how one should go about achieving the goals of effective, responsible leadership 
(as defined in the King III Report). 
 
3.2. The relational or systemic perspective on leadership  
 
In contrast to the entity or agential perspective, the relational or systemic perspective on leadership 
is more sensitive to the human and contextual complexities that influence the leadership process. In 
this approach, the focus is on both the interdependent and dynamic relations between stakeholders, 
as well as on the contextual contingencies that impact upon these relations. As such, a “relational” 
orientation starts with processes and not persons, and views persons, leadership, and other relational 
                                                    
104
 Sims and Brinkmann (2003: 247-251) employ Schein’s model in order to illustrate how the leadership 
practices in Enron served to create an organisational culture that was focused on accruing profits at all costs. 
Firstly, the issues that capture the leader’s attention will also capture the attention of the greater 
organisation, and of the employees. At Enron executives’ attention was focused on profit, power, greed and 
influence. Secondly, a crisis tests a leader’s true values, and brings these values to the fore. When Enron 
was found out, leaders reacted by shifting blame and pointing fingers. Thirdly, role-modelling refers to the 
behavioural example that leaders set in terms of tolerating unethical behaviour. Enron’s executives did not 
set a good example in living the company’s values of communication, respect integrity, and excellence. To 
the contrary, they broke the law in their use of creative partnerships called special purpose entities. Fourthly, 
rewards signal to others what is necessary in order to succeed in an organisation.  The reward system at 
Enron was premised on a ‘win-at-all-costs’ focus, and a former Enron vice-president was quoted as saying: 
‘the moral of the story is break the rules, you can cheat, you can lie, but as long as you make money, it’s all 
right’ (250; see: Schwartz, 2002). Lastly, a leader’s decision with regard to whom to recruit or dismiss signals 
his values to all employees. Kenneth Lay and Jeffery Skilling sought to hire the best and the smartest 
people, who embodied the same beliefs that they were trying to instill, namely: ‘aggressiveness, greed, a will 
to win at all costs, and an appreciation for circumventing rules’ (Sims & Brinkmann, 2003: 251). Employees 
who were unable or unwilling to conform to these values, and who did not produce results were humiliated in 
a public forum, and redeployed or fired. (The above description is taken from Grebe & Woermann, 2010.) 
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realities as emergent properties of a system (see Hosking, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Collier & Esteban, 
2000). In this perspective, leadership is:  
 
the systematic capability, diffused throughout the organization and nurtured by its members, 
of finding organizational direction, of generating and maintaining continual renewal by 
encouraging, harnessing and directing creative and innovative capabilities, while 
simultaneously holding in tension the processes of responsiveness to the environment on the 
one hand, and maintenance of internal integrity of purpose on the other (Collier & Esteban, 
2000: 208). 
 
A major strength of the relational perspective (henceforth referred to as the systemic leadership 
model) is that the individual moral agent does not form the central point of this perspective. The 
integrity of leadership processes are not driven by the person of the leader, but must be 
conceptualised as ‘an ongoing direction-finding process, which is innovative and continually 
emergent’ (208). This point implies that individual leaders do not have a priori knowledge of what 
ought, morally-speaking, to be the case. This is because our identities (and our sense of right and 
wrong) emerge in, and through our practices. We can, therefore, never be a hundred percent sure of 
the ‘rightness’ of our actions, since there is no external yardstick against which to measure the 
ethicality of these actions. Consequently, ethical leadership is related to the quality of the arguments 
that we provide for undertaking certain actions (see chap. 2, sec. 6.1.; chap. 3, sec. 6.2.).  Otherwise 
stated, ethical, systemic leadership guides the process of becoming and nurtures a sense of 
community, through focusing attention on the implications and consequences of our decisions and 
actions (which, in turn, shape our identities) (Wenger, 1998: 191).   
 
In the systemic perspective, it is recognised that people have different capabilities, and that 
leadership roles and responsibilities are not static, but shift between people, as the situation 
requires105 (Collier & Esteban, 2000: 209; see Kelly & Allison, 1998). What this means is that 
                                                    
105
 As an example, consider Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey’s (2007: 306-307; 309) distinction between 
administrative, adaptive, and enabling leadership: administrative leadership refers to the activities of 
individuals who occupy formal managerial roles, and who are, therefore, responsible for planning and 
coordinating organisational or institutional activities (i.e. they assume a bureaucratic function). In contrast to 
administrative leadership, adaptive leadership is an emergent, complex dynamic, ‘which originates in 
struggles among agents and groups over conflicting needs, ideas, or preferences; it results in movements, 
alliances of people, ideas or technologies, and cooperative efforts’ (306). Although adaptive leadership 
involves people, it is not embodied in people. However, Uhl-Bien et al. (306) still identify it as a leadership 
dynamic since it is the proximal source of change in an organisation or institution. Lastly, the role of enabling 
leadership (309) is to facilitate the conditions that catalyse adaptive leadership. Enabling leaders also 
facilitate the inevitable entanglement between administrative and adaptive leadership. This involves ‘using 
authority (where applicable), access to resources, and influence to keep the formal and informal 
organizational systems working in tandem rather than counter to one another’ (311; see: Dougherty, 1996). 
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leadership is distributed. Distributed leadership can be understood in two ways: Firstly, the 
common, numerical understanding of distributed leadership views the leadership function as 
dispersed amongst some, many, or all members of an organisation (Wenger, 2000: 231). On this 
reading, distributed leadership is the sum of the attributed influence. Secondly, distributed 
leadership can be understood as joint or concertive action (Gronn, 2003: 35). Distributed leadership, 
as concertive action, implies that (35):  
 
 There are collaborative models of engagement that arise spontaneously in the workplace  
 There is the intuitive understanding that develops as part of close working relations between 
colleagues  
 There are a number of structural relations and institutionalised arrangements which 
constitute attempts to regularise distributed actions  
 
This latter understanding of distributed leadership accords well with a complexity-view of 
organisations, since it not only accounts for the fact that the leadership function is stretched across 
individuals in the organisation, but also for the fact that organisational nodes or coalitions emerge 
which can play an influential role in determining the direction of the organisation (see chap. 3, sec. 
5.2.). Several important insights pertaining to the constituents of responsible leadership emerge 
from the above analysis.  
 
If one defines leadership as concertive action, then the qualities demanded of individual leaders 
include flexibility and adaptability, a willingness to engage in constructive conflict, and the ability 
to foster active participation amongst organisational members and stakeholders. Although not every 
leader can be a transformational leader, stakeholder actions have systemic impacts, and leaders 
must manage these actions and take responsibility for the effects that these actions have on the 
organisational structure as a whole. Individual leaders, therefore, have the important task of 
balancing organisational structures with the interests of individual stakeholders. In complex 
organisations, where interests compete with one another, resources are limited, and effects not fully 
predictable, this is a crucial, yet difficult task.  Indeed, Lissack and Letiche (2002: 86) report that 
the bulk of managers with whom they have dealt ‘are searching for means of reconciling the tension 
                                                                                                                                                                            
All three leadership types are operative in one organisation. However, sometimes one of these types will 
take precedence over another, and in some cases may even involve a pragmatic reversal of roles between 
those who occupy authoritarian positions in the formal hierarchy, and those who answer to them (Painter-
Morland, 2008: 224).  
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between the world of mission, vision, and strategy, and that of change and self.’106 Lissack and 
Letiche (86) further argue that such managers are striving for what they term ‘experiential 
coherence’, which is ‘a way of holding complex circumstances together and of it resonating.’  
 
Effective, responsible leadership generates several paradoxes, not least of which is the fact that, 
although leadership is the responsibility of all, it is exercised only by one person at a time (see 
Collier & Esteban, 2000: 212-213). Part of responsible leadership implies knowing when to step 
down, in order to give others a chance to lead. In other words, leaders must take note of the 
implications that follow from a Derridean (2002a) analysis of hierarchy and authority, where it is 
shown that – although we cannot do without hierarchies and authorities – they, nevertheless, remain 
conceptual and political constructions in need of deconstruction, so as to allow for qualitative 
differences and requisite variety to blossom (see chap. 4, sec. 2.1.1.) Leaders will only be aware of 
the effects of organisational hierarchies (including the effects of their own position within the 
hierarchy) if they practice deep openness, which is both participative (in terms of sharing 
information that generates dialogue and questioning), and self-reflective (in terms of being prepared 
to challenge one’s own convictions and presuppositions) (209).  
 
Another paradox of systemic leadership is that it ‘works with the unity of purpose, but with a 
diversity of ideas and interests, so that conflict is inevitable’ (212). Effective, responsible leaders 
are, therefore, also capable of showing the necessary humour (irony) for dealing with conflict, as 
well as creating an environment in which constructive conflict can emerge. Such an environment 
tends to be trusting, supportive, and caring, since it is only within generative contexts that 
organisational members feel comfortable enough to ‘take personal risks, express fears and hopes, 
critique structure of domination, and envision alternatives’ (Montuori, 1996: 60). Effective, 
responsible leaders are, therefore, tolerant. As was explained in chapter six (sec. 4.4.), tolerance 
implies the acceptance of human complexity, and the ability to allow many different lifestyles to 
flourish together within a societal network.  Morin (1999: 54) writes that: 
 
True tolerance is not generalized scepticism or indifference to ideas. Tolerance implies that 
we have convictions and faith, make ethical choices, and at the same time accept the rights 
of others to express different or even opposite choices, convictions, and ideas.  
 
                                                    
106
 Note the similarities between this management tension and the tension that exists between ethics and 
politics, where politics requires affirmation and position, and ethics requires vigilance and openness (Derrida, 
2002e; see chap. 5, sec. 7.2.).    
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In the organisational context, tolerance allows for difference and dissensus, without losing focus of 
the organisation’s purpose. Practicing true tolerance goes hand-in-hand with exercising moral 
imagination, which manifests in ‘pluralistic processes in which multiple actors with opposing moral 
viewpoints interact, and [where] no single actor is in control’ (Hargrave, 2009: 90). The challenge is 
to recognise and integrate contradictory moral viewpoints. This is only possible if we are capable of 
imagining possibilities for living other than our own, and of being open enough to allow these 
possibilities to transform the frameworks that we employ when apprehending the world (Cilliers, 
2005; see chap. 6, sec. 4.4.).  
 
To lead effectively requires the exercise of power. However, the traditional notion of leaders and 
followers (which assumes that power derives from formal authority and flows unidirectionally) is 
not tenable in a complex system. This is because many centres of both formal and informal power 
exist in organisations, and power is distributed or dispersed across levels. Therefore, in order for 
leaders to be effective, they must harness institutional and systemic resources. This requires that 
they pay attention to emergent organisational narratives. Lissack and Letiche (2002: 91) explicitly 
argue that ‘[m]anagers who attend to the affordances of the narratives that make up their 
environment can perhaps make a difference – to their teams, their organizations, and themselves.’ A 
reason for why taking cognisance of corporate themes is so important is because it represents a way 
of attaining ‘stakeholder buy-in’. Leaders must ‘sell’ strategies to stakeholders; however, these 
strategies must also resonate with stakeholders, since not taking account of stakeholder concerns 
undermines organisational coherence, and can have systemically-detrimental effects. This again 
requires that leaders take cognisance of the status of their models. As argued in chapter three (sec. 
6.1.), models function like novels to the extent that they ring true to our experiences (Oreskes et al., 
1994). Organisational models that are not compatible with the experiences of organisational 
members, will not find salience within the organisation. In developing successful models, leaders 
must, therefore, build alliances between people, ideas, or technologies, and foster collaborative 
efforts. However, in order for leadership to be both effective and responsible, leaders must also take 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions (they are accountable for the effects that their 
actions have on stakeholders), even though these effects are not fully predictable. As such, the 
integrity of end goals must be evaluated both in terms of how these goals are established, and the 
intended and unintended consequences of actions taken towards these goals.  
 
Again, we see the importance of openness and tolerance in this process: if leaders are not willing to 
engage in dialogue and account for the emergent themes that arise from the complexity that defines 
organisational relations, or if leaders are only willing to attend to ‘those aspects that “fit” some 
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preconceived picture’ (Lissack & Letiche, 2002: 91), then leadership strategies are doomed to fail. 
This means that leaders are unlikely to achieve the goals ascribed to effective, responsible 
leadership in the King III Report. However, if leaders ‘can guide those narratives, or even attend to 
them, purposive intervention regarding the selection among adjacent possibilities has a much better 
chance of achieving fruitation’ (91).  Here again we see the importance of taking cognisance of 
qualitative differences and of deconstructing conceptual paradigms, in order to ensure that 
organisational hierarchies do not becomes naturalised, fixed, unresponsive, and brittle (see chap. 4, 
secs 2.1. & 2.2.).  
 
3.3. Pedagogical implications 
 
Effective, responsible leaders are able to attend to the particularity and singularity of the situation. 
In other words, it is imperative that leaders (and organisational members) take cognisance of 
differences and of emerging organisational themes. Given this insight, it is, therefore, disconcerting 
that the universal and communitarian visions that underwrite many interpretations of the standard 
normative tale support homogeneous views of ethics. Our teaching strategies should reflect 
differences of opinion, and encourage tolerance; since, as Morin (1999: 44) argues, ‘the worst 
illusions are found within intolerant, dogmatic, doctrinaire certainties’.  
 
Decontextualised ethical and leadership theories further perpetuate the myth that ethical behaviour 
and ethical leadership is mostly about individual integrity (Trevino & Brown, 2004: 75). Lissack 
and Letiche (2002: 88) specifically argue against equating effective, responsible leadership with 
leadership integrity107, stating that whereas ‘[t]raditional organization science is about integrity… 
there needs to be a new focus on coherence’. They further offer the following comparative analysis 
between coherence and integrity (87-88): 
 
Coherence is not integrity. While integrity (seemingly) describes the (possible) 
characteristics of a closed system, coherence is typical of an open system. Integrity implies 
stability; coherence implies resilience. Coherence welcomes resonance. Integrity is 
threatened by it. Integrity stares down emergence, coherence embraces it. Integrity is an 
application. Coherence is a transient state. Integrity invites judgment and measurement. 
Coherence can be spoiled by the very act of judging or measuring it.  
 
                                                    
107
 Lissack and Letiche understand integrity in a more traditional sense, and, therefore, not in the way in 
which it is employed in this analysis to refer to ‘institutions of integrity’ and the ‘integrity of institutions’.   
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It is argued that coherence is a function of tolerance and openness, in that tolerance allows us to 
deal with conflict and dissensus, without losing our mutual sense of purpose.  In order to promote 
tolerance through our teaching practices, it is necessary to draw attention to, what Morin (1999: 49) 
terms, ‘intersubjective understanding’. Morin (50) writes that there are many obstacles to 
intersubjective understanding, including ‘egocentrism, ethnocentrism, [and] sociocentrism’ – all of 
which constitute ‘different levels of a common propensity to place oneself at the centre of the world 
and consider everything that is distant or foreign as secondary, insignificant or hostile’. Those who 
subscribe to the Cartesian dogma (in which the subject-object dichotomy prevails, and on which the 
entity perspective of leadership is based) are vulnerable to succumbing to these obstacles. If, 
however, we teach the importance of coherence and dialogue (and treat these as important elements 
when dealing with business ethics themes, such as leadership), as well as encourage students to 
develop the skills needed to imaginatively engage in situations, then the chances of fostering an 
intersubjective understanding amongst student is greatly enhanced. This is because such an 
understanding ‘demands an open heart, sympathy, [and] generosity’ (50). It also demands tolerance 
and imagination – all of which fosters moral development. In this regard, moral development should 
be understood in Rorty’s (1999: 89) terms as ‘re-making human selves to enlarge the variety of 
relationships which constitute those selves’.  
 
In order to promote tolerance, business ethicists should teach not only the importance of 
intersubjective understanding, but also of self-critique. This is because, in drawing attention to 
human fallibility, ‘[c]ritical self-examination helps us decenter ourselves enough to recognize and 
judge our own egocentrism. Then we don’t set ourselves up as judges of all things’ (Morin, 1999: 
53).  In other words, it is through critical self-examination that we come to understand our own 
weaknesses and failing and, thereby, develop tolerance for other people’s weaknesses and failures 
(53).  
 
Therefore, in order to promote tolerance, business ethicists would do well to take note of the 
following pointers when developing teaching strategies. 
 
 Morin (1999: 3; 55) writes that ‘[g]iven the importance of understanding, on all educational 
levels at all ages, the development of this quality requires a reform of modalities. This 
should be the task of education for the future.’ With regard to this reform of modalities, 
learning should be focused on discussing and refuting, as opposed to damning and 
excommunicating (52). In this regard, the art of debate and dialogue should be developed 
and practiced in the classroom. Further, it should be stressed that understanding ‘neither 
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excuses nor accuses’ (52). The difference between constructive criticism and blanket 
condemnation should be made clear. Emphasis should also be placed on sources and causes 
of misunderstanding. Students should also be taught the skills necessary to understand 
across different thought structures, ‘which requires the ability to pass through a meta-
thought structure that can understand the causes of incomprehension from one to another, 
and overcome it’ (55).  
 Morin (52; italicised in original) writes that ‘[i]f we learn to understand before condemning, 
we will be on the way to humanizing human relations.’ One way in which to develop the 
ability to understand before condemning is to encourage students to introspect, through (for 
example) focusing on cases of misconduct, cowardice, peer pressure etc. to which they can 
relate, and on which they are asked to explicitly reflect. Another way in which to promote 
sympathy and tolerance is to encourage students to seriously engage with the arts (especially 
film and literature). This is because, as argued in footnote 93, the arts foster awareness of 
human complexity (which is necessary for understanding others), and draw attention to the 
full range of human subjectivity (which is necessary for developing compassion and 
sympathy) (53). 
 
Note that with regard to the first of these pointers (i.e. developing understanding), deconstruction 
can serve as a valuable tool. Although a full philosophical course on Derrida and deconstruction 
will – in most cases – be inappropriate for business students (who do not have a philosophical 
background), the insights provided by a deconstructive ethics can, nevertheless, be conveyed 
through creative teaching techniques. When developing such techniques, careful consideration 
should be taken of various elements of deconstruction. Important in this regard is, firstly, the 
function of the double-movement, which, on the one hand, implies interpreting or commenting on 
our conceptual schemas; and, on the other hand, intervening in these schemas (Derrida, 1978a; 
1988d); secondly, the goals of the double movement, namely that it represents an attempt to 
undermine the stability of our systems of meaning, and thereby shift the limits of our understanding; 
that it seeks to challenge that which ‘is still too homogenous, insufficiently refined or differentiated, 
or else egalitarian’ (Derrida, 2002a: 20); and, that it draws attention to the limitations and 
provisional status of our models, thereby dispelling the myth of logocentrism; thirdly, the impetus 
of deconstruction, i.e. that it is guided by ethical testimony and the desire to do justice; and, lastly, 
the logic of deconstruction, i.e. that it functions as a recursive modality, and, therefore, cannot be 
reduced to a dogmatically-applied procedure.   
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Taking cognisance of these insights whilst teaching business ethics will do much to promote 
intersubjective understanding, and also provide students with some of the skills necessary to 
undertake meaningful action amidst the complexities that characterise our immanent, 
interdependent, and contingent realities. However, it is not only in the organisational context that 
skills for dealing with complexity have become critical. On a global scale we now face several 
crises that threaten the future of our planet, that are defined by innumerable complexities, and that 
require urgent intervention (see chap. 5, sec. 9). In this regard, sustainability and sustainable 
development have become key themes on the global agenda. In the next section, the implications 
that a complex view of sustainable development hold for business ethics will be explored. 
 
4. Case three: Ethical strategy development: implications for understanding sustainable 
development and teaching business ethics  
 
In the King III Report (intro., para. 8.2.), it is stated that: 
 
Sustainability is the primary moral and economic imperative of the 21st century. It is one of 
the most important sources of both opportunities and risks for business. Nature, society, and 
business are interconnected in complex ways that should be understood by decision-makers. 
Most importantly, current incremental changes towards sustainability are not sufficient – we 
need a fundamental shift in the way companies and directors act and organise themselves.  
 
It is particularly with reference to the ‘fundamental shift’ that should occur in organisational 
thinking that this analysis commences. In order to determine what such a fundamental shift might 
entail, it is useful to firstly reflect upon the traditional understanding of, and approaches to 
sustainability and sustainable development.  
 
4.1. Defining sustainability  
 
At a very basic level, sustainability is concerned with systems maintenance, which means that our 
actions should not impact on a system in ways that threaten its long-term viability. In other words, 
sustainability shows a concern for intergenerational equity, in that present actions should not 
hamper the ability of future generations to satisfy their needs (Crane & Matten, 2004: 22). Although 
the term has its roots in environmental management and analysis, the sustainability concept has 
been extended to include social and economic aspects. The reason for this is that it is impossible to 
consider environmental sustainability ‘without also considering the relevant communities and their 
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activities’ (22). Another reason for the extension of the term is that, if sustainability implies a 
concern for the equity of future generations, then, logically, it should also imply a concern for 
current generations (22-23). In taking the above into consideration, Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten 
(24) offer the following definition of sustainability: ‘Sustainability refers to the long-term 
maintenance of systems according to environmental, economic and social considerations.’  
 
Environmental sustainability concerns ‘the effective management of physical resources so that they 
are conserved for the future’ (24). Biosystems and natural resources are finite, and are negatively 
impacted upon by a number of human activities, including industrialisation, the continued use of 
non-renewable resources, and the use of damaging environmental pollutants (24). Not only do these 
activities threaten the sustainability of biosystems, but also pose a threat for economic 
sustainability.  
 
Economic sustainability ‘initially emerged from economic growth models that assessed the limits 
imposed by the carrying capacity of the earth’ (25). This led to a focus on the impact that our 
activities have on future generations, and an attempt to mitigate this impact. In terms of business 
ethics, economic sustainability can be narrowly interpreted as a concern for the long-term economic 
performance of a company, or more broadly interpreted as a ‘company’s attitude towards and 
impact upon the economic framework in which it is embedded’ (25). The concept of triple bottom 
line reporting (TBL) (Elkington, 1999) has also enjoyed a lot of attention in business ethics. TBL 
promotes the idea that business should not only add economic value, but also social and 
environmental value (Crane & Matten, 2004: 24).  
 
The youngest, but arguably most influential, sustainability development is social sustainability. The 
debate on social sustainability – which gained prominence in the 1990s – ‘marked a significant shift 
in the way that notions of sustainability were conceptualized’ (25). The key issue is this debate is 
social justice, specifically the implications for justice resulting from income disparities, the gap 
between richer and poorer countries, and the under-provision and deterioration of basic services in 
many countries across the world (25-26). Business is increasingly involved in this debate; and, as 
such, Elkington (interpreted in Crane & Matten, 2004:26) argues that TBL ‘is less about 
establishing accounting techniques and performance metrics... and more about the way that 
companies think about and act in business.’  
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4.2. The dominant model of sustainable development 
 
Although sustainability can be interpreted in many different ways, the concept is most commonly 
employed in relation to sustainable development, which is defined as ‘development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’ (Brundtland Report, World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).  
 
The three tiers of sustainable development (namely, ecological, economic, and socio-political 
development) are often thought of, and graphically portrayed, in terms of a Venn diagram (in which 
the three tiers are represented as three overlapping spheres), or in terms of three pillars standing on 
the base of technology and governance (Hattingh, 2006: 201; 202). Such representations draw 
attention to the fact that the three separate tiers of sustainable development are, in fact, 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and must, therefore, be ‘integrated’ with one another 
(203). This view of sustainable development corresponds closely with Elkington’s (1999) idea of 
the TBL.  
 
Despite drawing attention to the interdependence, mutual reinforcement, and interaction between 
these tiers, Johan Hattingh (2006: 203) argues that such representations serve to reinforce (rather 
than undermine) the notion that the three tiers of sustainable development are external to one 
another and function according to their own rules (see Zadek, 2003).  Given this interpretation, the 
main goal of sustainable development is to find the right balance or optimal trade-off between these 
three tiers. However, since there is no a priori viewpoint on which one can draw, determining the 
correct balance often ends up being ‘a function of the set of values that is given priority by policy- 
and decision-makers’ (Hattingh, 2006: 205). Given the fact that we live in an anthropocentric 
society, the set of values that is usually accorded priority ‘is that of social justice and human 
development’ (205). This is also reinforced in the Brundtland Report (in Hattingh, 2006: 200), in 
which the needs of the poor are defined as central to the notion of sustainable development.  
 
In the Brundtland Report (in Hattingh, 2006: 200) the ‘state of technology and the social 
organization in society’ is seen as the only constraint on sustainable development. This view is 
characteristic of the default position on sustainable development, which is defined by managerial 
optimism. Hattingh (2006: 206) defines managerial optimism as the belief that ‘we possess the 
knowledge and technical know-how to manage all environmental risks, provided... that the benefits 
of mitigation outweigh the costs involved.’ Taken to its logical conclusion, this means that nothing 
in nature should – in principle – be left intact if we humans can benefit from it, and mitigate our 
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impact on it (206). This conclusion reinforces the assumptions that resources are infinitely 
interchangeable (i.e. all aspects of nature can, in principle, ‘be ‘traded in’ for some kind of human 
benefit’ (207)), and that environmental protection is only warranted if it leads to social development 
(i.e. the environment is a means to human ends) (207-208).   
 
Hattingh (203-209) is very critical of the assumptions upon which the dominant model of 
sustainable development is based. Specifically, he argues that, if the three tiers of sustainable 
development are essentially seen as external to one another, then environmental protection runs the 
very real risk of being construed as an ‘add on’ or ‘a nice to have’. The problem is that we simply 
do not know how nature functions, or how our actions impact on it. Unfettered managerial 
optimism can, therefore, potentially lead to detrimental outcomes. Furthermore, if we do not know 
precisely how nature functions, then we cannot simply assume that resources are infinitely 
interchangeable. Trade-offs often entail irreversible processes, the effects of which are exacerbated 
by the fact that we do not have an unlimited supply of natural capital to begin with. Lastly, the 
instrumental rationality upon which the dominant conception of sustainable development is based, 
assumes that only humans have intrinsic value, meaning that sustainable development operates only 
in the service of mankind. These implications lead Hattingh (204; my italics) to conclude that, 
instead of working with a view of sustainable development in which the environment is always 
accorded third place, 
 
a far more accurate but also far more complex portrayal of sustainable development would 
be one in which these three spheres were conceptualised as embedded within one another, 
with values that are internally linked to one another and a logic that inseparably intertwines 
them.   
 
4.3. Towards a complex model of sustainable development 
 
Hattingh (211) argues that conceptualising sustainable development in terms of embedded spheres 
locks us in the language of impact prevention rather than mere mitigation (as is the case in the 
traditional models of sustainable development). Furthermore, he argues that this alternative 
portrayal of sustainable development necessitates a complex language, since – given this portrayal – 
we are forced to concede to the fact that we have incomplete knowledge regarding the impact of our 
actions.  This raises a number of difficult questions, including:  
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How does one evaluate a sustainable practice?  What are the time-scales involved? Are there 
measures for sustainability and if so, to whose benefit are they applied? Will what seems to 
be a sustainable strategy now actually prove to be so in the future?  (Cilliers, 2008: 40).  
 
Although none of these questions have certain answers (see chap. 5, sec. 9), Cilliers (40) argues that 
a first important step to assuming our responsibilities is to recognise the impossibility of cleanly 
separately the ‘human and the scientific, or the social and the biological’. The goal should be ‘to 
think on both fronts simultaneously’ (40). Morin (1999: 8) concurs with this point arguing that, 
instead of supporting paradigms that either prescribe disjuncture between man and nature (thereby 
excluding man from the idea of nature), or that reduce man to nature (in which case man is merely 
thought of in terms of his human nature), it is important to consider both ‘implication and 
separation in the relation between man and nature’ (see chap. 3, sec. 4.3.). Morin (8) further argues 
that ‘[o]nly a complex paradigm of implication/distinction/conjunction would allow such a 
conception.’  
 
The difficulties inherent to thinking about sustainability are compounded by globalisation, which 
necessitates that our actions be evaluated on a planetary scale. The complexity generated by 
countless bits of information about the world, means that ‘the more we are grasped by the world the 
more difficult it is for us to grasp it’ (31). It is precisely this complexity that makes us long for the 
possibility of isolating a vital problem that would help us in resolving all our other problems (31). 
Unfortunately, no one vital problem exists, because, as Morin (31) explains, ‘[t]he planetary 
problem is a whole fed by multiple, conflictual, crisical [crisique] ingredients; it encompasses, 
surpasses, and feeds them in return.’ Here again we see the importance of moral imagination. Only 
in striving to embody the ideal of fullness, will we become cognisant of the complexities which 
define our realities. We cannot fully understand these complexities, but we can try to imagine what 
they might entail; and, through this process, try to develop strategies and interventions that may 
help us in addressing the problems that arise from these complexities (see chap. 6, sec. 4.4.).  
Imagination is thus critical to reforming thought in such a way as to allow us to conceive of the 
world in terms of ‘its globality, the whole-part relation, the multidimensionality, the complexity’ 
(31).  
 
Acknowledging the complexities of the world also necessitates that we assume a critical attitude, 
that we continually reflect on our positions and strategies, and that we confront the uncertainties of 
our actions. In chapter six (sec. 4.3.), strategy was defined as ‘the art of working with uncertainty’ 
and strategy of action as ‘the art of acting in uncertainty’ (Morin, 2008: 96). Although concepts 
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such as ‘strategy’ and ‘bricolage’ focus attention on the inherent normativity of our models and the 
wager involved in the moment of the decision, such concepts also represent a way in which to 
lessen the complexity through taking action (even though every concrete decision and strategy is 
inherently characterised by risk and hazard). Strategy is the opposite of clear-cut plans or 
programmes. However, conceding to the complexity and uncertainty that define the heart of 
strategy is not paralysing, but rather opens up the possibility to a better future – both for us, and for 
future generations.   
 
Indeed, one could argue that not facing up to the uncertainty of action represents an unethical and 
reckless attitude. In chapter five (sec. 6.3.), Derrida (1999: 68) was cited as stating that ‘if we 
assume that Hamlet is a figure of paralysis or neurosis because of undecidability, he might also be a 
paradigm for action: he understands what actions should be and he undergoes the process of 
undecidability at the beginning.’ Reacting to the sustainability crisis with optimism or technocratic 
thinking disregards the fact that we are currently facing a number of undecidable questions (von 
Foerster, 1990) with uncertain outcomes. Such techno-optimists tend to avert their eyes when faced 
with the unnameable prospects that our actions hold for the future, and refuse to acknowledge that 
the product of our deliberations is both a baby and a monster, or the unknown for which we have 
not accounted in our deliberations (Derrida, 1978a: 293; see chap. 4, sec. 4.1.). 
 
Only once we concede to the uncertainties and the complexities involved in strategy development, 
will we be able to assume a position and take action, whilst always remaining aware of the fact that 
our best efforts might ‘fly back at our heads like a boomerang’ (Morin, 2008: 55). Being critical of 
our interventions at all times will allow us to undertake corrective actions and modify our strategies 
as we go along, in an attempt to light the way forward (see chap. 6, secs 4.1. & 4.2.2.).  In this 
regard, we must practice the infinite vigilance required of responsible deliberation, whilst 
simultaneously engaging in the urgency of the situation. This is because we cannot postpone action 
– as Derrida (2002a: 25) says: we must ‘do something, even if it’s imperfect’ (see chap. 5, sec. 
7.2.).  
 
4.4. Pedagogical implications 
 
In terms of business ethics education, the above analysis implies that we should forsake teaching 
strategies that are centred on applying categorically-binding formulae or instrumental 
proceduralism. Such strategies merely reinforce the mistaken notion that we can ‘calculate’ our way 
out of the problems with which we are confronted today.  Rather, it should be stressed that, 
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although calculations and programmes are important – indeed Morin (1999: 47) argues that ‘[w]e 
can use short program sequences within our strategies’ – they cannot replace independent ethical 
thought, decision-making, and critical reflection. This is because these skills are vital in developing 
robust strategies with which we can tackle the problems that we are currently facing.  
 
Part of successful strategy development (particularly in the context of sustainability) requires that 
we rethink our understanding of development. All-too-often, development is conceived exclusively 
as techno-economic progress (which is usually not sustainable in the long-term). In order to work 
towards sustainable strategies, Morin (34) argues that we need ‘a more rich and complex notion of 
development which is not only material but also intellectual, emotional, moral…’ Playing in the 
park ‘with big business and grand politics’ (Cilliers, 2008: 54), or blinding endorsing a scientific 
rationality will not solve our ethical dilemmas. Instead, we need to acknowledge the complexities 
associated with sustainable development, as this will ‘help us to humanise science’ (54). Companies 
should be seen as essential to this process. As such, their responsibilities should not be articulated in 
semantics that calls for ‘sacrifices’ or the ‘taming of capitalism’ (as is often the case in the 
governance literature). Such language frames companies as opponents, rather than partners in 
working towards a sustainable future (Homann, 2007: 5). As Homann (7) states: ‘Corporations 
cannot be expected to make ‘sacrifices,’ but they can invest – in real or human capital, but also in 
the social order as a prerequisite of long-run benefit.’ 
 
Humanising science is extremely important because, as Morin (1999: 38) explains, we – as humans 
– ‘all share a common genetic, cerebral, emotional identity’ which transcends ‘our individual, 
cultural and social diversities.’ We also now face the same life and death problems in that we are all 
‘connected in the same planetary community, sharing a common fate’108 (38). This means that, 
when thinking on sustainable development, we must take cognisance of the fact that ‘all truly 
human development means joint development of individual autonomies, community participations, 
and a sense of belonging to the human species’ (25). This requires a fundamental mind-shift in 
terms of how business is done, as well as the purpose of business. Homann (2007: 5) argues that 
corporate governance will only be successful if companies bear the responsibility for governance 
collectively. Currently, there is still little coordination between companies; and, according to 
Homann (5), a key reason for this is that corporations are not ‘used to cooperating with other 
corporations in the area of global politics – in mutual interests – while remaining rivals in markets.’ 
Therefore, it is only in focusing on joint development and our common human future that it 
                                                    
108
 Note that, in speaking of our commonalities, Morin (1999) is arguing on the material level, as opposed to 
on the ideological level (which is appealed to by De George (2008) in his analysis of morality).  
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becomes possible to change the mindset of companies, who still see themselves as operating in 
isolation to one another, and in isolation to the human community. One way in which to promote 
the focus on joint development is to draw attention to the embedded and inter-related nature of our 
identities and realities.  
 
As stated earlier, the King III Report (intro., para. 8.2.) calls for ‘a fundamental shift in the way 
companies and directors act and organise themselves’. As business ethicists, it is part of our 
responsibility to promote thinking that will facilitate such a fundamental shift. However, it is also 
part of our responsibility to equip students with the conceptual tools needs to deal with change. 
Morin (1999: 42) writes that ‘[a]ll development is the fruit of successful deviation that flourishes, 
and changes the system within which it arose; it disorganizes the system in reorganizing it.’ 
Development, therefore, implies change and uncertainty. One of the major problems with the 
dominant notion of sustainable development (described earlier in the analysis), is the fact that it is 
based on the illusion that we can predict the course of human events. However, as soon as the myth 
of Progress collapses, it brings with it an awareness of historic uncertainty (41). Although some 
progress is, of course, possible, it always remains uncertain; and, this ‘is compounded by 
uncertainties related to the speed and acceleration in our planetary era of complex random process 
that no human mind or supercomputer or Laplace demon could encompass’ (41). As business 
ethicists, we should take cognisance of this reality and stop propagating acontextual, universal 
theories, and rather favour teaching strategies that are sensitive to the contingencies and 
complexities with which we are faced. In this regard, it is again useful to consider the function, 
goals, motivation, and logic of a deconstructive ethics, summarised in section 3.3. This is because 
the insights derived from a deconstructive ethics can help us to remain vigilant of the strategies that 
we employ, and to modify and transform these strategies when necessary.  
 
Given the above analysis, one can conclude that successful, ethical, and sustainable strategy 
development is contingent on the following three dimensions, which must be incorporated in 
education for the future: 
 
 An awareness of the fact that ‘the human genre is now situated on a planetary scale’ and that 
‘recognition of our earth citizenship [is] indispensible for all of us’ (Morin, 1999: 2). This 
point is particularly poignant, given the fact that planetary developments will continue to 
accelerate during the 21st century (2). 
 A focus on the complex configuration of the planetary crisis, so as to ‘show how all human 
beings now face the same life and death problems and share the same fate’ (2). 
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 Learning that helps us to acknowledge and confront the uncertainties of knowledge, 
particularly since we ‘live in a changing epoch where… everything is interconnected’ (44-
45).  
 
It is this last case on sustainable development that most forcefully draws attention to the importance 
of developing strategies for dealing with the complexities of our world. Understanding the paradigm 
of critical complexity is essential in developing new ways for thinking about our problems. 
However, supplementing this paradigm with more specific tools (such as deconstruction) is also 
vital in developing the skills necessary to critique, intervene, and develop robust strategies. In a 
nutshell, education for the future (including the future of business ethics) must promote an 
understanding of our complex realities, and equip students with the skills necessary to deal with 
these complexities.    
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In reflecting on what it means to teach business ethics, one has to concede that, in one respect, 
business ethicists are doomed to teach a general morality. This is due to the fact that ethics becomes 
institutionalised through teaching and professional practices. However, this is not a worthless 
exercise: it is important to remember that ethics needs morality in the same way that justice needs 
the law; and, that ethics should guide morality (just as justice should guide the law). In other words, 
history is important as it provides us with moral precedents and programmes. The critical task for 
business ethicists in this regard is to make choices with regard to what precedents are taught.  
 
Throughout this study, it has been argued that business ethicists should reject acontextual, universal 
moral theories, in favour of theories that focus on the complexities of human nature, and that draw 
attention to the fact that learning is itself vulnerable to error and illusion (Morin, 1999: 5). As such, 
the type of theories that we teach should emphasise the importance of, what Morin (7) terms, the 
‘principle of rational uncertainty’ i.e. ‘that if rationality does not maintain vigilance it can turn into 
rationalizing illusion.’ Our theories should, therefore, serve to draw attention to the nature of 
rationality, which ‘is not only theoretical, not only critical, but also self-critical’ (8). Inherent to this 
view of rationality is the insight that ethical action cannot be reduced to moral law. Engaging with 
complexity does not lead to the rejection of ‘clarity, order or determinism’, but to the knowledge 
that ‘we cannot program discovery, knowledge, or action’ (Morin, 2008: 56). Therefore, in another 
respect, if business ethicists take cognisance of a complex notion of ethics, they can move far 
beyond teaching a general morality. This can be achieved by developing teaching strategies that 
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sensitise students to the complexities of our world, and equip them with the skills necessary to deal 
with these complexities.  
 
For too long, business ethicists have been bathing complacently in the light of clarity and order 
provided by the history of moral thought. This fact constitutes a very prominent reason for why 
business ethics has had such a limited impact on the business world: business ethicists have mainly 
looked backwards, not forwards. Morin (2008: 98) argues that: 
 
We stand on the threshold of a new beginning. We are not in the last stages of the history of 
thinking, nor have we reached the limits of the human spirit. We are, rather, still in its 
prehistory… We are in an initial period where it is necessary to recalibrate our perspectives 
on knowledge and politics… And here… we must learn to work with chance and 
uncertainty.   
 
In this chapter, the complex perspective on ethical knowledge developed in this study was 
elucidated in terms of the challenges that such a perspective holds for our traditional understanding 
of the notions of corporate social responsibility, leadership, and sustainability; as well as in terms of 
the implications that it holds for teaching business ethics.  Although the analysis was presented as 
three separate cases, all three cases dealt with the uncertainties that arise from our limited 
knowledge of the complex phenomena that characterise our realities. A central message from these 
cases is that we must abandon programmes and solutions that have worked in the past, and develop 
new strategies for the future.   
 
In the introduction to this chapter, the question of whether business ethics can be a viable enterprise 
was raised. At this stage, it should be clear that the important question is not whether business 
ethics is viable, but rather how we – as business ethicists – can ensure its viability. This is the ever-
renewed challenge with which we are faced.  
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 Conclusion 
 
1. Summary of the argument 
 
The study commenced with a description and critical evaluation of the theories that constitute the 
standard normative tale commonly taught in business ethics. The universal or communitarian 
notions of the good that underlie this tale were challenged at the hand of an affirmative view of 
postmodernism. Specifically, the implications that arise from a robust engagement with the realities 
of our age (including the crisis of representation, the provisionality of meaning, reflexivity, and the 
decentering of the subject) were addressed.  
 
Although postmodernism served as a useful starting point for challenging the standard normative 
tale, the study moved beyond postmodernism, in exploring the insights gleaned from critical 
complexity theory (and its roots) and deconstruction. The ethical challenges that these theories hold 
for understanding business ethics were explicated through means of a close reading of a critical text 
on the relevance of Derrida for understanding the nature of corporate social responsibility. The 
outcome of this analysis was to draw attention to why it is necessary to rethink the normative basis 
of business ethics.  
 
After having presented and evaluated the merits of various theories, the insights gleaned in the 
analysis were used to elaborate on the characteristics of a complex ethics. This was done in an 
attempt to provide some substantive suggestions as to how one is to conceptualise of a complex 
ethics. Lastly, the challenge that a complex ethics poses to understanding and teaching prominent 
business ethics themes was illustrated, so as to show the potential that a complex set of ideas holds 
for the field of business ethics.   
 
Key ideas and insights 
 
In the introduction to this study it was stated that this work is dedicated to critically exploring the 
ideas behind various theories, in order to discover the potential that they hold for ethics generally, 
and business ethics specifically. An underlying and central concern that informed this analysis 
throughout was whether the process of engaging with ideas reflected integrity. In order to show 
integrity in one’s engagement with ideas, one must be aware of the power of ideas. Morin (1999: 
10) explains that ‘beliefs and ideas are not only products of the mind, they are also states of mind 
that have life and power. That is why they can possess us.’ Furthermore, as cited in the introduction, 
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Keynes (1953) argues that ideas are dangerous for good and evil. As such, we cannot make good 
use of ideas, unless we are willing to engage in dialogue with our ideas (which allows us to ‘control 
them as much as they control us, and submit then to tests of truth and error’ (Morin, 1999: 10)). In 
order to ensure the integrity of our theoretical positions, we need to acknowledge the paradoxical 
status of our ideas, which amounts to the fact that we can only perceive the shortcomings of ideas 
through entering into conversation with ideas (11). 
 
In this study, the shortcomings of the theories that comprise the normative basis of business ethics 
were, in part, elucidated by drawing on ideas from affirmative postmodernism, complexity theory, 
and deconstruction. The central difference between the standard normative tale and these latter 
ideas can be summarised as follows: on the one hand, the standard normative tale is largely 
prescriptive and aimed at determining the heart of morality (either by providing substantive claims 
as concerns the nature of the good, or through determining the procedural steps that will lead to the 
‘right’ answer). On the other hand, affirmative postmodernism in general, and complexity theory 
and deconstruction in particular, are premised on positions that are sensitive to both the complex 
contingencies that impact on our idea of the good, and the peripheral veins that feed and sustain the 
beating heart of The Good. In showing that the concept of The Good is neither self-sustaining nor a 
natural given, theories such as deconstruction offer a challenge to universal or communitarian views 
of morality, which – when put into practice – turn our moral responsibilities into duties and rules. It 
was further shown that what is put forward as the greatest strength of the standard normative tale 
i.e. that ethical rules and principles can provide unambiguous solutions to moral problems, is in 
actual fact the greatest weakness. This is because, in an applied (business ethics) context these tools 
and instruments may limit and undermine the capacity or inclination of moral agents to appreciate 
and wrestle with ethical problems. 
 
A central insight of this analysis is that ethical problems are not limited to considerations of first-
order normative principles. The analysis of affirmative postmodernism showed that the rigid 
distinction between the normative and descriptive categories – or between what ought to be the case 
and what is the case – that defines the field(s) of business ethics is untenable. This is because, 
following the insights gleaned from postmodernism, our normative categories cannot be viewed in 
abstract terms but must be considered within specific practices and language games; and, 
conversely, our specific descriptions of our world and our practices do not correspond with an a 
priori view of reality, but involve certain choices and normative judgements. The imbrication of the 
normative and the descriptive categories poses a huge challenge to our understanding of ethics, 
since we can no longer appeal either to a transcendental ideal realm, or to an objective reality (as is 
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done in the functionalist paradigm) when justifying our ethical positions. In other words, the 
imbrication of ethics with the world introduces complexity.  
 
In this regard, the analysis of the paradigm of complexity presented in the study offers important 
insights for dealing with this postmodern re-description of ethics. From a complexity perspective, 
our identities are viewed as emergent and relationally-constituted constructs, rather than natural pre-
given phenomena. The question of what it means to be human cannot, therefore, be divorced from 
an understanding of our immanent and embedded positions in the world. Complexity theory further 
helps us to understand ourselves as component parts in the system, and for envisioning the potential 
consequences that our actions hold for other components in the system, and for the system as such.  
 
With regard to ethics, complexity theory provides the backdrop against which we can think through 
both the status of our ethical models, and the consequences of our actions. In terms of their status, 
our ethical models are the products of our choices and decisions, and are, therefore, necessarily 
limited, exclusionary, and characterised by some performative tension. In terms of consequences, 
complexity theory draws attention to the fact that it is impossible to fully predict the effects of our 
decisions (due to non-linearity); yet, because our decisions and actions have very real effects on 
ourselves and on others, we, nevertheless, remain responsible for them. Complexity theory, 
therefore, highlights the fact that we are always in trouble, and that we need to continually and 
critically reflect on our practices and strategies.  
 
What should be clear from the analysis of complexity theory is that, in its traditional understanding, 
ethics (as corresponding with some transcendental realm) remains inaccessible to us. In 
Wittgenstein’s terminology: the outside is the silence that delimits the world, and since ethics 
belongs to this outside, we cannot articulate ethics. On Wittgenstein’s, Luhmann’s, and von 
Foerster’s view, all knowledge (including ethical knowledge) is the outcome of reflexive processes. 
Ethics can no longer be determined in terms of right and wrong, good and bad, and what deserves 
respect and what does not, but can only be evaluated in terms of the pragmatically-determined 
standards of our practices and language games. A problem that, however, arises when we view 
complex systems as informationally-closed is that our language games and practices can bear 
solipsistic or relativist implications. In other words, if the ethical task is viewed only in terms of 
producing thicker descriptions of our practices and language games, we risk developing a relativist 
or incommensurable view of ethics. For this reason, we cannot completely forego the normative 
dimension. The question, however, is whether one can introduce the normative dimension without 
reinstating metaphysical assumptions. In this regard, Derrida’s deconstructive ethics offers a way 
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forward, in that he develops a philosophical position which attempts to find a breach in 
operationally-closed systems. In other words, Derrida’s philosophy addresses the methodological 
complexity of thinking together a system and its environment.  
 
Derrida is fully aware of the fact that we function as operationally-closed systems. In this regard, 
one need only consider his remarks regarding text and context: Derrida states that there is no 
outside (con)text (which is an ontological point) and that there is nothing outside of the (con)text 
(which is an epistemological point). Despite this, Derrida nevertheless, attempts to develop a strong 
challenge to our contextually-defined practices through deconstruction. Deconstruction implies a 
serious engagement in our practices in order to destabilise these practices. This is done through 
revealing the metaphysical idealisations that are smuggled into our conceptual schemas, and 
denaturalising these positions by drawing attention to the supplementary complications, and the 
play of différance that pervades all meaning. In so doing, Derrida opens the door to otherness, 
difference, and a conception of ethics that is not premised on the commonalities of our experiences.  
 
Furthermore, deconstruction operates in service of the singularity of the event, which Derrida 
defines as the moment of (im)possibility. Of this, he writes: ‘deconstruction [is]... put forward in the 
name of the real’ where the real is understood as a promise, or ‘as the coming or event of the other, 
where the other resists all reappropriation’ (Derrida, 2002b: 367). Deconstruction is, therefore, a 
means of trying to think through the complexity that precedes the reductive implications introduced 
by modelling. This is of course impossible since we cannot understand phenomena in terms of their 
full complexity. However, in positing the ideal of human fullness, Derrida, nevertheless, 
reintroduces a regulative ideal (expressed in limit or quasi-concepts such as the gift, justice, 
hospitality, etc.) against which we can judge the ethics of our practices, whilst still remaining firmly 
focused on the unique context in which the moment of the event materialises. Deconstruction is, 
therefore, a means by which to articulate the ethical interruption of ontological closure which saves 
us from ethical solipsism and enables us to practice an ethics that simultaneously focuses on the 
normative and the descriptive dimensions, by allowing for the manifestation of justice in the 
singularity of the event.  
 
Ethical testimony is the impetus of deconstruction, and in this regard one can argue that 
deconstruction is nothing other than a means of engaging with the inevitable normativity generated 
by complexity. Therefore, in a nutshell, understanding the paradigm of critical complexity is 
essential in developing new ways for thinking about our ethical problems. However, we must, as 
Allen (2000: 10) states, also ‘put in place the mechanisms that allow us always to question our 
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“knowledge” and continue exploring.’ In this regard, deconstruction is vital in helping us to develop 
the skills necessary to critique, intervene, and develop robust strategies. Furthermore, in addressing 
the ethical-political implications that arise due to the limitations of our knowledge, Derrida’s 
philosophy presents a way in which to pull the insights gleaned from complexity theory into the 
human domain. As such, it is argued that deconstruction provides us with a non-trivial productive 
reading of a complex notion of ethics.   
 
In summary, in contrast to the ideological positions espoused in the standard normative tale, this 
study draws attention to the idea that our choices and decisions should be viewed as strategies for 
living, rather than programmes or blueprints that correspond with some predetermined, ideal realm. 
Furthermore, it is only in recognising the nature and status of our strategies that we can develop the 
robustness and resilience needed to successfully deal with our complex environments – including 
our business environment. The above argument also reaffirms the point that complex positions 
cannot provide ‘The Answer’. In fact, when uncritically and dogmatically applied (as is often the 
case), the ideas of complexity theory and deconstruction can also become dangerous. A further 
condition for showing integrity when engaging with ideas, therefore, concerns the manner in which 
we put our ideas to work. Morin (1999: 11) writes that ‘[a]n idea or a theory should not be purely 
and simply instrumentalized, nor should it tyrannically impose its verdicts’. Rather, ‘it should assist 
and orientate the cognitive strategies adopted by human subjects.’ In this regard, this study 
hopefully demonstrates that – when honestly applied – complexity theory and deconstruction open 
us up to the multidimensionality of thought, and help us to navigate our way through this 
multidimensionality.  
 
2. Applied ethics: viewing ideas as tools  
 
It was further stated in the introduction that the goal of business ethics should be to provide students 
and practitioners with sense-making tools and tools of analysis that can aid in ethical decision-
making in the workplace. If we cannot keep the descriptive and normative categories apart, then the 
traditional understanding of ‘tool’ – as something which interfaces between the cognitive domain 
and objective reality – is subject to a deconstruction of sorts, in that the term is opened up to include 
not only analytical tools, but any strategy or knowledge that helps us to navigate our way through 
the complexities of our realities. In the business context, qualitative tools such as organisational 
narratives, workplace jokes and humour, budgets, memos, and newsletters can assist one in tapping 
into the complex network of tacit beliefs that inform corporate behaviour and identity (Painter-
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Morland, 2008: 244). These are, however, very specific tools. More generally (and as argued in this 
study), theoretical knowledge can also serve as a valuable tool.  
 
In this regard, it is worthwhile to take note of Lissack and Letiche’s (2002: 89) analysis of the 
similarities between physical tools and knowledge. Firstly, both tools and knowledge can only be 
understood through use, and using them modifies the user’s perspective on the world. Secondly, 
learning how to use tools and knowledge involves a great deal more than can be captured in explicit 
rules. And, thirdly, the occasions and conditions for use emerge from, and are framed within a 
specific context. What this analogy implies is that, in order for our knowledge and ideas to be 
useful, they need to be put to use – in other words, they need to be applied in ways that transform 
our thoughts and our practices.  
 
Many business ethicists feel that complex conceptions of ethics (which are critical, provisional, and 
transgressive in nature) won’t find footing in the ‘real world’, since such theories cannot provide 
ready solutions to the problems experienced by businessmen. However, using Lissack and Letiche’s 
analogy, one can argue that just as tools assist us in solving our problems, so too do ideas. Despite 
being crucial to the activity at hand, a paintbrush cannot give us a painting anymore than a violin 
can give us music. Rather, these tools are only of value if used by someone with the requisite skills, 
knowledge, and imagination. The same applies to our theories. It cannot be denied that complexity 
theory demands more from the user than do ethical theories that provide ‘moral recipes’ for 
attaining the good life. However, in this study it was shown that notions of ethics that are justified 
either in terms of transcendental ideals or the functionalist paradigm are often not practically very 
useful, since they are premised on moral free will and an objective, stable view of the world 
respectively. Neither of these premises holds, given the complexities of the world. Successfully 
engaging with moral problems requires skills such as critical self-reflection, moral imagination, a 
serious engagement with the arts, an ability to view the interdependent relations between parts and 
whole, an ability to understand subjects within their contexts, an ability to engage in dialogue and 
foster normative congruence, an ability to think through the challenges of globalisation etc. 
Furthermore, complexity implies an engagement with contingency, and for this reason a complex 
view of ethics can never prescribe to us how we should act as each situation calls for fresh 
judgement.  
 
Perhaps one of the biggest problems is that it is often assumed by business ethicists and 
practitioners alike, that being ethical should be easy: once people are motivated to make ethical 
choices, the ethicist’s work is complete as good consequences will necessarily follow. This analysis 
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has shown that this view, unfortunately, does not represent a realistic take on the nature of ethical 
actions. As Bauman (1993) says, conceding to the complexities is unlikely to make life any easier. 
The best we can hope for is that by putting these ideas to work, we may make life a little more 
moral.  
 
The above argument begs the question of whether deconstruction and critical complexity theory are 
the only tools that help us to successfully live up to our responsibilities (particularly since this 
analysis puts into question the usefulness of applying the standard normative tale). In staying with 
the analogy between tools and knowledge, one can argue that beautiful paintings (for example) need 
not be created with paintbrushes – sponges, or even fingers, can serve as adequate replacements. 
The same holds true in the case of our ideas: alternative ideas may prove just as useful for achieving 
our ends. Although, deconstruction and critical complexity theory were employed in order to 
introduce a complex understanding of ethics and business ethics, other critical and reflexive theories 
and ideas could have possibly led to many of the same insights that emerged from this study. 
Therefore, not only do deconstruction and complexity theory not provide us with ‘The Answer’, but 
they also cannot exclusively determine ‘The Way’.  
 
In order to be consistent with the position developed in this study, one has to concede to the 
possibility that other theories may be just as appropriate, or even more appropriate, in making an 
argument for a complex ethics. In this regard, one could claim that the choice of theories presented 
here is quite arbitrary. However, such an argument stems from a position akin to that of sceptical 
postmodernism. A better alternative is to follow a productive, affirmative, and more robust line of 
reasoning, and instead argue that – despite conceding to the applicability of utilising alternative 
theories – what is of greater importance is whether our chosen theories prove useful, and whether 
we employ these theories with integrity (i.e. that we show a willingness to engage with our ideas, 
and submit them to tests of truth and error). In thus regard, it is important to display an attitude of 
critical self-reflexivity at all times, in order to prevent our ideas from controlling us.   
 
We will only be able to successfully challenge our ideas if we understand these ideas, as well as the 
potential power that they hold for our practices. Therefore, to reiterate, a certain level of 
competence is needed on the part of the practitioner. To see why this is the case, one need only 
consider the damage done by the jargon-filled and confusing positions espoused by certain avowed 
‘deconstructionists’. This point can also be made by once more turning to the analogy between tools 
and knowledge: although the sounds of the violin (for example) can be beautiful, in the wrong 
hands the violin emits a terrible, screeching noise. Similarly, our theories and ideas need to be 
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appropriate to the relevant contexts in which they are employed. Just like an amateur musician is 
likely to create a more pleasant sound by strumming a few, simple guitar chords than by attempting 
a sophisticated piece on the violin; so too, one may achieve greater success with business ethics 
students without making explicit mention of deconstruction and critical complexity theory – 
particularly because many of these students do not have any formal training in philosophy.  
 
A fallacy which is often made by academics is that one can only speak of complex phenomena in a 
complex language. Although one must be mindful of the simplifying effects that can be created by 
language (see chap. 5, sec. 2.1.), it is possible to convey the insights that emerge from this analysis 
in other ways. As argued in the previous chapter (sec. 3.3.), taking cognisance of the function, 
goals, impetus and logic of deconstruction (for example) can help us to develop appropriate 
teaching strategies for equipping students with the skills necessary to deal with the challenges and 
the opportunities that present themselves in our rapidly-changing and complex world. Therefore, in 
certain contexts, we might have to modify our theoretical tools, in order to make them appropriate 
for a given audience. This is an enormous challenge for ethicists, as such modifications should 
present a translation of complexity ideas into an appropriate ‘language’ for students, whilst avoiding 
a dumbing down of these ideas (as this will reaffirm the illusion that it is easy to be ethical). 
Otherwise put: whilst our teaching strategies should be tailored to our circumstances, we should 
also be careful not to compromise on the integrity of the ideas with which we are working.  
 
3. Future challenges 
 
In this study, a number of ideas were explored in order to unlock the potential that they hold for our 
practices, specifically our business practices. Since there can be no radical distinction between ivory 
tower ethics and boardroom ethics, our ideas have the power to transform our practices, but our 
practices can modify and shape our ideas. What is of crucial importance in this regard is that we 
become competent and critical readers of texts and contexts, in order to make certain that our ideas 
reflect integrity. The significance of this task is further illustrated in the following statement by 
Morin (1999:38): ‘The worst dangers and the greatest hopes are borne by the same function: the 
human mind itself.’ 
 
Today, more than ever before, the business domain provides the forum in which human minds 
exercise their power. As such, it is imperative that business practitioners and leaders take 
cognisance of, and learn to successfully deal with, the complexities that characterise our age. This 
will only happen if we work towards realising the epistemological revolution of which Morin 
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speaks, and nurture the multidimensionality of thought needed to develop sustainable strategies. In 
this regard, the analysis presented in this study constitutes a meta-position that one can call upon in 
ethical decision-making and strategy development, since such a position shows us what type of 
considerations must be kept in mind when engaging in the particularities of complex situations.   
 
At stake is not only the viability of business ethics (as a subject which can potentially make a 
worthwhile contribution to the practice of business), but the viability of our collective future. As 
such, further research should be undertaken in order to develop the ideas presented in this study. In 
terms of business ethics, we need to determine the exact challenge that a complex notion of ethics 
poses for prominent business ethics themes besides those analysed in chapter seven. Furthermore, 
research should also be undertaken in order to unpack specific teaching strategies that would equip 
students with the sense-making tools and tools of analysis necessary to reflect on the moral 
dimension of business problems in their particular contexts. In terms of philosophy, we need to 
further develop our understanding of ethical complexity. As argued in the previous section, 
deconstruction is not the only critical, reflexive, and complex philosophical position. Therefore, one 
way in which to contribute to the debate is to explore other philosophical positions, as different 
positions may reveal different aspects of ethical complexity, all of which can help us to understand 
what it means to be human.  
 
The future is not certain and clinging to theories that pretend otherwise is extremely dangerous, as 
they provide us with a false sense of comfort. There is no relief from the enormous task that lies 
ahead of us: the only hope for the future is to concede to the complex nature of the multiple crises 
that we face today, and to act both vigilantly and urgently.  
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